



The Professional Journal of the Foreign Area Officer Association

"The FAO Journal"

International Affairs

- Politico-Military Affairs - Intelligence - Security Cooperation -

Volume XV, Edition Number 3 - Winter



STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. MILITARY ACTION IN LIBYA

- + Naval Statecraft
- + Why We Need a DATT in the EU
- + Why DLI Needs More Grammarians
- + How to Avoid an Identity Crisis in Country
- + How to Develop a Regional Knowledge Certification

PROFILE: An Advanced FAO Degree Program in San Diego

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Politico-Military Affairs - Intelligence - Security Cooperation

Volume XV, Edition Number 3 — December 2012
ISSN 1551-8094

INSIDE

06 Implications for U.S. Military Action in Libya / By Hugh L Atkinson, Lt Col, USMC

12 Why DLI Needs Native English Speaking Grammarians in the Target Language / By Spencer Stone, Intern, Political Officer in the US Consulate, Mumbai, India.

15 Serving in the Country of Your Ethnic Origin: Avoiding an Identity Crisis / By Major Jason Kim, USA

17 FAOA Waves the Flag at Intelligence Education and Training Workshop / By Dr. William C Spracher (COL, USA, RET)

19 Paper Abstracts / Combatting Transnational Criminal Organizations / PNG as an Incipient State / **Drone Wars / Britain's Nuclear Deterrent Beyond 2025 / Understanding Host Nation Support**

22 Naval Statecraft: A Summary / By CDR Brent D. Sadler, USN

24 **Western Intelligence's Great Misunderstanding: A Review of Andre Gerolymatos' Castles Made of Sand** / By Stuart Ruffin, FAOA Intern

25 Foreign Engagement & Global Coverage under the New Defense Strategy: FAOs, Security Cooperation, and the Defense Attaché System, 18-19 September 2012 / **By James "JB" Shelton, Col, USAF (ret.)**

27 FAO Graduate Education Opportunity in San Diego / By Jason Kim, Major, USA

30 Info Paper: What is the National Language Service Corps ?

32 Regional Knowledge Certification Program (RKCP) / By Cesar E. Nader (USMC ret)

38 Civil Affairs Roundtable on Security Cooperation / By Kurt M. Marisa, Colonel USAF (retired) President, Foreign Area Officers Association

39 The Case for Establishing a Permanent Senior Defense Official and Defense Attaché Position at the U.S. Mission to the European Union / Lt Col Erick A. Jordan, USAF, Air Force Regional Affairs Specialist (RAS) for Europe

DISCLAIMER

The association's *International Affairs Journal* (a non-profit publication for US Regional and International Affairs professionals) is printed by the Foreign Area Officer Association, Mount Vernon, VA. The views expressed within are those of the various authors, not of the Department of Defense, the Armed services or any DoD agency, and are intended to advance the profession through thought, dialog and academic discussion. The contents do not reflect a DoD position and are not intended to supersede official government sources. Journal content constitutes or implies affirmation or endorsement by FAOA or DoD.

PURPOSE

To publish a journal for disseminating professional knowledge and furnishing information that promotes understanding between U.S. regional and international affairs specialists around the world and improve their effectiveness in advising decision-makers. It is intended to forge a closer bond between the active, reserve, and retired FAO communities.

SUBSCRIPTIONS & MEMBERSHIPS

Subscription to the journal comes with membership in the association. Membership information may be obtained primarily on the FAOA website: www.faoa.org or by mail at FAOA, P.O. Box 295, Mt. Vernon, VA 22121 The email address is: treasurer@faoa.org Office subscriptions are also available.

SUBMISSIONS

The Association is a voluntary enterprise. For the Journal to succeed, we need articles, letters to the editor, etc. Contributors should e-mail articles to editor@faoa.org. Articles are subject to editing by the FAO Journal Staff, to ensure that space constraints of the publication are met. Further information of submissions, format requirements and assistance can be found on the FAOA website: www.FAOA.org



Dear FAO Association Members,

Congratulations to the new FAOA Board of Governors (BOG)! After the recent FAOA elections, the new FAOA BOG is now in place and organized to continue to move FAOA ahead, during its 3-year term, as the premier professional association for DoD international affairs practitioners, including FAOs, Attachés, Security Cooperation personnel, and other defense linguists and pol-mil specialists. Below is the new BOG and its five officers. Additionally, as per the FAOA Charter, representatives from the four military Service FAO proponent offices will serve as non-voting, advisory “Ex-Officio” members of the FAOA BOG.

OFFICERS

Kurt M. Marisa, Colonel, USAF (ret.): President
Jonathon Dunn, Major, USA: Vice President and Events Chairman
Graham Plaster, LT, USNR: Treasurer and Webmaster
Brian Hobbs, Lt Col, USAF (ret.): Secretary and Awards Chairman
Michael Dugan, CAPT, USN (ret.): Managing Editor

BOARD MEMBERS AT LARGE

Michael Ferguson, COL, USA (ret.): President Emeritus and Membership and Sponsorship Co-Chairman
John Haseman, COL, USA (ret.): Editorial Board Chairman
James “JB” Shelton, Col, USAF (ret.): Heritage Display and Hall of Fame Co-Chairman
Michael Trahan, COL, USA (ret.): Outreach and Chapters Co-Chairman

I’d also like to provide an update on some of the FAOA programs since the last President’s Letter. In September 2012, FAOA co-sponsored a fantastic FAO-related symposium together with the National Military Intelligence Agency (NMIA), with the title: “Foreign Engagement and Global Coverage under the New Defense Plan: FAOs, Security Cooperation, and the Defense Attaché System.” The event was an outstanding success with almost 200 registrants and high-level speakers from the intelligence, security cooperation, and FAO and defense language proponents. The speakers and proceedings of the symposium are highlighted on the FAOA website and in this journal edition.

Our Distinguished Speaker Luncheon on 29 November featuring MG Michael Nagata from J-37, Deputy Director for Special Operations was also a big success. General Nagata’s insights and candid remarks on the challenges of building partnership capacity and developing defense language capabilities clearly resonated with the 100+ attendees.

The FAO Heritage Display at the Pentagon, being done in collaboration with the DoD FAO Program Manager, the Defense Language and National Security Education Office (DLNSEO), is proceeding well. They will soon put out a call for FAO histories, stories, anecdotes, photos, and memorabilia. This long awaited display will recognize the history, development, and contributions of joint service FAO programs and individuals.

The first recipient of the FAOA Scholarship for Excellence in International Affairs, through the Military Officer’s Association of America (MOAA), has been selected. The 2012-2013 scholarship recipient is Matthew A. Robbins, who is majoring in International Relations at Liberty University in Lynchburg, Virginia. FAOA continues to solicit and accept donations to the FAOA Scholarship Fund.

CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS:

Lastly, several volunteers have stepped forward in recent months to assist with the FAOA/NMIA Symposium, the Heritage Display, and the Editorial Board. FAOA continues to need help from our members to keep our programs, activities, and Committees viable and vibrant. We are in need of additional volunteers to serve as Co-Chairman and/or members of several key committees, including the 1) Events Committee, 2) Awards and Scholarships Committee, 3) Membership and Sponsorship Committee, and 4) Outreach and Chapters Committee. Please contact me directly if you are a volunteer or with any other comments, questions, or suggestions at president@faoa.org or by phone at 703-853-0928.

Very Respectfully,
Kurt M. Marisa
Colonel, U.S. Air Force (ret)
President, FAO Association

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

is a Peer Reviewed Journal

One of the professionalization improvements made to the FAO Journal is the creation of an Editorial Board. The Editorial Board not only assists the Managing Editor in the screening, edition and selection process for content, but they also serve the critical role of elevating the journal to the status of a “peer reviewed” professional publication.

Board coordination on journal submissions is conducted via email by board members around the globe. Board members represent varied International Affairs backgrounds and all services — Active, civilian, reserve and retired.

Current Editorial Board members are:

John Haseman, COL, USA (Ret), FAO, Chairman
Graham Plaster, LT, USN, FAO
Mike Ferguson, COL, USA (Ret) FAO
Jonathan Dunn, Maj, USA

Phillip W. Yu, CDR, USN, FAO
Jeff Hoffmann, Civ, DSCA
Brian Hobbs, LtCol, USAF (Ret), FAO/RSA
Kevin Dougherty, LTC, USA (Ret), FAO

If interested to serve on the editorial board, please email editor@faoa.org

The FAO Association Writing Program

BY BRIAN HOBBS, LTC USAF (RET)
CHAIRMAN, FAO ASSOCIATION WRITING AWARDS COMMITTEE

The Foreign Area Officer Association Writing Awards Program officially began this year with five U.S. military War Colleges completing signed Memorandums of Agreement with FAOA - Marine Corps University, Naval War College, Air University, National Intelligence University, and Joint Forces Staff College.

The goal of the FAOA writing awards program is to recognize student authors who have demonstrated outstanding academic research, strategic thought, and professional writing skills on significant international or political/military affairs topics in completion of their graduation requirements.

There have been many high quality papers submitted for competition, some to be featured in the FAOA Journal and on our website. Winners receive a plaque or book commemorating their achievement at their graduation ceremonies and also receive a one-year FAOA membership.

Winning papers this year included "Drone Wars: The Legal Framework for Remote Warfare" by Coast Guard Commander Mark Vlaun from the Marine Corps War College; "State Formation and Failure: PNG as an Incipient State" by Wing Commander Darren Goldie of the Royal Australian Air Force from Air University; "Aligning for Hemispheric Defense: Synchronizing USNORTHCOM and USSOUTHCOM Efforts to Combat Transnational Criminal Organizations" by U.S. Navy Captain Robert Allen, U.S. Navy Captain Mary Jackson, U.S. Army Colonel Janice King, and Captain Jorge Palacios of the Chilean Navy from the Joint Combined Warfighting School; and "Boom or Bust: Britain's Nuclear Deterrent beyond 2025" by Commander Tim Green of the Royal Navy from the Joint Advanced Warfighting School.

We congratulate all the winners once again as well as recognize significant contributions by the selection committees and award administrators at each institution. They worked hard not only to select the winners from a very competitive group, but also diligently achieved agreements with FAOA earlier this year on joining with us in recognizing academic excellence in our field. We look forward to collaborating once again next year and sincerely appreciate everyone's hard work, dedication and sacrifice. Thank you!!

Sponsors & Partners



THE NATION'S FOREMOST ASSOCIATION



OF INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS
[WWW.NMIA.ORG](http://www.nmia.org)



USMCU - Gray Research Center



Center for Army Lessons Learned



Six3 Systems, Inc. (Six3) was founded in 2009 as a highly focused intelligence, defense, and national security company with specialized capabilities in *Intelligence Solutions*, *Cyber Security*, *Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)*, and *Mission Focused IT Solutions*.

The Six3 family is comprised of industry-leading companies including BIT Systems, Harding Security Associates, and Novii Design. Our teams solve complex problems with top-line subject matter expertise and leading-edge technology solutions to meet mission-critical requirements.

www.six3systems.com EOE



Strategic Implications of U.S. Military Action in Libya

BY HUGH L. ATKINSON, LT COL, USMC

On 15 February 2011, a civil war began to oust Muammar al Qadhafi from his 42 year old military dictatorship in Libya. By 19 March the U.S. had joined the war, fighting in support of the Libyan uprising against the Qadhafi government. In the 30 days prior to this war in Libya, the differences of opinion from members of the administration, the media, and the public was quite mixed. Some said the U.S. should not intervene, believing there was no real national interest there. (1) Others charged the president with not moving fast enough to intervene in the purported humanitarian crisis. (2) Some suggested a multi-lateral approach that shared the burden of military action.(3) Others bemoaned the loss of American exceptionalism in the way the President “led from behind.”(4) What is certain is that President Obama made the controversial decision to launch the United States into a third war in a Muslim country in ten years.(5)

Thesis

The purpose of this paper is to analyze positive and negative aspects of President Obama’s decision to participate in the war in Libya and to evaluate how it served U.S. strategic interests. The first part focuses on positive implications, the second highlights negative aspects, and the final section provides analysis using the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) as a framework to measure the strategic implications.

The Positive

To begin with, the manner in which President Obama went to war in Libya was a welcome change to the unilateral manner in which President Bush entered war in Iraq. Fueled by the events of 9/11 and the potential threat to U.S. national security, President Bush acted decisively and in a manner that at first seemed reasonable, but then began to alarm the international community. As many have pointed out, when President Bush went to war in

Iraq, he did so without a single Muslim ally and with very few international partners, which led to international criticism and isolation when things started to go wrong.(6)

In contrast, when President Obama went to war in Libya, he was following the lead of European allies and other Arab partners. To the international community, this was a major change from the Bush administration’s approach to war in Iraq. It reduced global concerns about the application of U.S. military power, and was a political win with U.S. allies. President Sarkozy of France and Prime Minister Cameron of England were the most vocal proponents for supporting the rebels in Libya, and put significant pressure on President Obama to support their interests.(7) The Secretary of Defense, National Security Advisor, and Counter-Terrorism Chief urged caution since Libya was not a national security interest and the Libyan opposition was an unknown entity.(8) Initially, the President was reluctant to use force.(9) However, as opinion in Europe and the Arab world began to coalesce against Qadhafi, Secretary Clinton joined forces with other key staff members in pressing the President to support European and Arab calls for action.(10) Consequently, President Obama elected to back European allies and Arab partners against the Qadhafi regime. Secretary Clinton admitted in a televised interview that a significant factor in the decision to go to war in Libya was that it was in the vital interests of France and England and other Arab partners. It was also a quid pro quo for key allies having supported the U.S. in Afghanistan for the previous 10 years.(11) Though controversial, Obama showed that the U.S. is a team player and would let others lead the way.

In addition to letting others lead, President Obama ensured that he had the complete endorsement of the international community prior to taking action in Libya. When the civil war began, the Qadhafi regime came under international condemnation for its retaliation against civilian population centers. On 25 February 2011 Secretary of State Clinton released a press statement which welcomed actions by the UN Human Rights Council condemning human rights violations and called for an immediate end to Libyan government violence against the Libyan people.(12) The next day, the United Nations Security Council joined the Arab League and African Union in the condemnation of the Qadhafi regime and adopted Resolution 1970. This resolution condemned Qadhafi’s use of force against civilians and human rights violations, demanded immediate cessation of violence,

The views expressed throughout do not necessarily reflect official policy or imply a position for the DoD or any other US Government agency.

imposed a travel ban on Libyan officials, established an arms embargo, and enacted an asset freeze of Libyan financial and economic resources.(13) Secretary Clinton released a press statement openly questioning Qadhafi's right to rule and urging him to leave the country.(14)

Events picked up momentum from this point on. On 3 March, the International Criminal Court announced its intent to investigate alleged crimes against humanity committed by the Qadhafi regime.(15) Two days later, the rebel National Transitional Council (NTC) declared itself the true representative of Libya.(16) Immediately following, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) expressed their support for the establishment of a no-fly zone.(17) The Arab League dispatched a request to the UN Security Council to impose a no-fly zone over Libya in order to protect the civilian population.(18) This was significant considering these organizations contain member states that could face this same kind of uprising, and yet they called for action against Qadhafi anyway.(19) On 16 March, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations indicated publicly that the Obama administration supported the establishment of a no-fly zone.(20) The next day, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, which authorized the establishment of a no-fly zone, enforcement of an arms embargo, ban on all flights and travel for Libyan officials, and the freeze of all Libyan financial assets.(21)

Immediately following, President Obama spoke from the White House and explained his guidance to the Secretaries of Defense and State to enforce this resolution. Among other things, he stated that the U.S. would not deploy ground forces and that the U.S. would not use force to go beyond the well-defined goal of protecting Libyan civilians.(22) On 19 March, U.S. participation in the war in Libya commenced.

Though the decision happened quickly, U.S. military force in Libya was employed only after a request for assistance from European allies, a request for action from the Arab League, a condemnation of Qadhafi's oppressive actions by the African Union, OIC, and GCC, a commitment from Arab allies to partner with the United States, and a mandate in the form of a United Nations Security Council Resolution authorizing the use of force for a very narrow purpose. President Obama's multilateral preconditions to go to war in Libya were in keeping with his 2010 National Security Strategy to work through international institutions and prevent atrocities. (23) The President signaled to the world that the U.S. could refrain from using its overwhelming military power in a unilateral manner outside the bounds of international norms and share the authority and responsibility with its allies. This approach was an important step in arresting

U.S. unpopularity and regaining international credibility around the world through participation in a morally compelling and internationally endorsed operation that demonstrated the U.S. had learned its lesson from the unpopular decision to invade Iraq.

A further benefit from the war in Libya was that it reinforced the momentum of the Arab Spring movement and undermined the long-standing strategic narrative against the United States in the Arab world. It presented a powerful opportunity for the U.S. to counter a long standing Arab accusation against the motives of Washington. One commentator observed, "For decades, Arabs have regarded Washington as the enemy because it has been the principal supporter of the old order... Al-Qaeda's first argument against the U.S. is that it supports the tyrannies of the Arab world as they oppress their people. Now the U.S. has the opportunity to break the dysfunctional dynamic that produces anti-American hatred and violence."(24) U.S. support for freedom fighters in Libya encouraged Arabs desperate for political change in their leadership.(25) Additionally, it demonstrated to autocratic regimes that the U.S. still has the will to oppose them and it assured those who long for the right to self-determine that the U.S. is on their side. As the President stated, "Wherever people long to be free, they will find a friend in the United States."(26)

U.S. participation against Qadhafi not only reinforced the Arab Spring, but it reinforced the legitimacy and military capability of NATO as well. One NATO Defense College author noted that the operation was a success for two reasons: NATO demonstrated its capacity to act quickly and efficiently, and proved its ability to end the engagement when the reason for the intervention had ended.(27) NATO took the lead from the U.S. just 10 days after the Security Council approved the use of force, which is significant considering how many countries had to agree in order to make that happen.(28) It not only acted quickly, it executed the campaign successfully. In 214 days, NATO flew 26,530 sorties, hailed 3,175 vessels, and performed a total of 2, 547 humanitarian movements.(29) NATO action saved the lives of many Libyans and enabled the demise of the Qadhafi regime. Furthermore, when news of Qadhafi's death emerged from Libya, NATO operations ceased within days. Ultimately, it was a successful military campaign for NATO and a boost to the credibility of the alliance.(30)

The short-term result of this war in Libya was the downfall of an internationally unpopular dictator that threatened to kill masses of his own people. The U.S. participated in the successful prosecution of an unconventional war in support of an insurgency in an Arab country without the loss of a single U.S. life. In

<< Strategic Implications of U.S. Military Action in Libya

short, it was a vindication of Obama's approach to the application of military power and a nice gain in political capital coming into the campaign season.

The Negative

There are, however, several problems raised by the Libyan intervention that present challenges for US strategic interests. To begin with, this war spawned other strategic narratives that are harmful to U.S. interests. U.S. military action in Libya begs the question of why not Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, Syria, Yemen, Iran or other countries facing oppressive regimes? As one commentator wrote, "We all want to protect civilians from Gaddafi's murderous wrath. But is there a contradiction in ordering air strikes on Libya while ignoring conflicts elsewhere?"(31) U.S. military involvement in Libya thus creates suspicion for many in the Arab world that U.S. motives are not as pure as the President claims. After all, Libya has oil reserves that the U.S. and Europe can exploit while other countries that the U.S. has not taken military action in do not. One author noted, "For months, many Arabs labeled [President Obama] an opportunist who used uprisings to his advantage in some corners of the Middle East, and ignored them when they threatened to interfere with oil markets or upend America's strategy to contain Iran."(32) Inconsistent support for democratic movements makes the U.S. vulnerable to the charge of hypocrisy. It undermines the political reform the U.S. claims to support by refusing to come to the aid of those who look to the U.S. for help and then do not get it. For example, in Bahrain, Shiite protests against the minority Sunni ruling class started in February 2011. They were forcefully contained with the help of 1,200 Saudi troops and 30 Saudi tanks. According to a human rights group, 34 people were killed, more than 1,400 have been imprisoned, and as many as 3,600 people were fired from their jobs. Since then, Bahrain has taken on the likeness of a police state.(33) U.S. tolerance toward Bahraini repression could offend a variety of Shiites outside of Bahrain and cause them to view Iran as a potential savior. (34) Inconsistent application of U.S. military support for oppressed people who desire greater freedom undermines U.S. values. It makes the U.S. vulnerable to new anti-western narratives.

Likewise, this inconsistency undermines the credibility of the UN doctrine of responsibility to protect (R2P). A debate about the international community's mishandlings of the human tragedies in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo arose during the 1990s. It culminated in the acceptance of the R2P concept by the Security Council in 2005.(35) The

69 member nations (including the U.S. and European allies)(36) agreed to: Clear and unambiguous acceptance by all governments of the collective international responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Willingness to take timely and decisive collective action for this purpose, through the Security Council, when peaceful means prove inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to do it.(37)

Responsibility implies an obligation. To take action in one country to prevent war crimes, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity and to neglect another where conditions may be more severe implies a double standard. When countries and the international community use a double standard to apply R2P, then in the eyes of many, that doctrine seems to become an excuse for military intervention in order for Western countries to pursue their own interests. Although R2P may be a noble concept, it carries with it a counter-narrative that may have negative consequences for the rescuer when unevenly applied.

Another more serious implication that the war against Qadhafi's regime created is the narrative that works against U.S. strategic interests with respect to nuclear non-proliferation. Qadhafi had a long history of support for anti-Western, anti-colonial, separatist, Islamic movements and terrorist groups. He opposed Arab negotiation with Israel and promoted armed resistance to end the Israeli occupation of Palestine.(38) During the 80s and 90s, Libya was subjected to UN sanctions and international isolation due to sponsorship of two high-profile airliner bombings. He also pursued nuclear technology.

In 1999, Qadhafi initiated an apparent transformation when he agreed to compensate victims' families for the UTA Flight 772 bombing and let two Libyans stand trial for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. Following 9/11, Qadhafi cooperated with U.S. intelligence and counterterrorism efforts. In 2003, he abandoned Libya's weapons of mass destruction and long range missile development programs and renounced state sponsorship of violent political movements. He participated in peacekeeping efforts in Africa and subsidized UN World Food Program aid flights. In 2006, the Bush Administration announced its intention to restore diplomatic relations with Libya and upgraded its Liaison Office in Tripoli to an embassy. The country was elected as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in October 2007 and even served as council president in 2008.(39)

Qadhafi responded to international pressure when he

abandoned his nuclear program aspirations, denounced state sponsored terrorism, behaved more responsibly within the international system, and pursued normalized relations with the global community. It now seems all for naught. When the bombing started over Libya, Qaddafi and his sons felt betrayed because they had complied with international demands.(40) This scenario is not lost on states that may be pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Some believe that if Qadhafi had acquired a credible deterrent, things may have turned out different for him. (41) An insightful author stated, “Qaddafi's forceful downfall will make acquiring nuclear weapons all the more justifiable to states that feel threatened by outsiders. In turn, that will erode the vision of nonproliferation that held such promise in the post-cold-war era.”(42) One should not think that this observation has escaped the leadership of Iran, North Korea or other nations waiting in line for the opportunity to acquire nuclear technology. For its part, Iran likely has no intention of terminating its nuclear power pursuits, but it now has a reason to pursue it with a renewed sense of urgency.

Another negative aspect that developed from this conflict is NATO leadership took liberty with the language of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 and pursued regime change in Libya when that was not the purpose of the resolution. Paragraph 4 of UNSCR 1973 authorized member states “to take all necessary measures....to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory....”(43) There is an intent here to limit attacks for the protection of civilians. But NATO used it to justify a seven-month bombing campaign in Libya. Just one week after requesting the no-fly zone over Libya, the Arab League questioned the tactics of western forces. Their spokesman stated that approval of a no-fly zone was based on a desire to prevent Qadhafi’s air force from attacking civilians and was not designed to endorse the intense bombing and missile attacks on ground forces.(44) In a joint op-ed by Presidents Obama, Sarkozy, and PM Cameron, they wrote that their duty under UNSCR 1973 was to protect civilians, not to remove Qadhafi by force.(45) But in President Obama’s address to the nation, he stated that the world and Libya would be better off without Qadhafi. He affirmed that removing Qadhafi from power was the goal, but through non-military means. He claimed that if the mission expanded to regime change, the coalition would splinter.(46)

But regime change is exactly what NATO enabled. One British commentator observed that once the resolution passed, Western powers interpreted it as they wanted. Officially, the intervention was to protect

civilians, but after Benghazi was secured the mission expanded and regime change became the main objective. (47) When questioned about this apparent contradiction in a press conference during the war, Obama explained that the U.S. policy was for Qadhafi to leave power but military actions were directed toward humanitarian efforts.(48) When the President offered this explanation, U.S. aircraft were bombing targets in support of opposition forces. His response revealed the political tight rope he seemed to be walking.

Speaking of a tight rope, the U.S. faces significant economic challenges and is financially overextended. The President’s decision to intercede in Libya added to the enormous price tag of U.S. wars over the past eleven years and contributed over a billion dollars to the national debt for which there is no repayment plan.(49) Furthermore, this war in Libya underscored the fact that the U.S. continues to finance a disproportionate share of NATO defense requirements. Those countries whose interests were served most and whose leaders were so adamant about military action did not possess the capability to successfully execute this campaign without U.S. participation.(50) The result would likely have been different had the U.S. not come along side to ensure its success.(51) In a recent speech in Brussels, former Defense Secretary Robert Gates delivered a stinging criticism noting that every member of NATO voted in favor of the Libya mission, but less than half participated and less than a third flew strike missions.(52) Gates warned European members that they need to be responsible for their fair share of defense and indicated that American policy makers may no longer be willing to underwrite the defense of European nations that seem satisfied with the American tax payer bearing the burden. (53) NATO members have become comfortable in the shade of the U.S. military umbrella. Some European NATO officials acknowledge the mismatch between European participation and financial contributions as compared to those of the U.S. and agree that it must be addressed.(54) But their defense spending indicates that they are in no hurry to do so.(55) For the sake of the U.S. economy, law makers should reevaluate the investment that the U.S. makes in NATO, and the President ought to resist the temptation to participate in wars that are of only peripheral interest to the U.S.

Not only did this war put the economy at further risk, U.S. participation in this war put the credibility of U.S. foreign policy at risk. Michael Doyle describes three traps liberators fall into when they attempt to free those who cannot free themselves. One trap is the formation of a new tyranny with another ideological label attached. Another trap is the creation of another civil war. The final trap is

<< Strategic Implications of U.S. Military Action in Libya

the establishment of a colony.(56) To explain, if the leadership that arises from the aftermath of this rebellion turns out to be antagonistic toward U.S. interests, the administration will be to blame for removing an actor that was behaving somewhat responsibly in the international arena and replacing it with something worse. Or, if the new Libyan government develops into an administration that cannot gain the support of the people, then a civil war could develop again. In order for it to retain power, it will have to use force. It would then be open to the same narrative used against the Arab ruling class today. The new government of Libya could be labeled a client state of Western imperialism. This could lead to further acrimony toward the U.S. and western allies. For this reason, it may be wise for the administration to detach itself from Libya altogether and make a clean hand-off to our European friends to assist with Libyan post-revolutionary development. Regime change is not an end state. It is only the beginning of unpredictable consequences, as we learned in Iraq.

Finally, speaking of unpredictable, by elevating the authority of the UN Security Council over that of the U.S. Congress, the President reinforced the expansion of the Imperial Presidency. One observer noted, "In his effort to forge a new, more multilateral model for intervention, Obama had succeeded in securing the backing of NATO, the United Nations and the Arab League. But the White House had done little to line up the one U.S. body that is actually vested with the constitutional authority to authorize a war: Congress."(57) President Obama is not the first one to do this. It has become a presidential trend since WWII.

This is a constitutional issue with strategic consequences that must be readdressed in this country. The President should not be handed the latitude to launch the United States into war in a unilateral manner without approval from Congress. It places the U.S. at great risk. The U.S. Congress must reassert its constitutional power to be the declarative body for U.S. war-making.

The Framers recognized the President has the authority to defend the United States against invasion or attack or imminent threat. However, the Framers never intended for a U.S. President to make a unilateral decision to initiate war. The President knows this. During his presidential campaign, he affirmed, "The President does not have power under the Constitution to unilaterally

authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to the nation."(58) Yet, as President, he has followed suit with his predecessors and stepped beyond his Constitutional authority.

Military action in Libya was not in response to an imminent threat to this nation nor was it self-defense. U.S. actions in Libya are at best a peripheral interest. Administration officials argued that U.S. military action in Libya was not really at war because Libyan forces could not exchange meaningful fire. They imply that the President can employ drones and missiles without having to bother with Congress.(59) This decision further entrenched the precedent that the President can take the country to war without prior approval from the U.S. Congress and this has strategic consequences. It is a trend in presidential decision making that undermines the national decision making process as framed by the U.S. Constitution. Unless this flaw is corrected, future presidents could take the nation into war where no war is required and the consequences could be catastrophic.

"U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THIS WAR CREATED COUNTER-NARRATIVES AGAINST THE U.S."

Implications for National Security Strategy

Having examined several positive and negative aspects of U.S. participation in the war in Libya, it is important to consider what it all means for U.S. strategic interests. In the 2010 NSS, President Obama identified four enduring national interests: Security, Prosperity, Values, and

International Order.(60) Considering these four categories, did the war in Libya strengthen U.S. strategic interests or put them at further risk?

First, consider security. The war in Iraq alarmed U.S. allies and adversaries because of the manner in which it was pursued. It created a reaction against the U.S. that if left unchecked could have further isolated the nation. The manner in which President Obama went to war in Libya was an important part of checking that isolation. The U.S. took a less threatening posture, supported the interests of allies only after unanimous international approval, and gave the lead to NATO. Also, by supporting the Libyan rebellion, President Obama undermined a popular narrative against the U.S. with respect to supporting oppressive regimes.

However, U.S. involvement in this war created counter

-narratives against the U.S. The first is one of hypocrisy. The U.S. took military action in Libya, but nowhere else. U.S. values and interests seem to be the same only when it is convenient. Secondly, and much more seriously, is the narrative that works against nuclear non-proliferation. This is a vital interest for the U.S. and its allies. This war very likely could encourage those seeking nuclear weapons to pursue them with renewed urgency. Third, there is no guarantee that Libya will become a democratic, pro-western nation. It may become an adversary yet again. It remains to be seen. Finally, the President committed the U.S. to another war without the consent of Congress. This further solidifies the precedent that the decision to go to war rests in the hands of one individual. That is a big risk for national security.

Next is prosperity. It will take time for reconstruction and development, but this war opened up new opportunities for U.S. and European markets in Libya. Oil is the biggest prize and European companies will reap the greatest gain.(61) The war in Iraq cost the U.S. significantly in terms of blood and treasure, but the 7-month war in Libya cost less than one month in Iraq and not a single U.S. life was lost.

However, Libya is not a large economy and any new opportunity is unlikely to make a substantial impact on U.S. markets.(62) Furthermore, even though the cost of this war was a fraction of other conflicts, it only added to the snowballing national debt and did nothing to arrest the economic uncertainties facing the U.S. The return on investment is not there. Additionally, this war highlighted the unbalanced investment the U.S. has made in NATO as compared to European partners. The NSS states that the foundation for U.S. strength and national security is a thriving economy. It is difficult to see how this war reinforced this important strategic interest.

What about U.S. values? This war prevented Qadhafi from killing many of his own people. It brought an end to the Qadhafi dictatorship and created the possibility for a free Libya. Furthermore, it reinforced the Arab Spring and encouraged those who seek self-determination that the U.S. may support them.

On the other hand, the U.S. failure to lend military support to movements similar to the one in Libya makes the U.S. vulnerable to the charge of hypocrisy and undermines U.S. values. Furthermore, the U.S. leaders emphasize that they supported a democratic movement, but that movement could turn out to be something much different. The chance that Libya will turn out to be a pro-western democracy that supports U.S. interests is yet to be seen.

Finally, consider international order. The manner in which the President prosecuted this war in Libya reinforced the credibility of several international organizations to include the UN, Arab League, African Union, GCC, OIC, and NATO. By supporting the NATO

lead in this war, the U.S. lent credibility to NATO as a war fighting and political alliance.

However, without the U.S. support, NATO could not have succeeded in this war effort. Without a greater investment from European allies, the U.S. is just propping up a weak institution. Additionally, to assert that the world had a responsibility to protect the Libyan people, but not others that face the same threat, undermines the R2P doctrine. It is considered by some to be nothing more than a façade for western nations to create proxy states that serve their interests. Finally, by taking license with UNSCR 1973, NATO members took advantage of the intent of the resolution and undermined their own credibility. This gives Russia and China a convenient excuse to veto future efforts to use force. And since the President has shown that the authority of the Security Council overrides the U.S. Congress, this in turn weakened the U.S. within the international system by granting other nations leverage over U.S. actions.

Conclusion

The war in Libya created very positive short term effects. A dictator is gone. The people of Libya have an opportunity to improve their country. It cost much less than Iraq or Afghanistan. There was not a single U.S. casualty. And the manner in which it was fought arrested U.S. unpopularity and curbed global concern over its use of force.

However, it created long term consequences that outweigh the immediate benefits. It did not improve U.S. security. Rather it put the future of U.S. security at further risk. It did not improve U.S. prosperity. It revealed an over investment in NATO and increased the national debt. It did support U.S. values, but only in a limited way. Finally, this war demonstrated a U.S. commitment to and reinforcement of international organizations. But in applying the R2P doctrine to Libya and taking license with UNSCR 1973, the U.S. weakened its credibility and gave Russia and China leverage over future U.S. military action.

Overall, the negative aspects outweigh the positive ones and only time will tell how it works out for Libya.

About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel Hugh L Atkinson is a Marine Corps aviator assigned to the Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL. He graduated magna cum laud from the University of Memphis in 1992 with a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering. He was a 2008 distinguished graduate from the Air Command and Staff College and a 2011 graduate of the Air War College non-resident program. He earned his wings in 1995 and has 2,900 flying hours in the T-34, T-45, F/A-18, and KC-130F/R/T/J.

Why DLI Needs Native English Speaking Grammarians in the Target Language

BY SPENCER G. STONE, *INTERN, POLITICAL OFFICER IN THE US CONSULATE, MUMBAI, INDIA.*

Rand recently published a study at the direction of the Air Force to determine why certain military occupational specialties were experiencing high attrition rates and to provide suggestions to reduce these rates (“Reducing Attrition in Selected Air Force Training Pipelines,” Manacapilli, et.al., 2012). Far East and Middle East Linguist, among other USAF military occupational specialties, were included. The study states the DLPT pass rate for students who start training in these MOSs, to include attrition during the course, is approximately 50%. It concludes with several possible causes: course expectations are possibly too high, the courses are too demanding, and enlisted personnel are not qualified enough to endure the rigor of these courses. As a recent graduate of DLI, I was disappointed to see that Rand did not include my language, as the pass rate is much lower.

As a USAF RAS in the training pipeline, my next stop after DLI was a six-month immersion. As it turned out, I was delayed due to family and visa issues. During the delay, I was assigned to the DLI department chair of my recently studied language and was asked to do some research on the high attrition rate. We discussed a few ideas prior to beginning: the material and vocabulary presented later in the course was far above what was required to pass the DLPT; we were not receiving a good foundational vocabulary; and the grammar was not presented in a manner conducive to forming a strong foundation in the language. I did not realize how obviously important the third point really was until the first day of my RAS immersion.

After arriving at my immersion location I wanted to jump into the language instruction as quickly as possible. The instruction was to be for five hours a day, solo—nowhere to hide, production in the target language (TL); I started 10 hours after I got off the plane. Although I had built up a fairly large vocabulary, many simple words with great grammatical significance were still missing, making speaking a struggle. Continued review of the DLI curricu-

lum, off the shelf grammar materials (very good with minutiae) and several other purchased resources were not helping. I needed a grand overview of the grammar structure and a base vocabulary, a foundation I could build on, not poetic sayings that were good for dinner parties.

My language instructor grew up in Chicago speaking my TL. He then went on to get very well educated in the theory and methods of language instruction, with grammar as his specialty. It only took him a few minutes of the first hour of the first day for the light bulbs to start flashing. The much-needed grand overview of the language was being formed: structure, how the word order was modified based on emphasis, why a conjugation differed in a specific instance and how all those little and very important everyday words were used. Many of the grammar points that previously seemed convoluted and out-of-joint while at DLI suddenly made perfect sense. I again looked at the DLI materials as well as my purchased materials; they all failed to explain what I believed was the common sense approach to the basic concepts of the language—concepts that this instructor easily conveyed. If my present instructor could relate this material so effortlessly, why couldn't DLI?

My newfound understanding of the language and the points that were raised during my initial conversations with my DLI department chair brought back some memories as a prior-service linguist. I believed they were related; however, I was unable to fully piece together the parts into a comprehensive picture until I gathered more information. As a prior linguist, my job was to ensure the best translation, *in English*, as possible. While the native speakers could catch the nuance in the TL and read between the lines, they were often unable to translate this into proper English while the native English speakers translations were much better. What faculties did the native speaker have that I did not and vice versa? What was missing?

I decided to dig into some books. Between what I was learning from my immersion language instructor and theory, I came up with a few items that appeared to be the missing pieces in my latest DLI experience: the environment for the instruction, a good foundation of beginning vocabulary and grammar, the overall goal of the language acquisition and how the material is taught to the students. Rand suggests valid changes to lessen the environmental stressors but the remaining factors are equally as necessary to increase success.

Environment:

DLI does an outstanding job of fulfilling many of learner's basic needs by having native language speakers teach

the language. Weinreich, one of the founding theorists in second language acquisition, argued that any proper study of language must include basic internal facts of the TL as well as the descriptions of the communities in which the language is spoken. I think Weinreich would be proud of the intercultural environment that is reproduced at DLI, as the vast majority of the language instructors are native speakers. From a cognitive well-being aspect, almost all of the major linguistics theorists agree, in differing terminology, that stress, anxiety, personality type and “mental blocks” are prohibitive factors in learning a language.

Foundational Vocabulary:

Linguistic research boils down to a few main points about vocabulary: 1) basic level words should be taught first; 2) some words may be taught through components of meaning (root words in Arabic, Latin, etc.); 3) it is how the word is practiced, not how often, that is important; 4) teaching should not separate words from their structural context. My latest DLI experience did not fare well in this respect: we were consistently given vocabulary words with no examples of usage, words were frequently repeated in vocabulary lists and words that were of high frequency were buried in the lessons and not on any vocabulary lists. In light of this, I searched for and found a list of the 5000 most common words (from the The Center for Research in Language Processing) as well as “core” word lists (most common 100 words found in various frequency studies) in the TL. I then wrote a Perl script to compare the words in this list to the words in the 48 week DLI curriculum. Without going into great statistical detail of the results, most of the “core” words were never introduced in the vocabulary lists and a good portion of the vocabulary that was introduced was outside of the list.

Process:

Quite possibly the most frustrating aspect from my latest experience at DLI was the confusion: I constantly struggled in the TL—I had no broad overview of the language with which to build from. We were introduced to grammar features and vocabulary but there was never a grand structure or overview of the TL to lay the foundation—there never seemed to be a logical progression. Usage was, more or less, left to the students to figure out on their own. A couple of theories were extremely enlightening in this respect: Interlanguage and Universal Grammar.

Interlanguage is the language that is between learner’s language (L1) and the TL. It is constantly evolving towards the TL as the learner advances their skills. I felt that my Interlanguage had become a mess of right and wrong as I did not adequately understand nor was I receiving the needed proper instruction to advance my language ability. I didn’t know what I didn’t know about the lan-

guage and neither the instructors nor the curriculum were adequately moving me along or making the corrections.

While Interlanguage provided great insight about my experience at DLI, Chomsky’s concept of Universal Grammar (UG) is the most relevant to the first few hours with my immersion language instructor. Cook states in a 1985 *Applied Linguistics* paper: “...an adult native speaker of a language knows things he could not have learnt from the samples of speech he has heard; since this knowledge is not based on his experience of the world, it must come from some property inside his own mind.” Cook uses the examples “Is the programme that is on television any good?” and ‘Is the programme that on television is good?’” to demonstrate. A native English speaker may have never heard either of the example sentences but the acquired UG gives enough clues to immediately determine which sentence is correct.

UG is the umbrella in which our language usage is guided. Poor habits and incomplete instruction will delay the acquisition of UG and confuse Interlanguage. Since my immersion language instructor was a native speaker of both English and my TL, his UG in both languages was well established. Further, he was able to explain in great detail, in English and the TL, how the TL is structured, its most important features and where and how the details fit in. Further, grammar instruction leans heavily on the side of teaching grammar to adults as a necessary prerequisite to learning a second language—a fact that was present both at DLI and on my immersion. However, the immersion language instruction was a top down perspective that filled in the details when necessary, further affirming the basic structure of the TL. The DLI instruction introduced grammar points as a matter of schedule without any logical progression.

Finally, If we look at Stephen Krashen’s theories, the study of grammar is effective when the TL is being used for the instruction *and* the teacher has the skill set to use the TL as the medium. Only when necessary should the instruction revert to English, knowledge of which is required at an intimate level. This was the strong point of my immersion instructor: he was able to explain, in as much detail as I ever could desire, the most granular portions of the language. There was never an explanation of “Well, that is just the way it is...”

My immersion instructor was able to provide the umbrella that was needed in the TL in very explicit English when necessary—a point that I never received the entire time I was at DLI. He provided a corpus of the most common words with expectations of mastery, engaged in conversation at my level, made immediate corrections in the TL when I made a mistake and, as he so happened to be

my in country manager, arranged excursions that furthered my language ability. It was a logical progression that was based on building a strong grammatical foundation with appropriate vocabulary and exercises to match.

In contrast, DLI is able to provide an environment that involves the cultural aspects of the TL but is lacking in practice on several of the theoretical aspects. Students in any interlingual stage need to have proper grammar fundamentals stressed through verbal, written and aural usage. The homework should be an extension of the concepts that have been covered. Answering questions about a story is good, writing a story with known and recently learned grammar and vocabulary is best. Perhaps most lacking during my recent DLI study was the lack of English UG in the instructors. If I posed a question in English about how to say X or specifics of a grammar feature, I was often given several different answers based on which teacher I was talking to, one often contradicting the other. I was also often told: "Well, that is just the way it is...". This does not bode well for the concept of UG and encourages bad habits that get "burned in" in students' Interlanguage.

All students in CAT III and CAT IV languages spend a week reviewing English grammar and terms so as not to delay the TL schedule. On the first day at DLI, we were told to ask questions of the teachers so as to not "burn in" bad habits. Language learning at DLI walks the fine line between acceptance of the material as "...that is just the way the language is..." to basic and sometimes conflicting explanations of the grammar features. In my experience, accepting a grammar feature in the language, as "...that is just the way it is..." is not an acceptable answer and requires access to external resources that will hopefully clarify the point. All DLI instructors must have the capability to clearly, concisely and in several different manners, explain the intricate grammatical details of the TL in English and the TL. Furthermore, corrections must be made immediately and on the spot so as not to disrupt the acquisition of UG and burn bad habits into our Interlanguage.

How does this get accomplished?

Until there is a comprehensive DLI-produced curriculum that is superior to what is available off the shelf, the off the shelf materials should be used and fully incorporated until exhausted. Proper development of Interlanguage and UG for each student is an absolute necessity; incorrect, incomplete, contradictory and substandard materials should not be allowed in the classroom. Instructors who are unable to adequately teach the grammar in English also have little use in the classroom as they may present bad information that becomes a matter of confusion for the student.

Incorporate tools that are empirically based to help language learning. DLI distributes CDs to all students that

have several language learning software packages developed by Transparent Language. Most significant and widely used among these is Rapid Rote, a flashcard program. The concept of the software is brilliant; however, the implementation is severely lacking: it does not accommodate all but a single operating system as distributed by DLI (only for Windows), is incredibly slow and has no empirical basis for the presentation of the material. Furthermore, many of the included language lists distributed by Transparent Language through Rapid Rote are just plain incorrect and/or confusing. I sent several emails to Transparent addressing these issues and only received a single reply. Transparent did not address any of my questions or comments.

A much better software solution is Anki. Anki is an open source software package originally built for language learning. It will synch all learned material across the most common computing platforms (cell phone/tablet: iOS, Android; computer: OS X, Windows, Linux). Among its many features, it allows flashcards to be built through a system of models and templates, allowing for any combination of sound, TL, English, reference material or any other user-defined field to be added to the card. Once the models and templates have been set up, import of the data is extremely easy. The software is free for the desktop while the mobile version (Android, OS X) is \$15. I purchased this software and use it on my iPhone daily; the synch capability alone has been worth every penny. Anki also uses an empirically based algorithm for retention of the material and will show statistics of the covered material to users as well as those authorized to see it. Anki is cost effective, empirically tested and feature rich. Rapid rote is not.

Lastly, a corpus based on texts at the expected levels of development should be developed and placed into the facilitation software, such as Anki, for rapid memorization as well as continued reinforcement of the grammar features. Usage notes are key to understanding a grammar-heavy language—these are also easily written into the facilitation software. The material should be presented in its single form, such as a vocabulary word or phrase, as well as in a sentence so that usage can be determined and UG can be more readily achieved.

The Rand study cites several factors that would encourage better performance: removing stressors and possibly changing the end of course metric away from the DLPT. However, from a theoretical point of view, there are several other factors that should be given attention to increase the success rate: a comprehensive corpus, a logical grammar teaching method and progression and an overview of the language. This can be achieved through using off the shelf language study materials while filling in the gaps with complementary materials written by DLI. Writing a

new curriculum for a new language is essentially re-creation of the wheel and is a poor use of resources.

My immersion instructor on my first day, stated: “Language is a code. The code of each language is different, for some it is grammar, others, it is an ideographic system of writing or spelling.” He is absolutely correct. DLI is one of the foremost language schools in the world and its job is to deconstruct this code into bite-sized chunks that can be swallowed in bites on a daily, weekly and monthly basis. The goal of DLI is to train linguists while being the best stewards possible with taxpayers’ dollars—it must make necessary changes to ensure the best-trained linguist are sent to the field.

Spencer G. Stone is currently on immersion as part of the USAF Regional Affairs Specialist program, working as an intern as a Political Officer in the US Consulate, Mumbai, India.

Serving in the Country of your Ethnic Origin: Avoiding an Identity Crisis

MAJOR JASON KIM, U.S. ARMY

Long before selection as a Northeast Asia FAO, I served in the Republic of Korea (ROK) as a Military Police Lieutenant. As an MP speaking the host nation language and of Korean ethnicity (born and raised in Los Angeles), I found myself assisting senior officers and commanders with many unit functions and events, and assumed more duties requiring direct interaction with host nation law enforcement personnel as well as regular citizens on a daily basis. One can imagine the multitude of police issues that arose: from off-limits establishment disputes and contested tickets to more serious Status of Forces Agreement jurisdiction cases, a plethora of engagements placed me as interpreter, translator, cultural advisor, and often times all three. I realized quickly the importance and utility of language proficiency and cultural competency firsthand, which also strengthened my interest to pursue the FAO path. However, while serving in the ROK I encountered potentially problematic situations as a result of my ethnicity, and I wish to share these with the FAO community. Not only FAOs but also other service members that are assigned to overseas locations with similar ethnic conditions could face the same as a result of their ethnicity. This is even more likely now with

the regionally aligned force concept in addition to existing state partnership programs. A caveat I wish to emphasize is that my experience by no means is universally applicable for every country or ethnicity. I share these experiences only so that service members can glean relevant considerations from a ROK context that can be applied to their own environment. These considerations, however small, may help service members to maintain their identity while assigned to the country of their ethnicity.

Ethnicity does not equate to cultural competency

The ROK consists mostly of a homogeneous population of ethnic Koreans. There are many U.S. service members of ethnic Korean descent that serve honorably in the country. However, simply being Korean does not mean one is competent in the driving forces of the beliefs and behaviors of the population. Although this may be apparent to Koreans living stateside, I found that many ROK citizens, particularly government and military officials, assumed that because I was a service member that spoke the Korean language and read *Hangul*, I was knowledgeable on the customs, courtesies, history, and political climate of the country, to the degree that an ordinary Korean citizen would. Engagements of both an official and unofficial nature revolved around my contextual understanding of these issues relevant to our mission in the country. My upbringing did expose me to a certain extent to the customs, courtesies, and baseline history, but other aspects important to fully understanding Korean culture such as modern history and politics I acquired through individual study. Pouring *Soju* (Korean alcoholic drink) with two hands and enjoying *Bulgogi* (delicious Korean barbequed beef) are but a small slice of Korean culture, and one should not claim to understand it in whole because of their familiarity with the social aspects, however enjoyable.

To be culturally competent, one must take the time to

achieve a practical understanding of the other disciplines that are influential to the formation culture in the host nation: language, history, economy, sociology, politics, and especially in the ROK's case, security. Achieving even a baseline understanding of these areas will provide valuable insight into the general beliefs and behaviors of host nation citizens. For heritage speakers, efforts should be made to improve weaker areas such as military terminology, higher-level vocabulary, and writing skills that are not normally emphasized in household communications. If these subjects were not studied during formal schooling there are many time and cost effective methods to pursue them on an individual basis. Reading Don Oberdorfer's *The Two Koreas* and Bruce Cumming's *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History* provide an excellent foundation that covers most of the important topics with good breadth and depth. In addition, a myriad of language resources from grammar workbooks to audio recordings are available to strengthen language proficiency.

Going native is a slippery slope

Being of the same ethnicity and race of the host nation, it is very easy especially out of uniform to be viewed as a local even among those host nation individuals in which a professional working relationship exists (for example, one's combined staff counterpart). These individuals are usually happy to extend the customs and courtesies – especially social courtesies, shared amongst their own family and friends. In the ROK most host nation individuals feel proud that a Korean-American is serving in the U.S. military helping to defend their country. Many will view the service member as one of their own, commensurate to the degree the service member lets them. Herein exists a susceptible area attributed to ethnic and racial commonalities that must be acknowledged and carefully assessed.

What I argue is not distancing with a host nation individual or insensitivity to their social norms or values. The last thing we want is for our hard earned trust and working relationship to suffer with any partner nation. The problem to avoid is overly and overtly close association with host nation counterparts that extend beyond the professional and acceptable social realms. In such a state, boundaries become blurred to the point one is expected to understand behavior or requests because he or she looks, acts, and closely relates as a fellow local national would. Unique senior-subordinate relationships, professional duties extending into the social realm, and acceptable business practices in the ROK are areas frequently encountered that require social tact and smart discretion by a U.S. service member. I need not mention the ethical or moral dilemmas that could arise, and it all begins with

something as simple as violating curfew or accepting favors. One should participate in social events in moderation, cultivate personal relationships with professional responsibilities in mind, and never forget they are there to accomplish a military mission.

I witnessed many situations where service members grew accustomed to social norms and the way business was performed, forgetting that they represented the U.S., and associating more closely with the operating norms of the host nation. This may be *perfectly legal* and *socially acceptable* within the host nation, but as U.S. service members we are also held accountable to our own laws and regulations. Although cultural tact is important to cooperate with a host nation and to a certain degree one should do as the Romans do to facilitate partnership, there clearly is a line that is not crossed. Anyone having served in Korea the past decade will be all too familiar with several examples, some even making national headlines, each with the common theme of an individual that sank too closely into the way things were done in the ROK and failing to realize U.S. legal consequences. Serving in the country of one's ethnic origin is a privilege that should not be abused. Forgetting that we are there not only representing the interests but also adhering to the values of the country whose flag is worn on our uniform will only accelerate our slippery slope descent.

The one-trick pony doesn't fare well

Commanders and staff often heavily utilize many service members serving in the country of their ethnic origin that are also proficient in the local language. Rightfully so; cultural awareness and language proficiency are valuable skills that enable commanders to better understand the operating environment and interact more effectively with host nation counterparts. However, it is important to note that utility solely for these skills detracts from the overall professional development of service members. Depth but also breadth of experience is important. During my time in the ROK, I witnessed service members serving multiple year tours in-country, often within the same duty position or unit. No doubt they were important assets to their commands for their abilities, but I suspect their overall professional development in the Army's broader operational footprint suffered to some degree. Continuity is an important benefit, but serving in the ROK five consecutive years limits other opportunities given the Army's rather large global footprint. The heart of the matter here is reflected in the mentality for FAOs as regional experts and not country-specific officers. In-country experience, broader regional experience, and higher-level staff or agency experience round out the different but equally important engagement levels for a region that FAOs undertake. A key consideration also ex-

ists for commanders and staff that rely on such individuals. Not only should they bear in mind overall professional development considerations, but also avoid cultural or language proficiency skills masking other deficiencies that require improvement on part of the individual. The one-trick pony concept does not fare well even for FAOs who are the most closely focused cadre of service members on a specific region and certainly does not for a basic branch service member.

Conclusion

This article and its examples are by no means all-inclusive and universally applicable to countries. However, I am confident that these considerations could manifest themselves in similar form or fashion within each country's cultural context. An identity crisis exists when one begins to feel he or she has unique insight into the host nation's populace with the belief that other U.S. service members, whether peers, subordinates, or supervisors lack the ability to understand simply because they are not of the same ethnicity. This type of thinking is faulty and detrimental to good order and discipline. Maintaining one's identity as a U.S. service member first and foremost while balancing personal relationships as part of the professional mission, con-

sistent with Army Values, will garner individual and collective respect as a military from the host nation.

About the Author:

Major Jason Kim is a U.S. Army FAO and currently attending the Command and General Staff Officer Course at Fort Belvoir. Upon graduation he will serve as the U.S. TRADOC Liaison Officer to the Headquarters, Republic of Korea Army Training and Doctrine Command located in Taejon, South Korea. Major Kim's basic branch is military police and he has served in a variety of assignments to include company commander, garrison executive officer, military advisor, and combined/joint operations officer.



He holds a Bachelor's degree in Information Systems Engineering from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and a Master's degree in International Affairs with a dual concentration in Japan and Korea from the University of California San Diego. His research interests include security of the Asia Pacific, North Korea policy, and Japan-South Korea military capabilities.

FAOA Waves the Flag at Intelligence Education and Training Workshop

BY DR. WILLIAM C. SPRACHER (COL, USA, RET)

The Foreign Area Officer Association took advantage of a unique networking event on November 15, 2012, to showcase its programs and benefits by joining with several other professional associations that promote intelligence learning. A 1-day workshop called "Intelligence Education and Training Day," co-sponsored by the National Military Intelligence Association (NMIA) and the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE), was held at the Northrop Grumman facility in Fairfax, VA.

With the aid of other organizers from the local chapters of NMIA and IAFIE, the undersigned recruited the presenters and acted as emcee for the event. Panel moderators came from the ranks of the recently reincarnated NCR Chapter of NMIA and the only slightly older Washington Area Chapter of IAFIE. NMIA has been in existence for nearly four decades, having been founded in 1974 by a group of primarily active duty Army MI officers. The first NMIA President was LTG (USA) Vernon Walters, the legendary military attaché and master linguist for whom FAOA's new writing award for international affairs-focused master's theses at the National Intelligence University (NIU) was named. IAFIE was founded in 2004 by a group of governmental and non-governmental academics who saw a need for improving intelligence education. The DC area chapters of these two organizations have emerged in the last few years to reach out to a broader audience by holding totally unclassified events. This was the first joint venture between IAFIE and NMIA, though FAOA partnered with NMIA in sponsoring a 2-day symposium in September 2012 that explored the theme "Foreign Engagement & Global Coverage under the New Defense

Plan: FAOs, Security Cooperation, and the Defense Attaché System.”

The November 15 workshop was kicked off with a provocative keynote address by Mark Lowenthal, Executive Director of IAFIE and the President of the Intelligence & Security Academy, LLC, a private educational consulting firm located in Northern Virginia. He also is a former Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Intelligence Analysis and Production, and has taught as an adjunct at Johns Hopkins and Columbia Universities. Dr. Lowenthal set the tone for the day by offering his perspective on where intelligence education and training are headed in a budget-constrained environment in which some high-level consumers are questioning the efficacy of Intelligence Community assessments and how well the IC supports policy and decision-makers.

The keynote address was the only individual presentation of the day. All the other speakers participated in interactive panels, prompting a robust exchange with the audience consisting of a diverse group of over 110 people—faculty and students; military, civilians, and contractors; government and non-government types; NMIA and IAFIE members; plus quite a few non-members interested in the teaching of intelligence and in meeting others sharing their concerns. The first panel was moderated by Dr. Susan Studds, currently NIU Provost and former Assistant Vice President for Academic Affairs at NDU. Senior representatives of ODNI, DoD (USDI), DHS, and the IC Analysis Training and Education Council (ICATEC) discussed educational policymaking and strategic planning. Of note, one of the panelists was the Chief Learning Officer for ODNI and thus in a position to influence the direction of the entire IC. The second panel featured a sampling of representatives from the many IC schoolhouses. Those participating included the CIA University’s Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis, NSA’s National Cryptologic School, the FBI Academy, and DIA’s Joint Military Intelligence Training Center. The latter’s representative is also the program manager for ODNI’s IC Centers for Academic Excellence, which provides seed money for national security and language programs at a number of diverse civilian schools throughout the country. The next two panels explored intelligence education programs at, respectively, traditional (brick & mortar) civilian colleges and universities and non-traditional (primarily online) universities. Those heavily involved in the first category which provided spokespersons included George Mason University, James Madison University, the University of Maryland-College Park, Mercyhurst University, and the U.S. Coast Guard Academy. The second category was represented by American Military University (AMU), the University of Mar-

yland University College (UMUC), Henley-Putnam University, and the Advanced Technical Intelligence Center (ATIC). The Institute of World Politics (IWP), somewhat of a unique hybrid focused less on educating theorists and more on practitioners, was also on the panel and sponsored an exhibit table alongside other tables run by AMU, Henley-Putnam, NIU, FAOA, and a couple of others which kept the workshop attendees engaged during breaks.

The final panel of the day included a number of professional/private associations that count promotion of intelligence education and training as one of their key missions. Representatives of IAFIE, NMIA, FAOA, the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA), the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO), the International Education Foundation (INEF), and the U.S. Geospatial Intelligence Foundation (USGIF) explained their organizations’ goals and their programs supporting education and training. Many of these associations indicated the need to partner more frequently with each other to support the IC as governmental funding becomes tighter. For example, NMIA has organized activities in the last couple of years not only with IAFIE and FAOA but also with the Association of Old Crows (AOC). AFCEA has established a foundation to support NIU and part of that effort will be restarting the University’s dormant alumni association. The USGIF strongly supports the National Geospatial-Intelligence College, whose rep unfortunately was unable to attend due to emergency leave. Of course, FAOA has developed student writing awards and scholarships benefiting several senior service colleges and other academic institutions. Cooperation and collaboration, not competition, are the wave of the future, and this richly illuminating workshop on intelligence education and training demonstrated just that.

Anyone interested in learning more about this event and/or accessing promotional materials provided by the various reps should go to the NMIA and IAFIE websites at www.nmia.org and www.iafie.org, respectively. In addition, one of the two 2013 editions of NMIA’s *American Intelligence Journal* will examine the theme “*Intelligence Education and Training*.” Any FAOA members interested in contributing should contact the undersigned at William.Spracher@dodis.mil or (202) 231-8462.

Dr. William C. Spracher (COL, USA, Ret)
Faculty Member, NIU
Founding Member, FAOA
President, Washington Area Chapter, IAFIE
Secretary, National Capital Region Chapter, NMIA

Aligning for Hemispheric Defense: Synchronizing NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM Efforts to Combat Transnational Criminal Organizations

CAPT BOB ALLEN, UNITED STATES NAVY
CAPT MARY JACKSON, UNITED STATES NAVY
COL JANICE KING, UNITED STATES ARMY
CAPT JORGE PALACIOS, CHILEAN NAVY
FACULTY ADVISOR: LT GEN (RET) CUNNINGHAM

Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) pose a significant and growing threat to national and international security. Transnational organized crime and illicit trafficking aggressively seek to undermine governments and institutions throughout Latin America. This proliferation has generated a significant surge in violence in the region, to include the United States. Violence and crime are symptoms of a larger climate of insecurity throughout the region. TCO penetration of Central American states is deepening, leading to co-optation and further weakening of governance in many others. Terrorists and insurgents, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), are turning to TCOs to generate funding and acquire logistical support to carry out their violent acts. International terrorist groups, including Hamas and Hezbollah, have also reportedly funded terrorist activities through linkages formed with TCOs in South America. While the crime – terror nexus is still mostly opportunistic; this threat is critical, especially if it involves the successful criminal transfer of WMD material to terrorists or their penetration of human smuggling networks as a means for terrorists to enter the United States. TCOs and their illicit trafficking activities clearly pose a national security threat to the nations of the Western Hemisphere. The role of the Department of Defense (DoD) in the *National Strategy to Combat Transna-*

tional Crime, specifically U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), is not clearly defined despite the Geographic Combatant Commanders' (GCCs') responsibilities for homeland defense and security cooperation in Latin America, the nexus of TCOs' activities impacting U.S. national security. The role of the military is principally focused on addressing the *supply* component of the illicit trafficking problem presented by TCOs, while the *demand* component of illicit trafficking is considered as a domestic law enforcement and health care challenge. Regardless, the current (GCC) construct is not optimized to address these threats which cross borders and undermine the stability of nations, subverting government institutions through corruption, breeding violence, and harming citizens worldwide. The threat neither respects international borders nor the boundaries between U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). Without a comprehensive, whole of government approach to combat the illicit trafficking activities of TCOs in the Western Hemisphere, U.S. Government response will remain fractured, allowing an adaptive enemy the opportunity to exploit gaps and seams in counter illicit trafficking efforts. NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM, along with regional partners, must achieve a unity of effort to provide a defense in depth against the illicit trafficking threat posed by TCOs. In order to achieve this objective, the U.S. will need to fundamentally realign its military command and control structure in the Western Hemisphere.

EDITOR'S NOTE:

THIS THESIS WON THE FAO ASSOCIATION AWARD FOR WRITING AT THE JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE. THE ASSOCIATION IS PLEASED TO PROVIDE THIS SCHOLARSHIP TO THE FAO ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP.

Boom or Bust: Britain's Nuclear Deterrent Beyond 2025

TIMOTHY COOPER GREEN,
COMMANDER ROYAL NAVY

Britain's submarine launched nuclear deterrent is due to go out of service by 2025. The final decision to procure and replace it with a new system has been delayed until 2016, the latest decision deadline the procurement timeline will allow. The decision to replace the British deterrent is beset with challenging questions. Britain has over one trillion pounds of national debt. The Ministry of Defence needs to make severe cuts to its already shrinking budget. The 2016 decision to replace the deterrent submarines will cost a 25 billion pound sum that is currently unallocated. The Conservative and Liberal parties within Britain's coalition government have opposing views on nuclear weapons. Contemporary global threats are ambiguous with regards to the relevance of nuclear weapons. Finally, Britain's only nuclear submarine base in Scotland is in jeopardy from an anti-nuclear Scottish regional government that is making great strides towards a 2014 referendum on Scottish independence. The debate on replacing Britain's nuclear deterrent is a difficult and uncomfortable problem that the coalition government does not wish to confront in the current parliamentary term.

The thesis of this paper is that Britain must take a positive decision by 2016 to continue Britain's nuclear deterrent if it is to guarantee national security into the middle of this century.

Overseas Military Bases: Understanding Host Nation Support

JEFFREY J. DRAEGER, CDR, USN

Overseas military bases have played a prominent role in support of United States security interests since World War II and particularly during the Cold War. While basing requirements have changed in the wake of the Cold War, it is clear that a forward U.S. defense posture, including overseas bases and security partnerships, will remain essential to exert strategic influence, enable global access and project power when necessary. Globalization, fiscal constraints and the evolving threat landscape all present challenges to maintaining a network of forward bases. While it is important to assess overseas basing options in terms of operational requirements and value, their establishment and utility in times of crisis depend on host nation consent and support. Therefore, understanding host nation interests and concerns when it comes to the presence of U.S. forces is critically important. Prompted by observations of the globalization phenomenon and an operational experience that highlighted the complexity of base hosting decisions, this study seeks greater awareness of the determinants of host nation hospitality. By examining overseas bases in Ecuador and Saudi Arabia that were ultimately rejected by those host nations and a third installation facing sharp opposition in Japan, the complex nature and relevance of host nation perspective is brought to light. These insights may inform future basing strategies as well as the diplomatic, military and economic engagement on which they depend. The investigation shows that economics can play an influential role in host nation decision-making. Moreover, it finds that the greatest threat to establishing and maintaining overseas bases may be U.S. policies and deliberate or unsanctioned behavior as interpreted within the political context of host nations.

FAOA NEEDS YOUR HELP:

We are soliciting for more stories, histories, photos, and international memorabilia for the FAO Heritage Display at the Pentagon. The goal is to have the display completed by the end of March 2013. Forward comments by 11 January 2013 to Mr. Jeff Hoffmann at faohistory@gmail.com

Drone Wars: The Legal Framework for Remote Warfare

COMMANDER MARK R. VLAUN,
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

On 2 October 2011, Anwar Al-Awlaki, the leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and several associates rode in a pickup truck toward a meeting in Northern Yemen. In a violent explosion of twisted steel and burning gasses, the vehicle and its occupants perished in a flash. Al-Awlaki and his acquaintances were the target of a U.S. drone strike - one of nearly 300 strikes to occur in hostile regions throughout the globe over the last three years. The drone, which can be flown remotely from thousands of miles away, is silent, precise and lethal. As such, the drone has fast become the weapon of choice for the United States in a war against violent extremism. Available to all, the drone will most certainly be on the battlefield of the Next War.

The conditions under which drone use is acceptable as a tool to target and destroy those who haunt the globe under the shadow of terror, is hotly debated among academics, government lawyers and practitioners. Who can operate drones, what constitutes a lawful target, and even what law should be applied are a few of the complex issues that are still largely unresolved. Drone use must be examined in light of International Humanitarian Law, the Law of Self Defense, Criminal Law and the secretive Law of Covert and Intelligence Operations. This broad application of battlefield law will shape the risk-based decisions of policy makers, as it will inform target selection, location of drone activity and which government or private organizations may lawfully operate drones.

Ultimately, this paper will conclude that kinetic drone strikes are a lawful instrument of war, supported by domestic and international law. However, each drone strike must be considered in light of its own circumstances with the understanding the precedent set by U.S. drone use today will establish the legal principles that will govern drone activities of our allies and our enemies tomorrow.

State Formation and Failure: PNG as an Incipient State

WING COMMANDER DARREN J. GOLDIE,
ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE

States ‘fail’ and ‘collapse’ and can be ‘weak and ‘fracturing’, yet these terms say little for the capacity of a nation to uphold its sovereign responsibilities; to maintain a monopoly over the use of violence and protect its civilian population. This paper offers an alternate term to characterize states facing similar challenges and introduces a flying metaphor – extending Rostow’s take-off model for societal development, while proposing a state “flightpath framework” with the introduction of the term *incipient state*.

Papua New Guinea is used as a case study of a nation in the incipient stage of flight. This paper forecasts a successful, yet muted recovery from its current security challenges. The combination of unique socio-cultural aspects of PNG society and improved infrastructure and services through improved economic conditions, will provide a stable platform for the prevention of state failure and a more positive flight path for the future.

CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS:

We are in need of additional volunteers to serve as Co-Chairman and/or members of several key committees, including the

- 1) Events Committee,**
- 2) Awards and Scholarships Committee,**
- 3) Membership and Sponsorship Committee**
- 4) Outreach and Chapters Committee.**

Please contact me directly if you are a volunteer or with any other comments, questions, or suggestions at president@faoa.org or by phone at 703-853-0928.

Naval Statecraft: A Summary

CDR BRENT D. SADLER, USN

With China's Xi Jinping's recent U.S. visit the question of how to confront a rising and potentially hostile peer competitor has once again become a popular topic. However, limiting the discussion to China is shortsighted, especially if U.S. economic viability is considered. Looking out to 2050, potential challenges to U.S. continued freedoms and prosperity require a more long range and wide ranging strategy to ensure U.S. security. I devoted some time at the National War College researching this question by looking into the influences emerging markets will have on maritime security. It started as a fairly narrow project, but soon expanded to include how best to respond to this changing maritime world. What I found is an approach best called *Naval Statecraft*:

Naval Statecraft is a coherent approach to foster global economic growth by developing markets to support continued U.S. prosperity. The assumption is that only through economic growth will stability take hold and trade and therefore prosperity for the U.S. persist. Maritime trade is key to global trade and the U.S. Navy is a vehicle on which this economic development can be accelerated. It can do this by developing the infrastructure for maritime security by forward basing at first, and then by attracting infrastructure investment provide the basis for expanded trade beneficial to the U.S. market as well as the global economy. The approach provides security benefits to all parties - ensures safety of commerce with a forward based naval presence that provides the U.S. a cost-saving, timely and flexible means of responding to crises. In seeking greater regional involvement the U.S. will be exposed to *Base Politics* with host nations, and have to navigate the challenges of regional animosities.

Naval Statecraft is recommended due to the complexity and uncertainty that several forces are creating looking out to 2050:

1. **Economic development fostered through globalization will result in a more diffuse world of state power** - the U.S.'s absolute power will not necessarily recede but other states' power will grow. The inherent interconnectedness of globalization will engender greater trade dependant on cheap shipping and reliable, fast communications.

Because so much is invested in global trade today, the likelihood of a concerted attack on the shipping networks and undersea fiber optic cables by a state actor is unlikely. This is because of the inability to isolate effects of such attacks to a single targeted actor/state - shipping carries cargo for multiple and often changing destinations and the construction of the fiber optic networks is so interconnected that severing one segment has significant downstream affects.

However, as already seen in the past 20 years, economic crises and financial volatility will become more pronounced, requiring coordinated global efforts to overcome. Trust between states on several levels will be required to put in place the coordinated efforts increasingly needed if mercantilist tendencies are to be avoided - trust is being built and questioned as the world's financial institutions struggle to recover from the 2008 *Great Recession*.

2. **Challenges for continued economic growth and prosperity include a host of issues that threaten the shipping and communications that globalization is currently built upon.** By all accounts, the shipping industry currently has the capacity to meet a growing world economy with a surplus today in tonnage. However, fuel prices and the need to take advantage of volumes of scale for profit, means larger hull ships that necessitates major infrastructure improvements in order for many of the world's ports to remain competitive. In some cases, such as in the East Coast U.S, the draft and crane support needed for servicing such large vessels will give way to new shipping patterns - hub and spoke as smaller vessels ferry cargo to shallow water or more remote ports.

While piracy does cost shipping, the overall cost to the major shipping firms is minimal making this a livable problem. That is unless a politically charged event such as the killing of Americans or seizure of sensitive cargo demands prompt retaliation. Efforts at anti-piracy today will not solve the problem without addressing the poor governance and economic dislocation that fosters it ashore.

A more sinister and destructive challenge to economic growth is illicit trade and the corruption it fosters which scares off investment and limits economies by suppressing human potential to innovate. Indications are from this research that the scale of illicit trade is in the hundreds of billion of dollars and represents a measurable portion of global trade.

“Only through
economic growth
will stability take hold ...
and therefore prosperity
for the U.S. persist”

3. The rise of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) states will drive competition for resources and the seeking and developing new and profitable markets.

The opening of the Arctic will be an opportunity both for access to resources and cheaper shipping lanes between East Asia and the North Atlantic economies. While there is ample speculation as to when or if the Arctic will ever be totally ice free (best conservative estimates are by 2050), there is clearly efforts by many players at preparing the area for development and safe navigation led largely by the Russians.

Like Arctic shipping routes, the Panama Canal's expansion will also help BRIC states' meet their needs for access to resources and markets for trade necessary for continued growth. To this end, expect continued and expanding Chinese investment in the Caribbean and South America aided by an expanded canal.

The impact on the U.S. of both the Arctic shipping routes and Panama Canal expansion will be a decoupling of the East and West coast economies, unless transshipping costs can be reduced relative to shipping via the Panama Canal and potential Arctic routes.

Also, all of the BRIC states are building significant naval capabilities with an eye to protecting their maritime investments and trade. This need not be a threat to U.S. interests, but matched with these state's restrictive interpretations of UNCLOS and mercantilist tendencies, it does pose a potential long-term threat to U.S. security and prosperity.

Confronting this future through 2050 will require tough choices confounded by several limitations:

One, budget constraints in the near term that will limit the manpower available and capital for investing today in preparing for and countering the above trends.

Two, as economic and military power becomes more diffuse and the global economy continues to be increasingly bound together, the need for knowledge (intel, cultural awareness) and the ability to preempt or respond to crises will increase. Crises in this case refer to war, natural disasters, small scale interventions with respect to illicit activities/terrorism.

Three, self defeating isolationist and protectionist tendencies at home in a world where continued U.S. prosperity will be driven by success in global trade in resources and finished products.

To best confront the challenges of emerging markets and safeguard U.S. prosperity through the maritime commons the following is proposed:

1. **Build a balanced fleet** that includes a segment of shallow draft vessels with small crews that can be forward based, and developing a small fleet of Arctic capable vessels. Adding these capabilities to the fleet should be done

while retaining (though with fewer hulls) the power projection provided by larger deck vessels.

2. **Seek forward basing** or unit exchanges with host nations in key regions (Gulf of Guinea, Bay of Bengal/Arabian Sea, Coral Sea/Sulu Sea) where maritime security is weakest and economic development is most likely to be successful and have a region wide impact.

3. **Coordinate forward basing with economic development** initiatives in concert with USAID/Department of State (DOS) in an open approach that seeks participation by other likeminded navies/militaries and multinational organizations. While this is a maritime centered approach, the U.S. Marine Corps and the other services' involvement is in fact sought. As for multinationals, the World Trade Organization's (WTO) "Aid for Trade" program is one potential partner in fostering maritime trade in targeted host nations. Effective coordination of *Naval Statecraft* will require an invigorated relationship between Department of Defense (DoD) and DOS/USAID centered on the country team's Chief of Mission and associated Combatant Commanders.

Thankfully there is an example for what could be called *Naval Statecraft* underway in Djibouti. The security provided by several states' navies/militaries has attracted over \$200 million dollars in investment annually since 2005. This investment has grown the local economy and expanded infrastructure connecting Ethiopia and soon Southern Sudan to maritime trade. By taking the lessons already learned in Djibouti within a coherent multi-department strategy - *Naval Statecraft* - it can be applied in other regions to safeguard U.S. interests in a cost effective manner.

The cost of neglecting the challenges posed by emerging markets in the form of increased resource and market competition will result in a reduction in the quality of life at home. Only by safeguarding the principles of free trade and open seas can trade be expanded by developing new markets. This effort safeguards U.S. continued prosperity while allowing for the peaceful and prosperous rise of emerging markets.

Pursuing an isolationist, or a less extreme form of disengagement inherent in *Offshore Balancing*, may not save much in reduced defense costs. As the U.S. increasingly relies on overseas markets, the uncertainty engendered by a reliance on regional powers will necessitate more not less interventions, requiring a sizeable and expensive large deck fleet and expeditionary force capable of rapid deployments. To say nothing of the challenge in motivating the public to support rapid interventions in otherwise neglected corners of the world.

Western Intelligence's Great Misunderstanding: A Review of Andre Gerolymatos' *Castles Made of Sand*

BY STUART RUFFIN

The study of Anglo-America intervention in the Middle East has undergone a drastic expansion in the post-9/11 world. While this expansion has created an overwhelmingly vast literature on the topic, Andre Gerolymatos' *Castles Made of Sand: A Century of Anglo-American Espionage and Intervention in the Middle East* is a profoundly interesting and unique contribution to the field. Its atypical focus, coupled with the author's bold writing style, works to distinguish this book from others like it. While most authors choose to analyze the seminal events of the region from a political standpoint, Gerolymatos focuses on the intelligence organizations, operations, and leadership that shaped these events. The result is a truly unique and informative new understanding of the story.


Pulling data from an extensive collection of official records, scholarly reports, and personal accounts from important actors; Gerolymatos' argues that the past century of Western espionage in the Middle East is marked by a deliberate strategic effort to harness the power of "political Islam" through convenient alliances with various Islamic political organizations, including militant and extremist groups. In the short term, the material support given to these groups played into the West's goals of undermining Arab Nationalist and Communist movements in the region. In the long term, however, these policies served as catalysts for militant and extremist forces that have since spun out of control. The fundamental flaw in this strategy, the author claims, emanates from the Western nations' consistent oversight of the aspirations of the religious organizations that they supported and their strong propensity to misjudge and misunderstand "the significance of the Caliphate and the degree to which political Islam could serve the interests of the West."

Gerolymatos never shies away from sensitive issues and fills the book with bold assertions, backed by over seventy pages of footnotes and citations. In particular, his discussion of Americans employing former Nazi intelligence agents and frequently providing plausible deniability to intelligence leadership is both interesting and, occasionally, disturbing. While these and other descriptions are incredibly thorough and make for an interesting read, the level of secrecy inherent to intelligence organizations creates important gaps and conflicts in the description of some events. In part because of these gaps, some of the book's boldest assertions are difficult to confirm and often contradict other accounts of the referent event. Gerolymatos usually includes the dissenting opinion(s) in his retelling, but it is always clear which account he prefers.

The structure of the book, while confusing at first, is actually brilliant and entirely logical upon review. Its opening chapters chronicle the rise and fall of British intelligence capability in the region, exploring major intelligence entities individually and reintroducing relevant actors and organizations from previous chapters as they reappear. While occasionally redundant, this serves the important function of allowing each chapter's event(s) to be explained and understood without relying on the reader to make connections between chapters. The book hits a clear inflection point in chapter twelve when discussing to the downfall of British Intelligence in Egypt. Here, the preponderance of the discussion moves from British intelligence organizations to their American counterparts. That this inflection point also marks the start of the Cold War is no mere coincidence and the change in the global context is

evident throughout the rest of the book.

All told, Andre Gerolymatos' *Castles Made of Sand: A Century of Anglo-American Espionage and Intervention in the Middle East* is an intensely interesting read that offers new insight into intelligence organizations and operations in the region. The author's strong inclination to make bold assertions makes this book both interesting and uncommonly entertaining. It should certainly be considered a worthwhile read for anyone interested in the West's covert activities in the Middle East.



Foreign Engagement & Global Coverage under the New Defense Strategy: FAOs, Security Cooperation, and the Defense Attaché System, 18-19 September 2012

JAMES "JB" SHELTON, COL, USAF (RET.)

On the 18th and 19th of September 2012 the Foreign Area Officer Association (FAOA) and the National Military Intelligence Association (NMIA) co-sponsored a 2-day symposium focused on "Foreign Engagement and Global Coverage under the New Defense Strategy: FAOs, Security Cooperation, and the Defense Attaché System." The event was based on the premise that as the United States begins to refocus and rebalance its Armed Forces, the importance of diplomatic and mutual security cooperation, as well as global intelligence coverage, is certain to grow.

The objective was to engage FAOA and NMIA members and supporters throughout industry and government by providing in-depth information touching on a broad range of foreign engagement and global intelligence coverage subjects while providing an opportunity to dialogue on the emerging and the most pressing subjects of the day. The proceedings were conducted at the Secret/NOFORN classification level at the TASC Inc. Heritage Center in Chantilly, Virginia. Although the NMIA and FAOA have long standing collaborative agreements, this was first event they have co-hosted. The event was attended by over XXX Government, Military, and defense industry men and women.

The program featured military and government community leaders and proponents, expert presenters, panels, and dynamic attendee participation across a broad range of intelligence, diplomatic, and security cooperation topics, including current and evolving policy, operations, and training of the Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA) Defense Attaché System, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Joint-Service Foreign Area Officers, and Defense language-region-culture programs. Also presented were detailed briefings on the Human Terrain System; the evolving role for the Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT) function; and the new Defense Clandestine Service (DCS).

The Strategic Framework

Following the welcome and conference overview by LTG James A. Williams, USA (Ret.), Chairman of the

Board, NMIA, and MG Edward Leacock, Army National Guard, Mobilization Assistant to the Director, DIA; and TASC Program Manager, LTG Michael T. Flynn, USA, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) provided a broad assessment of the contemporary global strategic environment. General Flynn's presentation focused on the multiple impacts of accelerating change and the consequences for training, organizing, and, in general, anticipating and responding to tomorrow's challenges.

His comments mirrored the evolving strategic thinking reshaping the Defense Intelligence Agency and the broader Intelligence Community. Citing Thomas Friedman (New York Times columnist and author) and Michael Mendalbaum's recent book: That Used to Be Us: How America Fell Behind in the World It Invented and How We Can Come Back as an excellent reference and good place to begin to understand the many forces impacting and shaping our defense and security missions. These forces include accelerating globalization and the growth and many impacts of information technology, the consequences of widespread debt and associated social and economic turmoil.

General Flynn also outlined a number of ongoing Defense initiatives based on the demands of accelerating change including enhanced integration across the IC, new approaches to defense analysis, and the upsizing of training, and the operationalization of intelligence. He articulated his Vision 20/20 priorities for DIA of which the top three were the standup of the Defense Clandestine Service, improving recruiting and retention, and the reshaping of Defense analysis to meet the needs of the emerging global environment, an environment characterized by non-traditional threats, non-military security challenges running the gamut from cyber security, terrorism, economic upheaval, and criminality as well as the traditional topics pertaining to war and peace. His assessments and comments aptly established a strategic framework in which the ensuing presentations could be assessed and compared to the broader objectives of both the IC and the foreign area communities of interest.

The Defense Attaché System and Security Cooperation Missions and Issues:

With the broad strategic assessment in hand the focus shifted to the Attaché System and an overview of the Attaché System "Forward." RADM Bradley R. Gehrke, USN, Director, Defense Counterintelligence and HUMINT Center and former Defense Attaché to China provided background and assessment of the Senior Defense Officer (SDO) and Defense Attaché. He provided details of his experience as a pioneer of the SDO concept and his assessment that the in progress program is being favorably met and reviewed every-

where it's been tried.

The SDO update was followed by Mr. Richard Genaille, Deputy Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), who provided a detailed look into the role of security cooperation in foreign engagement, primarily through specific programs that both strengthen collaboration, and serve to build foreign partner capabilities, capabilities that in turn enable a broader and more detailed range of shared engagements that serve each of the Combatant Command's mission needs. Mr. Genaille provided a detailed look into the evolving international sales environment, DSCA's evolving roles and responsibilities, and overview of security reform initiatives and FMS related improvement programs.

Rounding out the first day's focus on the DAS and Defense Cooperation was Mr. Jeffrey Jore, Senior Intelligence Officer(SIO), DIA/DXA-5 Latin America Division, and RADM Douglas Venlet, Director of International Engagement, HQ Navy OPNAV N52. Mr. Jore provided an overview of the evolving role of the DAS in Global intelligence coverage illustrated by Latin more regional focused assessment while Adm Venlet detailed his personal experiences as the first Navy SDO, life as the DATT in Russia, and an upbeat assessment of the SDO concept, in particular, and the evolving Naval Foreign Area program.

Setting the table for the afternoon's more Training, Education, and Career Management focused agenda, Mr. Richard Anderson, from the newly minted Defense Language and National Security Education Office (DLNSEO) (a merger of the Defense Language and National Security Education offices within the DoD Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness) highlighted recent work shaping FAO and Language Policies for the future. He detailed initiatives to provide minimum standards of language proficiency and cultural competency, as well as academic standards and regional experience.

The afternoon program focus more on foreign area education, training, and career management and featured a detailed look at a Special Operations program to enhance stability operations using Aerial Terrain Mapping. Mr. Glenn Nordin, Foreign Language and Area Advisor, OUSD(I) addressed a host of the most pressing issues associated with Foreign Language Skills development and Area Knowledge requirements, including the need for greater focus on the most needed languages and enhancements to the current foreign language incentive programs that will emphasize and reward attainment and retention of high levels of target language proficiency.

The first day was capped off by a Service FAO Proponent Panel with representatives from each of the service

FAO proponent offices, including Lt Col A. J. Werner, USAF, SAF/IA, IAS Branch Chief; LtCol Anthony C. Bolden, USMC (FAO/RAO/PEP); LTC Paul DeCecco, USA, Deputy Chief DAMO-SFF; and Capt (Sel) Elizabeth A. Thomas, USN, Chief. The panel was moderated by COL Humberto (Rod) Rodriguez, USA, DoD FAO Program Oversight, DLNSEO who led a very animated discussion focused on the various service paths being taken toward common Defense goals in language, region, and cultural expertise. The wide range of perspectives highlighted the very different approaches being taken by each of the services, the differences in emphasis on Foreign Area expertise, the varying career management strategies, and the significant difference in Service experience in managing dedicated Foreign Area components.

Kicking off Day Two's proceedings, Col Kurt Marisa (USAF, Ret), Foreign Area Officer Association President reviewed the FAOA's upcoming programs, including FAOA's collaboration with DLNSCO in the building of a museum quality display in the Pentagon that will highlight, educate, and inform the public about the Foreign Area Officer mission and contribution to National Defense. The second day's program brought further review of Day One's themes and issues while emphasizing the COCOM's perspective and introducing the Defense Clandestine Service (DCS) and the National Guard Bureau's (NGB) State Partnership Program.

Key noting the day MajGen Richard Lake, USMC, Deputy Director of the National Clandestine Service for Community HUMINT (NCS/CHMO) and Senior USMC FAO focused on the FAO role in global intelligence coverage and Defense partner engagement. The presentation was at the Secret precluding a more detailed exposition in this forum; however, Gen Lake made it clear that the thinking animating the development and implementation of the DCS is based on the objective need to engage directly with the foreign partner, in his language, and in his environment. Emphasizing this point he quipped that "virtual presence is actual absence".

The morning's programs included LTC Jason Weece, USA, Director, FAO Program Office, Defense Language Institute-Foreign, who provided an update and look into the future of DoD linguistic training; and Dr. Mark Ahles, Deputy Commandant and Dean of Academic Affairs, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), who gave a detailed update on training the Security Cooperation workforce. Mr. Steve Chill, DOTMLPF Integrator, Human Terrain System (HTS) Program gave a detail filled review of TRADOC's human terrain and cultural intelligence. He was followed by Ambassador Asif Chaudhry, Foreign Policy Advisor to

FAO Graduate Education Opportunity in San Diego

BY JASON KIM, MAJOR, U.S. ARMY FAO

The University of California San Diego (UCSD) offers a top-tier graduate education program that is designed very effectively to support the advanced civil schooling requirements of FAOs across all services. The Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies (IR/PS) offers a Master of Advanced Studies in International Affairs (MAS-IA) degree. Developed as an executive master's program for mid-career professionals possessing five or more years of work experience, the program is educating its third cohort of professionals since its creation. Although a newly established degree program within IR/PS, the graduate department itself was founded in 1986 and has a prestigious history of educating and training more than 1,900 global postgraduate students who hold leadership positions in business, government, and nonprofit organizations throughout the world. The MAS-IA degree is ideally suited for FAOs concentrating in countries in the Pacific region or the Americas.

Degree Flexibility

The MAS-IA degree has many appealing features both for prospective FAO graduate students as well as respective service proponent/branch managers supervising the FAO training phase. The degree can be completed in nine months (three quarters) of full time study and consists of 48 required units. In place of a thesis, students conduct a final quarter capstone research project on a real world major policy issue. In an already lengthy training phase for most FAOs, the MAS-IA degree program can be flexibly sequenced into a training timeline as opposed to a full 12 or 18-month degree program. As a result of an in-depth full time academic schedule to complete the degree in nine months, FAOs should expect to devote time for quality, focused study outside of regularly scheduled classes. The MAS-IA degree, although shorter in length than other similar programs, does not omit any core requirements, elective offerings, or regional concentrations one would expect to

find in a reputable international relations graduate program. Additional flexibility is provided through a rolling applications process after early and standard deadline periods allowing prospective FAO applicants who may be deployed or serving in remote locations ample time to complete admissions requirements. As a program dedicated toward supporting career professionals, the staff and faculty are very accommodating to the unique requirements and situations of military personnel.

Requirements Breakdown

The degree curriculum offers both depth and breadth in subject areas that are aligned to the professional arenas that FAOs are likely to serve in. FAOs enrolled in the program first choose from five career tracks: international relations, international political economy, international public policy, environmental policy and sustainability, and security of the Asia Pacific. Each track has core course requirements that drive the foundation of study. Regional electives are then selected to further explore the regional area of concentration, and FAOs may choose to focus on one or more of the following: China, Japan, Korea, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. Finally, to ensure adequate flexibility and enough specificity to meet training requirements, FAOs must choose additional elective courses across the overall IR/PS course catalog to complete their degrees. A FAO may be an MAS-IA candi-

date in the International Relations track with regional concentrations in Japan and Korea, and elective courses in China and U.S. Foreign Policy. FAOs may also utilize the flexibility in electives to study subjects such as conflict and terrorism, strategic studies, or defense policy that would complement a security-centric focus. Regardless of the combination of track, region, and elective courses, FAOs will find plenty of opportunity to tailor a curriculum that is both personally rewarding while professionally supportive to future service.

Dedicated to Asia and the Americas

As the only school in the University of California system dedicated to Asia and the Americas, IR/PS stands

"This program at UC San Diego IR/PS is a superb opportunity for FAOs and those military members considering this career track. With experience as former commander of both USPACOM and USCENTCOM, I strongly endorse the MAS-IA program as the best way to leverage a rich educational experience in regionally focused areas of study with advantages in location (San Diego), curriculum flexibility and cost."

William J. Fallon

**Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)
IR/PS International Advisory Board**

among the top graduate schools worldwide in international relations and is a full member of the Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs (APSIA). FAOs can expect to study with superb faculty members that are professionally accomplished and renown in international circles. For example, during the fall quarter I had the opportunity to study under Professor Stephan Haggard who taught a very informative class on Korean Security involving the armistice, U.S.-ROK Alliance, and proliferation issues with North Korea. The professional relevance and applicability of the course to a Northeast Asia FAO was invaluable. Professor Haggard serves as the Chair of the MAS-IA degree program and the Korea Pacific Program at IR/PS. He often provides commentary on current developments in the Asia-Pacific, particularly Korea, and on the politics of economic reform and globalization. I also completed a core course on Politics of International and National Policymaking, which included a China module taught by Professor Susan Shirk. Professor Shirk serves as the Chair of the 21st Century China Program at IR/PS and previously served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State. As evident by these examples, students gain access to stellar faculty members through their informative classes and far-reaching networks with leaders in government, industry, and non-governmental organizations.

Diverse Cohorts

Within the MAS-IA degree program it is not uncommon to find foreign diplomats, ministry officials, and other U.S. military officers. It is almost certain that a FAO enrolled in the program will find one or more classmates that are government representatives of the host nation countries in which they will serve in or be involved with in the future. This unique mix of professionals allows for the creation of invaluable networks that will support FAOs throughout their assignments.

In addition to the experiences inherent pursuing the MAS-IA degree, several other programs within IR/PS provide further enrichment and collaboration opportunities for FAOs. The Global Leadership Institute (GLI), which also oversees the MAS-IA degree, serves as

the executive education unit within IR/PS and is host to hundreds of government and industry professionals enrolled in certificate programs and non-degree coursework to enhance their careers. Other degree programs include the Master of Pacific International Affairs (MPIA) degree geared toward recent undergraduates, and a highly selective PhD in Political Science and International Affairs offered jointly with the UCSD Political Science Department. FAOs pursuing the MAS-IA degree at UCSD attend classes with students from all other programs and can expect to learn in a collaborative and experience rich environment.

Quality of Life and Recent Initiatives

For many FAOs family support is critical, and the location of many colleges and universities suited for FAO graduate education are often distant from military activities. Fortunately, FAOs attending UCSD will find an abundant support network throughout San Diego. Prominent facilities such as Naval Base San Diego, North Island -Amphibious Base Coronado, Naval Medical Center Balboa, and Marine Corps Air Station Miramar are all within a 30-minute drive from UCSD. Personnel services, MWR facilities, medical care, commissary, and exchange access are readily available.



The Geisel Library is an iconic landmark on the UCSD Campus named after Audrey and Theodore Geisel (Dr. Seuss).



The IRPS pavilion and classrooms are where students spend the majority of their time.

ble throughout the San Diego area at numerous facilities.

Several recent initiatives have strengthened the relationship between IR/PS and the military community. The Army FAO Proponent approved UCSD and the MAS-IA degree as an approved program for FAOs to pursue. In addition, IR/PS received approval as a civilian graduate institution for the Navy's Political-Military 680 Curriculum (National Security/International Relations and Diplomacy). These two approvals highlight the quality of the program and applicability to FAO-related duty requirements.

An area of improvement that could hopefully be addressed in the near future is the tuition cost. Because this program falls under the Army's medium cost school category, not all FAOs may be eligible for a medium cost quota thus reducing potential applicants. A possible solution would be to work a proponent level agreement with IR/PS to offer university or department scholarships that would subsidize the cost difference, similar to Boston University's mid-career international relations program.

Another area to strengthen is the working relationship with the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) faculty in the School of International Graduate Studies (SIGS). Collaborative activities involving the University of California Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC), which performs leading social science research on topics such as nuclear nonproliferation, terrorism, regional security, and international security institutions would benefit both schools' security centric curricula.

In conclusion, the MAS-IA degree program is a superb option for FAOs or related career field officers applying to graduate programs as part of their training requirements. Proximity to military support activities is a unique feature that not many institutions have, and the quality of life is unquestionable in San Diego. As FAOs concentrate on their studies they will also find plenty of opportunity to enjoy the numerous attractions and activities local to the

area as well as the greater Southern California region. Those wishing to apply or obtain additional information may contact Dr. Darla Wilson, GLI Director at darlawilson@ucsd.edu or (858) 534-4019, and Mrs. Renate Kwon, MAS-IA Degree Program Coordinator at rmkwon@ucsd.edu or (858) 534-7420.

About the author:

MAJ Jason Kim is a U.S. Army Northeast Asia FAO currently attending CGSC at Fort Belvoir. He received his master's degree from UCSD IR/PS with a dual focus on Japan and Korea in 2012 and was the first FAO to apply to the program. He previously served as Company Commander, NTC Military Police Company, Fort Irwin prior to selection into the FAO Corps. Upon completion of CGSC he will assume duties as the U.S. TRADOC Liaison Officer to the Republic of Korea Army TRADOC stationed in Taejon. MAJ Kim previously served in the 2nd Infantry Division as an MP Platoon Leader and Operations Officer as well as in the U.S. Forces Korea Provost Marshal Office from 2003 to 2006.

Article continued from pg. 26 >> Foreign Engagement & Global Coverage under the New Defense Strategy: FAOs, Security Cooperation, and the Defense Attaché System, 18-19 September 2012

... the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), who gave an outline of his personal experience serving the CNO as a political advisor and the range of benefits to accruing to country teams for the Dept of State's POLAD program.

The afternoon program featured a detailed presentation of the SDO/DATT & DAO/SCO cooperation and Integration policy and vision given by Mr. Roman Hrycaj, Col, USAF (Ret), OUSD(I) – HUMINT, and Mr. Paul Gendrolis, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). This was followed by a comprehensive review of the graduate-level and advanced Joint FAO Education and FAO web site. Mr. James Howard, Joint FAO Program, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Post Graduate School (NPS), provided insight and detail to these important education programs and the web gateway to the many support and reference repositories available to FAO community.

The remainder of the program featured a look at the JCS support to Security Cooperation and COCOM's presented by Brig Gen Maryanne Miller, USAF, JCS/Deputy Director for Partnership Strategy. Mr. Jack Dees, Chief, Security Cooperation Division (CCJ5-SC), USCENTCOM, provided further review of the role of security cooperation and the Attaché in CENTCOM's engagement mission. The final presentation featured a very detailed exposition of the thinking behind and the approaches to the establishment of the DCS. For man of the attendees this was the first exposure to organizational structure and operation philosophy of this new capability.

Info Paper: What is the National Language Service Corps ?

The National Language Service Corps (NLSC – www.NLSCorps.org) is a civilian corps of volunteers with certified proficiency in languages important to the security and welfare of the United States. NLSC members serve anywhere using their diverse language skills to support needs across all federal agencies. The opportunities for service include language support such as interpretation, translation, analysis, training (instruction), logistics activities, emergency relief activities, and language support services in support of Federal Government domestic and international activities wherever language skills are needed. Some members may have clearances or may be clearable.

The NLSC is a cost-effective solution to the uncertainty in management of foreign language support needs within the US Government (USG) enterprise for operations, plans, and workforce requirements. It provides a surge capability from individuals who are not generally available to the Government by tapping into our nation's population of highly educated professionals who speak hundreds of languages critical to our nation's needs.

FACTS ABOUT THE NLSC

- ◆ Nearly 4,000 Members worldwide and 258 languages to support USG requirements.
- ◆ The NLSC is a true corps of language capable individuals who identify themselves as NLSC members.
- ◆ Members are motivated by the chance to serve and give back to the nation.
- ◆ Members generally must possess ILR 3/3/3 Proficiency (Listening/Reading/Speaking) in a foreign language and in English.
- ◆ Approximately **15,400** work-hours provided in FY12.
- ◆ **48** missions complete (15 OCONUS), **2** on-going (CONUS), and **60** requests and queries in planning.
- ◆ **29** agencies departments and components supported (e.g., DOJ, DHS, DOL, FBI, and DoD including PACOM, EUCOM, AFRICOM, CENTCOM & DLIFLC).

Full range of language needs supported including translation, interpretation, video and audio transcription, captioning and voice-over, exercise development and support, role playing, course development, test development, language team leading, cultural advice and training.

In August 2012, the NLSC supported the following 7 agencies with 49 members in 12 languages: INTERPOL Washington (Spanish, French), DoD USCENTCOM (Arabic), DoD Naval Postgraduate School (Farsi, Indonesian, Swahili, Portuguese), Department of Labor / Wage Hour Division (Lao), DoD Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (Dari), FBI (Akan), and DoD US Army (Russian, Kazakh).

It allows for developing a reserve language capability in advance of requirements. It provides access to small language communities through its member networks.

True surge capacity: Many organizations have identified and cataloged language capabilities internally within their staff for possible use in a time of crisis or disasters, such as the Haitian earthquake or the Indonesian Tsunami. However, such a strategy does not provide additional surge capability and if employed can cause gaps in staff capability when capabilities are needed most – during a crisis. The NLSC provides additional capability when the resources are most needed.

Improved federal disaster response in language support to local governments: The NLSC can help state and local governments meet emergent and unexpected language needs. For example, Local NLSC membership chapters could be a source or doorway for those governments to gain access to language resources that they normally would not have access to through commercial sources or Government employees

The NLSC can provide important access to language resources to support federal, state and local Limited English Proficiency (LEP) requirements

Efficiency: The USG is looking at ways to reduce the overhead costs while preserving capability. Organizations like the NLSC are clearly a means to help meet that objective.

Administration of the NLSC

The NLSC is a Department of Defense program administered by the Defense Language and National Security Education Office (DLNSEO), formerly known as the National Security Education Program (NSEP – www.NSEP.gov). In addition, the Defense Human Resource Agency and Defense Logistics Agency are providing support in the processing and management of the Members. The program is sponsored by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. NLSC Members are detailed as temporary federal employees. Their support is available on a cost-reimbursable basis. Requests for NLSC support or to apply can be made directly to the NLSC online at www.NLSCorps.org.

In 2013, NLSC could quadruple the originally predicted activations.

DHS language access plan sites NLSC as a valued language resource. Note: DHS has the only published plan built in response to Executive Order 13166, which mandates that all federal agencies will provide language access at all levels to Limited English Proficient (LEP) people. The DHS plan is expected to be the template plan for all other agencies going forward.

Value of the NLSC

The NLSC is a means for meeting valued language needs for all federal agencies. It is a cost-effective source for positioning resources for contingency plans and addressing gaps in language capabilities in organization's workforces.

Retaining government investment in personnel and language: Over the last eight years, the department has spent billions of dollars developing cultural and linguistic capabilities for a specific AOR and set of adversaries. The NLSC provides a means to warehouse and retain access to civilian or prior military personnel with language capabilities.

Mitigate unplanned language needs and uncertainty: A fully implemented NLSC can mitigate against the shortfall of language skills we faced in Iraq and Afghanistan in future conflicts and engagements

Regional Knowledge Certification Program (RKCP)

BY CESAR E. NADER (USMC RET)

The Combined Foreign Knowledge Capability (CFKC)

Within the wide spectrum of The Global War on Terror our forces must be able to project not only a supreme military power, but also the ability to work and collaborate with military forces and civilian communities from different countries without culture and regional misunderstanding. We must create a force continuum to enable our operators to adapt to the dynamic environment of our new battleground by learning and appreciating the idiosyncrasies of tribal communities and societal complexities of other cultures. We must develop the necessary knowledge and experience to build on the success of our



past in dealing with other cultures by learning not only their military tactics, but also how to adapt and immerse ourselves into the foreign environment in which we are operating without disturbing the progressive knowledge of human-to-human relations.

Our national security and the future success of our military forces depends upon our ability to operate with socio-cultural agility and tolerance to analyze, assess and decide how to effectively succeed in different regions, on different

missions, and with different coalition partners. We must also grow a unique and experienced cadre of military professionals in foreign affairs (Foreign/Regional Affairs Officers - FAO/RAO), who can provide stability, security, transition, and reconstruction efforts to local tribes and communities with an emphasis on self-sufficiency and inter-cultural exchange. To do this we must combine the skills



and abilities inherent in our nation's diverse military and civilian population, and form a select and experienced corps of foreign service professionals, with specific Knowledge, Skills Abilities and Attitudes (KSAAs) in civil/military affairs, into one team capable of deploying to any region and corner of the world to augment, supplement or engage with our military forces to ensure success in all aspects of military operations. The result will be a Combined Foreign Knowledge Capability (CFKC) that will include four core sets of skills.

These four skill sets are: Foreign Language, Culture Immersion, Regional Knowledge and a new dimension



called Social Imitation Patterns (SIP). Each skill set builds on the other to create a true strategic capability within a cadre of foreign affairs professionals that will comprise the Civilian FAO/RAO Corps or CFRC. This article focuses on the RKCP and how a standardized certification will create a program that is robust and continuous to a level of mastery only seen in true FAO/RAO specialists. Before we discuss the RKCP, it is important to note that there is no standardized testing method for assessing and certifying Regional Knowledge Skills.

Today, only Foreign Language has a widely accepted, standardized certification test. The Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) is the only recognized means to certify personnel in DOD and other agencies with having a foreign language proficiency skill. There is even a test to measure the propensity and aptitude ability to learn languages. The Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) is the test of record for this aptitude measurement. This certification process has

created the perception that language proficiency by itself is a core capability. It is reasonable to assume that foreign language skills could be considered a capability primarily because language is by far the most important aspect of communication when dealing with other foreign communities. Yet, It is also reasonable to argue that language in and of itself is simply not a strategic capability that a commander can leverage when dealing with high-level officials or influential local network leaders in a foreign environment. Without a comprehensive program that includes the means to certify the other two dimensions of foreign knowledge (Culture immersion and Regional knowledge), it is difficult to know how much more effective our forces can be while maneuvering in foreign human terrains. After all, language is the most effective form of communication. Or is it?

Regional Knowledge Certification Program (RKCP)

Regardless of where we find ourselves on the issue, we can agree that while many Americans may speak a second language, their lack of regional knowledge along with culture immersion experience in their foreign language claim is a critical gap in the makings of a true Combined Foreign Knowledge Capability (CFKC).

To reiterate, a foreign language skill in and of itself is not a strategic capability. A language skill alone does not constitute a strategic advantage in a foreign envi-

ronment, especially when dealing with influential and high-level foreign leaders. At best, it allows the verbal exchange or purpose to occur, and depending on the level of language proficiency, it could be argued that it may act as a tactical and maybe even operational advantage. There is no denying that a foreign language skill is a core competency and surely the most difficult skill set to acquire among the three skills sets discussed here (not including the SIP). While there is a standardized method to measure language proficiency through the Inter-

agency Language Roundtable (ILR) scale we do not have a measure of proficiency for Regional Knowledge (RK) or for Cultural Adaptation/Immersion (CAI).


Consequently, we must create a building block approach of five RK certification levels to grow a robust and consequential CFKC. These blocks are: World (RK-1), Region (RK-2), Micro-Region (RK-3), Country (RK-4) and Area (RK-5). Certification be-

yond Country Level will be the most difficult and will require a comparable native-level understanding of a specific area within a country. As we begin to discuss how to grow the RKCP model, we need to discuss the foundations of the program and how it should build on that foundation for subsequent certification levels. This capability must be built through competence and proficiency. Therefore, the requirement for a professional staff of linguist experts, FAO/RAO professionals and SC Scientists is key to delivering this CRKC to our forces.

Regional Knowledge Certification Program (RKCP) Levels

The initial level of RK certification is RK-1 or RK Apprentice level. This is an entry-level certification that lays out a standardized foundation from which all members who are certified can begin. In time, the building-block approach will also require that services and agencies incorporate this process into their formal training and education plans and schools so that it is part of their initial training process and becomes embedded into the programs for future training

As the baseline, the RK Apprentice will learn the basics of RK from a worldview. This will establish a foundational understanding of RK at a macro level and can be supplemented with the RK understanding of how culture is



relevant to the RK regions that will be taught later. The flexibility and broad spectrum with which this level is established will allow for a true standardization of the meaning and concepts of RK across cultures and human models. The key to this level is to create a general understanding of how important it is to know RK in order to influence the actions of others who see the world different than us. There is only one category of RK-1 certification. Everyone must begin at this level and there's one curriculum for this level.

The second level of certification is the RK-2 or RK Intermediate level and it is aligned with the seven regional Combatant Commanders (CoCom). The specific requirements of RK certification will be a combination of CoCom requirements that will be identified by these commanders



example, some RK-1 Apprentices will become RK-2 in USCENTCOM. Others may become certified on USSOUTHCOM or USEUCOM. The goal is to begin a level of intermediate experiences that will create a regional specialist. There's an optional requirement in this level of certification that members must deploy to one of these regions as part of their course curriculum. Certification

can remain pending until such deployment is completed.


Starting at RK-3 or RK Advanced level, this certification focuses on the micro-regions identified by DOD as areas of strategic interest to the United States. These seventeen micro-regions are inter-related and will have added requirements in order to achieve certification. There may be an adapted version of these micro-regions for the public and private sector, but, for the purposes of this article, we will focus on the development of RKC as a military skill. This means a more strategic development of those RK skills to focus on the combination of the foreign language skills already inherent in each member, the deployment experience achieved throughout one's career and the interest to become more specialize in a micro-region. The added level of effort here is the specific requirement to be deployed or serve in one of the countries within a micro-region. This will be a mandatory requirement in order to receive full certification credit at the RK-3 level. As expected, this level of certification will have seventeen categories coded appropriately to be identifiable in reporting systems within DOD. As seen in the illustration below, the two-letter code can be used to sub-categorize the specialty of the RK-3 certification.

The next level of certification is the RK-4 or RK Superior level, where members become certified in a specific country of assignment or interest. This level of certification will not only require the previous mandate to have specific deployment or in-country experience, but also a minimum level of language proficiency. The culture immersion should also be evident in the testing process to ensure the member is aligning his/her skills to create a strategic capability. This level of certification requires time, experience and a true assimilation of the foreign environment in which the skills are developed. Certification will be difficult and demanding to ensure that only those who master the program will be credited with a true skill certification. The added benefit of making this level of certification so demanding is that it can be applicable to formal career level

17 Micro Regions

1 TRANSCAUCASUS	TC	9 WEST AFRICA	WF
2 CENTRAL ASIA	CS	10 SAHEL	SH
3 BALKANS	BK	11 EASTERN AFRICA	EF
4 NORTH AFRICA	NF	12 CENTRAL AFRICA	CF
5 THE LEVANT	LV	13 SOUTHERN AFRICA	SF
6 ARABIAN GULF	AG	14 NORTHEAST ASIA	NS
7 WEST SOUTH ASIA	WS	15 SOUTHEAST ASIA	SE
8 SOUTH ASIA	SS	16 MEX/CAR/CENTAM	CH
		17 SOUTH AMERICA	SH

and imbedded into the certification process as well as other critical subjects of interest that will enhance the RK comprehension of how the countries in these regions share a common culture and bond. The goal is to grow a skill that, when combined with a foreign language skill and experience in the culture, will yield the beginning of a combined capability at the lowest level of the experience ladder. This educated professional will now have the right foundation to begin a higher level of education in the RKCP and will require more dedicated experience and not just academic knowledge to grow this skill. Unlike RK-1, this level of certification will have seven different RK-2 categories according to the region of preference each applicant chooses. For



mon and independent body that will be accountable and responsible for the proper development, implementation, review and evaluation of this program as a whole. Consequently, the FAOA and FAOWeb as well as representatives from each of the agencies and services who have FAOs and RAOs on active duty or personnel with similar credentials in their work force, will be invited to participate in the creation of the American Council on Regional Knowledge Accreditation (ACRKA).

In time, the combination of the RKC program with the DLPT score will be coupled with the culture immersion experience of practical, hands-on deployments and overseas assignments. This will later translate into a comprehensive program of capability development with multi-dimensional layers of professionals in Foreign Language, Regional Knowledge and Culture immersion. The resulting outcome will be a comprehensive program that captures the Combined Foreign Knowledge Capability (CFKC).

For the first time, commanders will have a new decision support tool for their foreign area professionals. Language alone will not be the deciding factor for selecting mission-

schools where we expect officers and enlisted to master the course material, and to provide proficiency in the execution of those learned skills with practical application.

Given the vast number of countries associated with this level of certification, it is expected that it will grow as the demand for different RK-4 specialists grows. It will also be highly unlikely that one individual will focus on more than one level of RK-4 certification. Consequently, this channeling of RK efforts will force members to become more specialized in one area versus becoming generalists in every area where they deploy.

The final and highest level of RK certification is the RK-5 or RK Master Level. This is where active duty FAOs/RAOs will benefit from their combined experience and ability to become certified at a level that is unique and extremely hard to acquire. To achieve certification at this level it is not only required to be an RK-4 within a country, but a certified FAO/RAO or other similar foreign affairs professional. It is extremely important that this certification is only offered to those who have made it a life goal to understand the human models of an area within a region of a country. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that many will ever achieve this level or expertise. The qualifications obtained from this level of certification should allow any professional to be the strategic advisor of an executive agent at the CoCom level or higher.



essential personnel. Additionally, as these members gain culture immersion experience, through a different set of certification processes not discussed here, they will add another layer of foreign knowledge skill. As a practical example, an individual with a 2/2/1+ in Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) will now have an additional certification in Regional Knowledge (level RK 1-5) to give the leader a new dimension of understanding into that individual's foreign knowledge capability. Previously, the same individual could only provide a limited (certifiable) level of support to his commander. The RK scale will be used as a complement to


RKCP Accreditation and Reporting

In order for this program to be an effective tool for commanders and executive leaders for the assessment of their agency's foreign regional knowledge proficiency it must be validated by an organization with American Council of Education (ACE) accreditation. The development and programming of these certification courses will be done in partnership with a certified organization or through a com-

the ILR scale, providing a more rounded capability that will be used in other man-power models for accession, selection, assignment and promotion within certain job specialties. For example, when selecting future candidates for linguistics fields such as FAO/RAO programs or SOF teams, then selection boards will be able to assess how and where those individuals may be more effective as a strategic capability given that they possess an RK certification.

From Concept to Reality

To establish the Regional Knowledge Certification Program (RKCP), we must create an environment that is fully oriented to support the systems required for the development of this and the other two skills. As stated, these combined skills will be a catalyst for the creation of the first Cultural and Language Immersion Center (CLIC).




The specific details of how the Cultural and Language Immersion Center will operate are the subject of a forthcoming article that explains the functions, staffing and objectives of the CLIC as a development and support structure that will serve the needs of our National Security Strategy in foreign affairs matters. Once these skills are combined to create the strategic capability that

combines Language Culture and Regional knowledge, we will develop a program that will provide degree completion credits in the first ever Military Foreign Affairs Master's program. One last, albeit important, point about developing the RKCP is, as these courses become the official certification of all agencies, they may be used for accreditation in other academic development in careers in nearly every field. It will support the motivations of younger Americans to develop these skills at an earlier stage in their lives. It is realistic to expect this to become the benchmark for all regional knowledge development programs in the nation and around the world.

Summary

Growing a regionally certified, culturally adapted and language-proficient operational force is a requirement that must be developed in a comprehensive way. The more critical skills of RK and CA are a complement to the operational language skills we are developing today through language proficiency. The product will be result of a true understanding of the marriage between a strong Foreign Language Program, experience through culture immersion and ad-



aptation during deployments and assignments and the ability to use the training acquired through the RKC program. Together, these skills will create a true strategic capability that will grow to enhance our national security.

About the Author



Cesar Nader is a retired Marine who rose from the enlisted ranks to attain the rank of Captain prior to retiring in 2011. Mr. Nader has 20 years of experience in language services. His last assignment prior to retiring was USMC Language and Classification Testing Control Officer to rebuild the Marine Corps' language and classification testing program and reduce fraud and misuse of test materials, improve testing control processes and implement a Web-based testing program across the Marine Corps. As a foreign area officer, Cesar served as a translator in Africa (French Foreign Legion), as an interpreter to the Moroccan forces during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, as a military liaison officer to the Colombian Riverine Marines in 2004, and as a Foreign Area Liaison officer to the Colombian Armed Forces in support of Plan Colombia. Mr. Nader is the President and CEO at X Corp Solutions, Inc.

Editor's Note: This article is copyrighted by X Corp Solutions, Inc., and Mr. Cesar E. Nader. It is reprinted here with Mr. Nader's permission. This article cannot be further reproduced or published without the copyright holder's expressed permission.

The Foreign Area Officer Association Scholarship for Excellence in International Affairs

KURT MARISA, COLONEL USAF (RETIRED)
PRESIDENT, FOREIGN AREA OFFICER ASSOCIATION

Beginning with the 2012-2013 Academic Year, the FAO Association is sponsoring The Foreign Area Officer Association Scholarship for Excellence in International Affairs through the Military Officers Association of America (MOAA) Scholarship Fund. The FAOA Scholarship is given to an undergraduate applicant with the requisite academic and extracurricular achievements; that have a declared/established major in International Relations, International Affairs, Regional Studies, or Languages; with preference given to ROTC students or current or previous enlisted personnel. More information on the FAOA Scholarship and other MOAA Scholarships can be obtained at www.moaa.org.

Through the MOAA Scholarship Fund, the FAOA Scholarship for Excellence in International Affairs

provides interest-free loans and grants to students (under age 24) who are children of former, currently serving, or retired commissioned or warrant officers (Regular, Reserve or Guard) and to children of currently serving or retired enlisted military personnel (Regular, Reserve or Guard), for up to 5 years of undergraduate education at an accredited two- or four-year college or university of their choice. The FAOA Scholarship provides an annual \$5500 combination interest-free loan/grant. Recipients are required to maintain a 3.4 GPA and must send a letter of appreciation to the scholarship donor.

The FAOA Scholarship application for the 2013-2014 school year is now available at www.moaa.org. The application deadline is noon (eastern standard time) on 1 March 2013.

Membership in MOAA (for officers) or, MOAA's subsidiary for non-MOAA members, Voices for America's Troops (for enlisted personnel), is required if your child is selected to receive Educational Assistance.

The 2012-2013 recipient of the first Foreign Area Officer Association Scholarship for Excellence in International Affairs was Matthew A. Robbins, who is majoring in International Relations at Liberty University in Lynchburg, Virginia, www.liberty.edu. Mr. Robbins will also be invited as a special guest to the 2013 FAOA Black Tie Dinner.

Donations to the FAOA Scholarship Fund can be made on-line at www.faoa.org under links "About FAOA" then "FAOA Scholarship Fund".

Civil Affairs Roundtable on Security Cooperation

KURT M. MARISA, COLONEL USAF (RETIRED)
PRESIDENT, FOREIGN AREA OFFICERS ASSOCIATION

On 11 October 2012, the Defense Education Forum (DEF) of the Reserve Officer's Association (ROA), together with George Mason University's Peace Operations Policy Program, convened guest speakers and panels of experts for a Civil Affairs Roundtable on Security Cooperation. The event was also supported by the Civil Affairs Association (CAA). FAOA representatives were in attendance.

The Security Cooperation Roundtable addressed the role of Security Cooperation activities in support of US national security and military strategy, in particular focusing on the role of military civil affairs units, personnel, and activities at the operational and tactical levels. As background, the Roundtable identified that the authorities for Security Cooperation are shared between the Departments of State and Defense and are funded through respective Congressional appropriations.

According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the DoD organization responsible for overseeing and implementing Security Cooperation and Assistance activities and programs, Security Cooperation activities are undertaken in order to strengthen partnerships with other nations to further U.S. national security goals. These Security Cooperation activities and programs, which ultimately support State Department foreign policy objectives, ideally address and advance shared security goals with regional partners.

Although they support the highest level of State and Defense policies and strategies, Security Cooperation activities are normally implemented at the individual country-level in accordance with Combat Command (COCOM) and Embassy Country Team strategic documents. Security Cooperation activities include Title 22 Security Assistance, which consists mainly of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and International Military Education and Training (IMET), as well as other Title 10 regional and country mil-to-mil exchanges, visits, exercises, and local training. Thus, Security Cooperation activities can include everything from a multi-billion dollar fighter aircraft sale to the visit of a senior mili-

tary officer to the nation's capital. At any given time, hundreds of Security Cooperation activities are being conducted across the globe.

At the tactical and operational levels, the Joint Civil Affairs community is a key player in Security Cooperation activities, along with Joint Special Operations Forces and Foreign Area Officers (FAO). The primary purpose of the Roundtable was to look at the policy, concepts, management, and experiences of the Joint Civil Affairs community in supporting Security Cooperation. The Roundtable was opened by Dr. Allison Frendak-Blume, Co-Director of the GMU Peace Operations Policy Program; Mr. Robert E. Feidler, ROA; and COL David C. Mitchell, USA (ret.), CAA Civil Affairs Advisor to the ROA. The Keynote Address on "Security Cooperation Support to National Security" was presented by Dr. James A. Schear, Deputy Assistance Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Low-Intensity Conflict, and Interdependent Capabilities. Following the keynote address, the remainder of the Roundtable consisted of three moderated panels. The first panel on "Security Cooperation Concepts and Management" was moderated by Dr. Janine Davidson, School of Public Policy, George Mason University. The second addressed the "Regional Perspective of Security Cooperation" and was moderated by BG Jim Owens, Deputy Commander of U.S. Army Africa, and the third panel on "Security Cooperation Missions and Case Studies" was moderated by COL Jim Ruf, U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. There was also a working lunch with an engaging address by MG Bert K. Mizusawa, JCS Assistant to the Chairman for Reserve Matters.

The Roundtable highlighted several important concept highlights.

One presenter characterized Security Cooperation as important for three primary reasons: 1) country and regional "access", 2) expeditionary military support using U.S. manufactured equipment, and 3) security "in situ" with partners able to exercise and maintain their own internal or regional control.

Another presenter categorized the value of Security Cooperation in "two buckets": 1) the ability of partners to take care of their own security, assist with regional security, assist the US with military operations, and to operate independently in the region without US direct assistance (but in support of US objectives), and 2) Security Assistance (FMS/IMET) creates long term military and economic relationships and dependencies, which are major components of foreign policy, mil-to-

mil engagement, and defense exports.

Security Cooperation activities must be developed and implemented under COCOM Theater Cooperation Strategies in support of State Department's Joint Regional Strategies, Functional Strategies, and Integrated Country Strategies. However, Security Cooperation denies an easy explanation and is too complex, and sometimes slow, due to the variety of programs creating aligned, converging and sometimes competing, objectives. One traditional advantage of a "patchwork" Security Cooperation system has been that it is difficult for budget cutters to know where to begin. Still, implementation of USG Sequestration budget cuts could be substantial, with severe adverse effects. A patchwork system has also been hard for engagement planners and our foreign partners to understand and navigate

Furthermore, one size does not fit all, but separate partner agendas and lack of buy-in is often a barrier to overcome and long-term sustainability is vital. DSCA is attempting to speed up the FMS approval and sales process by obtaining advanced export approvals, making advanced purchases of critical military systems, and better prioritization between partners. Security Cooperation also must have more of a regional approach and focus, vice the past country-to-country focus, and needs better inter-related "hub and spoke" activities.

FAOs historically and currently are "front line" major contributors to DoD Security Cooperation programs. The new Joint FAO Sustainment program is an important development for helping mature and further Security Cooperation objectives.

The FAO Association Outreach and Chapters Committee is currently in discussions with the ROA, CAA, and GMU about a possible future joint Roundtable on the Role of FAOs in DoD Civil Affairs Activities. Additional information on the ROA can be obtained at www.roa.org and the CAA at www.civilaffairsassoc.org.

The Case for Establishing a Permanent Senior Defense Official and Defense Attaché Position at the U.S. Mission to the European Union

LT COL ERICK A. JORDAN, USAF, AIR FORCE REGIONAL AFFAIRS SPECIALIST (RAS) FOR EUROPE

Introduction

Despite having maintained diplomatic relations with the European Union (EU) and its forerunners since 1953 (1), the Brussels-based U.S. Mission to the EU (USEU) currently has no permanently assigned and diplomatically accredited Department of Defense (DoD) representative to advise the Chief of Mission or to interface with the EU's Military Committee, its Military Staff, or the European Defense Agency (EDA) (2). Additionally, no DoD member is currently assigned at either the U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (USNATO) or Headquarters U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) to liaise full-time with the EU's military entities.

Given that in past decades the EU played a limited security and defense role in a supranational sense, in contrast to its active role in economic policies and activities, during that time there was no full-time DoD representative at USEU, USNATO, or USEUCOM. In the last 12+ years, however, a shift has taken place in which the EU has created supranational defense and security entities and competencies, while capabilities and decision making remain with individual EU Member States (3). A full-time DoD representative was established at USEU and maintained for much of that period, and in some periods was supplemented by other DoD officer(s) on a short-term basis (4). However, for the past one to two years no such position has been staffed (5). Meanwhile other significant developments of EU defense have occurred, notably at the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon, in which the European Security Defense Policy was revised as the Common Security Defense Policy (CSDP),

Editor's Note: This article was submitted with end notes. The printing system used by the Journal does not support superscripts for footnotes and end notes so this article omits the author's references. The notes are shown by number in parenthesis [(10)]; researchers may see full end notes by following this link to the article on the FAO Association website: www.FAOA.org

which codified “the progressive framing of a common Union defense policy.”(6) The later enactment of CSDP has brought about an increasingly active and engaged EU in defense activities, which further warrants the DoD, in coordination with the Department of State (DoS), to consider re-establishing a permanent military representative to the EU.

To engage EU military entities on a number of issues including non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and arms control, officials from USEU, USNATO, the U.S. National Military Representative (NMR) to NATO, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, USEUCOM, U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) as well as a number of the 28 individual European-hosted U.S. military bases have in recent years interfaced in an *ad hoc* fashion with EU defense entities (7). Recognizing the need to bring cohesion to these interactions, the USEU Chief of Mission recently approved the “dual-hatting” of the current Senior Defense Official and Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT) to Belgium as his principal military advisor and DoD official to interface with EU military entities (8). Yet, with this temporary arrangement due to expire (9) the advantages currently being derived at USEU will cease.

This paper examines possible locations to establish a permanent DoD representative to the EU, and identifies some prospective benefits and potential drawbacks. After a brief analysis, the paper recommends the establishment of a permanent SDO/DATT at USEU, discusses some of the qualifications and roles envisaged for the position, and suggests the next steps to proceed with the recommendation’s execution.

The Case for a Permanent SDO/DATT to the EU

Starting with a USEU presentation to the Naval Postgraduate School-led Joint Foreign Area Officer Skills Sustainment Pilot Program (hereafter “NPS class”) last September, this paper’s ideas on exploring the establishment of a permanent DoD representative to the EU took shape during later discussions with USG policy officials (10). This dialogue made it clear that with no dedicated DoD official in Brussels to engage EU military entities, it was difficult, if not impossible, for the DoD to remain abreast of EU security and defense activities and engagements with the appropriate U.S. military counterparts in a timely manner. USEU Ambassador Kennard’s decision to dual-hat the current SDO/DATT to Belgium in November 2011 as his military advisor did not preclude the need to examine the issue in greater detail, particularly due to the arrangement’s end date in the summer of 2012 (11). Ambassador Kennard’s decision also underscored a desire to bring greater policy cohesion to the overall U.S. Government policy towards the EU with respect to de-

fense and security (12).

As suggested in the cable that preceded the dual-hatting of the current SDO/DATT to US-Belgium to USEU, the main drivers to making the position permanent would be to dedicate a military representative as an advisor to the USEU Chief of Mission and serve as the lead DoD representative to the EU’s military staff and the European Defense Agency. A permanently assigned DoD member at USEU would also be uniquely postured to share insights into EU security and defense activities. Indeed, prior to the nomination of a temporary military advisor at USEU, the lack of such a representative was a limiting factor in terms of gaining insights into the EU’s military inner workings (13). Without a permanent interlocutor to engage EU counterparts, it was also more difficult to maintain the effective use of other channels to advance policy issues involving EU defense and security, as well as NATO-EU cooperation (14). These alternate channels include USNATO, the U.S. NMR to NATO, USEU, and USEUCOM (15).

While USEU led the way in establishing a temporary DoD representative to the EU, USNATO and USEU were both given consideration as potential hosts for a permanent SDO/DATT. USEUCOM was not considered in depth primarily due to Stuttgart’s geographical separation from Brussels, which would preclude daily contact with Brussels-based U.S. diplomatic missions to NATO and the EU, and perhaps more significantly, limit interaction with EU military entities. Similarly, the U.S. NMR to NATO did not receive detailed consideration given its primary coordinating function at the military level between U.S. military authorities and NATO military authorities at NATO HQ in Brussels and Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) seat at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) near Mons, Belgium (16).

USNATO was considered in part due to its location on the outskirts of the EU’s main seat in Brussels, and because as a matter of course, the USNATO staff and NATO International staff need to interface extensively with EU military entities on issues involving NATO. The scope of this interaction covers essentially the full range of NATO roles—in capability development, operations, and partnership engagement—and so extends far beyond the NATO-EU Berlin-Plus agreement which provides the EU access to NATO planning capabilities and assets for its own operations (17). Also, because the EU and NATO share many common members, USNATO must engage fully with USEU to address EU defense issues, most of which affect NATO and extend beyond to scope of the Berlin-Plus agreement (18) and as such are vital to represent U.S. interests from a national perspective. And while the USNATO staff include some of the most expe-

rienced and respected career Foreign Service Officers (FSO), there is insufficient knowledge of the EU within this mission to cover both NATO and EU defense issues of interest to the U.S. 19). Additionally, notwithstanding USNATO's geographic proximity to the EU's primary seat and significant membership commonality, expertise in NATO is quite different from expertise on EU military entities, given differences in the respective institutional structures, roles, authorities and working processes (20). Further consideration was therefore not given to USNATO serving as a host to a permanent DoD representative to the EU, though the pressing need for close teamwork is recognized by both Missions (21).

USEU is a better choice to host an SDO/DATT to the EU. It is the U.S. Mission with overall responsibility for representing and executing USG policy involving the European Union and its institutions. Regardless, the SDO/DATT would certainly be envisioned to work with USNATO staff on EU issues and potential actions affecting NATO (22). This includes essentially all CSDP actions, ranging far beyond EU operations in which the Berlin-Plus agreement is invoked. Similarly, for EU operations occurring in USEUCOM or USAFRICOM's geographic Areas of Responsibility (AOR), the SDO/DATT would serve as a key facilitator by which the views of the respective operations staffs of these Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) could be included in NATO-EU consultations (23). Equally important, the SDO/DATT could serve as an interlocutor for deliberations on potential future NATO or EU operations (24). Examples of these operations are addressed in a later section.

An additional reason to establish a permanent SDO/DATT to the EU is to place a diplomatically accredited officer with the means and access to observe and report information on EU military activities in accordance with the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. As with military attachés the world over, article seven of the Vienna Convention defines attachés' legal status, and establishes their diplomatic immunity based on their position on their diplomatic missions (25). And while military attachés most often liaise with the defense ministries of the respective nation of accreditation, there is precedent of military attachés with accreditation to international governmental organizations (26). For example, Russia and China currently have military attachés assigned to their countries' EU Missions (27), while neither is a Member State of the European Union (28). Correspondingly, the SDO/DATT would liaise between OSD and EU military entities for defense policy issues, while the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) would administer and provide oversight as per its responsibility for managing the Defense Attaché System (DAS) (29).

In addition to serving as an interlocutor for downward

directed policy issues, and up-channeling information through the DAS, a permanently assigned SDO/DATT could serve as a Security/Defense Cooperation representative to the EU. In this role, the SDO/DATT could formally engage the appropriate EU entities for potential foreign military sales, training and exercise activities. While information available through open source media suggests there has been relatively little rationalization of defense industrial capacities among Member States, the EU is now the authority with responsibility for overseeing and examining defense contracts (30). This development supports the inclusion of a security/defense cooperation role within the SDO/DATT's portfolio.

Despite its recently expanded role in overseeing and investigating military contracts, the EU does not desire to form a "European Army." Rather, it will facilitate the pooling and sharing of defense capabilities, which will continue to belong to Member States and to be available for use by the EU as well as NATO or national operations (31). The EU has proven itself as having sufficient institutional capacity to conduct small-scale military and civilian operations in theaters of EU and NATO interest including the Balkans, the maritime region around the Horn of Africa (HoA), and select regions within the African continent (32). Though these EU missions have been predominantly civilian in nature, several EU military operations of significant size and duration have involved the deployment of combat troops (33). These have included peacekeeping operations in the Balkans (Operations CONCORDIA and ALTHEA), the Democratic Republic of Congo (Operation ARTEMIS), and the EU's first-ever naval mission in the HoA maritime region (Operation ATALANTA) to counter piracy and protect World Food Program vessels and other vulnerable ships sailing off the coast of Somalia (34). In the case of ATALANTA, the operation employed EU-flagged naval vessels of Member States (35).

In contrast to other EU missions, including Operation ALTHEA, in which the EU used NATO's planning capabilities, headquarters and other assets under the Berlin-Plus agreement, the EU has conducted Operation ATALANTA independently of NATO headquarters or assets, even as NATO and the U.S. have simultaneously conducted similar operations in the same area (36). With respective operations by the EU, NATO, and USCENTOM, plus USAFRICOM's Combined Joint Task Force-HoA (C-JTF HoA) operations all ongoing simultaneously in the region, it has become necessary to coordinate among different operations (37). Both for these missions, and others initiated in response to future crises, an SDO/DATT to the EU could serve as a vital coordination channel between NATO, USCENTCOM or C-JTF HoA and the EU when they are considering how—or indeed, whether to—conduct operations such as ATALANTA outside the

NATO framework.

As the EU develops an independent, albeit niche military capability, a permanent SDO/DATT could bring value not only as an interlocutor between defense institutions, an observer of EU military activities, and a security/defense representative, but as a key inter-agency official working towards the broader U.S. policy objective seeking to ensure EU's military capability development is also supportive and compatible with NATO (38). With the U.S. and Europeans committed to the Berlin Plus arrangement for this very reason, an SDO/DATT at USEU could play a part in their efforts to shape the EU's CSDP in a way that results in a symbiotic relationship with NATO.

The recently announced reduction of U.S. military forces based on the European continent (39), as foreshadowed in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, (40) provides a further basis for the permanent establishment of an SDO/DATT to the EU. With a significant withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe projected to occur over the next few years, a SDO/DATT will act as a force multiplier from the perspective that the U.S. will be increasingly likely to turn to Europe—and expect NATO and the EU to cooperate on capabilities (41) — to respond to security concerns both on its own territory and in neighboring regions.

In contrast to a Cold War height of 277,342 U.S. troops, Secretary of Defense Panetta's recently announced withdrawal of two heavy armor brigades will bring the Army presence in Europe to just 30,000 troops (42). These projected reductions, taken at the same time of declining NATO partner contributions against the backdrop of a strained European economy, led the Pentagon's Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and NATO policy to state, "We'll have to look at pooling, sharing, multinational procurement, and come up with some innovative approaches on doing more with less in some ways." (43) A SDO/DATT to the EU would be uniquely positioned to dialog with EU military representatives as the U.S., NATO and Europe face a future in which a shared approach in confronting defense and security issues of mutual concern, both in Europe and in other regions, is more likely given fiscal realities on both continents.

Potential Drawbacks

In spite of the above-mentioned prospective benefits, a number of counter arguments could be made against establishing a permanent SDO/DATT position at USEU.

First is that with military staff serving at the U.S. NMR to NATO, and career FSOs at USNATO, a USEU-based SDO/DATT could be viewed as duplicative or even potentially as undermining these Missions' efforts. This view could be mitigated by distributing this paper to the U.S. missions working with NATO on a daily basis, followed by a briefings and consultations to socialize the concept prior to its implementation. Similarly, the establishment of a military attaché in the USEU Mission could be viewed as an encroachment by the DoD into a U.S. Mission that has thus far successfully managed to represent the DoD through the efforts of its experienced and hard-working staff. Any reticence by USEU to permanently establish an SDO/DATT could be mitigated with OSD-led consultations with DoS staffs in Brussels and Foggy Bottom, in which roles and responsibilities could be agreed upon prior to making the position permanent.

A permanent DoD advisor at USEU would bring military expertise to USEU and provide dedicated coverage of EU military activities. However this additional expertise will come at an organizational and financial cost.

As discussed earlier, FSOs and officers of other federal departments and agencies at USEU currently work defense-related issues, which results in a high degree of cohesion from a relatively small, tightly knit team (44). An additional officer representing a large federal department could potentially bring about a shift in the internal USEU "center of gravity", which would require efforts at the front-end to ensure the overall mission remains focused on the broader USG policy interests for which the Chief of Mission is responsible.

While the current dual-hatting arrangement of the SDO/DATT results in few, if any, additional costs, permanently establishing this position will result in expenditures that must be accounted for the Departments of Defense and State. Housing and administrative expenses to support an SDO/DATT would most likely be commensurate with that of a First Secretary and calculated through the International Cooperative Administrative Support Service (ICASS). This expense would need to be programmed by the DoD through the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process. This could be included as early as the Fiscal Year (FY) 2014-2018 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) if the requirement were programmed in the near term. Moving forward with the permanent establishment of the SDO/DATT in advance of FY14 would most likely require the re-programming of FY12 or FY13 dollars allocated to

"a key inter-agency official working towards the broader U.S. policy objective seeking to ensure EU's military capability development is also supportive and compatible with NATO"

wards other DoD requirements. Should DIA be restricted in adding another SDO/DATT to the DAS, an attaché position could be realigned from another Defense Attaché Office to USEU. Such realignment would require further study and presumably require consultation among stakeholders including DIA, DoS, OSD, GCCs, as well as the affected host nation.

Another argument against making the SDO/DATT position permanent, based on the fact that the U.S. is not an EU member, is less substantive in that USEU traces its origins back to 1953, when the U.S. established diplomatic relations with the EU's forerunners (45). First with a Luxembourg-based U.S. Mission to the European Coal and Steel Community (1956), and the later establishment of USEU (1961) following the 1957 Treaties of Rome (which created the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community), the U.S. has maintained diplomatic ties with the EU and its predecessors for the majority of the post World War II period (46).

Qualifications

An attaché's observer role does not necessarily drive the candidate to have an international affairs background, as the Joint Military Attaché School (which all first-time attaches attend) provides training to perform this function. With an SDO/DATT to the EU almost certain to interact with senior military members from Services of 27 CSDP participating nations (47) (Denmark has indicated the intent to hold a referendum to reverse its CSDP opt-out, but not until late 2012) (48), joint duty experience would be essential. Additionally, while military attachés in select countries must be trained pilots to execute an operational support aviation mission, such a requirement is certainly not envisioned at USEU given the robust nearby commercial aviation capacity.

For a DATT to carry out his/her responsibilities it is essential he/she be able to communicate effectively in the language of the host nation. The fact that the European Union has 23 official and working languages complicates this requirement given no single language is mandated for official meetings and working documents (49). In practice, however, the European Commission uses English, French and German as procedural languages (50). With French designated an official language common to the three cities that are political centers of the Union: Brussels (Belgium), Strasbourg (France) and Luxembourg City (Luxembourg) (51), this paper recommends a prospective candidate be rated proficient in the French language (speaking, reading and listening).

Next Steps

Pending concurrence by all stake-holding organizations to permanently assign an SDO/DATT to USEU, the staff should prepare a National Security Decision Directive-38 (NSDD-38) for submission by the Chief of Mission to the Under Secretary for Management's Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation (M/PRI) (53). After M/PRI's approval of the NSDD-38 request, the DoD should request an ICASS cost estimate from the DoS and program for the amount in the FY14-18 POM submission. An immediate rough planning figure would be the amount budgeted for the current dual-hatted SDO/DATT to Belgium/EU. DIA, in consultation with OSD, should then decide whether to add an SDO/DATT authorization to the DAS or realign a current position from elsewhere. Next, DIA, in consultation with the Military Departments, should determine which Service should provision the billet. Alternately, a rotation between the Services could be put in place, as in select U.S. Missions including those to the U.K., Russia, and China. The training pipeline administered by DIA's JMAS should then include the SDO/DATT to the EU into the DAS training program including language training. Finally, the appropriate Service should initiate the screening and selection process to identify a qualified FAO or other Service equivalent officer for the position, subject to approval by DIA.

At an administrative level, and as outlined in the Vienna Convention, should this paper's recommendation be implemented it should be noted that the EU may require notification of the U.S. decision to establish the SDO/DATT's position (54).

Conclusion

Making the SDO/DATT position at USEU permanent could perhaps best be viewed as a reflection of how the U.S. is evolving its foreign policy towards the EU to correspond to its evolution in the realm of security and defense affairs. As Secretary of Defense Panetta and Secretary of State Clinton sought to reassure Europe recently in spite of the aforementioned future withdrawal of 6,000 to 7,000 troops, they pledged the U.S. was not abandoning its allies across the Atlantic (55). According to Secretary Clinton, "Europe remains America's partner of first resort," while Secretary Panetta added that Europe remains the United States "security partner of choice for military operations and diplomacy around the world." (56) The implementation of this paper's recommendation would serve as a tangible and meaningful action to embody the above statements.

FAO Association
PO Box 295
Mount Vernon, VA. 22121

MARK YOUR CALENDARS

FAOA on Tap Mixer	17 Jan
FAOA Luncheon	28 Feb
Black Tie Dinner	25 April

Get information and register online at
www.FAOA.org



FAOA Journal Submissions Writing Guidelines

When submitting articles, book reviews or letters to the editor for potential publication, please email them as WORD documents, single spaced, single paragraphs in Times New Roman, size 11. Insert any graphics, maps and pictures within the text at the appropriate location. Within the same email attach separate copies of each image, and a short “About the author” bio including a personal photo. Photos, maps and graphics add interest to articles and are highly encouraged. Footnotes/endnotes are generally not printed, but may be included in an online version of the article, so include critical references within the text body and provide an extended copy for online publishing if applicable. Key data adding interesting facts and emphasis to your article can be added as text boxes. All submissions are subject peer review and then minor editing for format, brevity and grammar as required.

EMAIL SUBMISSIONS TO EDITOR@FAOA.ORG

Call for Topics

The journal is actively seeking articles on the following topics:
Perspectives from family members on life overseas, Lifestyle articles,
Transitioning from military to civilian life, Book and product reviews,
Advice for new FAOs, Recommendations to improve FAOA

