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**Global Trends and Security Strategies,
Part 2**

**Chocolate Chip Ice Cream and Theater
Security Cooperation**

Language Training at West Point

Don't Forget About Latin America

The Concept of the Caliphate

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ASSOCIATION NEWS

Letter from the President

Dear Colleagues,

As I mentioned in my first letter as President, the Board of Governors have identified three objectives for the Association over the next year:

- Develop a stronger bond among FAOs in all Services (active, reserve, and retired).
- Promote FAO professional development and keep individual skills at the highest possible level, and
- Advocate more support and resources for the FAO program, both within the Department of Defense and from the Congress.

In support of the 1st two objectives, we will have a FAO Association luncheon at Ft. McNair Officers' Club on Wednesday, 15 March 2006 at 1200hrs. LTG James Williams, USA, Ret. will be our featured speaker. LTG Williams is a former Director of Defense Intelligence Agency, a former military attaché in Venezuela, and a strong proponent for the FAO program. You will also hear from the Service FAO Proponent Chiefs. We will also use the opportunity to discuss what other events our Association should sponsor over the next 12 months. Your time and effort in attending our 15 March event will be well rewarded.

As for the 3rd objective, I'm very pleased to tell you that FAOs, language, cultural skills and HUMINT were recently highlighted in the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) released by Secretary Rumsfeld on 6 February 2006. For example, this is a quote from page 78 of the QDR:

"Current and emerging challenges highlight the increasing importance of Foreign Area Officers, who provide Combatant Commanders with political-military analysis, critical language skills and cultural adeptness. The Military Departments will increase the number of commissioned and non-commissioned officers seconded to foreign military services, in part by expanding their Foreign Area Programs. This action will foster professional relationships with foreign militaries, develop in-depth regional expertise, and increase unity of effort among the United States, its allies and partners."

There is a lot more in the QDR that affects the human dimension in which FAOs work. Any doubts you might have had about how the senior leadership of DoD views FAOs will be dispelled after you read the 2006 QDR.

I look forward to meeting as many of you as possible at the 15 March luncheon and solicit your help and participation to make our Association both meaningful and fun.

Thanks.

Steve



GLOBAL Trends and Security Strategies

Part 2: Can the European Union Defend Itself?

Major R. Reed Anderson, USA

NOTE: This is Part II of a three-part series entitled “Global Trends and Security Strategies.” Part I of this series discussed current global security threats and how the U.S. and the EU security strategies each addressed these threats. Part II of this series discusses how and if the EU is capable of backing its security strategy with its defense forces, and specifically discusses how, and if, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) can accomplish this important task. Finally, Part III will focus on the role of the U.S. Armed Forces in contemporary Transatlantic security.

Introduction

The French and the British initiative at St. Malo in 1998 would, according to many, seem most unlikely. The British, and to a lesser extent the French¹, had for years rejected the possibility of integrating foreign policy, let alone defense, into the European Union (EU).² In fact, at the Inter-Governmental Council (IGC) of the EU in 1991, the French and British vehemently rejected such a proposal by Germany and the Benelux countries.³ Not only did it pose a threat to their national sovereignty, but it would also inevitably challenge the pride in their national military heritage and traditions.⁴ In contrast to the French and British, several other EU member states, for example Spain and Italy, have supported a greater role by the EU in defense and security. With the expansion of the EU in May 2004 to include several former Warsaw Pact countries, one might argue that there is an even greater need for defense integration in order to secure its member states that are not part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) against threats emerging from the eastern borders of the EU.

Despite the debates, and diverging from the impotence of past agreements, actions since the St. Malo declaration for EU defense integration have moved at a much more rapid pace. Yet there is still much work to be done, and doubt exists whether the EU can completely and efficiently meet objectives it has set forth in its European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). So what caused this committal change, and what are the prospects for a legitimate EU defense structure that is capable of meeting its objectives? In addition, what impact is the EU's momentum towards autonomous defense having on the traditional role of the United States in European defense over the last half century? This paper will argue that the reality of the European Security and

Defense Policy (ESDP) has evolved out of necessity over the past 15 years, influenced by a changing European and global security environment rather than initiative and a genuine desire for a more fully integrated Europe. Further, despite the positive progress subsequent to the St. Malo declaration, the EU still must deal with significant obstacles to full defense integration. Finally, despite every effort for autonomous self-defense, the EU cannot afford to alienate the United States as it continues to develop its defense structures; nor can the United States afford to ignore the EU's desire for security independence.

This paper will proceed by first outlining the evolution of EU security goals and associated actions preceding St. Malo. Next, the paper will focus on the St. Malo declaration and the subsequent agreements and actions that brought the EU to where it is today, and assess the major obstacles to complete development of its ESDP. The paper will then explore relationships between the EU and NATO as it pertains

to defense integration, and the role that the United States is playing in the EU's evolution and in future relations with the EU.

ESDP Evolution: Before St. Malo

To think that the ESDP is solely a function of the Franco-British St. Malo Declaration is naïve. Several aspects of European security both in terms of agreements and actions in Europe shaped the conditions under which the French and British have become the leaders in European defense integration and cooperation. To understand the evolution up to the St. Malo declaration, one must remember that the EU first began as a French initiative under the Schuman Plan for a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1950, ultimately culminating in the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1951.⁵ The intent behind this plan was based on national security issues for France, among other west European countries, and the push by the United States for full German reconstruction of its heavy industry.⁶ Thus, the ECSC acted as a check to German historic hegemonic tendencies by creating an economic interdependency.

This interdependency has evolved over the years and grown wider in participation and deeper in scope. In so doing, its focus was primarily on economic integration, focusing on European market forces in order to bring greater economic integration and prosperity to its member states and greater competition in the global market. At no time, at least until 1991, was common foreign and security policy or defense a part of the EU's agenda. However, institutions did indeed exist which met the needs of European security and defense. Uniquely within Europe were the European Political Cooperation (EPC) and the Western European Union (WEU). However, these two entities focused more on political and policy cooperation without much to back it up. In addition, they were trumped on the European scene by NATO, which had the military capabilities

to back up its policies and provide European security and defense.

Yet NATO was focused on a Soviet threat that dissipated after 1989, thus bringing the role and purpose of NATO into question. It was at this time that the EU first included a common foreign and security policy in its treaties. In the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, Article J.4 states that such a policy includes all issues tied to EU security and would eventually be framed under a common defense policy. It further states that this common defense policy **might** lead to a common defense. With NATO's role in questions and the EU without a common defense unique to Europe, the EU tied its defense to the Western European Union (WEU), citing it as, "... an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications."⁷ As noted in the introduction, the French and British had traditionally been antagonists to creating integrated security policies and defense structures (except perhaps France's attempt at creating the European Defense Community), arguing that such a responsibility rested solely on governments representing states; and that the legitimacy of the EU was too weak to provide such a capability.⁸ Yet perspectives began to change as the EU and the world were faced with the crisis in Yugoslavia.

As the United Nations (UN) moved into Yugoslavia under predominantly British and French resources, the two antagonists slowly began to realize the feasibility for integrated defense. Fueled by the United States' reluctance to get involved in the Bosnian War of 1992-1995 and its emphasis that Europe should take more responsibility for its own security issues, France and Britain began an active defense dialogue by the end of 1993.⁹ These sentiments were confirmed with the 1999 Kosovo War, along with a realization that despite their intentions, the EU did not have the capabilities to back up any form of

common foreign and security policy, let alone defense policy. While the St. Malo declaration preceded the Kosovo campaign by about six months, the two actions provided the impetus to push the EU towards a more committed and expeditious effort at integrating its foreign, security and defense policies.¹⁰

ESDP Evolution: After St. Malo

Following St. Malo, and the European embarrassment in its inability to respond militarily to the Kosovo crisis, movement toward a more integrated EU security and defense policy progressed more rapidly than ever before. To gain a better appreciation for the progress requires one to analyze the major events over the past seven years and where the EU currently stands in its progress and continued commitment to security and defense integration. These events fall into four major categories: infrastructure, force development, policy development, and mission execution.

The first significant steps taken following St. Malo occurred in June 1999 at the European Council Summit in Cologne, Germany. At this summit, the EU committed to acquisition of the, “. . . necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence [sic].”¹¹ Among the initiatives are: creation of a Political and Security Committee (COPS – the more commonly used French acronym) designed to manage developing crises and give political advice to the European Council; creation of a European Union Military Committee (EUMC) responsible for giving military advice and recommendations to the COPS and the European Council, as well as issuing directives to the European Union Military Staff; creation of the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) responsible for early warning, situation analysis and strategic planning for Petersberg tasks¹²; and the creation of a Situation Center responsible for collecting information for the EUMS.¹³ These commitments were further

elaborated during the European Council Helsinki, Finland Summit in December 1999 and agreed to at their summit in Nice, France a year later. The creation of these bodies is significant in that these institutions serve as the foundation on which the capabilities to execute a common foreign and security policy can be formed.

Perhaps the greatest task ahead for the EU is force development. A legitimate force is needed in order to backup its policies. However, the EU has the challenge of integrating a multinational force with varying degrees of capabilities and technology. In addition, procurement of equipment has primarily been a national endeavor, with funding approved by national parliaments. However, the EU is establishing a common agency under the auspices of the European Defense Agency, as outlined in the EU Constitution, responsible for the research, development, and acquisition of armaments.¹⁴ This is in line with positive trends in the past five years in the consolidation of private defense industries across Europe.¹⁵ These trends were actually initiated in a July 2000 Letter of Intent (LOI) signed by the EU's largest arms manufacturers that made up 90% of the EU's defense industry.¹⁶

Demonstrating their commitment to force development, the EU in its December 1999 Helsinki Summit established the Headline Goal whose objective was to enable the EU, by 2003, to deploy a force of up to 60,000 troops and sustain them for up to one year.¹⁷ Yet, the EU still faces significant challenges in developing this ability, as illustrated by the adjustment and recommitment to these goals as outlined by the Council's June 2004 *2010 Headline Goal*.¹⁸ Yet positive progress has been made in other areas of force development, most notably the EU Rapid Reaction Force.

Another area of notable progress is the development of a common foreign and security policy. Although Maastricht identifies the need for a common policy, it was not until 2003 that the

EU actually developed one in the form of the European Security Strategy. The impetus to accomplishing this task was, one could argue, a function of the nomination and subsequent appointment of a High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), under whose purview the EDSP falls.¹⁹ EU policy is further outlined in the EU Constitution, thus providing a perpetual foundation on which, if ratified by the member states, the EU can base further evolution of its ESDP.

With policy developed, infrastructure in place and continuing to develop, and force development proceeding, the EU has been able to execute several missions on a progressive scale demonstrating not only its commitment, but capabilities as well. The first significant exercise consisted of a crisis management exercise conducted in March of 2002. The significance behind this exercise is that it validated the first line in the EU's force structure, the Situation Center. It is the monitoring and analysis conducted here on which all subsequent actions will be based. Further progress was made in January 2003 when the EU deployed its Rapid Reaction Force to Bosnia, thus demonstrating its ability to deploy; although locally. Later that same year, the EU conducted two missions further demonstrating their progress. In March, the EU assumed NATO's Operation Allied Harmony in Macedonia; deploying some 350 personnel to provide security it what the EU termed Operation Concordia.²⁰ Later that year, in December, this mission was assumed by an EU police force, again demonstrating the EU's commitment to and capability of executing the Petersberg tasks. Then in June of that same year, the EU demonstrated its ability to deploy its forces over long distances when it deployed approximately 1,400 personnel to the Democratic Republic of Congo in Operation Artemis. This mission demonstrated that the EU has the capacity to respond quickly to a crisis situation, whether within or without its borders.²¹ While much work still has to be done, especially pertaining to lift capabilities for de-

ploying and sustaining a large force, the EU has demonstrated that it is making progress. Progress was further demonstrated when the EU assumed command and control of the Bosnia mission from NATO in December 2004.

Despite the progress that has been made, there are still some significant challenges ahead of the EU. Perhaps the most difficult challenge facing the EU and that could completely derail its attempts at further developing its ESDP involves the development of its force structure. The challenge ahead of the EU is to accomplish the force development task while defense budgets are declining. With an imminent increase in the social expenditure burden on the EU as its population ages and as the EU expands, the possibility that defense expenditures will continue to decline is high. With decreasing defense budgets across the EU, it has a significant uphill climb.

To effectively pursue its goals for ESDP, the EU must reevaluate how it approaches its defense capabilities effort. The key is defense integration, an effort that will not only take time, but will have to be negotiated between the member states as it requires relinquishing some degree of sovereignty of its defense. Defense integration allows several efficient possibilities for force structure development: asset pooling, infrastructure pooling (already began on a small scale with the infrastructure previously discussed), developing niche capabilities within member states, and multination procurement (also progressing as noted).²²

Because of the challenges the EU still faces in force structure and development, it has had to rely on NATO assets and resources to accomplish many of the more complex missions. It is therefore vital that, until the EU is able to fully develop its own defense structure, the EU maintain close relations with NATO, and therefore the United States.

EU Relationships

Many perceived the EU's development of its ESDP as a threat to NATO and the transatlantic relationship, to include the United States. The basis for this contention lies in the origins of the two entities. NATO was founded primarily as a security and defense organization, while the EU's foundations were economic. With the emergence of the ESDP, concerns were raised on the role ESDP would play in Europe and how it would affect NATO's dominance of European security efforts over the last half century. Yet NATO and the EU are completely different entities. The EU, in addition to its robust economic integration, has taken on a wide range of policy functions; defense now simply being one of those.²³ NATO on the other hand, while indeed garnering political debate, is focused primarily on security and defense. With the fall of the Soviet Union and as outlined in the new NATO Strategic Concept from the Washington Summit of 1999, that function has evolved. As opposed to providing the collective defense of Europe:

*NATO's essential and enduring purpose, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by **political and military means**. Based on common values of **democracy, human rights and the rule of law**, the Alliance has striven since its inception to secure a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe.*²⁴

This new purpose has taken on an even greater global perspective since 9/11, as evidence by NATO missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan. With NATO's new role, it is essential that the EU integrate its efforts with NATO and begin to focus its efforts in its own domain. Doing such will improve the operability of the EU and the ultimate security and stability in the region by allowing the EU to focus efforts internally and NATO globally for security.

Two key steps taken in the past three years have illustrated the EU's commitment to maintaining a positive working relationship with NATO, due primarily to its capability shortfalls. In December 2002, NATO and the EU outlined the "Berlin Plus" agreement that essentially assures EU access to NATO planning capabilities and assets when not in use by NATO. This agreement was further solidified during the European Council Summit in Copenhagen, Denmark in December 2003.²⁵ This agreement has proven effective in many of the EU missions conducted to date, to include Artemis, Concordia and the most recent assumption by the EU of the NATO mission in Bosnia. Continued cooperation between NATO and the EU is key to a successful ESDP. One potential source of tension, however, is how the EU integrates the United States into its ESDP efforts. As a key player in NATO, it is essential that the EU not alienate the United States.

The EU relationship with the United States presents a significant and perhaps perpetual challenge. Although both have several security concerns in common, the conflict is partly due to a lack of a well-defined common enemy such as existed during the Cold War and on which NATO was founded. It is the approach to addressing the security threat where the two diverge.²⁶ The European desire for autonomous defense policy and the United States tendency to unilateralism have the potential to create perpetual rifts in the transatlantic relationship.²⁷ However, following the tensions created by the United States on Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent issues involving Iran's nuclear program, it appears as if the United States realizes the importance of maintaining positive relations with its European allies.

Another point of conflict is the perception among some that the ESDP could create distinctions among NATO allies and create rifts in political relations within NATO.²⁸ However, with the key agreements reached between the EU

and NATO as outlined above, those concerns should abate. Contrary to these concerns, I would argue that the best tactic the EU could take is to seek complete integration of its defense forces. Due to disparities in security strategies, defense spending, and technology, Europe and the United States will not be able to efficiently integrate forces like they did at Normandy in 1944 and in Iraq in 1991. By developing an integrated multinational European force, transatlantic integration would be facilitated. As Nicole Gnesotto from the EU's Institute for Security Studies notes, "A Transatlantic Partnership without European Integration has little chance of success."²⁹ She further states:

*This deceptively simple idea is one of the major lessons to be learnt [sic] from the Iraqi crisis. The post-conflict stabilization difficulties have demonstrated the limits of U.S. power and of unilateralism as its foreign policy doctrine. On the other hand, the internal divisions and overall abstention of the EU from the Iraqi crisis have shown that European nations must overcome their individual, national pretences and act as a whole if they ever wish to attain a position of influence together.*³⁰

The role that the United States should play is one of support for the defense integration efforts of the EU. Niblett et. al. have outlined three useful steps for the United States in its support of EU defense integration and ultimately the ESDP: acknowledge that the ESDP is not a competitor to the United States nor a threat to transatlantic security cooperation; take the lead role in helping NATO and the EU effectively integrate their overlapping roles and missions; and be more willing to share defense technologies with its European allies.³¹

Conclusions

The St. Malo Declaration and the circumstances leading up to it gave the EU the impetus

and motivation to actively pursue the ESDP. However, the capabilities shortfalls and rocky transatlantic relationships create some significant obstacles for the continued evolution of the ESDP. The key to the future of the ESDP lies in the EU's ability to integrate its defense forces. This accomplishes two key things. First, it allows a more concerted, efficient and fiscally feasible effort by the EU to build a force structure capable of backing its policies and security strategies. Second, creating a capable defense force of its own has the potential to increase the EU's legitimacy in respect to NATO by taking on many, if not eventually all, of the missions within the EU without putting an increased burden on the United States; thus allowing NATO to focus on the broader spectrum of global security that it has assumed since 9/11.

Although the above challenges are not inclusive, the key point is that Europe should continue to deepen integration in all aspects of military operations in order to facilitate operations within its borders. Additionally, a unified and integrated military structure would make multinational force integration with the United States, and ultimately NATO, much easier since the integration would involve only two entities (the EU under its ESDP representing Europe) instead of perhaps a dozen. The benefits of such an integrated force in Europe will go a long way to facilitating successful evolution of the ESDP, to the implementation of United States and European security strategies, and to unifying efforts in providing security and stability within today's current threat environment.

Endnotes:

¹ Although it should be noted that it was the French in the early 1950s who sought a European defense capability separate from NATO and the US in the form of the European Defense Community.

² The name European Union will also refer to the pre-Maastricht name of European Community in this paper.

- ³ Anthony Forster and William Wallace, "Common Foreign and Security Policy: From Shadow to Substance," *Policy-Making in the European Union*, 4th ed., Helen Wallace and William Wallace eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 472.
- ⁴ Ibid., 481.
- ⁵ Helen Wallace, "The Institutional Setting: Five Variations on a Theme," *Policy-Making in the European Union*, 4th ed., Helen Wallace and William Wallace eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 4.
- ⁶ Foster, 463.
- ⁷ Council of the European Union, *Treaty on European Union*, 12 February 1992, Article J.4.
- ⁸ Foster, 472.
- ⁹ Ibid., 479-481.
- ¹⁰ Nicole Gnesotto et. al., *European Defence: A Proposal for a White Paper*, (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 42-47.
- ¹¹ European Council, "European Council Declaration On Strengthening The Common European Policy On Security And Defence," Annex II to *Presidency Conclusions* (June 1999). Available online at http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/june99/annexe_en.htm#a3, accessed 23 May 2005.
- ¹² Petersberg tasks are primarily peace keeping missions developed by the WEU which were adopted by the EU in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and around which the ESDP development is focused.
- ¹³ Gnesotto et. al, 47-48.
- ¹⁴ European Council, *Constitution of the European Union*, (December 2004), Article I-41. Available online at http://europa.eu.int/constitution/index_en.htm, accessed 21 May 2005.
- ¹⁵ Terrence Guay and Robert Callum, "The Transformation and Future Prospects of Europe's Defense Industry," *International Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 4, pages 757-761.
- ¹⁶ *ESDP Timeline: 2000s*. Available online at <http://www.europeansecurity.net/timeline>, accessed 21 May 2005.
- ¹⁷ *NATO Handbook*, (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), 102.
- ¹⁸ Council of the European Union, *Headline Goal 2010*. Available online at <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf>, accessed 21 May 21, 2005.
- ¹⁹ Gnesotto et. al, 47.
- ²⁰ Annalisa Monaco, "Operation Concordia and Berlin Plus: NATO and the EU take stock," *NATO Notes*, vol. 5, no. 8, (International Security Information Service, Europe, December 2003). Available online at www.isis-europe.org, accessed 21 May 2005.
- ²¹ Catriona Mace, "Operation Artemis: Mission Impossible?," *European Security Review*, no. 18, (International Security Information Service, Europe, July 2003). Available online at www.isis-europe.org, accessed 21 May 2005.
- ²² Robin Niblett et. al., "Achieving an Effective Global Military Capability for the Alliance: The Need for European Defense Integration," *Test of Will, Tests of Efficacy: Initiative for a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership, 2005 Report*, (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005), 41.
- ²³ Nicole Gnesotto, "Reconsidering the Future," *EuroFuture*, (Spring 2005). Available online at <http://www.iss-eu.org/new/analysis/analy105.htm>, accessed 21 May 2005.
- ²⁴ *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, April 1999, Part I, para 6, emphasis added. Available online at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1999/9904-wsh/pres-eng.htm>, accessed 21 May 2005.
- ²⁵ Gnesotto et. al., 56-59.
- ²⁶ Refer to *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002 and *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, 8 December 2003, for a comparison of security concerns and defense strategies.
- ²⁷ Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered*, (Boston: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 200.
- ²⁸ Sloan, 181.
- ²⁹ Gnesotto.
- ³⁰ Ibid.
- ³¹ Niblett et. al., 42-43.

Chocolate Chip Ice Cream and Theater Security Cooperation: A Personal Account

By COL Michael P. Anderson, USA, 48B

"We must constantly question things that we have routinely been doing to ensure that we are doing the right things and to see if we can do them even better. It is kind of like me always ordering chocolate chip ice cream whenever I visit an ice cream stand -- is that really the flavor that I want to be ordering *every* time? The same applies to our annual European Command Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) Conference. Are we focused on the right things? Is this the way we want to be conducting the conference *every* time? Can we make the conference even better?"

INTRODUCTION

These were the words I recently used to challenge the 25 joint officers, among them 13 FAOs, in my Europe Division of the J5 Policy Directorate of US European Command (EUCOM) as we prepared to conduct the command's Theater Security Cooperation Working Group (TSCWG). Theater Security Cooperation is the expression used to describe military to military engagement with other nations. It includes everything from joint exercises, to senior officer visits, to port calls, to train and equip efforts. European Command's (EUCOM) TSC Conference also happens to be the largest gathering of European, Eurasia, and African FAOs from all Services.


The conference was held in 2005 at the Ramstein Air Base Officer's Club, near Kaiserslautern, Germany, 17-21 October. There were more than 400 participants including

Defense Attaché Office (DAO) and Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) representation from 90 of the 91 Country Teams in EUCOM's Area of Responsibility (AOR).

The gathering was the biggest EUCOM TSC Conference ever. Indeed, EUCOM's TSC Conference was probably the largest conducted by any Combatant Command. The EUCOM Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) has more than 112,000 forces full-time forward-based and is responsible for a landmass that is 35% of the earth's, with a coastline that comprises 60% of the world's coastline. EUCOM's AOR includes 91 countries, nearly half of the nations represented in the UN General Assembly.

This article will outline how this important EUCOM assembly has improved over the past few years and how it remains perhaps *the* paramount gathering of FAOs.

European Command AOR



WHERE WE WERE

I have participated in four TSC-related conferences at EUCOM. I attended the first as the Army Attaché at US Embassy Copenhagen in March 2002. That conference was held in a single plenary hall at Patch Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany. The 2002 meeting was primarily focused on Defense Attaché Offices, with hardly any involvement from EUCOM's Offices of Defense Cooperation, the other key military component of Country Teams in the AOR. In 2002, ODCs had their own separate conference, and unfortunately it actually preceded the policy conference. It was a situation when the Command's TSC execution experts, ODCs, were meeting prior to HQ EUCOM determining execution policy.

There were no senior EUCOM representatives at the 2002 Conference, with the most senior rank being Colonel. There were also very few participants from the Interagency, with only some from OSD and Joint Staff, none in any senior capacity, and none from Department of State.

In 2002 EUCOM held completely separate TSC conferences focused on the European and African portions of the AOR with 46 countries in Europe and 45 in Africa. These earlier conferences were exclusively J5 organized and led, with virtually no participation from the other "J-Codes", and hence virtually no "buy-in" from them, from the J2, J3, and J4. In fact, the numbers of contractors at the earlier conferences easily outnumbered other EUCOM staff directorates. While contractors can

play an important role in TSC execution, their role in the formulation of policy was questionable.

The 2002 Conference was inadequately titled as "Regional Working Group", a title that had been around since the mid 1990's. The product and focus of the earlier conferences was essentially an order of merit list, ranked by country and by security activity. But there had also been too much "gaming the system" that went on, and there seemed to be too little regard for the priorities of the Combatant Command.


In short, there was reason to call into question something that EUCOM had routinely been doing. Essentially it was time to question the repeated ordering of "chocolate chip ice cream."

WHERE WE ARE TODAY

Following the Attaché tour in Copenhagen, my next posting was to the US European Command in Stuttgart, Germany, in summer 2002. As

Chief of the Europe Division, J5 Policy Directorate, I have been responsible for contributing to policy formulation and implementation via TSC across the European portion of the European Command. This spans 46 countries ranging from Israel to Russia, Iceland to Azerbaijan. Also arriving in 2002 was the new Deputy EUCOM Commander, Gen Chuck Wald and a new J4 International Division Chief, the leader of the command's ODCs. Together, we radically

The EUCOM TSC Cycle, with assessments sent back to OSD





Regional Plenary Session

questioned and sought to improve upon the format and goals of EUCOM's critical TSC conference.

The EUCOM TSC conference has "come a long way, baby" over the past three years. The conference is now renamed "Theater Security Cooperation Working Group." It is focused on the entire command, all 91 countries. There are no separate Africa and Europe meetings, no separate Office of Defense Cooperation Conferences. Now both of the key military offices on the AOR's Country Teams, DAOs and ODCs, are present at the Command's annual TSC Conference; sitting and planning together to implement and support the TSC country objectives finalized at the conference.

In 2005, senior EUCOM officers were present, and all participants were able to hear from them important "top down" guidance. The EUCOM Deputy Commander, Gen Wald, participated for the third consecutive year. The EUCOM Chief of Staff, J5, J4, and J2 also addressed the conference.

Additionally senior Interagency representatives attended the 2005 assembly. Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense for both Europe and Africa, together with the Principal Deputy As-

sistant Secretary of State for Political Military Affairs, and a senior Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) representative all shared their insights, participated in interactive panel discussions, and provided thoughts from "inside the Beltway."

In what other ways had this year's EUCOM TSC Conference improved?

Now the conference involves the entire EUCOM staff. It is no longer just a J5-organized and led event. Theater Security Cooperation is now a "positive virus" infecting all elements of the command staff from J2 thru J9 actively participating in the planning and execution.

In 2005, all of the Component Commands of EUCOM were actively involved in the conference. They were able to provide necessary reality checks, indicating where they were able to support country objectives and where they were not able to support due to OPTEMPO. They joined in the development of the Country Campaign Plans (CCPs) which will be provided back to them and to all other EUCOM activity managers as directives for execution during the period 2006-08.



Regional Break-Out Session

By the way, there were no contractors invited to the 2005 conference. The Command still has an interest in presenting its TSC objectives and goals to the contractor community, but it will do so at a later date, with all contractors being given the same fair chance to hear EUCOM's goals at the same time.

This year's conference had the added bonus of being conducted away from EUCOM HQ, permitting full focusing on the conference at hand. The quality conference site at Ramstein AFB facilitated essential regional break-out sessions -- four for Africa and four for Europe-- permitting smaller group discussion and interchange

Finally, the product of the symposium was no longer just an order of merit list; a result of "gaming the system," divorced from command priorities. This year's products were instead clear command goals reflected in executable, measurable country objectives in Country Campaign Plans. Priority countries in the command received the most attention during the conference. All country plans now capture the "what, how, and why" of EUCOM's TSC goals for a country. They will not only be shared with all EUCOM activity managers, but also with OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Services.

CONCLUSION

In the past three years, the EUCOM TSC Conference has become an extremely valuable forum for the finalization of the country objectives and goals that the Command pursues for the countries of its AOR. It has also become a capstone event for the face-to-face meeting of European, Eurasian, and African FAOs. The face-to-face informal interaction, the dialogue, and the exchange of ideas that occur among FAOs and other stakeholders at European Command's premier TSC event is of great value to EUCOM and to FAOs.

FUTURE

EUCOM can be proud that this conference has become the biggest, busiest, and best to date. As we look beyond, we are mindful of new OSD Security Cooperation Guidance which charges "[...] Service and Defense Agency strategies ...to support ... Combatant Commanders' strategies [...]" I envision EUCOM's Components and perhaps Services and Defense Agencies coming to future TSC Conferences and briefing how they intend to support the Combatant Commander's TSC objectives. Special break-out sessions for FAOs and meetings addressing common thematic issues - such as Trans Sahel Counter Terrorism or illegal immigration impacting both Europe and Africa - would also improve future conferences.

Clearly, there is always room for new TSC ideas and improvements. That said, just questioning something does not always mean you have to change it. Very often the questioning results in an even stronger commitment than before. Take chocolate chip ice cream, for example, despite questioning my choice, it remains the only flavor I ever order.

Editor's note: COL Mike Anderson, currently Europe Division Chief, EUCOM J5, and the senior Army FAO on the EUCOM staff, has been a 48C since 1985. He has earned a Master's degree in International Relations from Columbia University, speaks German and Danish, is a graduate of the George C. Marshall Center's Senior Executive Program and Harvard's Russian-US Senior Officer Course, and has spent more than 17 years on European assignments. His email address is: andersmi@eucom.mil



COL Anderson addressing the Conference

Language Training at West Point Developing Future FAOs

By Major Mark Derber
Foreign Language Department, West Point

When it comes to waging modern war, the armed forces of the United States are arguably without peer. However, extended operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have revealed one critical shortcoming in the American soldier: *an inability to communicate*. Unlike rifle marksmanship and small unit tactics, “language skill and regional expertise have not been regarded as war fighting skills¹,” and these communication challenges are further compounded by a lack of understanding of non-American customs and traditions. Religious holidays, hand gestures, wedding parties, funeral processions and the like are entirely alien, and it is not uncommon for soldiers and leaders to inadvertently offend the local population.

ing regional expertise are developed and maintained... as strategic assets in the Global War on Terrorism and in future military operations.”

Today language and cultural training are imperative for Army operations. The Roadmap recognizes and addresses this saying, “...*language skills and regional expertise...are as important as critical weapons systems.*” Therefore, in this era of budgetary challenges, pre-combat training must be well-conceived, thorough, and properly focused on the long term. In pursuit of enhanced language and cultural literacy within the military’s ranks, an excellent starting point is the leadership – specifically, *tomorrow’s lieutenant*.

The United States Military Academy (referred to here interchangeably as “West Point” or “USMA”) provides 17% of the annual Army officer accessions² and presents a viable model for future progress in terms of language and cultural literacy within the officer ranks. Language study at West Point essentially follows three steps based on the “**Crawl, Walk, Run**” instructional model.

Crawl Phase: Core Language Instruction

The Department of Foreign Languages (DFL) teaches seven languages: *Arabic, Chinese, French, German, Portuguese, Russian, and Spanish*. Each USMA cadet is currently required to study two semesters of a foreign language, which provides only 90 contact hours per cadet – hardly adequate for a strong foundation of language and cultural skills (one contact hour = 55 minutes of classroom instruction or immer-



Cadet in Senegal for AIAD 2005
Can you find him?

To address this shortcoming the Department of Defense (DOD) in early 2005 approved a document called the **Defense Language Transformation Roadmap**. It clearly articulates DOD initiatives that must be implemented “to ensure that foreign language capability and accompany-

sion in a country where English is not the primary language).

When cadets first arrive at West Point, they indicate their language-study preferences. Cadets who have prior experience in the language they have selected take a written and oral placement test which determines what level of advanced study they will take. Those with prior experience who fail to test at the level they should have attained are required to begin study of a completely new language.

Like many other academic institutions, much of West Point's language instruction is centered on commercially available instructional materials and textbooks. However, DFL takes advantage of some additional training opportunities to enhance the cadet learning experience.

Over the past three years, DFL has forged a strong relationship with Fairfield Language Technologies – the creator of the computer-based learning tool called *Rosetta Stone*, which is used at the beginning and intermediate

levels to supplement textbook and classroom instruction with extensive audio-visual exercises. Cadets are routinely assigned Rosetta Stone exercises as homework, and the majority of graded examinations at the basic level include Rosetta Stone components. The program has been so successful in its implementation at West Point



Uzbeks visit USMA Spring 2005

Foreign Area Officer Association (FAOA) *MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION*

Name: _____ Rank: _____ Telephone: _____ Regional Specialty: _____
Street: _____ City: _____ State: _____ Zip: _____

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that the Army recently announced a new contract which provides access to Rosetta Stone for all military personnel.

In addition to classroom instruction, first and second year students have a number of other learning opportunities. For example, twice a year, Russian language students travel to nearby Brighton Beach, the Russian-speaking neighborhood in Brooklyn. The cadets are given assignments to complete during the visit which require face-to-face interaction with local Russian-speakers. This type of learning activity exposes cadets to intangible aspects of both the language and culture that cannot be replicated in the classroom.

Likewise, the reputation of West Point attracts numerous visitors from around the world. Many of these visitors comprise military delegations and include cadets from foreign academies. Because of its inherent expertise, DFL serves as host for many of these contingents, and language students are often called upon to serve as escorts for their cadet counterparts. These visits, which can last anywhere from two hours to several weeks, provide unique opportunities for cadets to work on communication skills. Not surprisingly, cadets quickly realize the value of communication and are motivated to attain greater mastery of the language.

For most cadets, the preceding paragraphs describe the full extent of their two-semester exposure to foreign language and culture while at




Cadet at Chirchik Tank Academy in UZ for AIAD 2005

West Point. However, some cadets – often those who intend to major in language – compete to participate in the *Foreign Academy Exchange Program (FAEP)* as part of the Crawl Phase. This one-week program occurs during Spring Break and seeks to 1) give cadets a foreign language based military and cultural experience, and 2) build ties with foreign service academies. During the week abroad, USMA cadets experience the life of their host cadet counterparts and are thoroughly immersed in a foreign environment. Shortly after their return, USMA cadets reciprocate, playing host to their new-found cadet friends here in the United States. In 2006 more than sixty cadets will travel to 31 different countries, including Argentina, China, Egypt, Germany, Ukraine, Portugal, and Senegal.

Walk Phase: Intermediate-level Instruction

West Point cadets choose academic majors at the beginning of sophomore year. In recent years more cadets than at any time previous have begun to recognize the value of advanced language training, and the Academy has seen a significant increase in foreign language majors.

Language Major Selection Classes of 2005 - 2008



Class of 2005 on left → 2008 on right

In fact, during the past two years, nearly 14% of the Classes of 2007 and 2008 (approx. 1000 cadets per class) have chosen to pursue language study beyond the one year minimum requirement.

For cadets who decide to continue with their language studies beyond the two semester requirement, USMA offers four challenging intermediate-level courses: *Intermediate lan-*



Cadet in China during FAEP 2005

guage (two semesters), Advanced Language through the Media and Military Readings, all studied in the target language. These four courses provide an additional 160 contact hours for each cadet.

One of the most popular components of the Walk Phase is the *Academic Individual Advanced Development Program (AIAD)*. Like FAEP, this three-week summer immersion program seeks to 1) provide cadets a military, foreign language-based cultural experience and 2) build ties with foreign service academies and armed forces. In the summer of 2006, around 120 cadets will participate in trips to over seventeen countries, including Chile, Kuwait, Mexico, Russia, and the Dominican Republic.

Programs such as FAEP and AIAD are instrumental in the cadet learning process. At the same time, they play a significant role in fostering long-term interest in language and cultural study. A cadet returning from Ukraine shared the following:

"When I tell people in America that I am a language major they generally say something like, 'Why would you study languages...everyone... speaks English now anyways.' Because of this, I questioned my decision a few times on becoming a language major. *After a few days in Odessa, these questions went away.* To truly connect with people from another culture and way of life you need to speak their native language."

Run Phase: Advanced Language Instruction

The third and final phase focuses on advanced language acquisition. During the Run Phase, coursework includes five courses in history, culture and literature, all studied in the target language for an additional 200 contact hours over the span of two semesters. Additionally, advanced language students who are performing exceptionally well are invited to participate in the *Semester Abroad* and *Semester Exchange* programs.


The *Semester Abroad Program (SAP)* currently affords eight cadets the opportunity to study in four countries with the intent of increasing language proficiency and providing cultural immersion opportunities. While abroad, cadets often live with host parents and take all coursework in the target language. Participating coun-



Cadet in Germany for FAEP 2005
Getting lost during land navigation is universal

tries include China, France, and Russia. The *Semester Exchange Program (SEP)* is similar but has an additional objective of supporting Army and Theater Security Cooperation goals. Currently, 14 cadets are studying abroad as part of SEP in Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, and Spain. Obviously, these two programs are the most popular (and therefore most competitive), and offer the best conditions for building strong lan-

spectrum of their West Point experience – from classroom study to an AIAD to an in-depth study of target-language media. At the conclusion of the semester, distinguished guests and scholars – often Foreign Area Officers – are invited to West Point to receive a formal briefing presented by the cadets on their findings. The intent is to create a situation in which cadets are briefing a “policy-maker” with their analysis and potential



guage and cultural foundations.

The final component of the run phase is the *Capstone Seminar*. In this semester-long academic exercise, cadets work in groups while researching a major issue of geostrategic relevance. Cadets are expected to draw upon the full

solutions. As an example, a Spanish-speaking group of cadets recently analyzed the Colombian drug industry as it relates to U.S. foreign policy. A former Defense Attaché was subsequently invited to listen to their conclusions and provide his

feedback regarding the Spanish cadets' analysis of the Colombian scenario.

Implications for the FAO Community

Foreign Area Officers may wonder why Academy language programs matter to the FAO community, and there are several responses to this great question. First, it's imperative that FAOs realize that not only is West Point developing tomorrow's leaders, but *it is also a prime recruiting ground for future generations of FAOs*. Currently, many of DFL's faculty billets are filled by FAOs. Cadets often cite their instructors as a major reason for choosing to major in language. Because of their extensive experience abroad, FAOs effectively relate daily language lessons to real world applications. These vignettes resonate with cadets, many of whom eventually aspire to pursue FAO careers.

A second implication of these programs is that the Department of Foreign Languages relies on FAOs across the globe to facilitate its in-country immersion programs. The programs described – FAEP, AIAD, SAP, and foreign visits – typically require coordination with a FAO down-range. For cadets, who are in a formative stage in terms of future branch and career field designation, this is their often one of their first contacts with a real FAO in action.

What also may not be obvious to our in-country FAO hosts is the long-term impact these programs have on the cadets. Not surprisingly, when a cadet finally has the opportunity to visit his target region of study, his interest and motivation to study are significantly heightened. This initiates the proverbial snowball effect, and many cadets develop an insatiable appetite for language and cultural study. In sum, a small investment of time and energy in the lives of young cadets will undoubtedly reap significant dividends in the years to come for our invaluable career field.

Conclusion

In an article published by the *Wall Street Journal*, Army Chief of Staff Schoomaker astutely recognized the need for strong language and cultural training. He wrote,

"Instead of taking a [cadet] and sending him out to the 101st Airborne Division during his junior summer, it would make more sense to send him to a foreign country for two months and put him inside a family where he will do nothing but speak a foreign language and learn another culture."³

Clearly, the United States Military Academy is doing what it can to bring his vision to fruition. Upon completion of the Crawl, Walk, Run phases, USMA cadets will have developed a strong, broad-based language and cultural foundation. Assuming they have the opportunity to participate in the entire program as described, cadets will have received over 1640 contact hours with the target language. While not enough to create subject matter experts, this robust language training program certainly cultivates interest within junior leaders, who hopefully will aspire to serve as FAOs later in their careers as a result of their cadet experiences.

Endnotes:

¹ Defense Language Transformation Roadmap.

² http://www.dod.mil/prhome/poprep2000/html/chapter4/chapter4_3.htm

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Don't Forget About Latin America

Captain Adam Rodgers, USA

INTRODUCTION

Latin America appears on the diplomatic radar screen only when there are major problems. A communist takeover in Cuba, communist revolutionaries in Uruguay, Leftist leadership in Venezuela, insurgencies in Central America; they all have one thing in common, America's neglect toward our neighbors to the south.

The purpose of this article is to demonstrate why we should not disregard Latin America. There are shining examples of our dedication to the Western Hemisphere, as well as dismal betrayals and abuse. This article will highlight both and provide reasons why we should not neglect our *vecinos del sur* (southern neighbors).

War on Drugs

The drug war the United States engages in throughout the Andean Region (Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia) in South America seems to have a more or less positive impact on relations with the South American nations. Focusing on Colombia, Plan Colombia (the U. S. Government's name for the current anti-narcotic emphasis in Colombia) has seen an investment of around \$3 billion in aid since 2000. The stance of the Uribe administration is obvious but maybe not as simply stated as: You send us money and we'll be your friend.

Plan Colombia forced a more consolidated approach to the regional combat of drug in a follow up plan labeled the Andean Regional Initiative. This plan focuses on diminishing the effects of the drug squeeze, or "spill over", from Colombia to the surrounding countries such Ecuador, Peru, as well as Colombia's other neighbors. The initiative places emphasis on democratic institution building, economic development and trade, as well as counterdrug and law enforcement assistance.

The success or failure of the drug war can be debated, but the affect of building cooperation with the leadership with Colombia is an important one. Although not sending troops in support of OIF due to internal preoccupations, Colombia was among the original 49 nations to side with the United States in its efforts to remove Saddam Hussein from power.

Operation Iraqi Freedom

Including Colombia, only seven out of 43 countries in the Western Hemisphere were included in the original 49 supporters of the invasion of Iraq. Of those seven, probably the most important contributors were Honduras, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador who committed troops in support of the Operation under the leadership of the Spanish contingent in Iraq. After the Spanish train bombings in March 2004, and loss of the election by the ruling regime, Spain withdrew its troop support as well as did the remaining Spanish speaking countries, save El Salvador.

South American Military Relations

Chile

Militarily, Chile has almost always touted a powerful navy. Most recently, Chile participated in a Joint U.S./Panamanian/Chilean operation to establish a security zone for the Panama Canal. The Panamax 2003 exercise intent was to establish a working relationship with forces that might be tasked to secure a potentially dangerous vessel approaching the canal. The exercise was directed to assist the Panamanian government who has been solely responsible for the canal itself since the United States returned control in 1999.

The shipping approaching the canal is a different story. Protecting the neutral waters and approaches to the canal is an extremely important task that Chile and Panama have taken seriously. Chile has assumed an important role in integrating security in the region that will greatly assist the United States and will allow us to maintain operations abroad.

El Salvador

Recent relations with El Salvador both politically and militarily have been outstanding. El Salvador has been the most consistent and faithful ally to the United States from Latin America. They were one of the first Latin American countries to sign the Article 98 agreement that protects U.S. Service member rights concerning prosecution in the International Criminal Court.

Probably the most important act of support is El Salvador's continued troop commitment in Iraq. El Salvador has consistently deployed troops in support of the American led coalition. The amount of forces deployed, as compared to the U.S. troop strength is miniscule at around 360 soldiers, but compared to the size of the Army and the GDP of the nation, the commitment is tremendous. The size of the Salvadoran Army does not allow a constant deployment of forces, but they deployed their 4th contingent in support of operation in Iraq in February, 2005 and are sketching plans for a 5th contingent as well.

Western Hemisphere Encroachment

China's role in the Western Hemisphere has greatly increased along with its economic growth in the world market. China sent a 125 man police contingent in support of joint operations in Haiti to deepen its ties in the distant region. Latin America has embraced the economic giant and is fostering new ties to enhance their own economies. Latin America's exports to China increased about 31% last year which brought some economic growth to the ailing com-

munities. As far as Latin America is concerned, China can assume the economic hegemonic role of the United States.

China has made its intentions clear. With applications to join the Inter-American Development Bank and desires on sponsoring a project to widen the Panama Canal area, China sees a new market to purchase fuel for its economic fire. Many Latin American countries are looking toward China to help provide a boost to their economies.

Chile is looking to improve upon its 70% increase in metal exports to China from last year. Chile and China have also defined a tentative free-trade agreement and Chile is looking to China as a major investor in almost any aspect of the economy. Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez has signed oil and gas deals in exchange for investments in order to reduce its dependency on the United States.

Argentina is looking to corner \$20 of the \$100 billion dollars China has pledged to invest in Latin America over the next decade for transportation improvements. Cuba signed a deal to invest \$500 million in its nickel industry to provide a much needed shock to its waning economy.

Brazil has urged China to invest in the state-owned oil and gas sector as well as increased sales and joint ventures in Brazil's aircraft production and satellite technology. Brazil's export/imports with China jumped 20 and 72% respectively last year and are seeking to increase its soybean and iron ore exports to China in the upcoming years.

Not all Latin American countries have been readily willing to accept China's role in the region. Mexico is feeling a sting as China competes with Mexico's number one commodity: people. The maquiladora sector has been encroached upon as China has replaced Mexico as number one

exporter to the United States of textiles. Mexico, for obvious reasons, has been the most reluctant to approach China for trade agreements.

“Leftist Leadership”

The emerging “leftist regimes” in Latin America, for the most part, have overcome fears in the United States about a communist or socialist wave spreading across South America. The 2004 election of President Vazquez to office in Uruguay put the nail in the coffin for some political analysts as the spread of potential pro-communist/socialist governments came to a head. The analysts should have, however, waited to pass judgment as the new leadership wave either defies or re-defines “leftist”.

The backgrounds of the new “leftist” leaders in South America had the potential for disaster. President Vazquez was affiliated with the communist Tupamaro guerrilla movement in the 1960’s. Brazil’s President Lula hails from the leftist Workers’ Party and President Lagos of Chile comes from a socialist background. President Kirchner in Argentina traces his origins to the leftist faction of the Peronist Party of the 1970’s.

The “leftist” label, probably initially justifiable, needs to be amended as each of these Presidents has overcome the apprehension as identifiable in their political agendas. All regimes seemed to have taken a moderate role in government that focus on fiscal discipline and urgent social agendas. Only their Venezuelan neighbor to the north seems to have justified the “leftist” or populist stance in government.

President Hugo Chavez has been a weakness in American foreign policy in Latin America. His anti-American rhetoric and inflaming attitude is reminiscent of Fidel Castro and so far, seems to be the next replacement on the world stage for Cuba’s aging leader. Although not currently able to shut off the oil supply to the United States (as he currently ships about 60% of his crude to the U.S.), he is obviously seeking investment oppor-

tunities elsewhere that could give him the option to slow the supply of oil to the United States and provide flexibility for the future.

Public relations between President Chavez and the United States have been tenuous. Once the leader of a failed coup in Venezuela in the late 1990’s, Lieutenant Colonel Chavez ran for and was elected President of the Republic and has been serving in that capacity, more or less, for six years. After being removed from office by an illegal coup, the United States quickly affirmed its support for the new government due to Chavez’s populist tendencies, purging of the military and government, and anti-American rhetoric. The coup did not last very long as President Chavez re-gained control of his office as the United States political leadership attempted to pull the “foot from our mouth”. This resulted in a continued downward spiral of political, military, and economic relations between the two countries despite the reliance of both on oil.

SUMMARY

The implications for disregard to our neighbors to the south are big. As we have seen, tremendous investment by China into Latin America could potentially derail the United States’ economy. Although it is doubtful that China is a serious threat to the political, economic, and military might of the United States at the moment, continual benign neglect southward and not engaging China immediately could boost China’s role in the world significantly.

This article has demonstrated that neglecting our neighbors in the Western Hemisphere quite possibly could provide a step backward in American hegemony. China’s threat to the United States is real and increasing and must be addressed at the earliest opportunity. It has also shown that attention, investment, and support can go a long way in Latin America as seen in the examples of the loyal allies of Colombia and El Salvador. Continued support of the Southern Cone nations of Chile, Argentina, and Brazil, although not in per-

fect harmony, is important to maintain as their economies continue to stabilize and improve.

The current American regimes' "agree to disagree" stance on certain issues seems to be acceptable to most Latin American nations, as well as across the globe. Pushing United States policy in Central and South America is a touchy subject and can potentially damage current relations. Silent support (economically and politically) seems to be the answer right now for most Latin American countries, but policy must adjust to confront China's emerging role, and yet not destroy relations with our neighbors to the South.

This article has provided broad in-context solutions to the problems and needs to be refined and further developed to provide more consolidated recommendations to current and future presidential administrations. It has also shown that modest attention in Latin America by the United States could provide dividends in the future and the current policy of benign neglect could further damage north/south relations. The United States and Latin America can benefit from increased cooperation and with effort, the benefits could enhance ties economically and politically for all.

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¹ "Latin America Politics: Drug Battles Won, a War Still Lost" EIU ViewsWire. New York: 11 Feb 2005.

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³ Darby, M.J. "Protecting the Waters of the Panama Canal" All Hands. Washington: Dec 2003. Iss. 1040. pg. 12.

⁴ "El Salvador: Country Outlook" EIU ViewsWire. New York: 17 Mar 2006.

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⁶ Buerkle, Tom. "Ole China" Institutional Investor. New York: Mar 2005. p. 5.

⁷ Ibid. p. 1.

⁸ Ibid. p. 3.

⁹ Ibid. p. 2.

¹⁰ Ibid. p. 3.

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³ Shifter, Michael and Vinay Jawahar. "Latin America Defies Old Labels: In Uruguay and Elsewhere, the 'Leftist' tag is no longer meaningful." Los Angeles Times. 1 Mar 2005. pg. B. 11.

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Continued on page 30

The Concept of the Caliphate: A Key Islamic Militant Ideological Point

By LCDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, MSC, USN

Since 9-11, U.S. national security decision makers have made the Middle East a central focus. Recognizing the misalignment of the Arab world in terms of integration into the global economy is one of the pivotal factors that have made the region unsuccessful and ripe for Islamic militants. The reasons are many and include a lack of legitimate government, the pervasiveness of despotic regimes who have not used their political power to address a worsening crisis in population, job creation and constructive education of the masses. With United States interest in the region comes a dire need to understand the Arabic texts and origins of Islamic militancy, both as a means of constructing credible public diplomacy products and for U.S. military personnel involved in psychological operations, intelligence and nation-building. Delving into Islamic sources brings forth a wealth of information that can be used credibly to discredit Islamic militant ideology and anti-American sentiment.

This review essay will look into the writings of an Egyptian counterterrorism academic and writer Dr. Rifaat Al-Saeed who writes for the Egyptian newspaper *Al-Akhbar Al-Yom* (the Daily News). His latest book *Al-Irhaab Al-Mutaslam* (Islamized Terrorism) was published in 2004 by the publishing section of Cairo's newspaper *Akhbar El-Yom* Book Press. It is an excellent look into how the Middle East and in particular Egypt coped with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. Islamic militants from Usama Bin Laden to Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan Al-Banna consider the 1924 abolishment of the Ottoman Sultanate and hence the Caliphate a significant disaster in modern Muslim history. The quest to re-establish the Caliphate is a central theme of Islamic radicals around the world. What few of their foot-soldiers know is that this concept of the Caliphate was hotly debated soon

after Attaturk abolished the religious title in 1924, two years after Sultan Abdel-Hamid II, the last Ottoman Sultan was deposed. Not all Islamic clerics in mid-1920s and 1930s Egypt agreed on the concept of the Caliphate and whether it is a religiously required means of Islamic governance. This 234 page Arabic book is part of a series that the Egyptian publishing house *Akhbar Al-Yom* will issue, the book by Dr. Saeed is the first volume.

Going Into the Classical Islamic Texts

Out of the 70 war verses quoted liberally by Al-Qaeda two things must be understood. First, Islamic militant clergy never explain the historical context of which these verses were revealed. The war verses were primarily revealed when the Prophet Muhammad was in Medina attempting to defend his society against the onslaught of a much more powerful opponent in Mecca. For their part, the Meccans could not allow Muhammad to remain in Medina, as he stood between them and the Syrian caravan routes. From Muhammad's view, the Meccan persecution of Muslims created a refugee crisis in Medina that required resources and raiding Meccan caravans offered an easy solution to the refugee crisis. This must always be viewed from the lens of the 7th century. Dr. Saeed exposes in his book that as jihadist quote the 70 war verses out of historical context, there are 124 verses in the Quran that deal with forgiveness, compassion, tolerance, and patience.

When dealing with ironclad Islamic law, the primary source that undisputed is the Quran (which has many interpretations) and the *Hadith* (sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad). The history of how these Hadiths were compiled is the subject of much Islamic scholarly discus-

sion. The books discusses how out of 500,000 Hadiths collected only 4,500 are undisputedly verified as uttered or done by Muhammad and the codification of the Hadiths did not take its final form until the Caliphate of Al-Mamoun (813-833 AD) less than two hundred years after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. This leaves a body of untested Hadiths that for the untrained can be used with deadly results. One must also be aware that even in the undisputed Hadiths there are contradictions that like the Quran must be explained in its historical context.

Another prominent theorist in jihadist discourse is Sheikh Taqi Ibn Taymiyyah whose writings were collected into a books called *Al-Siyasa Al-Shariyah* (The Sanctioned Polity). Ibn Taymiyyah lived in 1256 AD and the crown jewel of his book is the *Ahl Al-Mardaine* (The Corrupt Peoples) Fatwa issued against the Mongols who had occupied most of the Islamic lands of Iraq and the Levant. The Mongols had converted to Islam and were engaged in a death struggle with the Mamlukes of Egypt, with skirmishes and battles all over the Levant. Ibn Taymiyyah angry over the sacking of Baghdad a half century before by the Mongols, issued his Fatwa declaring that although the Mongols accepted Islam, they are considered apostates because they continue to practice their traditional *Yasa* (Mongol) Laws. The book delves into Ibn Taymiyyah's political reasons for issuing the Fatwa lies not only in them practicing their laws but that the cleric felt that since they converted to Islam their war with other Muslims should cease. Ibn Taymiyyah was reviving a doctrine that was suppressed by the fourth Caliph Ali. It basically articulated that since Ali as a first cousin to the Prophet Muhammad did not succeed Prophet Muhammad, and accepted the consensus of Medina's leaders for three persons to precede him; he cheated God of His divine plan and therefore Ali and the majority of Muslims were apostates. Ali found this message so divisive he declared war against what became known as the fringe or *Khawarij*.

The Abolishment of the Caliphate and the Egyptian Response

When Hassan Al-Banna established the *Ikhwan Al-Muslimeen* (The Muslim Brotherhood) in 1928 it would evolve into the first Islamist political party, the founder was not immune to events happening in Egypt. The best part of this book contains a debate over the Caliphate, which in turn would spurn a lively discussion on the true role of Islam in politics. A more sinister trend would occur and that is the amalgamation of fascism with Islamist politics. This would occur during this period when Egypt boasted a half dozen political parties in the 1920s to early 1950s. They included the Islaah Party, the Umma Party, the Young Egyptian (Fascist Party), the Nationalist (*Wafd*) Party, the splinter Free Nationalist Party, the Labor Party, and the Socialist Party to name but a few which also included the Islamist Ikhwan or Muslim Brotherhood. Each would have their own group of street toughs to rouse the crowd, a model taken from Italy's fascists and the early infatuation with Benito Mussolini.

The assassination of Egyptian Prime Minister Boutros Ghali represented a new trend in political violence in Egypt. What is crucial is this assassination was transformed from a nationalist crime to a religious obligation by clerics condoning the killing of this Coptic Egyptian. This touches on the Egyptian Coptic-Muslim divide that always lurks beneath the surface of Egyptian society to this day.

Sheikh Abdul-Aziz Jaweesh preached from his pulpit in the Al-Azhar mosque that there was no nationalism in Islam. These sermons directly undermined Egyptian movements attempting to negotiate an end to the British protectorate over Egypt and the withdrawal of British forces from the country, there since 1882. Mustafa Kamel, an Egyptian nationalist hero, argued that the love of the Ottoman Empire has caused Egyptians to forget their Egyptianess. Hassan

Al-Bana entered the argument saying that every Islamic nation is one in which every Muslim retains, works for and wages jihad for.

Kemal Attaturk's abolishment of the Caliphate coupled with the multitude of problems resulting from dividing the spoils of the Ottoman Empire among the French and British complicated this debate over identity. It is with great historic irony that between the whirlwind of ideas an ancestor of Al-Qaeda ideologue Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri would emerge to move the idea of the Caliphate forward. Sheikh Al-Ahmady Al-Zawahiri would rise to become the chief cleric at Al-Azhar University until his removal under pressure by King Fuad I. In the mid twenties however, he sought to resolve the caliphate crisis by calling for an Islamic Caliphate Conference in 1924 to select the next caliph to succeed the last Ottoman ruler Abdel-Hamid II. King Fuad I of Egypt saw this as an opportunity to take the title of caliph for himself and Zawahiri the Elder saw it as a chance to move the Islamic center from the Bosphorus (Istanbul) to the Nile (Cairo).

To understand why King Fuad I was intrigued by being named the new caliph of all Muslims one must understand how he ascended to power. After World War I, Egypt was technically under Ottoman suzerainty, yet was controlled by the British since 1882. After the war it was determined to make Egypt independent and still a protectorate of Britain, this was achieved when Fuad I, a descendant of the Mohammad Ali Dynasty that ruled Egypt since 1805 was declared King of an Independent Egypt in 1922. He was thus a British creation and in 1923 a constitutional monarchy was established, that led King Fuad to balance a hostile parliament filled with nationalists, the cleric establishment in the great Islamic university of Al-Azhar, and the Egyptian Army, all three were the only organized entities that posed a challenge to Fuad's rule. Other benefits aside from prestige to King Fuad assuming the title of caliph include:

- Giving him prerogative over matters of religion, enabling him to control the different fac-

tions of Islam and balance Islamic-Christian relations in Egypt.

- Provides a counter-weight against the popularity of his arch-nemesis and Egyptian nationalist Saad Zaghlul.

King Fuad was the first Egyptian ruler to give the Al-Azhar Rector ministerial status, this was to further encourage efforts to make him caliph and give him control over assignment and leadership of the religious institution. By the leader of Al-Azhar becoming a member of the King's cabinet he was not longer an independent body but was an organ of government. This became apparent when King Fuad used mobs from Al-Azhar to counter Egyptian nationalist and pro-Zaghlul riots in Cairo.

Is the Caliphate an Islamic Obligation?

The conference did not materialize in 1924 but it would spark an Islamic judge and lecturer at Al-Azhar to write a book that would send shockwaves in the debate over the role of religion in politics. Shiekh Ali Abdul-Razzaq wrote *Al-Islam Wa Usool Al-Hikam* (Islam and the Basis of Rule) in 1925. Its central thesis was that the separation of Islam from politics is not incompatible with the Quran and Hadiths. He goes on to describe how Islam in its essence is a spiritual not temporal religion that can only be debased if it associates itself with governance or politics. In refuting the need for a caliphate, Abdul-Razzaq writes that Prophet Muhammad was essentially a theological figure who was thrust into being the governor of Medina. The concept or even requirement for a caliphate cannot be found in the Quran or Hadiths and therefore is not an obligatory form of governance in the Islamic world.

Abdul-Razzaq's views came at a time when the tide was pushing for moving the caliphate to Cairo and the after-effects of World War I on the Middle East created such ideas as colonialism being another form of crusades. Usama Bin Laden ironically has reinvented these concepts when he rails against secularism and globaliza-

tion as crusader ideas. Another Islamic modernist was the Grand Mufti of Cairo Mohammed Abduh and Sheikh Khalid Mohammed Khalid who argued that clerical *fatwas* need to concentrate on the industrial age and address such issues as modern finance, the concept of life insurance and the rapid pace of ideas coming from the west such as Darwinism, secularism and modern sciences. Aside from being a senior religious cleric, Abduh led the drive to reform Egypt's education system, arguing for the need for more modern science, mathematics and rational philosophy balanced with Islamic studies. He along with Abdul-Razzaq were attacked by the clerical establishment of Al-Azhar and suppressed. One can only dream of how Egypt, if not the entire Arab world, would look today if they were allowed to continue pursuing this line of debate. The Islamic center of Al-Azhar would be split into three camps due to these debates and arguments:

1. *Mujaddidoon* (Renewers) led by Abduh.
2. *Taqlidoon* (Traditionalists/fundamentalists) the main Al-Azhar establishment.
3. Selective *Mujaddidoon* (led by Rashid Rida and adopted by Islamic Militants).

This debate also renewed the call to open the gates of *ijtihad* (analytical reasoning), an Islamic concept used at the time of the Prophet Muhammad and done away with in the eleventh century in Sunni Islam. Rashid Rida and Mohammed Abduh in common influenced a charismatic and controversial cleric who arrived in Cairo in 1890 and observed the issue of Islam needing *ijtihad* to survive, he also renewed the doctrines of Ibn Taymiyyah and the Khawarij to declare all Muslim leaders who enabled the colonization of Muslim lands are considered apostates. This man was Sheikh Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani a fascinating and little understood figure in the west. Originally Al-Afghani was Persian, who had learned as much as he could from Shiite centers of learning and decided to travel and learn from Sunni traditions. This led him to the

Sunni center of Al-Azhar University in Cairo where he rose from student to one of the more popular lecturers on Islamic jurisprudence. His emphasis on the need to renew analytical reasoning in Islam, stimulated clerics like Mohammad Abduh and Al-Afghani applying the label of apostasy on those Muslims enabling the colonization of Islamic lands earned him the admiration of Rashid Rida and Hassan Al-Banna, who would form the basis of jihadist rhetoric today.

Sheikh Rashid Rida in answering the tomes of Mohammad Abduh and Sheikh Abdul-Razzaq published a pamphlet entitled, *Al-Khilafa Aw Al-Imamah Al-Uzma* (The Caliphate or the Great Imamate). In it he stressed how clerics who keep only to the mosque were reneging on their duties by not ushering in a just Islamic society and addressing colonialism, Darwinism, and Christian evangelism. It is up to the clergy to set the way towards an Islamic government and to thrust themselves into the socio-political issues of the day. What is important to learn about the debate over governance and caliphate that ensued in the 1920s and 30s is that today this kind of discourse is suppressed by Islamic militants and the mainstream Wahabism in Islam today.

Abdel-Qader Hamza was inspired by Sheikh Razzaq and was moved to pen this commentary in support of separating Islam from politics: "We must free ourselves from the era of submission to the past, so that we do not remain ignorant and weak (as a people) as it is today." Hamza recognized in the 1930s that Arabs, Muslims and Egyptians were enslaved by a sense of victimization that was easy to blame upon the Mongols, the Crusades and the British. Today it is the Americans and Israelis who fill this void and Arabs simply do not take ownership of any decisions made, it is always someone else's fault. He also wrote that the Quran came with a general set of laws in which every generation of Muslim has right and obligation to reinterpret these laws. Another cleric of Al-Azhar who spoke in favor of Sheikh Razzaq was Sheikh

Tantawi Al-Jawhari, one of the few clerics in Al-Azhar to further the Islamic reform argument. Sheikh Al-Jawhari said that the pursuit of scientific learning and inquiry is a religious obligation and embracing even Darwinism as a means of better discovering the natural world would make us better human beings and only further the divine gift of reason that God has bestowed upon mankind.

Salafists Versus Mujadidoon

The most active voices of the debate center now on the Salafists, that merged the Taqlidoon (traditionalists) and the selective mujadidoon. The Salafists argued for a return to fundamentalist Islam and the pure Mujadidoon (who advocated renewing the interpretation of Islam to keep pace with the technological age). Both claimed Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani as one of their sources of inspiration. The Salafists had King Fuad I and his successor King Farouk I, the mainstream of the Al-Azhar clerical establishment, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood Islamist grassroots organization. The Mujadidoon (modernists) had several members of the Egyptian cabinet, chiefly the Education Minister Taha Hussein, the Egyptian intelligentsia; Egyptian nationalists like Saad Zaghlul, the Wafd Party and members of parliament who felt the Salafists were another tool for the King to erode their political influence.

Rashid Rida representing the Salafists used the label of apostasy to silence the critical and vocal elements of the Islamic modernists. For instance, he wrote the Wafd Party has no Islamic agenda and the 1923 Constitution was not written with an Islamic character. Rashid Rida using his magazine *Al-Manar* and pamphleteering was able to give a voice to Al-Azhar clerics like Sheikh Al-Jaweesh who is often quoted because he advocated there was no nationalism in Islam and that Arabist movements in Egypt should be rejected. Al-Jaweesh went on to preach that Islam was under assault with the carving up of

Muslim lands by European powers, the Italians colonizing and killing Libyans, the French fighting and killing Muslims in Morocco. He gave listeners as early as 1920 an "Islam under siege," mentality. This rhetoric spawned *Jamiat Al-Islami* (The Islamic Group) in 1912 to Young Muslim Men's Association YMMA in 1927 and finally the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. Reading Egyptian newspapers of the era the debate is answered not in looking back at Islamic texts to ascertain the requirement for the Caliphate but the need for a caliph to unite all Muslims coming under assault, in many ways a defender of the faithful title reasserting itself.

Contenders to the Caliphate

While the clerics of Al-Azhar in Egypt championed King Fuad I, clerics at the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem claimed the caliphate should go to Hussein Bin Ali (Sherief of Mecca whose sons Faisal and Abdullah led the Arab Revolt). Other contenders included the King of Afghanistan and a delegation representing the Iranian Hawza (Shiite clerical hierarchy). These competing interests and constituencies surfaced when the Caliphate Conference convened in Cairo in May 1926, it did not agree on a successor to the Ottoman Sultan Abdel-Hamid II.

Conclusion

Dr. Al-Saeed's book represents cutting edge Arab intellectual discussion on Islamic militant ideology that should be considered by US military and counterterrorism planners. He offers interesting lines of discussion on the caliphate that could be utilized to counter the argument of the religious obligation of such an institution. This new war on Islamic militancy has an ideological dimension that can only be exploited by considering and studying books being published in Arabic that support or dispel the notions propagated by Islamic radicals. In this case, this is an excellent examination that dispels the simplistic world Islamic militants are trying to create by pushing the concept of the caliphate. It highlights

the contradictions within Islam that can be used to ideologically challenge Islamic militant slogans. It also demonstrates that Bin Laden and his ideologue Al-Zawahiri's diatribe is not new and that they draw on many of the books highlighted in Dr. Al-Saeed's exposé of Islamic militant ideology.

Editor's Note: LCDR Youssef Aboul-Enein is a Medical Service Corps and Middle East Foreign Area Officer currently serving at the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. He is a frequent contributor of essays that highlight the Middle East and Islamic militant theory and tactics. His analysis of Dr. Al-Saeed's book, which is in Arabic, represents LCDR Aboul-Enein's understanding of the material.

The **FAO Journal** needs:

FAO articles written by FAOs!

All FAOs are requested to submit articles to be published in the **FAO Journal**. Articles should nominally be 7-10 pages, single spaced (longer articles will be considered). Graphics (pictures, maps, charts) should be included embedded in the article and sent separately (in a PowerPoint file is convenient).

After publishing in the **FAO Journal** articles will be uploaded on the FAOA web site (www.faoa.org).

Please e-mail articles and graphics to editor@faoa.org or webmaster@faoa.org.

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In other news, the results of the 25 JAN Early Career Field Accession's Board for YG 98 were released on 6 FEB. The good news is the FAO community continues to attract the best and brightest. The board selected 30 high quality officers that possess college grade point averages (GPA) and Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) scores much higher than the current FAO standard. The minimum standard for FAOs IAW DA PAM 600-3 is 2.5 and 90 respectively. Selected officers exceeded the standard with an average of 3.3 and 124 respectively.

FAO Proponent is already preparing for the YG97 and 98 normal CFD board this spring and YG99 CFD board scheduled for SEP 06. We are increasing the minimum standard for future FAOs. We are raising the GPA standard to 2.7 but will waive the GPA to 2.5 if the officer has a GRE of 500/500/4.0 or has already completed a Master's Degree program. The DLAB standard is increasing to 105 but waivable to 95 if the officer has a current DLPT (less than one year) of 2/2. We are very cognizant on the impact that "raising the standards" have on accessing enough officers every year. Therefore, we will always strive to main-

ARMY NOTES

**LTC (P) Daniel Fagundes, Chief,
Strategic Leadership Division**



Excitement is brewing within the Department of Defense and Army FAO Proponent is hard at work on initiatives designed to build “Pentathletes and multi-skilled leaders the meet the needs of the force and improve regional expert capacity congruent with Army Transformation. We are also heavily engaged in creating opportunities for “regreen” our FAO Corps. In an ever changing world the Army must be capable of adapting to changes in regional dynamics and so should our FAO training program. It is prudent to periodically review our training program to meet the needs of our Armed Forces.

For this issue of the FAO Journal I would like to focus attention on the one thing that has distinguished Army FAOs from other functional areas and Service programs; the aspect of mentorship.

Years ago, Proponent developed a training program designed to create regional experts. The program continues to improve each year. In recent years we have spent approximately 5 million dollars per year on the ICT program. My regional managers have close interaction with all ICT officers at sites throughout the world. While FAO Proponent is responsible for FAO policy and the total lifecycle management of officers throughout their career, training management remains a vital responsibility. One of the key portions of training management is monitoring in-country training. Though the program of instruction varies, one thing remains constant – mentorship. Each ICT officer has a rater that oversees all aspects of the ICT experience. The Army has had a long-standing agreement with DAS and DSCA. As our new FAOs conduct ICT they all report directly to a local supervisor.

Understandably we are all focused on our duties during this time of war. Given the critical strategic role FAOs are playing, it is even more important that not only ICT supervisors, but all Army FAOs undertake the responsibility of mentoring our FAOs in training. I would ask that when a FAO ICT officer requests a clearance for travel within the country you reside, that you please take the time to scrutinize their travel plan, schedule office calls with country and regional experts that you know and trust, and provide the officer information on those issues that have an impact

on our foreign engagement policy.

Most people recognize the importance of advanced civil schooling and language training for a FAO. However, neither of these two phases of training are unique to the Army FAO program. Officers from any service can attend language school or enroll in graduate education. What sets the Army program apart from others is a developed and mature ICT program. We must all give due diligence in our support of this valuable training tool. This is an Army FAO program and all Army FAOs have an obligation to ensure it remains successful today in meeting current and future Army operational needs. If you are located in the national capital region you may be asked to brief an outgoing ICT student on issues pertaining to your region. In many cases, ICT officers pass through the COCOM enroute to their ICT site. If you are working at a COCOM you may be asked to brief the ICT officer on policies, security issues, or cooperative agreements within your AOR. All of these things are important to the education of an ICT FAO and have been integral in making the Army program what it is today.

If you have questions or comments about the ICT program please feel free to contact me or any of my regional managers. Another great tool is the Army FAO website. www.fao.army.mil This is a great source for FAO related updates. Both the ICT Handbook and the Supervisors Guide are located on the ICT training page.

To ensure the Army FAO ICT program remains at the cutting edge, FAO Proponent continues to conduct Regional FAO Conferences. On February 28th there will be a Sub-Saharan and Middle East regional conference in Amman, Jordan. On March 6th we will be conducting an Asian Regional Conference in Tokyo, Japan and on April 28th we will be conducting the Latin American Regional Conference in Quito, Ecuador. I would like to thank the Attaché offices in Amman, Tokyo and Quito for hosting these events. I would also like to once again thank ICT supervisors for the work that they do to keep the Army FAO program strong.

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**CDR Greg H. Molinari,
FAO Officer Community Manager**




-Navy FAO Vision

In accordance with the June 2005 Secretary of the Navy approved FAO Implementation Plan, Navy has promulgated the Navy FAO Instruction (OPNAVINST 1301.10A (Nov 05)) and is on track to establish a distinct FAO Restricted Line with promotion opportunity through Flag rank. This is a single career track community and replaces our legacy dual track system. Navy has also assigned a full-time FAO Officer Community Manager (yours truly) and completed the first FAO selection board in December 2005. Navy anticipates full implementation of a single professional career track (FAO Restricted Line) no later than April 06, with initial training commencing in June 2006.



FAO LIFE CYCLE MODEL

FAO Career Model



(Continued on page 33)

Predominately, Navy FAOs will act as the Fleet, Component, and COCOM's actionable element for Theater Security Cooperation (TSC). Initially, Navy will detail FAOs to the Plans, Policy and Operations directorates overseas at Fleet Headquarters, Naval Component Commands and COCOM staffs. These officers will assume country desk duties as well as serve as the "on call" subject matter experts for theater crises and contingency operations. Acting independently when required, Navy FAOs will augment forward deployed JTF, Expeditionary Strike and Carrier Strike Group Staffs, American Embassies and coalition partners. Additionally, as part the new Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), FAOs will provide the core TSC capability available to augment Joint and Navy Task forces on a more permanent basis.

When not assigned to operational sea tours, Navy FAOs will be assigned as attachés, directors and action officers within the Offices of Defense Cooperation, Interagency Liaison Offices and the Joint and OPNAV staffs, typically assigned to the Plans, Policy and Operations

Directorates as well as the Navy International Programs Office (NIPO) and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). Figure A depicts anticipated FAO Life Cycle Model.

Now that our initial screen board is complete, future FAOs will be selected via the semi-annual lateral transfer board process. The Navy FAO instruction, OPNAVINST 1301.10A (Nov 2005), details the application process and a NAVADMIN will announce the semi-annual boards, with the next board scheduled for June 2006. If you work at a joint command that requires a Navy FAO, please contact me so that I may staff the requirement and meet your needs. Email address gregory.molinari@navy.mil and phone number is (703) 697-8761 / DSN 227-8761.

Thanks for your interest, and on behalf of all Navy FAOs, we look forward to working alongside you and benefiting from your extensive experience.

V/R
Chipper



USS Annapolis (SSN 766), Souda Bay, Crete (US Navy photograph)



USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) transit through the Suez Canal (US Navy photograph)

Air Force FAO Notes

**Colonel Robert Sarnoski,
International Airmen Program Chief**



“International Affairs Specialists to Enter Training Pipeline”

The Air Force recently selected 87 officers from a field of more than 400 volunteers to become the inaugural class of International Affairs Specialists. They will enter training this summer to become either Political-Military Affairs Strategists (PAS) or Regional Affairs Strategists (RAS).

The International Affairs Specialist (IAS) Program was established to produce a cadre of globally skilled airmen needed to achieve success in the Global War on Terrorism and today's expeditionary environment. “The vital need for these global skills is reflected in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, which promotes increased language and cultural capabilities along with enhanced security cooperation activities,” said Colonel Robert Sarnoski, Air Force International Airmen Division chief. “Fielding these skills is just as important as fielding new weapon systems.”

PAS candidates will complete a political-military affairs oriented IDE program, such as Air Command and Staff College with the PAS specialized study track or the USAF Political Advisor (POLAD) internship, while RAS candidates will earn a regionally focused masters degree at the Naval Postgraduate School and learn a foreign language at the Defense Language Institute. They will then employ their knowledge and skills by serving in key international positions at regional Major Commands, Combatant Commands, and in military-diplomatic offices at U.S. Embassies.

“RAS officers combine professional military skills with foreign language proficiency and a focused

education in regional history and international security studies to understand the specific regional context in which air and space power may be applied,” said Major Paul Tombarge, chief of the Air Force International Affairs Specialist Branch. “They can then integrate this understanding into plans and operations, and build effective relationships with our global partners; relationships that are critical enablers for our Expeditionary Air and Space Force.”

While this select group of officers will become international affairs experts, they will remain competitive in their primary Air Force specialty. “The IAS Program is designed to complement an officer's overall career development through carefully managed career broadening assignments,” said Mr. Bruce S. Lemkin, Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force (International Affairs). “Fully consistent with the Air Force's Force Development concept, we are committed to keeping these officers competitive in their primary career field while building their international expertise.”

As this inaugural class enters the IAS training pipeline this summer, Air Force Personnel Center Development Teams will begin vectoring next year's candidates. Interested line officers with 7-12 years commissioned service should indicate a preference for IAS development on their Transitional Officer Development Plan (T-ODP). Intermediate Developmental Education selects should also reflect their desires on the AF Form 3849, *PME/AFIT/RTFB Officer Worksheet*.

F.Y.I. — Service FAO POCs

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
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