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Please join us and become a part of this important conversation at a critical inflection point in our history. Whether new to the community or a seasoned FAO, we invite you to write for the journal. Email your article, news from the field, professional paper, or opinion piece to John Haseman at editor@faoa.org to begin the peer review process. Your submission will be reviewed by the Editorial Board. The Journal typically has a backlog of terrific content and the process of peer review can take some time. If you are interested in serving on the editorial board, please email editor@faoa.org to let us know.

THE FAOA JOURNAL AIMS TO BE

- A professional stepping stone to help you in your career as a warrior-scholar
- A community of voices representing the diversity of regions, specialties, and experiences in our network
- An advocacy platform to inform the defense community about the value of the FAO profession
- A resource to help those who aspire to become FAOs understand the work and make an informed decision when applying
- A bridge for FAO community partners, in the public and private sectors, to stay connected and abreast of industry thought leadership

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IN THIS EDITION

Book Reviews

Fellow Foreign Affairs Professionals at Home and Abroad,

This issue takes aim at a number of more controversial policy topics surrounding "FAOs and the Future". As you may notice on page 17, one of the articles has already inspired a rejoinder. We welcome this kind of civil disagreement of course. What would a peer reviewed journal be without give and take? Letters to the editor may be published if they perpetuate a rigorous, professional conversation. If you read anything in this issue or others that moves you to respond, please do not hesitate to reach out to editor@faoa.org or leave a comment in our LinkedIn group.

This issue is also published shortly following the release of the new National Security Strategy. We invite FAOA members to respond to this document's implications in our future editions. The Strategy identifies four national interests under a philosophy of "principled realism":

I. Protect the homeland, the American people, and American way of life;
II. Promote American prosperity;
III. Preserve peace through strength;
IV. Advance American influence.

Exactly how and how much these national interests will affect the day to day of DoD operations will likely de decided by the operators themselves which includes most of our members and readers. The Strategy document bears many differences from its predecessor, so we welcome your thoughts and recommendations.

In past issues we have typically focused on a geographic area. This edition has a more diverse selection of papers spanning specialties, regions, policy and strategy. Major Victor Duenas grapples with the stigma keeping FAOs from assuming command positions. Colonel Luke Donohue, Colonel Brad Nicholson, and Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Kopp, look into the future and imagine how FAOs should operate after 2025 - a very difficult task given the current rate of change. Major Dan Gable, Major Jeremy Sherman, and Major Aaron Wiggins, make a policy recommendation to increase the influence of FAOs in the Joint Force. Lieutenant Colonel Paul Gendrolis breaks down a number of FAO community challenges and makes suggestions on how to solve them. Lieutenant Commander Kent McLaughlin looks at U.S. politics as they affect the FAO community.

Graham Plaster
Editor in Chief,
FAO Association Journal

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This edition also includes a number of community updates from DLNSEO, FAOA Monterey, and the FAO Heritage Pentagon Exhibit Chair. For those wondering when the next FAOA Gala will occur, we have some good news. Lieutenant General Charles Hooper, Director of DSCA, has agreed to be our keynote. The date is still pending, but we are working with his staff to get something locked in for the spring. As soon as we have something finalized, you will get an email.

Sincerely,
Graham Plaster

DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY
201 12TH STREET SOUTH, SUITE 203
ARLINGTON, VA 22202-5408

November 30, 2017

Dear Kurt:

Thank you for the invitation and I would be honored to attend and deliver remarks at the upcoming dinner. There has never been a better time to be a Foreign Area Officer and it is a privilege to be in this position, be a part of the FAO community and help to further it in support of our nation.

My staff will be in touch to work out the timing, and I look forward to the event!

Sincerely,

Charles W. Hooper
Lieutenant General, USA
Director

Command for Army Foreign Area Officers

By Major Victor A. Duenas, U.S. Army

Disclaimer: The views reflected are his own and do not represent the official position or opinion of the United States Government or any of its agencies.

Editor's Note: In the interest of space we publish Major Duenas' article without his research notes. To see the full article, visit www.faoa.org. The author welcomes comments on his article -- send your thoughts to editor@faoa.org and we will forward to the author for his response.

The Curse of the Army Foreign Area Officer (FAO)

There is a stigma associated with being an Army FAO, that all we do is serve as cultural staff officers; all that Army FAOs really do is make trip books and plan parties. Consequently, it is exceptionally difficult for FAOs in the single-track system to become competitive for promotion to general officer. In order to combat this perception, this essay recommends that the Army should look for opportunities to re-inject FAOs back into the operational force through increased command opportunities. The Army consistently describes its force needs within the context of the joint interagency intergovernmental and multinational (JIIM) dimensions, which is one of the Army FAO's core competencies as detailed in DA PAM 600-3. Maintaining currency through command assignments will improve the FAO's connection back to the operational Army, greatly enhance the FAO's legitimacy with foreign military counterparts, and improve the possibility of promotion to general officer.

In discussions with senior army officers of other branches, a common thread of issue taken against the Army FAO specialty has been its perceived emphasis on regional expertise at the expense of basic military expertise. While it is easy to dismiss this perception as a fundamentally uninformed opinion, it does not address the issue of the prevalence of this bias in the service. As a way to curb this misconception, senior Army FAOs consistently encourage junior FAOs to stay connected to the Army and not shy away from assignments that "re-green" FAOs. That is key advice that all members of our specialty should heed and encourage amongst ourselves. We all came from primary branches where we completed key developmental assignments that were essential for our "credibility as Army officers grounded in the Profession of Arms." It is in our interest to remain connected to peers and colleagues that relay their perspective from within the force, since we are our own branch, rarely ever serving back in a traditional unit.

The practical reason for the Army's decision to manage its personnel through a single-track system was the optimization of assignments and career management. The Army does ensure that it selects officers that have completed key developmental assignments, which includes successful company command, but that is generally the highest level of command possible for an Army FAO. The single-track system has served the Army FAO program well, and this essay does not advocate a change to the alternative dual-track system.

> **"Peculiar to the martial art is the concept that all decision making, all action, all expression of moral restraint is centralized in the person of the Commander."**
>
> **The Challenge of Command, by Roger Nye**

In comparing the Army FAO program with those of the other services, only the Navy transfers FAOs into a separate specialty field as the Army does. The Air Force and Marine Corps maintain their FAO equivalent corps through assigning the responsibility as an additional occupational specialty that will allow those officers to fill the respective services' FAO billets. A key reason for this strategy is to allow these dual-track officers to serve in command billets in their primary branches. Furthermore, the Department of Defense (DoD) 2008 Report on FAOs assesses that "the dual-track FAOs may have greater opportunities to remain well-grounded in their basic military skill or designation."

Should an Army FAO Command?

Command of soldiers is the currency of the Army Officer Corps. The Army Officer's Guide states that "Command is the highest responsibility that can be entrusted to an officer." The nature of the responsibility as described in Army Regulation 600-20 is an eligible officer who "exercises primary command authority over a military organization or prescribed territorial area." This understanding of the officer profession serves as a departure point of comparison across the Army experience throughout different branches. The experience of command translates, not only across the Army, but also across fellow services, and more importantly for Army FAOs, across partner militaries.

"There's a little flavor of Special Forces in there. There's a flavor of the Foreign Area Officer program. These people in these units would get cultural training and language training ..."

GEN Milley describing the skeletal brigades

During the height of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan the opportunity to command Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), Security Force Advise and Assist Teams (SFAAT), and other similar organizations became a real possibility. The DoD 2008 Report highlighted the Army Secretary's finding with the following paragraph:**…recognizing the value and unique skills (Army) FAOs bring to the operational and strategic environment, FAOs were granted eligibility to command Military Transition Teams (MTTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan. Also, the Chief of Staff of the Army directed a holistic review of the Army FAO program to remain relevant to an expeditionary combat ground force.**

These command opportunities are increasingly rare, but the need to expose competitive Army FAOs to the command positions still remains. It should be noted as well that the commander of the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California. had been an Army FAO Colonel in the past, but the command is essentially a branch-immaterial position. Successful battalion-level command represents one of the most common sense ways to improve our reputation within the Army, increase legitimacy with partner militaries, and create a path to general officer rank for the most competitive Army FAOs. To provide more options for Army FAOs to command, this essay recommends two options:

1 – Reserve one battalion command slot per Combatant Command (CCMD) as an Army FAO billet in the new Train, Advise, and Assist Brigades that GEN Milley recently unveiled. He spoke this past summer about "train, advise and assist" skeletal brigades that would be staffed with officers and non-commissioned officers (NCO) and train and assist partner nation militaries in each of the five regional CCMDs, presumably not including Northern Command. GEN Milley described the skeletal brigades as a developing concept where: "There's a little flavor of Special Forces in there. There's a flavor of the Foreign Area Officer program. These people in these units would get cultural training and language training and that sort of thing."

The nature of these brigades is therefore a natural fit for the most competitive Army FAOs and would provide a key battalion command opportunity. The recommendation for only one battalion per brigade highlights the competitive reality against other branches, given that the Army FAO branch is small. The number of qualified and potentially willing candidates within the branch may also be small, so the recommendation for only one slot acknowledges that additional requests would be unlikely. The brigade commands should remain competitive for only the most qualified officers regardless of branch. An additional benefit, but not the focus of this essay, is that these skeletal brigades could also provide increased relevant operational staff assignments as broadening experiences for Army FAOs.

2 – Provide more options for Army FAOs to command branch-immaterial command slots. These positions, which most often include garrison commands, are not the most coveted, but do provide the experience that the right Army FAO candidates could excel in and leverage appropriately in their career.

Final Considerations

The advocacy for command assignments is not meant to supersede the primary Army FAO goal of becoming the Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT) or Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) Chief; rather it is to look beyond the standard Army FAO career timeline, with a view towards complementing the high-performers' experiences, and give more credibility to these officers across the inter-service and partner military environments. The type of commands being recommended are not typical maneuver and operational support commands, which most likely means that they may not be highly sought-after positions. GEN Milley noted in his statement that he intends for the Advise and Assist Brigades to serve as second commands for eligible officers. Army FAOs therefore stand as uniquely qualified and trained experts that could assume command in one of these skeletal brigades after a successful tour in a critical lieutenant colonel billet determined by each CCMD within their respective region.

If the goal is increased command opportunities for Army FAOs so that they become more competitive for general officer promotions, then the next logical issue to address is where these officers would serve once promoted. The most sensible path would be to fill the key positions in the CCMDs and Joint Staff that require regional expertise and serve as key advisory positions to a four-star flag officer. A suggestion of these positions includes the CCMD J2 and J5 and each of the Joint Staff J-5 Deputy Directorates responsible for the geographic regions.

Ultimately, the privilege to command is the universal acknowledgement that an officer is at a superior level of achievement. Consequently, success at the battalion level in this charge is already almost necessary to become a general officer. Command is a crucible in the continued development of an officer's leadership skills, which bonds former commanders across branches, services and countries. An additional benefit of increased command opportunities may also be improved promotion rates, as the 2008 DoD report emphasizes, "It is interesting to note that the dual-track programs – Marine Corps and Air Force – exceeded their Service averages while the single-track programs – Army and Navy – were below their Service averages." The opportunities for highly competitive Army FAOs to command needs to increase in order to enhance currency in the JIIM and generate more Army FAO generals in the force.

About the Author

Major Vincent A. Dueñas is a Foreign Area Officer focused on Latin America, and a recent graduate of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C.

FAO 2025 and Beyond

A Strategic Vision for the U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer Program

By Colonel Luke Donohue, U.S. Army;

Colonel Jason "Brad" Nicholson, U.S. Army; and

Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Kopp, U.S. Army

Editor's Note: The authors welcome comments about their article, which they agree may generate strong opinions within the FAO community. Send your thoughts to editor@faoa.org and we will forward to the authors for response.

Introduction

The U.S. Army's Foreign Area Officer (FAO) corps remains the exemplar for joint service foreign and regional affairs officer programs. However, as the Army confronts an increasingly unpredictable security environment the service's FAO community must seek to address challenges posed by an uncertain future security environment. Provocatively titled FAO 2025 and Beyond, this paper describes a strategic vision intended to elicit comment and spark debate by proposing structural changes and improvements to the FAO program as part of an Army in transition. U.S. and partner nation government officials look to and value the unique contributions of Army FAOs in the Joint, International, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) environment. It is incumbent on the service's FAO corps to strive to continue developing the agility, expertise, and versatility required to remain relevant in supporting army and joint force requirements.

The cornerstone of this vision is a clarification of the future role of Army FAOs in the JIIM environment. We propose three areas where the FAO corps could gain efficiencies and better position itself to meet future needs.

- ***First, existing areas of concentration should be further consolidated.***
- ***Second, training and education should more directly correspond with the requirements explicitly required of FAOs.***
- ***Third, professionalization of the security cooperation enterprise should reflect the investment in and importance placed upon phase zero activities.***

Each of these suggested areas of improvement have been addressed in various monographs, strategies, and legislation. The acute demands of the contemporary military environment have stressed the FAO corps as much as the operating force, exposing its shortcomings. The amount of debate and interest in FAO-related topics reflects a growing awareness that changes are necessary in order to continue mission accomplishment.

Area of Concentration Realignment

In 2014 the Army created a single FAO area of concentration (AOC) to align all officers assigned within the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) geographic boundaries by combining billets from Western Europe, Russia, and select East European states. Additionally, the 2014 realignment moved billets from Central Asian states previously part of the Eurasia AOC to the South Asia AOC to create a more balanced career path for officers serving in South Asia. The 2014 realignment was not deliberately designed with a focus upon how to best support Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC). Parochial and historical interests made a broader reorganization untenable in 2014. However, the requirements of the future force indicate the time for separate country-specific specialists has passed.

Since the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the GCC has served as the primary command and control institution for all military activities in their regions. As such, the GCCs provide the majority of the structure within which FAOs work, with 76% of all billets being in the JIIM environment. The allocation of FAOs across nine areas of concentration does not align with the six GCC boundaries and focuses instead on sub-regions or specific countries. The structural bifurcation of AOCs impacts unified action within the GCC area of responsibility, as it creates permissive conditions for Army FAOs to focus tactically and operationally in a sub-region rather than strategically.

The United States Pacific Command (PACOM) area of responsibility provides an interesting example for exploring AOC consolidation under a single GCC-aligned construct. Four of the nine AOCs - 48F (China), 48H (Northeast Asia - Korea and Japan), 48I (Southeast Asia) and 48D (South Asia) are in the PACOM area of responsibility. The specific country and sub-regional focus of the four AOCs within one combatant command area of responsibility impacts unity of action within theater campaign and security cooperation plans, strategic-level policy from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and other elements within the JIIM. Officers from 48D (South Asia) also split their career time between the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) and PACOM areas of responsibility, further impacting the development of regional experts within a GCC area of responsibility (AOR).

Development and promotion data indicates career advancement issues also exist between the four Asia AOCs not seen in other AOCs. For instance, 48I (Southeast Asia) has 51% of its billets in U.S. Country Teams while 48F (China) has only 20%. Promotion trends for 48D (South Asia) FAOs, where arguably FAOs have the toughest geographic assignments in Asia, suffer compared to 48H (Northeast Asia), who hold significant billet numbers in two sub-unified commands and have unparalleled developmental opportunities. An example comes from the 2016 lieutenant colonel primary zone promotion board, where the Army selected 48H FAOs at a 10% higher rate than 48D FAOs. These assignment and developmental disparities leave the majority of Asia FAOs lacking the knowledge, skills, and attributes gained in Army, Political-Military (Pol-Mil), and country team assignments required to effectively perform as a FAO senior leader where the expectation is that FAOs are regional vice sub-regional or country experts.

Combining the four Asia AOCs creates an Indo-Asia Pacific FAO that can be assigned across the breadth and depth of the theater; perform developmental assignments at the GCC, ASCC, and U.S. Country Teams to develop the regional expertise required at the strategic level. Furthermore, PACOM holds two FAO general officer assignments - the Senior Defense Official billets in India and China. Consolidating the four PACOM AOCs allows for the very best of the Indo-Asia Pacific FAO colonels, with the developmental assignments required to operate at the generalist level, to compete for these positions. This provides the Army a broader pool from which to select the top regional expert for managing the defense relationships with the world's largest militaries, in countries that comprise 50% of the world's population, and challenge the regional and global order. A realignment of AOCs along combatant command areas of responsibility would provide a deeper assignment and experiential base for building senior FAOs.

Similar examples from other AORs could be proven but are beyond the scope of this paper. We only seek to highlight what is possible, not make an exhaustive argument for all AORs.

A structural realignment of AOCs will better support combatant commanders' operational requirements and develop the knowledge, skills, and attributes required for sustainable career paths to senior leadership in the Army FAO program. The reorientation would have a single FAO area of concentration for each geographic combatant command. Challenges of talent management in the PACOM case exist in both the Africa Command and Central Command areas of responsibility as well. Aligning combatant commands with a single FAO specialty would allow for a broader developmental base of assignments required to develop a larger pool of senior leaders with a truly region wide experiential base.

There are numerous examples of FAOs excelling outside their traditional AOC and in languages other than those for which they were trained. In the AFRICOM AOR non-48J FAOs from Europe or South America, whose control trained language is French or Portuguese, often serve in country team billets. In fact, one of the authors, Colonel Donahue, a Chinese speaking 48F, previously served as the security cooperation officer in Bangladesh. The 48E AOC routinely trains officers for low-density languages such as Czech or Polish without retraining in another language prior to subsequent assignments where the control language is not spoken. Considered against these examples, our proposal is more evolutionary than revolutionary regarding language-based assignments.

Concern may arise about sustaining expertise in seam countries like Egypt, Turkey, Mexico, Israel and India/Pakistan. Additionally, there is a possible dilution of functional expertise in treaty-partner countries. While both concerns are valid, the retention of cross-AOC support to seam countries and functional expertise in key partner states are not mutually exclusive and can be managed by the Army FAO enterprise. Increased professional development, support to GCC commanders, and strategic capabilities outweigh *status quo* arguments. Reorientation of FAO areas of concentration to align with GCCs will serve as the foundation for all other improvements in training and development.

FAO Training and Education

There exists a need for a review of the training and education program to ensure the FAO corps is adapting and adjusting to new requirements in the contemporary environment. The current Army FAO training and education program has remained largely unmodified for the past three decades. The three-phase training model of language, in-region training, and graduate school is the cornerstone of FAO competence. While recognizing the training triad must be retained, each of the individual components should be evaluated for potential improvements. The extended training pipeline that produces the Army's FAOs is expensive; if efficiencies can be introduced they must be seriously considered. Colonel Timothy Mitchell's 2013 "Break More Glass" Army War College monograph serves as the guidepost for recommended changes that should be explored. While the triad itself provides officers the academic skills and real world experience to excel in a multi-lingual and multi-cultural environment, greater attention should be focused on educating FAOs for planning roles on strategic level staffs.

Over the past several years the Defense Language Institute (DLI) has created FAO-centric courses with greater emphasis on speaking proficiency. However, limitations remain in course flexibility, availability, and outcomes in speaking ability. We recommend a reassessment of FAO language training and move towards a combination of shorter contract-supported basic language acquisition and advanced language acquisition at a foreign location in conjunction with IRT or as a separate modularized continuation phase. While DLI does a commendable job overcoming the normal one-to-three year timeframe for basic verbal production in a new language, research in the language acquisition field shows an individualized and multi-tiered process that lasts several years for verbal fluency.

The tailored language acquisition model would allow greater individual officer flexibility and focus resources in professional language acquisition and verbal fluency. While most officers eventually serve in countries where they do not have a demonstrated mastery of the language, these skills remain the most distinct identifier for the FAO community. Additionally, language sustainment should move beyond a few weeks immersion TDY to a recertification program focused on measurably improving speaking, reading, and listening ability commensurate with the Defense Language Proficiency Test. Developing enduring language skills beyond minimal requirements should be a priority. This requires investment through time.

The in-region training portion of the FAO program is perhaps the most important for developing regional experts. The educational value of sustained travel and exposure to the cultures, languages, and peoples in assigned areas of concentration makes FAOs unique force multipliers. Applying this understanding of the operating environment in subsequent assignments from inside the beltway, to combatant commands and theater armies, or other regional embassies distinguishes FAOs from other career fields.

However, the in-region training program needs greater standardization towards a common outcome. Some FAOs participate in structured programs such as those Russian-speaking officers enjoy at the George C. Marshall Center, while others are completely unstructured. We feel that establishing some shared commonalities can help balance the acquisition of important skills necessary for performing at embassy and headquarters assignments. There should be an emphasis upon performing a "working" internship where FAOs are exposed to expectations for desk officers and embassy staff. Army service component commands provide a natural nexus for the management and mentorship of officers conducting in-region training, whether in an embassy or on staff.

The advanced civil schooling (ACS)program should also be evaluated to minimize lost opportunities to fully-prepare officers for future requirements. The Army asks FAOs attending ACS to consider recommended research areas asked for by various commands without any associated requirements. Accordingly, the Army is losing an opportunity to leverage significant intellectual capacity to help combatant commanders and strategic institutions in the JIIM environment, while developing the core academic competencies it requires in its future FAOs. We recommend establishing an avenue for the Army to remain engaged with FAOs during their graduate studies. For example, an officer could choose a directed thesis topic to focus his/her studies on regional priorities and future threats. The FAO would collaborate with a strategic institution such as a regional center, the Chief of Staff Strategic Studies Group, or PME institution and present his/her thesis or major research paper to their affiliated institution. We recommend a formalization of the relationship between the FAO enterprise, supported institutions, and students to codify research expectations and linkages to the broader JIIM environment.

A common refrain from non-FAO leaders, supervisors, and commanders concerning FAO staff performance reflects a perceived general deficiency in the community's overall operational and strategic planning ability. During a conversation about combatant command staff roles one general officer indicated that a lack of staff expertise among FAOs, particularly pertaining to joint planning teams and operational planning teams, was a trend he observed across the community. While FAOs are not primarily strategic planners, when assigned to strategic level staffs officers contribute directly to the allocation and determination of ways, means and ends. Often, FAOs serve in crisis action and operational planning teams and are expected to synthesize policy guidance, JIIM equities, partner nation context, and possible unintended consequences into recommendations for senior leaders. In an uncertain strategic environment it is essential that FAOs demonstrate professional competence in operational and strategic planning.

The authors propose leveraging existing advanced military programs to supplement self-study to close capability gaps. The Army School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) and the Army War College are two examples of schools offering courses that might help officers develop greater operational and strategic planning acumen. In the case of SAMS, a small number of highly qualified officers should be encouraged to compete as field selects for the year-long course. Upon graduation these officers would serve a utilization tour at a strategic, theater, or national level staff. The SAMS qualified FAO cohort would be spread across the AOCs and target new FAOs accessed with pre-existing language proficiency or regional expertise or experienced senior majors. This would minimize prolongation of the initial entry training timeline. Select officers could also attend SAMS in lieu of more traditional regional studies or area studies graduate programs as part of the FAO training pipeline.

The Army War College also offers two non-resident programs of instruction, potentially providing excellent options for continued professional education. To date, several FAOs have taken advantage of these programs as part of their own self-directed professional development. The Defense Strategist Course educates officers on the role of the Department of Defense in the development of national security strategy within a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) international environment. The officers graduating from this program earn the additional skill identifier of "6Z," strategic studies graduate. The Defense Planners Course focuses on improving competency in strategic direction, strategic/operational art, operational design, and the joint operation planning process (JOPP). Officers with the requisite aptitude, skills, and desire should be encouraged to pursue these options. In fact, the in-region training period provides an excellent opportunity for FAOs to pursue such self-development. Another window for such training is between permanent changes of station. Officers already routinely attend the Joint Military Attaché Course or the Joint Combined Warfighting Course en-route to follow-on assignments. The combination of a small cohort of SAMS-trained FAOs and graduates of the Defense Strategy Course and Defense Planners Course would help broaden the strategic and operational planning abilities of the FAO community. Since FAOs spend much of their careers outside purely military organizations, these courses would serve to "regreen" officers in anticipation of assignments where technical planning skills are as valued as regional expertise.

Professionalization of the Security Cooperation Enterprise

The NDAA 2017 directs the Department of Defense to improve the "development, management, and sustainment of the DOD's security cooperation workforce." Specifically, the legislation mandates "increased attention and resourcing must be focused on the recruitment, training, certification, assignment, and career development of the security cooperation workforce." No matter how the bill's language is interpreted, it will significantly impact the Army's FAOs. No longer does work as an attaché command center stage, but rather that of the hard, roll-up the sleeves phase zero work that looks to build employable partner capacity and capability tied directly to U.S. efforts to maintain regional stability and security and reduce risk to U.S. interests abroad. This requires a cultural shift and a reorientation towards Security Cooperation as the operational skillset valued by theater commanders of the FAOs forward serving on U.S. country teams and on HQ staff. Capability assessments provided by the attaché are key to be sure, but it is support to security cooperation that directly meets combatant commanders' regional security objectives. This calls for increased focus on professionalizing the force, and credentialing security cooperation to our partner nations to ensure the primary provider of the Department's security cooperation workforce, the U.S. Army FAO, particularly the most specialized and experienced members, are equipped to assume the lead in responding to the specified tasks in the NDAA 2017 bill.

Reorienting training to place primacy on the security cooperation officer and office ensures DOD responds to the congressional mandate with an aggressive program focused on right sizing training for the FAO to support the warfighters' needs. Army FAOs are the very officers who possess the knowledge, skills, and attributes to lead the Phase Zero efforts across the GCCs. When the USPACOM Commander looks to Republic of Korea military capability and capacity it is the Security Cooperation Office, in concert with the Warfighter, who does the yeoman's work to ensure the ROK can "fight tonight," against DPRK threats. When building partner capacity in sub-Sahara Africa and in Latin America, it is the security cooperation offices and its FAOs that know how to synchronize the resources to achieve the warfighters end states.

Modifications to the training of FAOs, outlined in the previous section, will produce more technically knowledgeable leaders and functional security cooperation experts. Of critical importance in the security cooperation workforce is the requirement for FAOs serving in various capacities to synchronize security cooperation activities to achieve maximum effects. As indicated in the 2017 NDAA, however, there are many instances in which training, equipping, and partnering lack the sequencing and nesting required to build the required inertia to achieve the strategic ends directed by the combatant commander. Additionally, attempts to achieve sub-regional integration occur in limited cases and quite often outside of the natural institutional mechanisms of the partner nations. It is apparent the current functional training model for FAOs in the security cooperation workforce does not fully, or adequately, develop the professional competency requirements of the future force.

The authors recommend measures for professionalizing the security cooperation workforce that exceed the 2017 NDAA's directed requirements. The investment in security force assistance and phase zero operations is immense. The Department of Defense and the U.S. Army should invest more in training the planners, supervisors, and executors of these programs on a level that at least mirrors the level of investment in officers assigned to attaché billets. We propose DSCA develops a basic security cooperation workforce course that incorporates aspects of the current Security Cooperation Management course with additional focus on joint operational and strategic planning. While the course design would be under the purview of DSCA, the authors recommend a modular design that, includes in-residence and online components, and incorporates training in force design.

At a minimum the same professional instruction imparted at JMAS geared towards traditional attaché duties should be given to SCOs who face similar operational environments focused on a different problem set. Ideally, the modular course would consist of an intense initial resident phase focusing on security cooperation workforce competencies and incorporate aspects of joint professional military education-level II. The capstone phase could be conducted entirely online or as a hybrid course and include a mentored experiential project or study focused on contemporary DSCA challenges. The course would serve as the capstone event for the security cooperation training and DSCA could certify graduates. The DA G3/5/7 FAO Proponent Chief would then endorse Army FAOs as fully trained and proficient as security cooperation officers. This certification would be required prior to serving in the security cooperation enterprise.

Conclusion

The authors hope this article provokes purposeful discussion in the Army and joint service FAO programs about how to best meet future requirements. Foundational to any institutional change is the structural realignment of AOCs to coincide with geographic combatant command areas of responsibility. Beyond the structural changes, the Army FAO program must make a cultural shift and prioritize FAO enterprise activities to support combatant command requirements. Further, the FAO enterprise must assume resource constraints over the long-term and the associated requirement of maximize efficiency in the development of FAOs and in security cooperation activities. It is essential we break through parochial interests and focus on how best to ensure the Army FAO program serves as the catalyst for GCC commanders to meet their strategic ends.

About the Authors

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Colonel Jason (Brad) Nicholson is the Senior Defense Official and Defense Attaché to Nigeria. He is also a doctoral candidate at the University of Utah in international relations and comparative politics. His previous FAO assignments include U.S. Embassy Tanzania and Uganda, Africa Command, the Joint Staff, and the Army Staff. Colonel Nicholson writes frequently on international security issues.

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Foundational to any institutional change is the structural realignment of AOCs to coincide with geographic COCOM AORs

FOREIGN AREA OFFICERS
INCREASING THEIR ROLE IN THE FUTURE JOINT FORCE

By Major Daniel R. Gable, U.S. Marine Corps,

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Major Aaron J. Wiggins, U.S. Army

Editor's Note: The Wiggins Team thesis is published here without the authors' research notes in the interest of space requirements. To read the complete thesis with all research materials, visit our website at www.faoa.org. The Journal is pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.
Disclaimer: The contents of this submission reflect our writing team's original views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

Thesis

Only through the combined emphasis of developing Joint Foreign Area Officers (JFAO) and optimizing their career paths across services, will the nation fully benefit from the demands laid out in the Goldwater-Nichols Act and President Obama's National Security Strategy (NSS). If properly trained and developed, through an integrated initial qualification training plan culminating in completion of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) phase II and more consistent career progression, JFAOs will strengthen their uniquely qualified position as leaders, educators, and advisors on regional perspectives and strengthen international relationships while developing a joint force capable of synchronizing partner nation capacity with the United States' national security requirements of the future.

Background

Foreign Area Officers are uniquely qualified, due to their regional and interagency expertise, to enable future operations and meet the demands of our National Military Strategy (NMS) and Joint Force (JF) 2020 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations. The current and expected global threat environment are leading to an increased need for a balanced comprehensive approach that is synchronized with our foreign partners' military forces and includes whole of government (WOG) unity of effort. The NMS addresses this requirement and discusses that, in order to meet the future objectives of the Joint force, we must "conduct globally integrated operations, implementing institutional reforms at home, and sustaining the capabilities, capacity, and readiness required to prevail in conflicts that may differ significantly in scope, scale, and duration." Globally integrated operations are further described within JF2020 as those that:

"require a globally postured Joint Force to quickly combine capabilities with itself and mission partners across domains, echelons, geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations. These networks of forces and partners will form, evolve, dissolve, and reform in different arrangements in time and space with significantly greater fluidity than today's Joint Force."

The increased need to work with foreign partners, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and through diplomatic, information, military and economic (DIME) means, requires a shift of priority from the U.S.'s traditional military approach of unity of command and highlights that the future success of the joint force will be determined by commanders who can lead partners through unity of effort.

The modern Foreign Area Officer (FAO) is a powerful resource available to the Commander. The Joint FAO can bridge the diplomatic and military elements of national power, and bring language, regional experience, and cultural understanding to the Commander's staff. Currently 79% of FAO Billets are Joint while only 14% of FAOs are Joint Qualified Officers. A finding published by the House Armed Services Committee stated:

"Many officers are assigned to joint billets without having completed appropriate joint education. This disconnect between JPME and joint duty assignments has become a common practice, disregarding a fundamental purpose of JPME, which by law and policy, is preparation for those assignments."

A FAO's potential impact will be vastly increased through development of a fully Joint Qualified FAO. Only through the combined emphasis of developing the JFAOs and optimizing their career paths across services, will the nation fully benefit from the demands laid out in the Goldwater-Nichols Act and President Obama's National Security Strategy (NSS). If properly trained and developed, through an integrated initial qualification training plan culminating in completion of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) phase II and more consistent career progression, JFAOs will strengthen their uniquely qualified position as leaders, educators, and advisors on regional perspectives, and strengthen international relationships while developing a joint force capable of synchronizing partner nation capacity with the United States' national security requirements of the future.

Initial Qualification Training

Selection criteria and initial training requirements are neither standardized nor sufficient to prepare the FAO to meet the demands of the evolving global security environment. The lack of standardization across the services in FAO selection criteria creates a quality management deficiency resulting to varying levels of FAO expertise and performance. Further, the initial qualification training is not sufficient to control the proficiency variance caused by the non-standardization in selection criteria.

Current Selection and Qualification Criteria

The career path to become a FAO varies amongst the services due to divergent selection requirements and nomination procedures. Army and Air Force candidates are chosen from a pool of early top-performers who submit packages and compete in a selective boarding process. The Marine Corps has two tracks to select FAOs. One is the pool of those eligible for permanent change of station, regardless of interest in the program or capacity to learn a foreign language. The second track is based on personal experience and previous regional expertise. The Navy considers officers who may not be the top performers in their career paths but have the capacity for career broadening, and provides them an opportunity for promotion.

In addition to the differing selection processes, the current training requirements across services are neither standardized nor sufficient to fully prepare the FAO to successfully manage the unique challenges faced as a military representative embedded within a U.S. embassy. The experience and professional military education pathways vary between services. One requirement that is standard across services is that FAO candidates must be at least senior O-3s and be experienced in their primary military occupational specialty prior to being selected for the FAO program. This ensures that FAOs are solidly grounded in military art prior to being trained as an expert in their respective region.

Two primary initial training differences among the services include Joint Professional Military Education



Figure 1: Recommended Training Path

(JPME) and language proficiency requirements. JPME I is not currently a universal requirement and in most cases the service members have limited Joint experience prior to their selection as a FAO. This develops a single-service perspective that doesn't represent the entire Joint community. In addition, language proficiency and maintenance requirements also vary across services. While the Army and Marine Corps mandate this requirement, there exist differences in the recurring testing requirements for reading and listening in their respective language. Periodic testing standardization would help retain language proficiency throughout a FAOs career and provide universal expectations within embassy teams.

Recommended Path for Initial Qualification Training

The recommended path (Figure 1) for initial qualification requirements include Joint Qualified Officer (JQO) training and standardized annual language training/assessment. As a prerequisite, the JFAO path should require previous completion of JPME I. If not completed prior to selection, JPME I would be mandatory prior to completion of a JFAO's Master's Degree program. Upon initial selection, the JFAO candidate would attend the Defense Language Institute (DLI) for their initial language training unless already proven to be proficient. Upon successful completion of DLI, the JFAO candidate should then attend the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) to gain a master's degree in Regional Security Studies aligned with their language proficiency. Finally, the JFAO should attend the Joint and Combined Warfighting School at the Joint Forces Staff College (JPME II) to immerse the student in the Joint environment and familiarize them with the intricacies of comprehensive planning prior to arrival at their first assignment. This would extend the student training pipeline by approximately 10 weeks. The completion of JPME I and II would be worthwhile in the long run because JFAOs would be far more capable of functioning in the joint and intergovernmental environment where they will be assigned. These new JFAOs would more readily grasp comprehensive perspectives and contribute more effectively to their Country Teams, future CCMD planning staffs, and their respective services.

JFAO Career Management

To ensure the effectiveness and longevity of the uniquely qualified JFAO, the various military services must universally manage the three pillars to their career: Development, Placement, and Retention. Recurring development should include periodic language skills assessments to include annual reading/ listening comprehension and speaking assessments. Additionally, their development should include Joint professional military education to instill a broad knowledge of comprehensive military operations and reinforce their Joint perspective. Placement of JFAOs in single track systems would align job opportunities with their regional expertise. This single track system would further prevent the atrophy of perishable foreign language skills and regional expertise that is being lost in the dual track system during their years spent back in their non-FAO military operational specialty. Finally, retention of the JFAO through career progression and developmental/leadership opportunities will ensure that the depth of regional expertise is not lost due to high attrition rates. Only through universal standardized development and management of the FAOs careers will Combatant Commands and Services realize the JFAO's maximum potential.

Barriers Inhibiting FAO Efficiency

One barrier to the effectiveness of FAOs is the variation of career paths across the military services. Both the Navy and Army utilize single track systems, ensuring this will be their primary specialty throughout their career. But, it appears that Navy and Army promotion boards value tactical and operational level experience over strategic support. This perception also deters highly qualified individuals from applying for the program. Alternatively, the Air Force FAO program is divided into two branches, Political-Military Affairs Strategist (dual track) and Regional Affairs Strategist (single track). Both Air Force programs have higher promotion rates compared to those of other career fields, but recruitment and selection are much smaller compared to Army counterpart programs. By rotating FAOs back to their primary specialty, in a dual-track program, the Marine Corps allows them to be competitive for promotion with peers. But this immediate rotation prior to their country team assignment deteriorates proficiency in their regional expertise and foreign language. Further, the Marine Corps recruits fewer FAOs, which leads to unequal service representation within country teams and proficiency compared to their service counterparts. Aside from selection and retention, the underlying problem of the single and dual track systems are that they create vast differences in the quality of FAOs arriving to country teams and supporting operational planning at Combatant Commands.

A second barrier previously mentioned is that "Joint" training is absent early in a FAOs career. To fully leverage the FAO's positions as military advisors and representatives, they must have a solid foundation of understanding of all services' capabilities and be able to advise Joint commands as they plan for operations. Any advice prior to a Joint qualification often represents a single service perspective, and lacks the breadth of knowledge necessary to fully integrate the military arm of national power.

Recommended Career Path

Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz outlined the importance of FAOs and their training and status in an important Department of Defense directive: "Officers with potential for service on political-military staffs and for effective military diplomacy shall be competitively selected within the Military Departments and be able to represent the U.S. Department of Defense to foreign governments and military establishments. They shall be educated, trained, and have their careers managed to ensure they are retained for such assignments. Procedures to ensure competitive career advancement for such officers shall be incorporated in personnel management programs, to include opportunities for service at General/ Flag Officer ranks."

In consideration of Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz's direction, services should provide higher fidelity implementation guidance to previously existing FAO career development programs. Specifically, standardized programs across services would support future JFAOs. Figure 2 depicts the ideal single track system where the first assignment after initial qualification should be to a country team where the officer can immerse in newly acquired language skills and broaden regional expertise. This can be accomplished by the board aligning initial JFAOs with their country team during the selection process

Once complete with a full-tour assignment at a country team, the JFAO, if not selected for developmental education, should continue as a combatant command (CCMD) planning advisor or professional military education instructor. Currently, FAOs are often assigned to CCMD planning teams as operational planners. Alternatively, we recommend that the CCMD FAOs advise planning staffs and coordinate with country teams rather than having a primary duty as a planner. This coordination can also be filled within a CCMD joint interagency coordination group (JIACG). As an alternate path, after the initial utilization tour, JFAOs should serve as professional military instructors in the JPME II course, FAO initial qualification course, language proficiency course, or act as a regional instructor. This would ensure future students can leverage the experiences gained from the JFAO's experience and immerse the experienced JFAO in discussions that broaden their knowledge of their region. The goal of the second JFAO tour is to maximize the use of the knowledge gained during their initial country team tour while broadening knowledge of their specialized region.

After completion of their first tour in a country team and the second tour in a combatant command or as an instructor, the JFAO should return to a country team with higher leadership responsibilities to ensure their development as a military officer, while continuing to develop regional expertise.

Why It's Important

While the focus of this article has been on initial training, recurring development, and proper use of the FAO as a Joint Officer, the intent is to ensure proper utilization of the newly qualified JFAO within the Joint Force. General Odierno stated that,

"The complexity of this (security) environment requires a deliberate investment in our leaders. The need to adapt to rapidly changing situations and identify underlying causes of conflict calls for mental agility and strategic vision. History has shown that no amount of planning or analysis can accurately predict where conflict may arise. However, our ability to respond effectively when it does hinges in large part on the quality of our soldiers and leaders."

Implementing these recommended adjustments to the FAO program will develop a Joint officer that is capable of adapting to rapidly changing situations as an advocate within the country team to advise and influence foreign policy; acting as Regional Advisors to planning officers at CCMDs; educating Joint Service components on regional perspectives; and being leaders of our Joint Force. These newly developed JFAOs will be uniquely qualified to defeat complex, non-traditional threats to defend our national security interests.



Figure 2: Joint Foreign Area Officer Career Path

Conclusion

The current FAO track provides opportunities for single service expertise infusion within country teams and provides foreign partners the vessel to tap into U.S. service capabilities, the program lacks the capacity to implement the full spectrum of Joint functions due to the lack of Joint Qualification Training early in a FAO's career. The recommended JFAO pathway requires standardization in initial training and subsequent training to include language proficiencies, regional specialty, and Joint Qualification training. Additionally, standardized career development pathways through a single track system will provide opportunities to fully integrate proficient JFAOs into country teams and ensure their future development as leaders of our Joint Force while providing opportunities for promotion. Their Joint training will further enable them to implement a comprehensive approach to advise CCMD planners or act as leaders, educators, and advisors of our Joint Force on unity of effort to incorporate the full spectrum of Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic elements of national power. Through these standardized education opportunities aligned with services taking a proactive role in career development, the newly developed "JFAO" will be both prepared and fully capable of synchronizing partner nation capacity with the United States' national security requirements of the future.

About the Authors

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Letters to the FAOA Board

To the Editor, FAO Association Journal of International Affairs:

"FAO 2025 and Beyond" is not a catalyst for discussion about Army FAOs in 2025. It is a frenetic example of how critical thinking and rational analysis can be dulled by hubris, and distorted by Mill's principle of "where you stand depends upon where you sit."

As a retired Army Colonel, I still take great pride in the U.S. Army as one of the most effective and amazing organizations that has ever existed; but I don't believe for a second that this article's unsophisticated, Army-centric vision of FAOs in the future JIIM environment can serve as the foundation for discussion of remedies for vaguely-articulated current "shortcomings" in the FAO specially. This article's shortcomings in logic and critical analysis dull its utility as a FAO-futures discussion platform.

Put another way, instead of a careful needs assessment that parses geo-political issues, force-capability considerations, and FAO specialty political, cultural, and functional requirements eight years hence, the authors offer a dumbed-down current model of the COCOM in Phase Zero as the "Salvator Mundi." In doing so, they blur the essential focus on specific requirements for FAOs.

I think the merger of FAO specialties is an artifice that works for assignments but taxes the FAOs on the ground. It's lazy to align FAO specialties to COCOM numbers -- and ignores the fact that COCOMs sub-divide their staffs to accentuate their ability to deal with diverse cultures and non-overlapping issues. Hard Targets (like Russia and China and some others) also call for specialized skill sets and experience. Army FAOs are ahead of AF and Navy in this regard and will fall behind if changed.

Their thesis and recommendations are problematic. Alleged FAO problems are validated by unattributed anecdotes and a confused amalgam of partial statistics untested for causality and unsupported by inferential analysis. Both problems and solutions lack relevant, accurate data, which are essential to problem identification and solving. The deductive argument is a text-book example of logic errors (including stereotyping, faulty sampling, and false dilemmas). Weak critical thinking and analysis is diluted by silly, marginally-relevant assertions like the "toughest geographic assignments in Asia" [are] endured by 48I (South Asia). Generalized conclusions of this type are sprinkled throughout the article --and they are neither professional in style, nor objective in fact.

DLI uses theory and pedagogy that is unmatched in the world. It provides results that are unique as well. I have studied in country, in Wash DC, in DLI and practically everywhere. DLI is the best -- if you are a mature, focused officer. If you are a lazy, entitled millennial maybe not.

COCOM staff work is a function of mentors, and JPME Phase 2 and prior staff work all help make that work. The Army Staff has its own course and JCS has a shorter version as well. I have worked on all three types of staff and don't see any shortfall -- in general -- for FAOs serving in the field. The problem -- supposedly asserted by some GO (probably an O7) is not ubiquitous or systemic.

This is not to say that the authors' three issues might not be problems. They may or may not be so. What is certain is that the FAO stakeholders do not get the necessary data or the essential clarity from this article to focus their time on these three issues as genuine, significant issues for change. In short, the animated but sloppy approach toward problem identification renders the authors' premises and recommendations moot, and not worth FAO stakeholder's thoughtful consideration.

I respect the authors, and appreciate how much work it takes to prepare an article for publication in our Journal or elsewhere. We are lucky to have contributions from such talented colleagues and peers. They all are experienced FAOs serving in important FAO assignments. Moreover, two of the authors have embarked in relevant doctoral studies, for which critical thinking, rigorous analysis, and precise, accurate presentations of data and findings are fundamental.

However, the FAO community does not need a *pāo zhuān yn yù -- a* half-baked brick tossed out to attract jade. The passion to contribute a crisp, change-focused proposition cannot justify professional scholarship that eschews precision for brevity, or replaces critical analysis with simplicity in exposition.

Mark Brice Chakwin
Colonel, U.S. Army (retired)

Dear Mr. Marisa,

I want to thank MOAA for selecting me for a scholarship of $500 going toward my efforts to obtain an education and eventually a fulfilling career.

I will use this generous investment toward my education to achieve my associates degree at Northern Virginia Community College in General Studies and then the four-year university I decide to transfer to.

I greatly appreciate the kindness and interest that is taken toward students to see them grow and succeed in their goals. It means all the more that it comes from veterans who kept our country safe and secure, and to then support proceeding generations.

Thank you and best regards,

Shaina Williams

Shaina Williams.

Once a FAO, Always a FAO
Improving the DoD FAO Program

By Lieutenant Colonel Paul S. Gendrolis, U.S. Army Retired

Introduction

Since Desert Shield/Storm, the need for and importance of Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) has increased, especially so due to the long-standing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the introduction of programs such as Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT) and security force assistance. FAO training, regional expertise, language skills, and cultural awareness allows the Department of Defense (DoD) to accomplish mission objectives via indirect or non-kinetic means. As political and military tensions continue to increase in Syria, on the Korean Peninsula, and with Russia, FAOs serving on the Joint, Service, and geographic combatant command staffs provide a critical source of regional and country-specific information for senior leaders. Appointed as SDO/DATTs, FAOs provide U.S. Ambassadors with information on host nation military capabilities and requirements, which assist high-level policy decision-making.

There is limited uniformity across the services in terms of FAO program management, training, and utilization; each service has its own individual FAO program. And all FAOs are not created equal: some officers become FAOs because they are native speakers of a target foreign language; some are given constructive credit for overseas assignments; some get training waivers; some get credit for graduate school although the degree does not meet specific FAO requirements. And some officers become "paper FAOs" to meet an immediate need when a bona fide FAO is not available. The current FAO system creates great FAOs; a standardized FAO program across all services will make even better FAOs. Qualification, training, and skills standardization will ensure that the joint force has a more predictable FAO capability regardless of service.

As the increasing requirement for highly trained and capable FAOs continues to grow, so does the need to ensure that FAO management remains highly attuned to all DoD requirements. The intent of this article is to explain why the DoD needs to standardize the FAO program across all services and to provide recommendations and proposals on how the DoD can improve and strengthen the current FAO program, which are in line with the FY17 National Defense Authorization Act (FY17 NDAA) mandate for professionalization of the security cooperation workforce. This article proposes new DoD FAO program management, the establishment of a dedicated FAO branch in each service, a standardized FAO training program, and FAO professional certification.

The DoD currently manages a FAO program inclusive of its four services: Army, Navy, Marine Corps (USMC), and Air Force (USAF). For the purposes of this article, a fifth service is included: Coast Guard (USCG). Although the USCG belongs to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and is not subordinate to DoD, the USCG performs missions critical to DoD.

New DoD FAO Program Management

The DoD FAO program requires the highest level of DoD oversight and management. Specific and centralized DoD oversight is needed, and would be better served by being reassigned to the Offices of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and Intelligence (OUSD-P and OUSD-I), with daily management tasked to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

OUSD-P and OUSD-I already oversee DoD security cooperation and intelligence programs through DSCA and DIA, respectively. DSCA and DIA are the largest employers of FAOs tasked with managing security assistance/cooperation and intelligence programs through the geographic combatant commands. As such, OUSD-P and -I, DSCA, and DIA have vested interests in the success of the DoD FAO program and in seeking means to improve its value. DSCA and DIA know what skill sets FAOs (and non-FAO officers) need prior to assignment to a Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) or to a Defense Attaché Office (DAO) and work with the services, geographic combatant commands, and the training schools to ensure they obtain them.

Under current DoD policy and directive, the SDO/DATT program is jointly overseen by OUSD-P and OUSD-I, with daily operations managed by DSCA and DIA, in close coordination with the services and the geographic combatant commands. The DoD recognizes the importance of FAOs to its SDO/DATT program: DoD Directive 5205.75, governing the DoD SDO/DATT program, states

"SDO/DATT billets requiring foreign area officers (FAOs) should be so coded. Whether or not SDO/DATT billets are so coded, they should be filled when practical by FAOs with prior security cooperation and attaché experience, consistent with the providing Military Service's FAO program objectives."

Currently there are 135 SDO/DATTs appointed to 141 countries; about 71% of these SDO/DATTs are FAOs. It has been posited that SDO/DATT is a FAO command. Therefore, it follows that the first requirement for selection as SDO/DATT is that the officer be a FAO.

Some services have mature FAO programs and can fill all positions with qualified FAOs. Some services are continuing to grow their FAO programs and are not able to provide FAO SDO/DATTs, especially at the O-6 and general officer/flag officer levels. Instead, the "best qualified" criteria is used to nominate an officer -- meaning the officer, although not a FAO, has prior experience in comparable areas that indirectly qualify him/her for the position. It is incumbent upon the services to grow their FAO programs to be able to meet all requirements and upon the geographic commands to ensure that their SDO/DATT billets are coded for FAOs.

Through the initial SDO/DATT vetting process, OUSD-P, OUSD-I, DSCA, and DIA have learned what talent is needed for SDO/DATT and how to manage that talent. DSCA and DIA work closely with the services and geographic combatant commands to ensure that the officers nominated for SDO/DATT have the temperament, security cooperation and attaché experience, qualifications, skill sets, and training that will enable them to be successful. Based upon the proven success of DSCA and DIA in managing the SDO/DATT program, management of the DoD FAO program is a logical and viable step. To be clear, this does not mean cutting out the service FAO program/career managers or the geographic combatant commands -- their roles in getting the right FAO to the right job remain as critical as ever.

There are challenges in meeting this first recommendation: DSCA and DIA must be able to take on the new role of DoD FAO program management from a human resources, personnel, and funding stand point; OUSD-P and OUSD-I will need to be actively engaged in their oversight role, critical to successful program management; and the Secretary of Defense will need to be certain that this change is in the best interests of the DoD writ large. This may seem to be a daunting task, but it has been done before when DSCA and DIA convinced superiors and the Secretary of Defense to develop and implement the SDO/DATT program.

The risk in not implementing this change to DoD oversight and management will be the continuance of the "same old, same old." Without new and energetic DoD FAO program management, there may be little incentive to standardize the FAO system, to change service business practices, to implement the same core training for all FAOs, and for certifying FAO professionalism. These changes require top-down direction that can only be provided by leadership genuinely interested in the improvement and growth of the FAO program.

The timing for such significant change is right. DoD leadership has described the FY17 NDAA as a "once-in-a-generation" paradigm shift for security cooperation, with far reaching effects on the security cooperation enterprise and on the professionalization of the security cooperation workforce. The FY17 NDAA will result in an extensive change in demands that will be placed on FAOs and on FAO management. These effects are being compared to the changes made to the defense acquisition community in the 1990s due to the Defense Acquisition Improvement Act.

Dedicated Service FAO Branch

To improve the DoD FAO program, better meet national direction as found in the FY17 NDAA, and match the growth in international commitments and requirements, the DoD should direct that each service establish a dedicated, stand-alone FAO branch that is standardized in accordance with direction provided by OUSD-P and -I. This would be the first step in creating one program out of many and in creating a common corps of FAOs.

Under new high-level DoD management and in close coordination with the services, DSCA and DIA will need to develop the policy directive and implementing instruction for a standardized service FAO branch that will incorporate, as a minimum, the following provisions:

-- Each service will establish a dedicated, stand-alone FAO branch. Officers will be accessed into the FAO branch upon completion of initial FAO training. Assignments and promotions will be managed by the respective service FAO branch/career managers to meet the immediate and projected FAO requirements of the DoD, the service, and the geographic and functional combatant commands.

- All FAOs will be single-tracked -- meaning that once accessed as a FAO, those selected officers will be assigned to FAO positions for the duration of their careers and will compete only against other FAOs for promotion.

- All FAOs will complete a standardized, initial FAO training program (described in detail in the next section) prior to accession into the branch.

The stand-alone FAO branch enables a service to better manage the career progression of its FAOs from training and initial accession to assignments and promotion. As the Army learned, the services will not have to compete with other branches of that service to keep its FAOs in the FAO pool; it will not require an officer to remain simultaneously qualified for alternating assignments in two divergent career fields, such as Central

Asia FAO and helicopter pilot. The promotion playing field would be leveled by having FAOs compete against each other instead of against officers from other branches or career fields. A stand-alone FAO branch will enable the services to more efficiently grow the cadre of senior FAOs needed to fill SDO/DATT and other high-level FAO billets.

A service FAO career manager might object to accessing FAOs into the branch after completion of training rather than upon initial FAO selection. Selection for FAO is highly competitive; the field is full of extremely motivated, capable, and qualified candidates. But there are selectees who leave the program during training due to below-the-zone promotion, non-promotion, a desire to return to one's basic branch, an insurmountable difficulty in some phase of training, or family considerations. The FAO career is rewarding and challenging, but definitely not for everyone. Those officers (and their families) who realize this during initial training should be able to continue their career in their basic branch. Accession into the FAO branch needs to be made upon completion of all initial training; an officer should not be designated a FAO until he/she has earned it through the rigorous FAO training program.

Currently, one of the greatest differences among the services is how they manage FAO assignments and training. The Army and Navy single-track their FAOs. Due to the officer size of the USMC and smaller number of FAOs, the USMC dual-tracks its FAOs between FAO and service assignments. The USAF revised its FAO program in June 2017 to realign its Regional Area Specialists as FAOs, and dual-tracks them. And the USCG does not have a FAO program; it assigns best-qualified officers to FAO jobs. The Army, Navy, and USMC send their FAO selectees on one year in-country/regional training assignments; the USAF sends its FAO selectees for six-months.

The Army was the first service to have a FAO program and the first to convert to the single-track system. It recognized that foreign language skills erode and that successive FAO assignments in SCOs, DAOs, the Joint Staff, and geographic combatant commands grew senior FAOs who could not only advise senior leaders, but could become senior leaders: witness LTG Charles Hooper, Director, DSCA, and former SDO/DATT Egypt (China FAO); MG Robin Fontes, former SDO/DATT India (Central/South Asia FAO); and LTG Karl Eikenberry, U.S. Army-retired, former Ambassador to Afghanistan (China FAO).

As previously mentioned, the USCG does not belong to the DoD -- it belongs to DHS, and has a small officer corps. But the USCG does have an International Affairs division that assigns officers to SCO, DAO, and SDO/DATT positions. With its growing importance to the security cooperation and intelligence missions of the geographic combatant commands, the USCG might find it beneficial to establish a FAO program and incorporate the provisions of DoD FAO management and training.

The challenges of this recommendation require FAO program management standardization across the services; the change from dual-tracking to single-tracking FAOs; all FAOs to complete one year of in-country/regional training; and it impacts service business practices and personnel management systems, such as promotion policies and career management.

Creating a standardized FAO branch and program will need service buy-in and compliance. That may be the greatest challenge to creating a true, service-wide team of FAO professionals. Each service has its own missions and methodology of and rationale for managing its personnel. For the continued improvement of the FAO program and to ensure that all future DoD FAO requirements are met by fully qualified FAOs, a paradigm shift needs to take place. The DoD and the services need to recognize the benefits gained by its service-wide team of FAO professionals and support them accordingly, even at the expense of current service business practices.

The risk to not implementing this recommendation is that the services continue to run their FAO programs in a non-standard fashion and grow their own type of FAO. By creating a standardized FAO branch in each service, the same FAO management practices will be implemented and commonalities among service FAOs will emerge. The end user of FAOs will find that he/she has the same, high quality, professional FAO, regardless of service.

Standardized FAO Training

The DoD should direct the establishment of a standardized FAO training program that produces the same high caliber of FAO professionals across all services. DSCA and DIA, in coordination with the services and the combatant commands, will need to develop and implement a standardized FAO training program to certify FAO professionalism.

To become a certified FAO and be accessed into the respective service FAO branch, all prospective FAOs will need to complete initial training pre-requisites: Joint Foreign Area Officer Basic Course, foreign language training, security cooperation and attaché training, one year in-country/regional assignment, and graduate degree.

The U.S. Army G3/5/7 FAO Proponent Branch and the U.S. Army FAO Director at the Defense Language Institute (DLI) conduct the Joint Foreign Area Officer Course Phase I, a five-day FAO orientation program covering the full spectrum of FAO duties, responsibilities, and challenges. It is the logical starting point for a new, expanded, two-week Joint FAO Basic Course. The Army would continue to sponsor the course, with increased DoD funding and greater service input and participation. DSCA and DIA will need to work closely with Army to ensure that the course is comprehensive and all-inclusive. Since the DLI foreign language training programs are so intensive, the Joint FAO Basic Course needs to be held prior to the start of foreign language study.

Upon completion of foreign language training, prospective FAOs are assigned to a DAO or SCO for in-country/regional training. To gain the maximum value of this assignment, the prospective FAO must first complete both security cooperation and attaché training taught by the Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies (DISCS) and the Joint Military Attaché School (JMAS), respectively. Since JMAS is located within the National Capital Region (NCR) at Bolling Air Force Base and DISCS has recently established a satellite campus in Arlington, both courses can be completed in nearby locations and take advantage of other security cooperation and intelligence stakeholders, such as the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Joint Staff. Upon completion of these two courses, the prospective FAO will be certified as both a security cooperation officer and an attaché, and will be conversant in what a SCO and DAO do, how they operate, why, and be prepared to serve in both. One of the great take-aways of in-country/regional training in a SCO and DAO is the exposure the prospective FAO will experience in interagency coordination and cooperation.

The final initial training requirement is graduate school. At this point, the prospective FAO will have a solid base of training and experience with which to achieve his/her academic credentials. A requirement of advanced degree study will be a thesis addressing an issue key to a specific country, region, or geographic combatant command. A list of key issues and topics, with input from the geographic combatant commands, will need to be maintained by DIA and DSCA and provided to the service FAO program/career managers and to the DLI FAO Director as a source of thesis ideas.

Upon completion of initial FAO training, DSCA and DIA, in concert with the service FAO program/career managers, will certify the prospective FAOs as professional Foreign Area Officers.

Continuing education is a requirement for recertification in many career fields. Currently, there are two advanced training programs available to senior FAOs: the Joint Foreign Area Officer Course Phase II (JFAOCP-II) at the Naval Post-Graduate School (NPGS) and the SDO/DATT training programs run by DSCA and DIA.

Developed by the Defense Language and National Security Education Office, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, JFAOCP-II is an advanced refresher course to provide senior FAOs (O-5, O-6) with advanced seminar studies addressing regional security issues, aligned by geographic combatant command. JFAOCP-II should be transferred to OUSD-P and -I for implementation by DSCA and DIA, expanded into the Joint FAO Advanced Course, and made mandatory for all senior FAOs. This first phase of advanced training would continue at the NPGS and include a comprehensive overview of current FAO issues and topical seminars. It would also offer an opportunity for FAOs to take short, intensive advanced or refresher foreign language courses at DLI. The second phase would be conducted by the geographic combatant command regional centers to address specific regional security issues and include select regional travel. Completion of this course would provide recertification credit.

The SDO/DATT training is now mandatory for all newly appointed SDO/DATTs. It needs to be formalized into a consolidated course managed jointly by DSCA and DIA, and taught by DISCS and JMAS. Currently, this course provides the SDO/DATT-designee with key issues and challenges he/she can expect to meet in his/her designated country, information specific to the security cooperation and intelligence fields, and briefings with other major stakeholders. Course expansion would include participation by additional DoD and State stakeholders and provide the opportunity for refresher security cooperation and attaché training. Course completion would provide FAO recertification credit.

The challenge to a standardized FAO training program and advanced training is time and money. With new DoD FAO program management and establishment of the stand-alone service FAO branches, the time constraints can be lessened and more readily managed. Training timelines could be standardized and adjusted as required to meet DoD exigencies. Funding will be a constant issue; DoD will need to increase and reallocate training dollars to ensure that all essential training is created, expanded, and maintained, for both initial and advanced FAO training.

The risk of not implementing a standardized FAO training program is that the services will continue to train their FAOs in accordance with current service policies. The FAOs produced, although high quality and highly motivated, will continue to be different in terms of experience and training. The point of having a stand-alone FAO branch in each service and standardized training is to improve the system that ensures every FAO is fully qualified, capable, and prepared to meet the challenges of a FAO assignment, especially in a foreign environment. And, to reiterate, end-users should expect that all FAOs have the same credentials regardless of service.

FAO Professionalism Certification

The trend in recent years has been to professionalize the military and civilian work force and require certification in certain career fields. This is highlighted by the clear mandate for professionalization of the security cooperation workforce in the FY17 NDAA. The initial FAO training program outlined above will provide initial FAO certification. Currently, both DIA and DSCA require officers projected for follow-on DAO and SCO assignments to complete refresher attaché and security cooperation training if there has been a five year or greater hiatus between assignments. To receive FAO recertification credit, every FAO will need to complete refresher attaché and security cooperation training every five years and the Joint FAO Advanced Course. And as previously stated, recertification credit would be given to completion of the SDO/DATT Course.

"Consideration should be given to merging all FAOs, regardless of service, into one, "purple" (joint), DoD managed and trained FAO Corps."

Foreign language acquisition is lengthy and challenging. To maintain and improve language skills, FAOs dedicate personal time and effort in keeping foreign language expertise current. This is incentivized by the award of Foreign Language Proficiency Pay for those FAOs who maintain or improve their foreign language skills. Additionally, some FAOs have the goal of acquiring an additional regional foreign language or the requirement to attain a higher level of foreign language proficiency for key assignments. Refresher and advanced foreign language study opportunities and other excellent foreign language study tools are available at DLI. Expansion of FAO-specific foreign language study programs would provide FAOs with the opportunity to keep their foreign language skills fresh. Short, intensive study programs will need to be available to coincide with the proposed Joint FAO Advanced Course taught at the NPGS. Acquisition of a new foreign language, completion of refresher or advanced foreign language training, and maintenance/improvement of foreign language capabilities as measured by the Defense Language Proficiency Test will provide recertification credit.

FAOs must stay current with the doctrine, capabilities, and military equipment of his/her service and are expected by host nation counterparts to know this information or have it readily available. There are numerous books and periodicals covering the full range of topics a FAO needs to remain current and which provide the required information. Professional reading offers another avenue toward recertification credit.

Intermediate and senior service schools provide another source of training and up-to-date information. Distance and e-learning programs simplify and expand service-related training and education. Attendance at intermediate and senior service schools and completion of resident, distance, or e-learning courses will provide recertification credit.

Another means for staying abreast of US military developments, across services, are assignments in the NCR (i.e. Joint and Service Staffs, DSCA, DIA, State Department, etc.) and geographic combatant commands. Officers serving in these positions are often the life-lines for FAOs serving overseas. Although many of these positions are now coded for FAOs, DoD and the services need to increase the number of FAO positions on these staffs and do more to ensure that FAOs fill them. These assignments also afford FAOs the opportunity to gain valuable knowledge in interagency and high-level decision-making in the political-military arena, key skills for an SDO/DATT. Although these assignments do not provide recertification credit, they do provide the opportunity for FAOs to stay current.

Concluding Thoughts

Experienced FAOs will note that some of these recommendations are not new and have been discussed in other fora, and that this article does not provide an approved solution. This is by design; there are much smarter FAOs in our community who will see the value of these recommendations and will be in a position to make change happen. This article is meant to complement all previous and current discussions, spur further discussion, and ultimately, result in a stronger FAO program for DoD.

Each of the recommendations and proposals made above come with its own set of challenges. To be implemented, they will require a change in the way the DoD and the services conduct business and a significant increase in funding. But with new high-level DoD FAO program management, a dedicated FAO branch in each service, and a standardized FAO training program, the result will be an improved, professionally certified, joint FAO program that better meets the growing needs of the DoD.

As a result of the SDO/DATT program, it has been suggested that at some future point DSCA and DIA should merge into one organization responsible for all phases of overseas military operations (other than combat) under the aegis of the U.S. Ambassador. If so, then consideration should be given to merging all FAOs, regardless of service, into one, "purple" (joint), DoD managed and trained FAO Corps. Once a FAO, always a FAO!

About the Author

LTC Gendrolis served as a Middle East FAO for over 17 years, in SCOs in Turkey and Saudi Arabia, in Desert Shield/Storm, as an Assistant Professor at DISAM (DISCS), as the FAO Director at DLI, and as the TRADOC LNO to the Turkish Army, and for 9 years as the SDO/DATT, SCO, and C-12 program manager at DSCA. He is currently on the editorial board of the FAO Journal. He wishes to thank Alex Garcia, DSCA; Roman Hrycaj, OUSD-I; Mark Ahles, Joe Piontek, Saul Ramos, Bart Chess, and Bob Van Horn, DISCS; and Mark Chakwin, FAOA, for their assistance and contributions to improving this article.

FAO Heritage Pentagon Exhibit Completes Long-time Association Charter Milestone

By Jeff Hoffmann, FAOA Board Member and FAO Heritage Pentagon Exhibit Chair

For more details, visit Defense News article at:
www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1036119/pentagon-heritage-displa

Following the official ground-breaking in December 2016, over the past month, the technical upgrades of the video wall completed the multi-year $120K Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Heritage Pentagon Exhibit. For the ground-breaking ceremony, Then Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness, Mr. Daniel Feehan, led the activities along with lead Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) sponsors, the Defense Language and National Security Education Office (DLNSEO) and OSD Historical Exhibits and Executive Services Division. The ceremony was also attended by several Service leaders, members, and supporters across the FAO Community. Full details are available on FAOA website at: www.faoa.org

From left, Lee Johnson, Navy Senior Language Authority and Director of the Navy Language, Regional Expertise and Culture Office; Diana Banks, Then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Education and Training and the Defense Department's Senior Language Authority; Daniel P.C. Feehan, Then Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness; and Michael Nugent, Director of the Defense Language and National Education Office, cut the ribbon to dedicate the Foreign Area Officer heritage display at the Pentagon, Dec. 12, 2016. DoD photo.

Evolution and Summary of the Historical Narrative

The completion of this Exhibit located on the 2nd Floor (7/8 Corridor) fulfills a long-time FAO Association Charter goal to document the history of the FAO and establish a FAO Hall of Fame/Awards Program. To establish the roots of the FAO, our team decided to extend the reach of the historical founding, beginning with U.S. Army Captain Merriweather Lewis who was co-Commander with Captain William Clark who were asked by former U.S. President Thomas Jefferson to explore the lands west of the Mississippi River. Their mission was to conduct diplomacy with and gather information about various nations of American Indians, which included contact with at least 55 different native cultural groups, including assistance from guide and interpreter Toussaint Charbonneau and his wife, Sacajawea.

Lewis and Clark paved the way for an amazing historical narrative that offered documented and archived accomplishments across the military services, not to mention several appreciative (non-monetary based) sponsors and contributors. These included the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, the George C. Marshall Center for European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, and the George C. Marshall Foundation at the Virginia Military Institute. Additionally, several retired and active duty FAO's contributed to the narrative including

one who donated their copy of the Dayton Agreement, used by a joint U.S.-Russian team with ethnic Serbian and Bosnian units that led to separate forces during implementation of NATOs first major crisis response in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Dayton Peace Agreement marked the end of the 1992-1995 war in the country.

Following the 1800's, the narrative of the FAO can be linked throughout many of the historical events that helped shaped America's national security and foreign policy. While I won't disclose the entire Exhibit for those who are able to travel to the Pentagon to read the full history, this section of the Exhibit is divided into three timeframes:

1920-1940 (World War). Includes historical foundation/roots of each of the U.S. Military Service FAO lineages along with a summary of milestones that contributed to the formation of functional areas that make up the three pillars of the FAO: Security Assistance, Political-Military Affairs, and Intelligence. The leadership honored in the FAO Pioneers section began their origins during this timeframe. The two individuals honored are U.S. Army Lieutenant General, confidant to Dr. Henry Kissinger and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Vernon Walters and former General James A. Van Fleet, known as the "Father of South Korea's Army" and establishing foundational security assistance practices.

1950-1980 (The Cold War and Insurgencies). This section provides an overview of the actual terminology FAO, which originated from the U.S. Army Foreign Area Training Specialist (FAST) program and provides honorary credit to FAO Founder, recently deceased U.S. Army Lieutenant General Samuel Vaughn Wilson (AKA General Sam). General Wilson was one of the first Russia FAST graduates who spent a lifetime as a soldier-statesman at the highest levels of U.S. Government including advisement to at least five U.S. Presidents (Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and George H.W. Bush). As a veteran of Merrill's Marauder and a Fort Benning Small Units trainer for Office of Strategic Services (OSS), his experience is the true coin of counterinsurgency training, tactics, and procedures (TTP). Upon retirement, General Wilson continued to consult, including assistance with the development of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 legislation known as the Nunn-Cohen Amendment that led to the establishment of the present-day U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

1990-21st Century (Refining Global Partnerships).

This portion pays tribute to FAO Association (FAOA) Founder, Dr. Joseph Tulbane (U.S. Army, Eurasia FAO) including the incorporation of the Association in the Commonwealth of Virginia in January 1996. The remainder of the section defines policy and directive origins for the FAO Program in conjunction with the transition of the Defense Language Institute and ends with acknowledgement of the first Navy FAO Flag Officer assignment in 2010.

Other sections of the FAO Heritage Pentagon Exhibit include a tribute to the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) titled, "The Evolution of Foreign Language in the Armed Forces," and artifacts memorabilia wall and the first-ever FAO Annual Awards Program and Hall of Fame.

Future Plans for the Exhibit.

The FAO Walls were designed to be evolutionary over time with the flexibility to change some portions like the Artifacts display. There is also additional wall space available for other organizations that have been approached like the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). Most importantly, the exhibit includes a section to honor an Annual FAO Awards Program. The Video Wall including FAOs in Action allows continued update and inclusion of new material like videos, photography, and FAO event and activity updates. This exhibit will also be added to the Pentagon's public tour circuit along with availability for special tour group requests ranging from VIP to students local universities like The Institute of World Politics and the Naval Post Graduate School Joint FAO Course.

The FAO Exhibit is joined by several other Pentagon hallway displays, which you could refer to as the "Smithsonian of the Department of Defense" that allows the rich FAO history, including accomplishments and success to be displayed and shared with those who served or are serving as a FAO in addition to documenting this history and soldier-diplomat statecraft and lessons learned for future generations to come.

Defense Language National Security Office

FY18 FAO Regional Training

In FY18, DLNSEO continues to partner with the Department of the Navy and George Washington University's Elliott School to provide Regional Sustainment Training to ensure that FAOs have up-to-date knowledge of regional and thematic security issues to ensure they have all the tools required for optimum performance while serving in FAO roles.

The aim of the Regional Skill Sustainment Initiative is to provide FAOs with advanced understanding and analysis of current regional security developments and key cross-cutting (seam) security issues, and to assess the impact of these for interagency and joint operations in order to meet the existing and demonstrated training needs of Department of Defense units, offices, and agencies. The goal is to enable participants to sustain and build upon their security assistance, regional security, and analytical skills, and to ensure their optimum performance in FAO roles.

There will be seven courses conducted beginning November 2017 and ending in June 2018. There will be two seam (DoD wide security challenges and impact) and five Combatant Command focused courses. The seam courses will be three days in length and will be held at GWU. The CCMD courses will be held near the CCMD headquarters and will be combined instruction by GWU and the Naval Postgraduate School. Course descriptions and dates are below. Registration is now open.

November 2017 (Completed) – The International Defense Trade (WDC) - Drawing on experts from the regions, this course examined the major supplier states and their developing defense trade strategies. The supplier states to be discussed include: Russia, China, Great Britain, France, Sweden, Israel, South Korea, India, Pakistan and Brazil. The course also considered the roles of offsets in defense sales, pan-European initiatives, financing, creative deal making etc. It concluded by considering the implications of these supplier's defense trade strategies for U.S. national security.

February 2018 - Data, Robotics and Artificial Intelligence (WDC) - This course will examine the impact of advances – and coming developments – in big data, robotics and artificial intelligence (AI) for a number of spheres. It will begin by reviewing the advances in data collection, robotics and AI and the positive benefits that these bring for example, to aging societies. It will then consider the disruptive effects of technologies on manufacturing, services and employment and the challenges these developments pose for the state, the economy and social stability. It will then move to consider the impact of the developments in robotics and AI for defense systems, including the ethical issues that weapons autonomy raises. Finally it will consider the implications of these technologies for privacy and civil liberties at home and abroad, and the implications for advancing human rights.

March 2018 – Pacific Command (Hawaii) - The Pacific Command seminar will include consideration of: China's 'One Belt, One Road' initiative, China's economic reach, conflicts in the South China Sea, Japan's evolving defense policy, Russia's pacific interests, Oceania, developments in Thailand and the Philippines, and India and Pakistan's nuclear and conventional postures.

April 2018 – Central Command – (Tampa, FL) - The Central Command seminar course will examine issues including: Saudi Arabia's increasing activism, conflict in Yemen, The evolution and role of the GCC, different perspectives on engaging with Iran, Turkey's foreign and defense policy and its implications for the AOR, the conflict in Syria, and Kurdish politics.

May 2018 – Southern Command (Miami, FL) - The Southern Command seminar course will include sessions on: Conflict and chaos in Venezuela, Brazil's corrupt political culture, Cuba's relations with the U.S., Central America's security challenges, Latin American peacekeeping for the UN, and agricultural production and food security in the AOR.

June 2018 – Africa Command (Brussels) - The African Command seminar will include consideration of: the civil war in South Sudan, continued conflict in the DRC, soft power in Africa, China in Africa, urbanization in Africa, African terrorism – will it stay on the continent? African demographics and their implications for future conflict on the continent, and Africa and the international drugs trade.

June 2018 – European Command (London) - The European Command seminar will consider issues including: NATO in the Trump era, the pressures on the European Union, challenges to Europe's defense identity, the implications of Turkey's growing authoritarianism, Islamic terrorism in the European Command AOR, Russia-Ukraine developments, Arctic security issues, and British perspectives on European security after Brexit.

Space is limited. Current FAOs (Active Duty and Reserve) can register through their Service FAO Proponent office. Civilians working in FAO billets or doing similar work can apply through their agencies FAO representative or by contacting DLNSEO directily. For more information, please contact Beverly Rouse, 571-256-0698, beverly.p.rouse.civ@mail.mil

News from the FAO Foundry

By Colonel Mark Chakwin, U.S. Army-Retired

FAOs on Tap goes South!

During this past summer, FAOA sponsored a "FAOs on Tap" at a local brewpub for the senior FAOs attending the latest iteration of the Joint Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Course Phase II (JFAOC-II) in Miami, Florida. This provided the participating FAOs with a rare and interesting chance to socialize and network with the peers from all over the region. The JFAOC-II course was hosted by SOUTHCOM from 8-12 May, and included a seminar program organized by the Naval Postgraduate School. JFAOC-II provided the SOUTHCOM senior FAOs with both advanced seminars to share insights on key SOUTHCOM security and defense issues, and professional development sessions for sharpening the skills of serving experienced FAOs. Ambassador Liliana Ayalde, Civilian Deputy to the Commander and Foreign Policy Advisor U.S. Southern Command, provided the keynote address to the course, which included senior FAOs, current and former DOD senior officials, and notable scholars from the region. FAOA offers a heartfelt

SOUTHCOM FAOs Enjoying "FAOA on Tap"

"FAOA On Tap" Fisherman's Wharf, Monterey

"thanks" to FAO Association member Lieutenant David Bundy, U.S. Navy, for his exceptional work arranging this FAOs on Tap for the Course!

FAOA Award

The Foreign Area Officer Association Award for Excellence in Interntional Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School was awarded twice in 2017. The Spring Award winner was Major Adam W. Drexler, USMC, in June; the Fall Award winner was Captain Michael Kristek, USMC. FAOA sponsors this award semi-annually (June and December) to recognize the graduating students who, in the opinion of the National Security Affairs Department faculty, have distinguished themselves by outstanding thesis in international affairs, based on the quality of the research and overall scholarly achievement. FAO Association Board of Governors member Colonel Mark Chakwin, U.S. Army-Retired presented the award plaque to both winners.

Colonel Mark Chakwin, U.S. Army – retired, presents the FAO Association writing award to Captain Michael Kristek in Decmber 2017

FAO Association Continental Breakfast and Briefing, JFAOC

Joint FAO Course Phase I

The semiannual Joint FAO Course Phase I for new Foreign Area Officers was held at the Defense Language Institute, Presidio of Monterey, in Monterey California, from June 19 - 23. This was the largest-ever iteration of the JFAOC Ph I, with more than 185 new FAOs and spouses attending. The FAO Association sponsored its traditional JFAOC breakfast-briefing that combined good food with a history and overview of the FAO Association's role in the FAO profession. We also sponsored the course's "FAOs on Tap." This social evening was the first for most of the participants and it provided a unique opportunity for the new FAOs to meet and network informally with peers, with senior FAOs, and with professionals associated with the FAO profession.

Interested in hosting an "FAOA on Tap" event in your corner of the globe? Let us know. FAOA is here for you!

CONGRESSIONAL INFLUENCE ON U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE

By Lieutenant Commander Kent M. McLaughlin, U.S. Navy

Editor's Note: Lieutenant Commander McLaughlin's article is published here without his research materials and with discrete editing to fit space requirements. To see the full article with all research notes, visit www.faoa.org. The Journal is pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.

Disclaimer: The author is solely responsible for the content and the views expressed do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Defense or the Department of State.

Congressional Influence on Security Assistance

One of the greatest strengths of U.S. national security policy is the ability of the United States military to use its considerable resources to promote the security of partner nations. Security assistance is a tool of U.S. foreign policy, and affects how the U.S. interacts with partner militaries through a set of programs and policies that assist foreign security forces while advancing U.S. foreign and defense policy objectives. The global reach and high visibility of U.S. security assistance makes it subject to significant Congressional influence and oversight. The U.S. Congress allocates resources, conducts oversight, and provides the authorities and appropriations for security assistance programs. However, the threat exists that the Congressional powers that provide resources could also hamper efforts towards creating and maintaining effective security assistance. Recent bipartisan gridlock has demonstrated how Congress' ability to provide resources, or not provide resources in the case of gridlock, can create a challenging environment to execute security assistance. This article will examine the process of Congressional influence on U.S. security assistance programs, discuss authorizations and appropriations, identify challenges with these processes, and conclude with ideas on how Congress can work past some of its challenges to increase security assistance's effectiveness.

Security Assistance and Congress

U.S. security assistance programs are authorized by Congress, overseen by the U.S. Department of State (DoS) under Title 22 of the United States Code, and often administered by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). These programs authorize the United States to provide "defense articles, military education and training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, cash sales, or lease, in furtherance of national policies and objectives. All [security assistance] programs are subject to the continuous supervision and general direction to the Secretary of State to best serve U.S. foreign policy interests; however programs are variously administered by DoD or DoS. Those SA programs that are administered by DoD are a subset of [security cooperation]." Additionally, other programs and authorities are overseen directly by the Department of Defense under of Title 10 of the United States Code.

Annually, Congress exercises its oversight through the federal budget process which occurs in two stages: authorizations and appropriations. Authorization bills direct how federal funds should or should not be used, by establishing, continuing, or modifying an agency or program for a defined or indefinite period of time. Appropriations bills provide funding to an agency or program.

The general process of authorizations and annual appropriations starts when the President presents the next fiscal year's budget request to Congress, traditionally on the first Monday in February. The House and Senate review the President's budget request, and hold hearings to determine if Congress agrees with that administration's priorities and resource allocations. In late Spring or early Summer, each House of Congress will pass their respective appropriations bills. Then, both houses negotiate the differences between their bills and develop a conference report which includes compromises to resolve the differences between the House and Senate's bills. Ideally, once both houses have passed the appropriation bill in the exact same form, it is sent for the President's signature or veto prior to the start of the new fiscal year on October 1.

Authorizations for government agencies are historically provided through legislation specific for that executive agency. DoD authorization legislation known as the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is passed annually (for the last 54 years). The DoS authorization has not been passed annually, and has not been made law since 2002. In absence of a specific authorization act, authorization for the State Department is provided within that agency's annual appropriation.

Oversight and appropriations for security assistance is provided by eight congressional committees and subcommittees that have jurisdiction over both the DoS, and the DoD. The eight committees and subcommittees are: House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC), Senate

Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Other Programs, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Other Programs, House Armed Service Committee (HASC), Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense (HAC-D), and the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense (SAC-D). The House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee provides the policy oversight for programs administered by the DoS.

Within the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, the respective Subcommittees on State, Foreign Operations and Other Programs, draft annual legislation funding foreign assistance which eventually becomes the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (SFOPS). Furthermore, since U.S. security assistance is administered by the DoD, there are separate Congressional committees which conduct oversight of the U.S. military. The two committees that have jurisdiction over the DoD policy are the House and Senate Armed Service Committees, which are responsible for drafting the NDAA. Finally, the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on Defense provide the funding for the DoD. Each of these eight committees has input into what programs are supported and how they are implemented; each committee can restrict funding or write legislation that changes security assistance policy.

The multiple Congressional committees and procedures, for both authorizations and appropriations, highlight the underlying complexity of establishing legal authority and funding for U.S. security assistance, as each has a role in completing these essential pieces of legislation.

Congress also has the power to overrule decisions made by the executive departments and can slow, stall, or stop foreign assistance through legislation and the Congressional Notification process. Congressional Notification is the process by which an executive department must notify Congress of certain actions as they relate to security assistance. These requirements are codified in the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 as amended and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976 as amended and include proposals for large foreign military sales programs, sale of major defense articles, and granting of excess defense articles. Restrictions and notification requirements can also be included in the previously mentioned authorizations or annual appropriations.

Once formally notified of the President's intention to make sales of defense related articles, Congress can block sales by passing legislation to that effect. Congress can informally delay or block sales by notifying the President that a proposed sale would be opposed if an official Congressional Notification were provided. Informal notification usually leads to a dialog between the Executive and Legislative branches in order to reach a mutually agreeable resolution to the proposed weapons transfer and limit the possibility of embarrassment over an administration's policy or damage to a bilateral relationship.

Legal Authorities and Restrictions

Lawmakers use legislation to change the authorities given to the Executive Branch. These changes authorize new actions, limit current actions, or prohibit action by executive departments. For example, Representative Jim Gerlach (R-PA-6) introduced a bill (H.R. 5190 – "Ukraine Security Assistance Act of 2014") in the summer of 2014 that would authorize the President to provide the government of Ukraine with specified defense articles, services, and training. The bill was referred to three committees (House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, HASC, and HFAC) for review, but was not enacted due to opposition of the White House, which was concerned that arming Ukraine would escalate tensions with Russia. H.R. 5190 serves an example of how Members of Congress sponsor legislation to allow or encourage specific actions by the Executive Branch regarding the provision of security assistance to foreign partners of the U.S. government.

Changes in authorities have challenged the ability of the departments to prioritize strategy and maintain the balance within the State and Defense Departments

Legislation can be used not only to direct security assistance; it can be used to restrict security assistance activities by the government. Possibly the best known example of legislation that restricts the implementation of U.S. security assistance are the Leahy laws sponsored by Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT). Senator Leahy is currently the Ranking Member of the Senate Appropriation Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs. The Leahy laws prohibit the provision of security assistance "to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible information that such unit has committed a gross violation of human rights." In 1998, the first iteration of Leahy laws were incorporated into the FAA and AECA, they were then incorporated into the SFOPS appropriations, and finally fully written into the Department of Defense Appropriation Act for Fiscal Year 2014.

Congress is solely responsible for writing laws; however, it does not legislate in a vacuum and requires input from executive agencies on what authorities (legal authorization) the departments need to complete their assigned missions. This includes taking recommended legal language from the DoS or Defense to include in their respective legislation in order to provide those agencies with the authorities to perform tasks the agencies see as necessary. For example, the annual NDAA provides a piece of legislation for additional language to expand or contract authorities that provide a legal justification for the DoD to educate, train, equip, and conduct exercises with foreign partners. In a recent hearing on security cooperation, Senator Bill Nelson (R-FL) noted that in the last decade and a half (since September 11, 2001) the number of authorities granted for security assistance has expanded, and has been used by the DoD and the State Department as a way to increase their ability to perform train-and-equip missions. Changes in authorities have challenged the ability of the departments to prioritize strategy and maintain the "balance within the State and Defense Departments," because all of the changes in authorities are made on the NDAA instead of a State Department Authorization which has not passed in over ten years.

All of the changes in authorities are made on the NDAA instead of a State Department Authorization which has not passed in over ten years.

In a report requested by DoD to address the growing number of Title 10 authorities, the RAND Cooperation studied some of the challenges faced by the Departments of Defense and State regarding the number of different authorities that are provided in the various annual laws like the NDAA. The number of authorities identified by RAND shows that when DoD identified a situation in which it was not able to operate, but felt that those operations were required, it would recommend that Congress change the law, which often resulted in a new authority and add to the patchwork of diverse authorities. RAND uses the term "patchwork" because of the authorities give DoD the ability to plug gaps in the law, but the gaps are filled in a way that does not provide a cohesive strategy.

The process by which Congress authorizes and restricts action on security assistance serves an essential part in the U.S. government's system of checks and balances. The process created by the Executive Branch requests for authorities, followed by the Legislative Branch review, authorization, and oversight of those authorities provide a method for the branches to communicate their intentions and plans, and a path for congressional committees of jurisdiction to oversee activities and provide feedback on the effectiveness of programs and policy. These processes are made more complicated with the number and disparity between different security assistance authorities written into multiple pieces of legislation.

One reason for the disparate authorities is that Congressional opinion is rarely homogeneous, and is often a conglomeration of different perspectives and influences. Congress has 535 members, each with unique constituencies influencing how laws are drafted, and how those laws are explained to the public. The 2015 State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriations (S. 2499, which became PL 113-235) provides, among other things, significant funding in the form of Foreign Military Financing to three countries: $3.1 billion for Israel, $1.3 billion for Egypt, and $300 million for Jordan.

The law's associated House of Representatives report, H. Rept. 113-499, and House Appropriation Committee press release, provide an example of articulated Congressional intent, and illustrate Congress' competing influences. The differing interests are visible when you compare the statement of the House of Representative's two senior Appropriators, who both support the legislation, but have competing interests and reasons to vocalize that support. A statement by the Ranking Member of the House Appropriations Committee, Congresswomen Nita Lowey (D-NY-17), uses the report's language to describe her support for partners in the Middle East by supporting Israel, Jordan, and Egypt and praises the Chairwoman of the subcommittee, Kay Granger (R-TX-12), for her bipartisan process. However, in speaking about the same legislation, House Appropriations Committee Chair, Representative Hal Rogers (R-KY-5), emphasized in the Committee's official press release that, "the legislation provides security assistance to key allies, including full funding for the $3.1 billion commitment to the United States-Israel Memorandum of Understanding." Chairman Rogers continues to state that the legislation prohibits, "aid to Libya until the Secretary of State confirms Libyan cooperation in the Benghazi investigation." The two different perspectives both show the desire to support Israel and maintain peace between Middle East partners, but the majority party also uses the legislation to focus on issues that have domestic political considerations, such as the investigation surrounding the attacks on the diplomatic mission in Benghazi, Libya.

"managerially inefficient and actually wasteful to taxpayers and industry... If Congress chooses to pursue this path for a full year, the Defense Department will be $38 billion short of the funding level the Joint Chiefs and I have determined is needed."

Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter describing the budget environment under the Continuing Resolution, 2015

As previously noted, Congressional authorizations differ from appropriations in the frequency with which they are passed. The NDAA is routinely passed on an annual basis, but the last time the DoS received its Congressional authorization was through the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (PL 107-228) in September 2002. Political observers claim that this is because of differing political goals supersede the necessity to annually authorize the DoS. Reauthorization bills for the DoS are often "hung up on politics and then flame out – often over suspiciously domestic-seeming issues, like money for groups that favor abortions overseas. Partisan fights over the United States' role in the United Nations have also killed legislation." Failure to authorize the State Department has meant that many foreign policy issues must be addressed through Congressional appropriations (i.e. appropriations for the State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs), or through other agency authorizations such as the NDAA. The Congressional Research Service identifies concerns from some policy makers in a report stating that the imbalance of authorities going to the DoD is leading to a "militarization" of foreign policy. The result of the increase in authorities to DoD is a lessening of authority for the Secretary of State who has overall responsibility for the foreign policy of the United States.

Congress' use of limits on security assistance and specific authorities illustrate that security assistance cannot be viewed solely through a national security lens, but instead must be seen as a holistic political issue that has numerous influences: Ukraine's security, human rights, Benghazi, and even abortion overseas.

Funding Security Assistance

The setting of spending levels for security assistance administered by the DoS is provided through the annual SFOPS appropriation. (Spending levels for DoD security cooperation programs are funded through the Department of Defense Appropriation.) In Fiscal Year (FY) 2016, the United States provided $8.9 billion in the baseline budget and the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) "war fund" for international security assistance. Over the last five years, the United States has provided on average $8.5 billion annually for State Department overseen security assistance. Such funding supports more than fifty DoS, and DoD administered security assistance programs.

Due to political differences, Congress has had difficulty passing budgets and appropriations within the standard yearly process. The most extreme case resulted in the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA, P.L. 112-25) and the process known as sequestration. Sequestration was codified as a portion of the BCA and the inability of lawmakers to reach a compromise that would raise the national debt ceiling by at least $2.1 trillion, and allow for spending cuts and tax increases that would result in total savings over ten years of the same amount. A stalemate between the Democratic leaders in the Senate and the Republican leaders in the House of Representatives, led to the creation of the U.S. Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction ("Super committee"), which tasked members of the House and Senate to find $1.2 trillion in federal deficit reductions or risk an across the board cut to both defense and non-defense discretionary funding. The Super committee did not find a compromise and sequestration officially went into effect January 1, 2012; however, the process of sequestration has been modified or delayed a number of times since its enactment in FY2012, but the funding caps on government spending has effected funding for national security programs including security assistance.

Aside from sequestration, in recent years Congress has regularly funded the government and its programs after the start of the next fiscal year. This is done by a continuing resolution (CR) which is a stop gap measure "enacted when Congress has not passed new appropriations bills and a program's appropriations are about to, or have, expired." CRs may be required due to political stalemate, or as a normal process to prevent a break in funding while an appropriation is being passed. In October 2015, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter described the budget environment under the then CR as "a straightjacket," and said the CR is "managerially inefficient and actually wasteful to taxpayers and industry… If Congress chooses to pursue this path for a full year, the Defense Department will be $38 billion short of the funding level the Joint Chiefs and I have determined is needed."

Since 1995, Congress has appropriated foreign affairs funding prior to the start of the new fiscal year only twice, and in that period there were four years where the funding was not appropriated until six or seven months into the following fiscal year. Before sequestration, an extreme example of delayed appropriation was in FY 2011, where the full year passed without a new appropriation becoming law, and resulted in the full year's budget being administered under a CR. Any delay to pass an appropriations bill limits the executive agencies' ability to work outside of the previous year's budgetary priorities or constraints, and can preclude the government from performing basic functions and reduce the ability of government personnel to perform tasks.

In 2014 the omnibus appropriation (in 2014 all 12 appropriations bills were passed together in one piece of legislation) was passed 108 days after the end of the previous fiscal year. Delays in funding require executive agencies to contingency plan for the continuation of basic operations, and require the leaders of these departments to issue guidance on how to operate under a continuing resolution. CR guidance from the DoD in 2015 provided instructions for furloughing non-essential civilian personnel, limiting transfers of personnel to those funded from prior years, and cancelling temporary duties and travel. Cancellation of travel inherently hampers efforts to conduct security assistance and work with partner nations. In FY 2016, Congress again passed the next fiscal years' appropriations after the start of the next fiscal year, by passing a combination of an omnibus appropriation and continuing resolutions in order to keep the Government operating through FY 2016. Budget uncertainty reduces Congress' ability to provide guidance on natio

Funding Where and When it is Needed

The use of CRs and the Sequester not only brings additional challenges to the execution of U.S. policy, they can negatively affect the relationship between the U.S. and those nations where international agreements, or understandings, are supported up by U.S. tax dollars. Changes in funding under the BCA provide an example of the effects the law had on security assistance policies. Between FY2012 and FY2013 foreign affairs funding was reduced by 5.1%. On a program level, these cuts were more drastic for some security assistance programs: "Peacekeeping Operations" was cut by 28.5%. Such cuts could affect relationships with countries that participate in these operations, or countries that are unable to participate due to funding constraints. While testifying before the Senate Armed Service Committee (SASC) former Commander of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), U.S. Army General Carter Ham described the effects of budget uncertainty on his command as causing "significant reductions in theater security cooperation activities, and joint and combined exercises. [This would] potentially endanger progress in strengthening partner defense capabilities, gaining access to strategic locations, and supporting U.S. bilateral policy objectives." These disruptions in assistance as described by General Ham, and the impression they make on our allies, could cause damage to bilateral relationships with foreign partners by making the United States appear to be unreliable. Conversely, security assistance is able to bring countries together to work with the United States and other nations in ways that foreign militaries may not be able provide for themselves, and provide an avenue for American military personnel to build relationships with military personnel from partner nation.

One place where these types of budgetary restrictions have significant impact is in Africa where partner nations are developing military capabilities and the ability to work interoperably with neighboring countries. A particular program called African Partnership Flight was developed to bring the US military together with African partners to learn from each other and gain an appreciation for each other's capabilities. The events focused on, "strengthening U.S. strategic partnerships with leading nations in Africa to enhance regional cooperation and interoperability." The inaugural event was held in Ghana in March 2012, but due to the sequester and budget constraints, subsequent events were delayed until spring 2014 when 150 people from nine countries participated in the event in Dakar, Senegal. Major James Renfro, a flight commander in the U.S. Air Force, described the event as a way "to bring regional partners together to build regional cooperation and interoperability… we want to facilitate them discussing among themselves." The United States has the ability to bring together partners with different backgrounds to ensure all participants benefit; programs such as African

Partnership Flight demonstrate this capability and provide a method of building relationships if they are properly funded.

Moving Forward

The American system of government currently faces the challenges of significant partisanship and fiscal constraints. To improve how the United States provides security assistance, Congress needs to return to the standard appropriations process known as regular order and streamline the number and type of authorities that legislate security assistance and cooperation.

The federal budget process is structured around an annual routine of authorizations and appropriations. Regular order involves specific timelines and milestones for the appropriations process that should be achieved every year. The process facilitates the government's running in a relatively orderly manner while providing room for debate and disagreement. Delays in the passage of appropriations and the BCA illustrate how Congress can make it more difficult for the State Department and the DoD to provide security assistance. Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD), Ranking Member of the Foreign Relations Committee, described the importance of the regular legislative process in both the appropriations and authorizations, by saying, "the stake for our foreign policy work is increasingly high. A fully authorized and functional State Department is a critical asset to U.S. national security." Regular order and authorizations can provide the State Department and DoD the resources needed to operate a successful security assistance program and demonstrate to our global partners the U.S.'s commitment to providing weapons, equipment, and training for the mutual benefit of the United States and our partners.

There is hope for a return to normal Congressional procedures, and a stable future for security assistance programs. The November 2015 budget deal between the Obama Administration and Congressional leadership shows a positive step towards the return to regular order. However, this deal only provides a two-year framework for the federal budget. The agreement ultimately resulted in the passing of an omnibus appropriations bill (H.R. 2029) which became law on December 18, 2015. In the future, it is not enough to provide a step; Congress and the Administration must continually work together and provide budgets and appropriations legislation to operate a stable security assistance establishment.

Returning to a normalized appropriations process could greatly reduce strain on the security assistance system. Additionally, Congress could streamline the implementation of security assistance programs by ensuring that the authorities it provides to the Departments of State and Defense are navigable by the people who have to implement the programs. Congress should consider RAND's recommendations and explore how it can turn the patchwork of authorities into a framework of security policy and use that framework in a national security strategy. Congress should review the authorities that it has given to the DoD, and consider pressing the Department to determine where each new authority will fit into its security assistance strategy. Additionally, Congress should work to pass a regular authorization for the DoS, and provide necessary authorities to ensure the State Department has an appropriate say in implementing security assistance policy.

Conclusion

Strengthening security assistance will require Members of Congress to provide guidance and support to the departments that execute its decisions. In 2013, Jim Webb, a former Senator from Virginia, and 2016 Democratic Presidential hopeful, criticized the U.S. Congress for abandoning its role in making national security decisions because of political fears over making wrong decisions. Strong national security policy comes from Members of Congress and Executive Branch leaders making difficult decisions and working together. Members of Congress play an important role by providing funding, oversight, and authorizations which contribute to the success of every government program; likewise, in security assistance, a lack of funding, oversight, or authorization fosters an atmosphere where friendly nations do not receive needed assistance which ultimately hurts U.S. security. Through the efforts of Congress and the Executive Branch, the United States has the ability to provide a coherent and effective security assistance program with proper policy oversight, funding, and leadership. It is only with the appropriate authorities and a normalized legislative process that Congress can work effectively and support the State Department and DoD to successfully conduct security assistance.

About the Author

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Security Assistance

Should or Should Not the U.S. Attempt to Train That Partner Nation's Military?

By Captain Lauren Serrano, U.S. Marine Corps

Editor's Note: In the interest of space we have published Captain Serrano's article without research notes. To see the full thesis, visit www.faoa.org.

This article is derived from the conclusion chapter of a Master's thesis written at the National Intelligence University. The title of the thesis is, "Conditions for Successful Security Assistance: A Case Study of Building Partner Capacity in Iraq" and the question it sought to answer was, "What are the necessary conditions in order to foster effective security assistance programs?" This thesis won the LtCol Kuszewski award for best Master's thesis about the Operations-Intelligence partnership.

Over the last decade, several acclaimed academic studies have attempted to evaluate the effectiveness of security assistance or determine certain patterns that lead to success or failure of U.S. security assistance efforts. What all literature on the topic, including this analysis, have in common is a conclusion that no single comprehensive explanation or concoction of conditions automatically led or leads to successful U.S. security assistance efforts. Every country, and the security situation therein, is different. However, both the previous studies, and the data assembled and analyzed here, have identified that there are best practices or patterns of conditions that generally lead to U.S. security assistance efforts being more or less successful. As Foreign Area Officers often relied upon to carry out security assistance missions, it is crucial that we understand this security tool from a strategic perspective. As evidenced by FAOs such as Army Colonel Norvell DeAtkine in his article Western Influence on Arab Militaries: Pounding Square Pegs into Round Holes, forcing security assistance in countries not conditioned for success leads to ineffectiveness, resource drain, and frustration on the part of FAOs and other security assistance operators.

This article synthesizes analysis from a case study of U.S. security assistance to the Iraqi Army and applies it to security assistance as a general U.S. policy. The findings of the case study are then presented as suggestions for conditions necessary to foster successful U.S. security assistance efforts in a given partner nation. The accompanying table outlines the analytic conclusions of this study in a graphic form (see Figure 1). As depicted in the table, this study separates the conditions for successful security assistance into three categories; internal, external, and shared conditions. Internal conditions are those that must be present within the U.S. itself in order to foster successful security assistance missions. These conditions are entirely within the control of the U.S. government. External conditions are those that exist within a potential partner nation, are not wholly controlled by the U.S., and are primarily factors controlled by the partner nation. Shared conditions are those that both the U.S. and the partner nation must both agree on in order to foster successful security assistance efforts.

Shared U.S. and Partner Nation Conditions

First and foremost, both the U.S. and the partner nation must both agree upon and share the same goals of the security assistance efforts. Without shared interests, if each nation is conducting security assistance for different reasons, the realistic results will not necessarily coincide with either country's intended outcome. The Iraq case study is a perfect example of a situation in which the host-nation and the U.S. did not truly share the same interests or objectives. Although much of the rhetoric claimed that both the U.S. and Iraqis mutually desired a united, democratic, stable country representative of all the Iraqi people, in reality the U.S. wanted this objective far more than the majority of Iraqis wanted it for themselves. Despite staged statements, the Iraqi government's interests were not entirely altruistic. The U.S. empowered a Shia Iraqi government that claimed it shared mutual objectives with the U.S., however, the Shia governing elites' underlying motives were to promote Shia interests and establish a Shia Arab state.

The misalignment of interests trickled down from the strategic to the tactical levels. Regardless of the rhetoric, actions of top Iraqi leaders down to many individual soldiers indicated that Shia Iraqis were more interested in promoting Shia power rather than a unified, representative government. At the top, Prime Minister Maliki replaced many Sunni leaders with Shia Arabs once the U.S. withdrew in 2011. On the tactical level, many Iraqi Army units refused to deploy to or fight for regions of the country not aligned with their parochial interests. The true security assistance objective of the Iraqi government was to create a military capable of securing Shia dominance in Iraq. As a result, unbeknownst to U.S. policymakers throughout the mid-2000s, the U.S. security assistance efforts resulted in an Iraqi Army representative of just one demographic within the Iraqi state. Secondary and tertiary effects of this are seen in the strengthened Sunni insurgency efforts in 2014-2015, in the desire for the Kurds to declare independence, and in inflamed conflict exacerbating the sectarian divide. Had U.S. and Iraqi objectives truly been aligned in earnest, not just rhetoric, the Iraqi Army would likely be more interested in actually defending the entirety of Iraq instead of primarily the Shia populated areas or regions of strategic importance.

Many Iraqi Sunni Arabs made no secret of the fact that they did not support the strategic interests or objectives of U.S. security assistance efforts in Iraq. Many Iraqi citizens were so unsupportive of U.S. objectives that they joined militant groups to purposely prevent the U.S. security assistance and nation building effort from succeeding. This avid and violent movement to prevent the U.S. from achieving its security assistance objectives significantly affected the progress of security assistance efforts in Iraq.

As evidenced in Iraq, mismatched objectives and strategic interests can have a crippling effect on U.S. security assistance efforts. U.S. policymakers must be aware of the true interests of partner nation leaders and governments, not just listen to what they want or hope to hear. Mutually shared security interests and objectives are imperative to the success of U.S. security assistance efforts.

Shared Conditions: Present in both the United States and the Partner Nation

- Shared security interests and objectives.*
- Internal Conditions: Present in the United States
- A long term strategy or plan for sustainment of security assistance efforts.
- Consistency in U.S. funding and implementation of security assistance.
- U.S. personnel trained and prepared to conduct security assistance in the specific partner nation (socially aware; culturally sensitive; some fluency in the native language).

External Conditions: Present in the Partner Nation

- Stable, established partner nation government and associated institutions.**
- Partner nation which invests its own funds.
- Partner nation with homogenous national identity.
- Partner nation with cultural, ethnic, and religious values similar to U.S. values.
- Partner nation in which the local environment requires the national military to fight using conventional warfare doctrine.
- Partner nation with good human rights record.***

Notes:

** This is the most important overall condition necessary to foster successful security assistance efforts.*
*** This is the most important external condition necessary to foster successful security assistance efforts.*
**** This is the least essential condition, and can also be more like a nice-to-have condition.*

Figure 1: Conditions Necessary to Foster Successful U.S. Security Assistance Efforts in a Given Partner Nation

Internal U.S. Conditions

By conducting the case study of U.S. security assistance in Iraq, it is readily apparent that a lack of consistency of effort and of a long-term plan had severe negative effects on the success of building the Iraqi Army. Thus, it is logical to assess that consistency in funding and implementation, as well as a long-term strategy or plan for sustainment are essential conditions for success of security assistance. Iraq went from receiving no security assistance from the U.S. in 2002, to being one of the top recipients of U.S. security assistance efforts worldwide throughout the mid-late 2000s. Then, in 2011, the U.S. security assistance efforts took a dramatic reduction in what was termed the "normalizing" of security assistance in Iraq.

The amount of U.S. military assistance obligations fluctuated from 1.2 million USD in 2002, to a peak of 6.0164 billion USD in 2006, and then down to 963.7 million USD in 2011. Although the statistics for 2012 – 2014 were not available at the time of data collection, the political decisions and approved fiscal obligations during these years imply that the amount of aid decreased every year after 2011. Like U.S. aid, foreign aid to Iraq from all countries worldwide differed. In 2002 Iraq received $85.39 million US. In 2005 all U.S. foreign aid peaked at $21.98336 billion USD, just to inconsistently fluctuate between $9.76454 billion USD and $1.11379 billion USD from 2006 - 2013.

This lack of consistent funding made it impossible for

Iraqi leaders to count on a constant flow of new military equipment, resupplies, and U.S. personnel to train and advise the Iraqi Army. Furthermore, the inconsistency in funding contradicted what many U.S. politicians had been promising Iraq for years. During the G. W. Bush administration in particular, top U.S. leaders made multiple promises and statements that the U.S. was building a long-term strategic partnership with Iraq. These promises were neither supported by consistent funding nor were they enshrined in a treaty that would bind the actions of subsequent administrations, which ultimately affected the strategy of building a modern Iraqi Army capable of defending their nation and enforcing security in the region.

The number of Iraqi soldiers was also inconsistent, perhaps as a secondary effect of inconsistent U.S. funding and implementation efforts. The number of Iraq soldiers dramatically decreased from 432,000 in 2003 to 179,000 in 2004. This was certainly due to the disbandment of the Ba'athist regime's military and the ban on former Ba'athists continuing to serve the new Iraqi state. From 2005 – 2010, the numbers steadily increased from 227,000 to 802,400, only to dramatically decrease to 177,600 Iraqi soldiers in 2013. The reason for the approximate 80% decrease in troops is not easily explained. One cause could be that the data was incorrectly recorded or reported. In 2014, the corruption in the Iraqi Army became public; many soldiers existed on the master manning documents only administratively, but were not physically present within their units, and likely did not exist at all. This scam was likely in existence for years prior to its public exposure. Thus, it is impossible to know if the reported numbers of Iraqi soldiers in fact even reflect "ground truth." Regardless, any major fluctuation in troop strength was likely tied to inconsistency in U.S. security assistance implementation efforts so that the Iraqi reports were never verified.

As security assistance funds ran out, so did most contracts with U.S. companies which the Iraqi Army had previously relied upon to sustain equipment maintenance and readiness levels. Many Iraqi soldiers in charge of equipment maintenance and supplies never learned to operate without the aid of U.S. counterparts. Without consistent funding for U.S. maintenance personnel and operators, much of the military equipment bought or supplied to Iraq has become non-functional and non-mission capable.

Another aspect of this condition is the consistency in implementation by the U.S. of security assistance. As also discussed in the case study, the amount of effort and number of personnel involved in implementing security assistance fluctuated dramatically. Throughout the mid-2000s thousands of U.S. service members were assigned to Military Transition Teams (MiTT) and embedded directly with Iraqi Army units from strategic commands down to small tactical units. However, instead of assimilating the training and becoming self-reliant, many of the Iraqi Army units became extremely reliant on their U.S. counterparts and were unable to sustain training and readiness levels once U.S. the MiTTs departed. Although the intention was to wean the Iraqi Army off of its dependence on the U.S. military and leave in place a strong, capable military, in reality the rapid withdrawal of U.S. troops and MiTTs resulted in a hasty and disorganized turnover of total responsibility to an unprepared, fledgling army. Furthermore, many valuable relationships and a significant reservoir of positive rapport that took years to build was lost throughout the hurried withdrawal process.

Soon after approximately 50,000 troops departed at the end of 2011, the entire security assistance mission was left to the care of approximately 120 personnel with little in the way of logistical and communication support. Instead of focusing entirely on continuing the security assistance mission in a traditional sense, these personnel were forced to spend valuable time conducting base closures throughout Iraq, transitioning authorities to the Department of State, and resolving all remaining "loose ends" from the Iraq War itself.

The implementation of security assistance in Iraq was never consistent. The promise of a long-term strategy and sustainment plan for security assistance did not correlate to the guidance being given or course of action taken. Contextually, the rapid transition from no security assistance mission, to one of the most robust missions worldwide, down to a small "normal" security assistance mission was not an appropriate or feasible course of action to achieve the desired end state. In order to ensure that security assistance efforts succeed, they must be tied to consistent fiscal support and implementation efforts and work toward an overall long-term strategy and sustainment plan.

Just as consistency of effort is essential to the success of security assistance, the provision of properly resourced and trained security assistance personnel is also key. As many after action reports and journal articles on building partner capacity have suggested, security assistance efforts can be improved by providing more comprehensive military, language, or cultural training to personnel assigned to execute the security assistance mission. For American service personnel, assignment to security assistance duty in Iraq was considered inferior in their career advancement than deployment to a combat operation. U.S. military personnel were often concerned, and rightly so, that deploying as part of the security assistance force would be viewed less favorably by promotion boards than other, more kinetic deployments. Furthermore, many units refused to volunteer their best personnel to go train Iraqi soldiers, suggesting that many of the trainers and advisors were not top tier service personnel. Therefore, many military personnel only reluctantly took assignments to train Iraqi soldiers, and were often ill-equipped culturally. Nevertheless, many trainers and advisors began their assignment with their respective Iraqi units with high hopes and ambition, only to leave Iraq feeling exhausted, defeated, and pessimistic about the future of the Iraqi Army.

The U.S. security assistance training pipeline did not set trainers and advisors up for success. It is possible that had these personnel been better prepared from the outset, their effect on their Iraqi counterparts would have been greater. The discussion of the specific training sufficient to fulfill such requirements is a matter for another thesis. However, it is certain that in order for security assistance to succeed, U.S. personnel involved in the process need to be trained and prepared culturally as well as tactically. This assessment is consistent with Jennifer Moroney's RAND study How Successful Are U.S. Efforts to Build Capacity in Developing Countries? A Framework to Assess the Global Train and Equip. Moroney's study concluded that in order to succeed security assistance personnel must have a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities. Additionally, there must be effective coordination and mutual understanding between DoD, DoS, and the leaders and members of key congressional committees, who all are responsible for the success of security assistance.

External Conditions

The most important external condition to foster successful security assistance is a strong, established partner nation, with a strong government and institutions. Although all of the other external conditions are important, none are as imperative as having a strong government, which in Clausewitzian terms means the government has ensured it has secure lines of cohesion between government, military, and all of its people, and ameliorated cleavages between the people and government that both internal and external enemies might seek to exploit to destabilize the state. A strong partner nation government is an indicator that many or all of the other external conditions are also present in the partner nation. RAND researchers Paul and McNerney also came to this conclusion throughout their studies of security assistance. The following center of gravity analysis helps highlight and explain the importance of a strong government as a condition to fostering successful security assistance efforts.

Identification of friendly and enemy center of gravity (COG) has been a critical component of warfighting for centuries. Many famous military strategists throughout time, such as Carl von Clausewitz, have theorized about the COG concept and its importance in military strategy. In recent years Colonel Dale Eikmeier (US Army, Retired) has added a scientific method to the art of identifying COG. In a 2007 Military Review journal article titled, "A Logical Method for Center-of-Gravity Analysis," Eikmeier makes the claim that ends + ways + means = strategy. Ends are the objectives (usually called 'end-state' in military doctrine). Ways are the critical capabilities (always expressed as verbs). Means are the critical requirements (always expressed as nouns). Altogether these elements constitute the strategy. The COG of the strategy is the critical requirement that is most vital to accomplishing the most critical capability. Any means that would be necessary to accomplish a way but that does not exist constitute a critical vulnerability. Although this process can be time consuming and complex, Eikmeier states that COG analysis is too important to leave to guesswork because a faulty conclusion resulting from poor or hasty COG analysis can have very serious consequences and impair the ability to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives.

COG identification is a vital tool in conducting analysis of the enemy and usually takes place during the Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment (IPOE). However, it is just as important to conduct thorough COG analysis of friendly elements and policies, such as security assistance. Using Eikmeier's process for identifying COG, this analysis section examines U.S. security assistance policy and determines that a stable, established partner nation government is the most important external condition to achieving successful U.S. security assistance efforts.

The ultimate objective of the security assistance policy is to build strong, reliable foreign military allies and partner capacity. The ways (verbs) of achieving this end include: selling military equipment to foreign governments using the Foreign Military Sales process, advising foreign troops and commanders, and training the foreign militaries to use U.S. military doctrine, tactics and equipment. The means (nouns) to achieve these ways include: capable U.S. troops, capable foreign troops, U.S. military equipment to sell, stable and established foreign governments, logistical means to deliver the military equipment, a U.S. budget large enough to fund the security assistance office, foreign government financing, and time.

Applying Eikmeier's process to the problem, the mean that is most vital constitutes the COG. Thus, for the U.S. security assistance programs, the center of gravity is the stable, established foreign governments. Without stable, established foreign governments many of the other means do not exist or are irrelevant. A stable foreign government is essentially the glue holding the partner nation side of the security assistance program together. Without the means of a stable, established foreign government to enforce standards and adhere to the remaining security assistance program critical requirements (the other means), then the critical capabilities of training, equipping, and advising a foreign military cannot achieve the strategic objective of building a capable foreign partner.

In Iraq, the U.S. conducted a nation-building effort while simultaneously conducting security assistance. The new Iraqi government established in the post-U.S. invasion period after 2003 was inexperienced, superficial, and not supported by the majority of the Iraqi citizens. With the aid of U.S. advisors, the burgeoning Iraqi government published a democratic constitution in 2005. That same year, U.S. military equipment began flowing into the newly established Iraqi Army units. Throughout the mid-to-late 2000s the new Iraqi government struggled to establish political legitimacy and create a functioning government. Sectarian and tribal conflict created underlying challenges to establishing a respectable, legitimate government. Controlling and guiding the security assistance efforts in Iraq was just one of a plethora of challenges the fledgling Iraqi government faced.

Without a stable, established government, Iraq struggled with developing resolute objectives and strategies. The U.S. expected the new Iraqi government to modernize quickly, and pushed Iraq to adopt democratic values. But at the same time the new Iraqi government was not able to function on its own and was not considered a legitimate government by many of the Iraqi citizens - especially the Sunni Arabs and Kurds. From 2005 - 2014 Iraq was considered anywhere from the second to the thirteenth most fragile state in the world, according to the Fragile State Index.

Although the U.S. attempted to force the Iraqi government into creating an inclusive structure representative of all Iraqi people, after the U.S. withdrawal in 2011 most leaders who were not Shia Arabs were removed from positions of power. There are many case studies about the struggles and mistakes of nation-building in Iraq; a great topic for another study. The point is, lack of a stable, established Iraqi government was a primary contributor to struggles the U.S. security assistance effort faced. This study assesses that the more stable and established a partner nation is, the higher the propensity for successful security assistance engagement.

In order to determine if a potential partner nation has a stable, established government analysts could use the RAND Propensity Matching Tool and the Fragile States Index. Another measure or indicator of a partner nation's stability is their gross domestic product (GDP) and economy. All of these factors can be scrutinized on a case by case basis using a consistent method, something analysts in the intelligence community are perhaps best postured to do.

Although the center of gravity in security assistance is the stability of the partner nation and the strength of its government, other external conditions cannot be ignored. A partner nation which commits its own funds is more likely to be invested in the outcome of the security assistance efforts. This conclusion is consistent with Paul's RAND study. Like almost any situation in life, people are less responsible if they are spending other people's money whereas they are more conscious about how they spend their own hard-earned cash. The same philosophy holds true for security assistance financing. Partner nations that fund the U.S. security assistance efforts themselves are more likely to be involved in, responsible for, and responsive to U.S. security cooperation efforts in that respective country.

Especially in the beginning, the U.S. financed the majority of the security assistance mission in Iraq. Slowly, Iraq began financing more and more of the security assistance effort, but never fully paid for all expenditures. In 2004, Iraq spent $614 million USD on the Iraqi military. From 2005 - 2014, the Iraqi government steadily increased the amount of funding for the Iraqi military from $1.120 billion USD to $9.516 billion USD. This slow but steady increase in financial responsibility showed promise that the Iraqi government was willing to sustain its investment in building the Iraqi Army. However, as U.S. funding decreased, Iraqi funding did not increase to keep pace. Although Iraq slowly took on more of the financial burden for its own military, the amount of financing Iraq spent specifically on purchasing U.S. military equipment decreased significantly. Iraq was either not willing to, or did not have the means to purchase as much equipment or training as the U.S. had during the height of the security assistance effort.

A country with a severely fractured national identity also suffers from deep and undermining conflicts. The lack of a homogenous national identity directly affected the ability of the U.S. to motivate Iraqis to be a part of their national military. Because many Iraqis have loyalties to their religious sect, tribe, ethnicity, family, etc. that override loyalties to the state, creating an Iraqi Army based on notions of nationalism, patriotism, pride, and unity was extremely difficult and proved ultimately unsuccessful. Within the Iraqi Army, units that were comprised of homogenous groups had a higher success rate as they were not suffering from internal friction. Even homogenous units within the Iraqi Army encountered desertion problems when tasked to conduct operations not associated with defending that group's particular part of the Iraqi land or population.

Another issue that plagued the security assistance effort in Iraq was one group's dominance of the Iraqi government and Army. Because the U.S. empowered a Shia-led government, the Iraqi Army subsequently became a vehicle for Shia Arabs to ensure their dominance over Sunni Arabs, Kurds, and any other minority group within the Iraqi population. The U.S. did not intend to prop up one group within Iraq while simultaneously fostering hate and discontent amongst various other groups. Nevertheless, the nature of the fractured Iraqi society and lack of a homogenous national identity naturally led to most security assistance efforts supporting one group, Shia Arabs.

Warring factions within a country can have devastating effects on the government's ability to maintain stability and/or build a national military. Just as seen in Iraq, if one or more group within a country does not believe the national military is looking out for their interests, that group may be inclined to create a militia, or worse a terrorist group, to act on their behalf. Smoothing the tensions between different groups and/or successfully encouraging the groups to adapt to a single homogenous identity is extremely difficult and likely takes decades or even centuries. The rift between religious groups in Iraq dates back over a thousand years, and is likely not going to be resolved anytime soon. Building a national military where such deep-seated fractures in society already exist is a very difficult process. Thus, this study assesses that those partner nations with already existing homogenous societies are preconditioned to be more successful recipients of U.S. security assistance.

Partner nation's preconditioned with values similar to those of the U.S. are likely to experience less friction when receiving U.S. security assistance. Paul, in his RAND study, What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and under What Circumstances, came to a similar conclusion. Paul calls this security assistance condition having a "partner with sufficient absorptive capacity." Culture, ethnicity, and religion all have the potential to manifest themselves in the military culture of a respective nation. Because part of the U.S. strategy of security assistance is promoting the use of American military doctrine, it logically makes sense that countries that share similar cultural, ethnic, and religious values will more easily absorb the efforts of U.S. security assistance.

As a comparison, most Americans value (or at a minimum tolerate) cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity. However, given that America is a "nation of immigrants," the glue that has bound Americans together for two hundred years is the shared values of freedom, democracy, patriotism, and liberty, which tend to be thought of as the most important virtues of American society. These values drive much of the American military culture, and dictate the day-to-day conduct of U.S. service members. Differences in culture, ethnicity, religion, and even gender are not considered appropriate grounds for discrimination (although incidents do occur). American values are generally idealistic. Even though there are incidents where discrimination occurs or some Americans prioritize their values differently, as a whole American nationalism and the virtues of liberty, freedom, and patriotism are extremely prevalent in American military culture.

Differences in values creates friction when trying to conduct security assistance or transform an undeveloped military into a modern military capable of fighting alongside U.S. forces using American military doctrine and equipment. Differences in values contributed to the overwhelming frustration American trainers and advisors felt about dealing with the seemingly endemic corruption, the attitudes, and lifestyles of Iraqi soldiers. The American military values of meritocracy and individual responsibility were lost on Iraqi soldiers as their perspective of values is extremely different. Furthermore, peoples with different values, cultures, languages, ethnicities, and religions tend to be wary of those unlike them. Building trust across cultures is difficult and takes time.

The U.S. security assistance effort in Iraq trained the Iraqi Army to fight a conventional war, but the security situation in Iraq was anything but conventional.

It is native to expect the military in a society that is extremely different from the U.S. culturally, ethnically, and religiously to easily adapt to or take on traits of American military culture. Societies in Africa and the Middle East tend to be the least like American societies, which suggests that building partner capacity with partner nations in these regions would be more difficult. This assessment is consistent with McNerney's RAND study, Assessing Security Cooperation as a Preventative Tool, that also suggests countries in Africa and the Middle are less optimal partners for security assistance.

Security assistance is less likely to be successful when conducted in a country in which conventional warfare is not the chosen method of adversaries. The FMS program provides partner nations with military equipment intended to be used in conventional warfare; much of the FMS equipment is not useful in conflicts that are not fought conventionally. Additionally, the U.S. military trainers and advisors are responsible for teaching partner nation counterparts how to fight, plan, and organize conventional military operations. In the manner it is currently conducted, security assistance must only be a foreign policy tool when dealing with partner nations capable of, or prepared to embody conventional warfare tactics. Security assistance is not intended to teach a partner nation how to fight with forces primarily comprised of guerrillas, terrorists, or employing other forms of militant tactics.

The U.S. security assistance effort in Iraq trained the Iraqi Army to fight a conventional war, but the security situation in Iraq was anything but conventional. Adversaries were, and remain, insurgent groups and militias that employ guerilla style tactics and do not conform to the Geneva Conventions. The Iraqi Army and U.S. could not expect adversaries to abide by rules of engagement as they were not fighting with a legitimate militant force. As seen in wars such as Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, a superior fighting force with more advanced weapons and technology can still lose to an inferior adversary if the super power does not adjust to warfare tactics more appropriate for the environment. Conventional warfare, even with overwhelming combat power, does not guarantee success. Thus, teaching a partner nation to rely on conventional warfare tactics in an environment where the adversaries are likely using unconventional warfare techniques is not a recipe for success. Unless U.S. policymakers are willing to adjust the security assistance policy completely, traditional security assistance effort is likely not the most appropriate or feasible tool to achieve regional stability.

In early 2014 the Iraqi government began investigating units of the Iraqi Army for human rights violations. Not only did the U.S. continue its security assistance efforts while the investigation remained ongoing, in February 2015 the U.S. Congress actually approved $17.5 million USD in military equipment to be expedited to Iraq in order to aid the Iraqi Army in defending against ISIS. This shipment took 22 days to complete, a process that normally takes months or even years. The overwhelming concern about defeating ISIS drove the Iraq Army's human rights violations out of the spotlight.

This situation suggests that Presidential Policy Directive 27's objective to promote human rights and only conduct security assistance with partner nations which have good human rights records is actually a secondary objective to promoting regional security. Therefore, partnering with nations that have good human rights records is not necessarily a condition that indicates security assistance efforts will be successful, but rather it is a nice-to-have condition of the partner nation. It is possible that a history of a good or bad human rights record will continue in the same pattern regardless of the U.S. security assistance mission, as seen in Iraq.

When is Security Assistance an Appropriate Tool to Achieve U.S. National Security Interests?

Security assistance is clearly a complex issue. It should not be a blanket strategy used with every partner nation worldwide, nor should it be abandoned as an effective tool. Instead, U.S. policymakers need to be more keenly aware of when and where to rely on security assistance. There are shared, internal, and external conditions that generally lead to security assistance being more or less effective. In situations where all of the conditions are present, potential for successful U.S. security assistance efforts are high. As fewer and fewer of the conditions exist, the likelihood of success also decreases. In potential partner nations where none of the conditions exist, security assistance is not an appropriate tool to achieve U.S. national security objectives.

In most situations, a mixture of conditions will likely exist. There is no perfect combination of conditions that lead to definitive success or failure. However, certain conditions are more important than others. The shared condition of the U.S. and partner nation having mutual security interests and objectives is imperative. U.S. policymakers should not employ the security assistance strategy in foreign nations which have differing security interests and objectives.

Another imperative condition is the external condition that a partner nation has a stable, established government and associated institutions. Without a stable, established government, the security assistance effort becomes buried and overwhelmed by a nation-building campaign. McNerney concluded that security assistance programs may be better at reinforcing success or preventing backsliding in countries that already have strong institutions rather than using security assistance to dig extremely fragile states out of instability. Highly fragile partner states are not able to use security assistance programs effectively, therefore, other approaches should be explored that focus more on building basic institutions rather than training, equipping, and advising an already incapable military.

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Military Engagement in Latin America through Building Partner Capacity

By Major Vincent A. Dueñas, U.S. Army

Disclaimer: The views reflected are the author's alone and do not represent the official position or opinion of the United States Government or any of its agencies.

Introduction

The Western Hemisphere is an integrated ecosystem of political, economic and military factors with nations that came of age through a shared experience in seeking independence within the "New World." Much of our shared history involves this process of discovery, the search for independence and the struggle for self-governance, as Figure 1 reminds us. A revised national security strategy should acknowledge one of the fundamental security issues that pose the greatest risk to U.S. national security in our hemisphere: weak governance.

Figure 1

U.S. policy towards Latin America following the end of the Cold War has been largely one of cooperative partnership within the sphere of regional politics, while the U.S. has opted not to exert hegemonic authority.1 This policy has generally served U.S. interests well, as it helped establish strong ties with partner nations with shared values. The Western Hemisphere is a resource-rich region that has provided for itself since before it was considered the "New World." Abundant in natural resources and flanked by two oceans and polar caps, it is an oasis unto itself.

It is in this shared context of hemispheric history and environmental splendor that this paper seeks to improve the success of Building Partner Capacity (BPC) programs to address and to enhance an active strategy of engagement for the hemisphere. This paper recommends targeted funding increases in International Military and Education Training (IMET) funding as an effective method of further advancing U.S. security interests in the hemisphere.

The Interplay of the U.S. and Latin America

The dynamics of U.S. foreign policy in the western hemisphere have been interdependent and complicated, seeing various peaks and valleys throughout its course. For most of that time however, Latin American states were focused inward, attempting to consolidate their governmental systems and establish political systems. International focus was primarily centered on limited trade, and in some South American countries, immigration from Europe.2 Foreign policy was therefore a reactive affair, especially with respect to security issues, where the U.S. provided a means through which countries could engage when partnering with the large neighbor in the north. The post-Cold War era, however, saw the first wide-spread divergence of Latin American and U.S. foreign policy goals with the establishment of new regional multi-lateral organizations such as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of the Americas (ALBA).3 Among the different power dynamics that were emerging, there was always a general desire on the part of Latin American countries to want U.S. support but at the same time avoid overly committing themselves to Washington's priorities.

Within this context, it is useful to take stock of positive developments to understand where the U.S. stands today. Fallout from intelligence leaks crises crested in 2014, during the height of the region's most recent spate of anti-Americanism. Since then, the hemisphere as a whole has gradually been shifting back towards partnership with the U.S. due to concerted efforts on all sides. Over the course of 2015, the "rapprochement" with Cuba and the Vice President's proactive engagements in

Central America and South America highlighted President Obama's policy shifts in Latin America. Today, the historical peace agreement in Colombia stands as one of the greatest examples of BPC and security cooperation in the history of the U.S. and inspires collaborative partnership with our government.

Across the region there are other key signs of progress. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has integrated the three economies of Canada, Mexico and the U.S. closer together and inextricably linked us in deep ways that extend to defense, with the establishment of the North American Maritime Security Initiative (NAMSI). Energy, specifically in oil and gas, today presents a great opportunity for investment with Mexico's recent pro-market reforms. In Central America, the self-initiated Alliance for Progress aims to tackle violence and the migrant crisis, by uniting Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador in a compact to improve the security and quality of life of their citizens. In South America, the wave of anti-Americanism has begun to subside with the Argentine election of a centrist, pro-market president, as well as the election of another centrist pro-market president in Peru.

Over the last seven years IMET funding for the Western Hemisphere has dropped by 16%

Where there have been positive developments, however, there have also been very concerning deviations. Instability in Mexico and Central America remains a concern due to the Transnational Criminal Organizations that transit significant amounts of drugs into the United States. Venezuela, however, is the most pressing and potentially volatile challenge in the region, which could affect countries of strategic interest to the U.S., especially Colombia.4 President Nicolas Maduro and the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) are experiencing a critical breakdown in leadership of the country as a result of failed economic policies that have resulted in unprecedented shortages of basic medicines, food, and electricity. The opposition movement gained a majority in the legislature in December 2015 and has been actively seeking constitutional means to unseat President Maduro. However, he in turn has chosen to consolidate power and enact emergency powers that allow him to rule by decree, further eroding democratic institutional powers. The country is experiencing a humanitarian crisis, with widespread protests and counter-protests, that have at times become violent, and which threaten to destabilize the region. This devolving predicament is a key example of the kind of situation that does not lend itself to unilateral involvement by the U.S., but rather requires a regional response, as the U.S. bolsters support for its key ally, Colombia, during its peace process.

Engagement to Address Weak Governance

A new strategy for Latin America must fully consider and integrate this new dynamic of outward looking countries that still look to the U.S. as an example, but have very independent foreign policies. For the U.S., the issue of weak governance in a number of states in Latin America serves as a detrimental flaw in partner countries that partly leads to the migration crisis that afflicted the southern U.S. border and also increased illicit trafficking flows. As Dr. Phil Williams of the University of Pittsburgh notes:

> The crisis of governance that is most disturbing and corrosive is occurring at the state level and reflects a world of more and more perennially weak, corrupt, or captured states that are unable or unwilling to meet the needs of their citizens, to provide an inclusive fold of protection and provision, to evoke the continued loyalty of their citizenry, to maintain the rule of law, to impose and maintain order in their major cities, and to control their borders.

Improving governance through the security dimension is one key way to improve the situation while simultaneously partnering and supporting nations with shared values. Today this crisis does not pose an existential threat to U.S. national security, but it does contribute significantly to instability in the region, which inevitably results in second and third-order implications for the United States. The distinguished Latin American expert, Dr. Ellis of the U.S. Army War College, notes that "the absence of a near-term existential threat from Latin America and the Caribbean does not make it any less strategically important for the United States.6

The hemisphere is at a point where popular movements within countries are refocusing priorities on economic prosperity while simultaneously demanding transparency and better governance. The U.S. has fostered good will by calling for pragmatic approaches to partnership, and now should consolidate that through increased actions conveying U.S. commitment to the region. To be most effective, the strategy should emphasize foremost that U.S. engagement in the hemisphere will be predicated upon mutual esteem and respect for sovereign states in the region. Through collaboration and cooperation based on mutually shared values and priorities, the U.S. should as a minimum seek to increase access and deepen those relationships through BPC.

It is important to note Dr. Henry Kissinger's warning against U.S. retraction from international commitments, of falling prey to a siren's call to pull back from the world: "America – as the modern world's decisive articulation of the human quest for freedom, and an indispensable geopolitical force for the vindication of humane values – must retain its sense of direction."7[0] The values the U.S. espouses necessitate continued engagement abroad to continue fostering those shared values and commitments. General (ret.) Jim Mattis in a February 2015 statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee emphasized that strategy is the manner in which ends, ways, and means are connected, and with reduced military personnel and constrained resources U.S. strategy must be adjusted to compensate for that.8[1] General Mattis goes further to address the need for allies in today's environment:

The need for stronger alliances comes more sharply into focus as we shrink the military. No nation can do on its own all that is necessary for its security. Further, history reminds us that countries with allies generally defeat those without. A capable U.S. military, reinforcing our political will to lead from the front, is the bedrock on which we draw together those nations that stand with us against threats to the international order.

As budget constraints continue to limit the execution of defense priorities, chief among them needs to be the continued commitment to our partners in the hemisphere. To abdicate forward presence in the hemisphere is to miss a vital opportunity to capitalize on key terrain that is closest to the U.S.. Dr. Ellis goes on further to elucidate:

To use a military analogy, Latin America and the Caribbean is, for the United States, an "unoccupied high ground." The fact that the United States does not fully leverage the opportunities offered by Latin America, nor suffers a significant immediate security threat from the region, does not make it any less strategic.

In fact, Latin America's strategic importance is highlighted by noting that where the U.S. does not have strong relationships, China has sought to aggressively partner with those nations, most notably in the case of Venezuela and Nicaragua. Throughout Latin America, China has undertaken an active role in expanding its interests across all countries in investments, the expansion of export markets, and to gain access to natural resources, having only truly begun this process after 2003.11[4] For Latin American countries the relationship with China has been colored by Beijing's more favorable terms for their exports, making Latin American countries overly susceptible to falling commodity prices. Based on a maturing and retracting Chinese economy, and a desire to find new investment opportunities, China's newest strategy doctrine aims to correct these imbalances in order to gain deeper access to Latin American markets and promises to expand trade and invest in the region's industry.12[5] Coupled with a stated desire to expand military cooperation that does not place restrictions for human rights violations, China is quickly expanding its interest in the region. The extent to which expanded Chinese participation in the region can support U.S. security goals can be ascertained only if we make more investment in Latin America to remain engaged, otherwise we are clearly abdicating the role of a preferred partner.

Taking Stock of what BPC Can Do

According to the Security Assistance Management Manual, BPC programs exist "for the purpose of building the capacity of partner nation security forces and enhancing their capability to conduct counterterrorism, counter drug, and counterinsurgency operations, or to support U.S. military and stability operations, multilateral peace operations, and other programs."13[6] Historical context for successful examples of BPC in Latin America includes Colombia, Mexico, Chile, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Brazil among others. For their part, Latin American countries with shared democratic values appreciate the important tradition of civilian control of the U.S. military and seek to professionalize their forces as strong transparent institutions. It is in this space that BPC can enhance the security aspects of any strategy for the region.

The U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) Commander, Admiral Kurt Tidd, referenced BPC as one of his five command priorities for his Area of Responsibility (AOR), which encompasses all of Latin America except Mexico. Admiral Tidd's Posture Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee identified BPC as the cornerstone of everything USSOUTHCOM engages in, highlighting the vital example of Colombia as a model of supporting a partner nation in dealing with an insurgency.14[7] Furthermore, Admiral Tidd listed professional development, highlighting International Military Education and Training (IMET), the Human Rights Initiative (HRI), humanitarian assistance/humanitarian and civic assistance programs, the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and the State Partnership Program as the examples of invaluable BPC programs that US-

SOUTHCOM undertakes to build a "Partnership for the Americas" and "remain the premier security partner of choice in the hemisphere."15[8]

Given that continued engagement in the region is critical for U.S. security needs and that Admiral Tidd prioritized BPC, it is useful to consider how effective BPC programs really are. In 2015, two separate studies were published that examined the value of BPC programs. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) and the RAND Corporation completed reports that attempted to qualitatively determine whether BPC programs achieved their intended aims.

In the CRS report, the study assessed eight broad goals that BPC attempted to achieve over a sample of 20 case studies. These goals were war termination, managing regional security, indirectly supporting a party to a conflict, conflict mitigation, enhance military coalition participation, and alliance building. The results showed that the goal most likely to be achieved by BPC programs was alliance building, with the rest progressively less successful.

Most importantly, the report suggested that "the effectiveness of U.S. BPC efforts may be related to the overall strategic objective the Unites States seeks to accomplish."1[9] For a region that currently does not have interstate conflicts, and that has a number of multilateral forums to manage regional security, BPC appears to fit perfectly within a strategy that calls for increased engagement for access and relationship building. Another point to emphasize in the findings is that in cases where BPC efforts were not successful, weak governance tended to be the common issue. The exceptions to that rule included efforts in the Philippines, and most notably Colombia. The success in Colombia, with respect to BPC, can be partially attributed to both a unity of effort on the part of both governments, as well as a holistic effort from the U.S. interagency.17 Still, however, BPC was deemed a success in this instance. Where the study fell short was in analyzing why BPC was successful, which was due mainly to the study's limited scope, but also to a dearth of definitive evidence from which to draw on. The study focused on whether or not BPC was actually successful, but pointed to a RAND report that attempted to dig further into why BPC was or was not successful in certain cases.

Surveying a sampling of 29 examples of U.S. efforts to conduct BPC, the RAND Corporation attempted to conduct a detailed analysis of the success of BPC and arrived at a series of conclusions. The first conclusion was that a primary correlation for success of a BPC program was alignment of the capacity-building activities with the partner nation's objectives, keeping in mind its ability to absorb the training and equipment.18 Additionally, relationships mattered greatly, whether the objective was outright access or another set of BPC objectives, the degree of existing relationships enhanced the likelihood of success.19 Finally, BPC is an endeavor that takes time in terms of consistency and investment and has been more successful since 9/11 due to the focused vision after the attack, which led to increased funding and emphasis.20 Understanding that relationships lay the foundation for the success of further BPC activities, it useful to consider what programs provide the deepest level of relationship building returns. This author's experience with attending both military schools and civilian graduate school with partner nation military students, leads him to conclude that educational exchanges are one of the best ways to forge relationships, second only to conducting real-world operations.

The experiences of undergoing either academic or operational rigor impart a similar shared challenge, the mental challenge of solving problems. Understanding that there is an extensive apparatus for USSOUTHCOM and security cooperation personnel to assess and recommend the appropriate funding levels for BPC programs that are most appropriate for each country's respective capacity, the IMET program stands singularly as a program that is universally successful with all partner nations. IMET emerges as an enduring program that addresses one of USSOUTHCOM's key priorities, falls within the CRS study's criteria for an appropriate objective for BPC programs, and lays the foundation for the first line criteria upon which all other successful BPC programs can flourish, according to the RAND report.

A 2012 qualitative correlational study of African and Western Hemisphere IMET students' perceptions of civil-military relations and understanding of the US revealed statistically significant relationships.21 The study found that IMET favorably influences participating students' perceptions of their views on civilian control of the military, view of democracy in the US, and understanding international human rights standards.22 A 2014 RAND report assessed security cooperation as an effective preventative tool, noting a strong correlation between security cooperation spending and improvement in the country's level of fragility.23 The report also emphasized that, apart from Colombia, Honduras and Guatemala have been key nations that have benefited from priority IMET support that has helped to reduce overall fragility as part of the respective countries' broader security cooperation strategy.24 If the overarching strategy is to remain engaged in the hemisphere, with a core military strategy of staying engaged with minimal resources in order to combat the fallout of weak governance, then IMET is the cornerstone upon which the military's access should be based. It is low cost compared to other BPC activities, and requires inherent stability in order to allow partner nations to project suitable students to attend, thereby allowing for a long term planning effort.

Based on available data, (see Appendix I), over the last seven years IMET funding for the Western Hemisphere has dropped by 16%, from a high of over $16 million in fiscal year (FY) 2010 down to just over $13 million. Furthermore, as a percentage of total spending for worldwide IMET dollars, the region dropped from 15% in FY2010 to 13% in FY2015. The trend should at least reflect an increase in percentage spending of total expenditure of IMET funds to broaden the base of Latin American military personnel exposed to U.S. institutions and norms, while building meaningful relationships with fellow U.S. military personnel. An increase in IMET for the region provides for a solid foundation of mutual shared experiences that include implicit understanding of similarly shared values, which enable more successful implementation of more complicated BPC activities to address the key issue of weak governance that results in the remaining plethora of security challenges the U.S. is concerned with.

Conclusion

The recommendations presented focus exclusively on BPC, but codify U.S. commitment and seeks to expand the relationship in the spirit of comprehensive hemispheric security. Since the end of the Cold War and the bipolar order, the United States has actively recognized the sovereignty of its partner nations in the hemisphere and worked to cooperate on shared interests. The U.S. today arguably faces the most unstable world in modern history and does so with limited resources.

The key message is that a targeted increase in IMET, partnered with an overall comprehensive strategy that addresses the remaining diplomatic, intelligence and economic tools of other agencies, will lead to a strategy of mutual collaboration from the top down between the U.S. and nations in the hemisphere. Active engagement is the most logical strategy to stay informed and be able to inform our partner nations.

This would signal the continued partnership that the U.S. is taking with sovereign nations and a commitment to strengthening bilateral and multilateral relationships predicated upon shared values. In more concrete terms, it would strengthen military-to-military relationships and serve as a potential leverage point in encouraging regional support for the two immediate challenges facing the region today: Colombia's transition to peace and Venezuela's instability.

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Better Together
Rethinking U.S. and UK Defense Cooperation

By Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas Cowley, MBE, United Kingdom Army

Editor's Note: Lieutenant Colonel Cowley's thesis won the FAO Association writing award at the Joint Advanced Warfighting School, Joint Forces Staff College. Because of its length, we publish hear a condensed version without research notes. To see the full thesis with all research materials, visit www.faoa.org. We are pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.

Disclaimer: The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense. This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, the world has been uni-polar. The status quo has suited the West and given structure to world affairs. However, a combination of increasing power being held by other states, the rise of non-state actors, the growth of NGOs, and the proliferation of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD), are signaling a move to a multi-polar world in which the U.S. and UK will find it increasingly difficult to protect their national interests without support from others. Unless Western states find innovative ways of combining their power, international order could change quickly and unpredictably. If there is a rapid change to world order, academics such as Abramo Organski and Robert Keohane predict an upsurge in conflict, and Richard Hass predicts "mostly negative consequences for the United States."

Concurrent to the rise of other spheres of power, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Roger Altman, and Richard Hass highlight the recent, relative reduction in defense spending in the U.S. Simultaneously, the UK's economic troubles have also forced cuts to military capability. Furthermore, the need to invest in new frontiers such as cyber and space, overlaid with increasing costs of defense equipment, are exacerbating the trend of reduced military spending in the U.S. and UK. As noted in Janes in 2010, "high and rising costs of modern defence equipment together with falling defence budgets mean that no nation can avoid difficult defence choices." As Simon Serfaty notes there is a discernable risk of the West losing its assurance and cohesion as the power of Western states dissipates.

However, there is some good news. The U.S.-UK 'special relationship' is largely intact, and there are areas, such as communications intelligence and special forces, where the U.S. and UK are working closely together. Moreover, there are examples of unprecedented burden sharing between states, especially amongst NATO and European countries, which combined with the recent propensity for Western nations to form coalitions, demonstrates the will and ability of Western states to form enduring, symbiotic military relationships.

Therefore, whilst neither the U.S. nor UK will outsource the security of their homeland, the strategic environment is such that the U.S. and UK must examine the benefits of increased security integration. This may be the time for the U.S. and UK to capitalize on their special relationship in order to gain more mutual security and to act as a bedrock around which the West can anchor itself.

To that end, this thesis will propose that: In a time of static or decreasing defense budgets and increased global threats, the U.S. and UK should capitalize on their special relationship through further integration of military capability. Doing so successfully might provide greater efficiency and flexibility in securing national interests.

Increased defense integration comes with risk and only occurs when there is a clear requirement to change. The UK's decline in military power since WWII is stark. Despite the positive headlines of the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), the chances of the UK rebuilding a sustainable, unilateral power projection capability are small. Moreover, due to U.S. dominance of space and nuclear technology, the UK would find it difficult to project and sustain a conventional military force, or use its nuclear strategic deterrence, without U.S. support.

Whilst the U.S. has not suffered from a decline in absolute power, the U.S. should put resources into encouraging bandwagoning from other Western states. The U.S. is in debt, its military is shrinking, defense equipment is getting more expensive, and inconclusive campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have eroded confidence in the ability of the U.S. to achieve its desired foreign policy outcomes. In contrast, China's military continues to grow, multinational corporations accrue power, WMD proliferates, and terrorism persists. Meeting those challenges requires fresh thinking and increased collaboration between states.

The U.S. -- UK relationship is known colloquially as the "special relationship." The strength of the special relationship is best analyzed based on comparisons of strategic guidance, history, shared threats, geography, International Organizations (IOs), and the economy. When analyzed in such a systematic fashion, the strength of the special relationship is beyond doubt; the number and depth of the links between the two countries proves that the U.S. and UK would support each other should either of their vital national interests be threatened.

Some states, particularly in Europe, have benefited from outsourcing aspects of their national security to other nations. Senior diplomats from NATO countries have stated the need for more inter-state cooperation in providing collective security. Condoleeza Rice believes that "Lord Palmerston got it wrong when he said that nations have no permanent allies. The United States does have permanent allies: the nations with whom we share common values." Rice may be overstating the case but her underlying point is sound. General Odierno, a former U.S. Army Chief of Staff, in an interview with a British newspaper, reiterated the point: "This is the most uncertain global environment that I have seen in 40 years of service…we need our multinational partners…we need to have multinational solutions." There are compelling theoretical and practical arguments as to why the U.S. and UK should consider closer defense cooperation.

One example of the practical application of progressive thinking on military integration and collective defense is NATO's concept of Smart Defense. Delivery of Smart Defense across an alliance the size of NATO is difficult because of the range of interests, resources, and cultures of NATO countries. However, the principles of Smart Defense could be more easily applied to the U.S. and UK. To achieve gains the UK would need to make changes to its military, but the potential benefits of aligning with the most powerful military in the world would make any restructuring changes worthwhile. Conversely, the U.S. would not need to make structural changes in order to recognize the benefits of increased defense integration with the UK; the U.S. would only need to give time and energy to the process of folding UK capability more closely into U.S. capability.

This thesis proves that there are compelling theoretical and practical arguments for deeper defense cooperation. However, any move that can be construed as giving up sovereignty is likely to come under close scrutiny on both sides of the Atlantic. A closer examination of the arguments shows that a successful process of specialization would not require the U.S. to take risk on any of its military capabilities. The UK would be taking perceived risks against its unilateral capabilities but, in fact, the UK already holds those risks – they are just not widely acknowledged. Nonetheless, even though the logic for the UK to deepen defense cooperation is sound, it would come with political risk. After Prime Minister Tony Blair's support to the invasion of Iraq, British politicians have become wary of overtly linking the UK's defense policy to the U.S. Moreover, the British public would instinctively be skeptical of such a move because British strategic culture is such that many in the population hold outdated and inflated views of the UK's military capability. Hence, political nervousness and British pride will likely act as the biggest impediments to creating greater mutual security.

This paper does not suggest that the U.S. decline will happen immediately or that threats to global order are going to manifest themselves in the short term. However, due to the time it takes for militaries to restructure, further U.S. and UK military integration must be discussed now, in order to ensure both countries are prepared to face the complex, global challenges of the 21st Century.

The most compelling argument for the UK to give up some of its military sovereignty is that it already has.

Global Power Projection

One of the criteria for being a great power is global power projection. Despite bold rhetoric, the UK is currently unable to project power in a meaningful way. The 2010 SDSR gave the Ministry of Defence (MOD) the task of delivering a brigade via amphibious means, but under current resource constraints, it is unable to do so. Whilst the UK has purchased two of the Queen Elizabeth Class (QEC) aircraft carriers, they will not be in full service until 2023 and the Royal Navy does not have enough ships to deliver the troops that make up an amphibious brigade. The UK military is also unable to project ground forces via the full suite of air assault operations. The minimum force required to seize an airfield in a contested area is a combined arms Battle Group, but the UK current policy for airborne operations only supports the maintenance of parachuting capability for one company. The ability to conduct air dispatch has also atrophied, leaving the UK's airborne forces without the ability to deliver vehicles, guns, and supplies by parachute.

As Sun Tzu pointed out, the danger of not knowing your own capabilities is as dangerous as not knowing the enemy.

Not only is the UK unable to conduct opposed theatre entry by airborne or amphibious operations, it also lacks the means to mount an armored division. The British Army considers a division as the lowest level of command at which the full orchestra of land warfare can be played, and yet 3 (UK) Division, the UK's only armored division at readiness, contains only one brigade at high readiness. Therefore, it is a war fighting division in name only. The 2015 SDSR states that by 2025 the Army will have two Armored Brigades and two Medium Weight Strike Brigades. The details of the new structure have not yet been published but assuming a 'year on, year off' readiness cycle, there will only be one Armored Brigade and one Medium Weight Brigade at readiness at any one time. Therefore, whilst the 2015 SDSR was welcomed by the British Army, it has not restored the British Army's ability to put an armored division in to the field.

The weaknesses in the UK military are out of step with the country's ambitions. In the 2010 National Security Strategy, the Prime Minister unequivocally rejected any "notion of shrinkage of our influence." The 2010 SDSR went on to say: "Our future forces, although smaller than now, will retain their geographical reach and their ability to operate across a full spectrum from high-intensity intervention to enduring stabilization activity." Furthermore, it claims that the UK "will continue to be. . . able to deploy a self-sustaining and properly equipped. . .force anywhere around the world and to sustain it indefinitely." The language in the 2015 SDSR is slightly less ambitious, possibly in recognition of the UK's inability to meet the lofty goals set out in 2010. However, it still is unequivocal that the UK must be able to respond to the full range of threats as well as promoting British values abroad.

Whilst some in the UK are fooling themselves as to the country's military might, fooling the UK's closest allies (and presumably enemies) may be more difficult. In 2013 the Financial Times reported that U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter could barely hide his dismay, when he described the UK's reductions in military spending as "actions which seem to indicate disengagement." When interviewed in March 2015 General Odierno highlighted the inability of the UK to field an Armored Division with three Armored Brigades, "what has changed is the level of capability, in the past we would have had a British Division working alongside a U.S. Division". British rhetoric in national documents does not match reality and senior leaders in the U.S. have realized. The UK's ways and means do not match the ends.

As Sun Tzu pointed out, the danger of not knowing your own capabilities is as dangerous as not knowing the enemy. In the case of the UK, the ignoring of current military limitations ensures that decisions are based on what the UK would like to do, not what is possible. The procurement of the two QEC carriers is an example of the drive for unilateral action outstripping the ability to deliver it. Britain procured two QEC carriers without budgeting fully for the aircraft to fly from them, the assets to protect them, the amphibious forces to exploit their projection, and the helicopter landing platforms required to complement them. The UK has admitted some of those shortcomings by reducing the number of aircraft allocated to each carrier and by deciding to have one carrier in dry dock at any time.

The most compelling argument for the UK to give up some of its military sovereignty is that it already has. The UK military is reliant on satellites for global positioning systems, communications, and Unmanned Aerial Systems, without which the UK military would be almost ineffective. The UK has its own satellites but does not have the means to defend them. Nor is there a unilateral UK plan to defend space. Therefore, the UK is dependent on the goodwill of the U.S. for the free use, and protection, of space.

In 2015, Lieutenant General Raymond, Commander of U.S. Air Force Space Command's 14th Air Force, spoke publicly about the threat to Western satellites, "China recently launched a successful nondestructive direct ascent anti-satellite missile, placing satellites in low Earth orbit at risk…Russia in May quietly launched an experimental satellite that we're keeping a close eye on … in the not too distant future every satellite in every orbit will be able to be put at risk." The threat is real and the U.S. is investing circa $8 billion per annum in military space programs. The UK is not investing in the protection of space and nor could it afford to. Therefore, by default the UK is relying on U.S. programs to defend critical parts of its military infrastructure.

Just as significantly, the UK has already outsourced its ultimate defense. As former British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook stated, "the deterrent is no longer independent as the missiles were leased from the Pentagon – what Denis Healey [UK Secretary of State for Defence 1964-1970] once referred to as 'rent-a-rocket'!" David Allen, in his study of the UK nuclear deterrent, states that "although it is generally accepted that Britain has retained its independent capacity to fire its nuclear weapons without consulting the United States, there are those who contest this and who say that the United Kingdom remains dependent on the United States to communicate with its submarines, to fix their positions accurately and to target their warheads." Allen's findings have been confirmed by the recent cross–party independent Trident Commission that stated, "the UK is dependent on the United States for many component parts of the guidance and re-entry vehicle, and for the Trident ballistic missile system itself." Professor Colin Gray stated in evidence to a British Defence Committee in 2006: "For anyone who wishes to question the true independence of the British nuclear deterrent I would concede that it is hostage to American goodwill…the dependency is critical and will continue."

The mismatch in the UK's ends, ways and means would be challenging even in a stable world but it is more so against the context laid out by General Houghton, the UK Chief of the Defense Staff, in his annual speech to RUSI: "I start from the firm belief that the world is becoming a more dangerous, less certain, less predictable, more unstable place." Fresh thinking is required.

The Challenge of Power Projection

Organski's definition of power is "the ability of one nation to control the behavior of another for its own ends." Based on Organski's definition, the inability of the U.S. to bring stability to Iraq and Afghanistan, and the ongoing failure to either neutralize the Islamic State or bring about the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, reflects the limits of U.S. power. Taesuh Cha explains the extent to which some commentators believe the U.S.'s global standing has changed over the last decade: Unlike the immediate post-Cold War era of triumphalism and neoliberal prosperity, the last decade has witnessed the erosion of the 'unipolar moment' after the major setbacks of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars and the financial crisis of 2008. In this context, reconsidering the idea of American exceptional identity is not simply a scholastic exercise, but an urgent practical problem concerning the direction of US leadership in the world.

The challenges facing the U.S. in the next few decades are likely to be similar to those that have recently proved so hard to solve. There is no indication that the U.S.'s chances of intervening successfully in the Middle East or Africa are likely to improve, and the long wars against terrorism and drugs are likely to drag on. Simon Serfaty looks nostalgically at a time when "the nation state ruled and military force prevailed, leaving the weak at the mercy of the strong." The irregular nature of the current enemy, combined with restraints imposed by modern democratic values and 24 hour media, make it increasingly hard for the U.S. to impose its will on other nations or non-state actors. "The epoch of state coercion and national submission" is over, and with it has gone the U.S.'s potency in unilaterally imposing its will.

Cooper explains the degradation of U.S.'s relative power due to the spread of WMD. Whilst WMD has until recently been owned and controlled by a few state actors, it is now available to numerous states and non-state actors, which in turn empowers states and organizations that had, until recently, been unable to threaten U.S. or UK interests in any meaningful way. The proliferation of WMD gives traditionally weak nations, terrorist groups, and even lone actors, the potential to threaten U.S. national interests more so than ever before. Globalization and modern communications have made it increasingly easy to share WMD technology and for rogue states and terrorists to conduct attacks outside of their traditional sphere of influence. Cooper postulates that "both the spread of terrorism and that of weapons of mass destruction point to a world in which Western governments are losing control."

Based on the number and nature of threats to the U.S.'s relative power, the U.S. may be tempted to try to impose its will by force, but to do so will inevitably lead to overstretch. Conversely, the U.S. could maintain its power through maximizing the use of alliances, international organizations, and bilateral relationships. Encouraging other nations to support the U.S. offers it the best, and most cost effective way, of maintaining power. The potential gains in influence through these relationships are likely to far exceed resultant losses in freedom of action. Bilateral relations with countries that share interests and beliefs, still afford the U.S. international legitimacy, with minimum loss of freedom of maneuver. Therefore, in order to maximize its strength and maintain legitimacy, the U.S. should examine its relationship with its closest and most powerful ally.

The Special Relationship

Underpinning all of the aforementioned points is the special relationship. The special relationship is "often used to characterize the strength of the ties between London and Washington made manifest by the strong British commitment to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; by our joint struggle against international terrorism; and by the bonds of language and history." Like any relationship it ebbs and flows, and yet over the past 70 years it has proved to be more resilient than most would have predicted. That it is an asymmetric relationship is without refute but as long as it is recognized as such, the imbalance should not be an impediment to deepening defense integration. When the aforementioned points are taken in their entirety, it is inconceivable that there could be a serious threat to either nation without the other nation responding.

Henry Bartlett describes "force planning. . . as the process of appraising the security needs of a nation, establishing the military requirements that result from them, and selecting, within resource constraints, military forces to meet those requirements." Increasing threats and the U.S. and UK's budget constraints mean that there is a gap in both countries between the military requirement and the military forces to meet them. Bartlett states that "wants almost always exceed resources" but due to the confluence of the aforementioned dynamics, that gap is as big as it has been since the start of WWII. Neither nation wishes to reduce their ambitions, nor will they increase the means.

Bartlett goes on to say that the "logical place to begin correcting a mismatch between the security environment and the means is to reconsider the national goals" followed by changing the means, and then addressing the strategy. This thesis shows that the two nations do not wish to reduce their goals, nor increase the means. Therefore, using Bartlett's model, the only way the U.S. and UK can address their strategic imbalance is by addressing the ways. Military integration is one feasible way of doing so and there are a host of theories as to why the U.S. and UK should be able to integrate successfully.

Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics postulates that states have a natural tendency to form alliances in order to balance power. The theory was useful in explaining some aspects of state relations, such as Soviet actions during the Cold War. However, it falls short in explaining many other alliances. Therefore, Stephen Walt, as one of the leading modern scholars on the subject, refined Waltz's theory one step further and created the balance of threat theory. In his theory Walt explains that states will either 'bandwagon' onto the principal external threat or form alliances in order to 'balance' against the threat. Against the combined threats of an unpredictable Russia, a rising China, and terrorism, the UK's relationship with the U.S. may be described as balancing, although such a move would certainly be perceived by Russia as bandwagoning. Nonetheless, from either perspective, the natural tendencies that Walt highlights give credence as to why the U.S. and UK would naturally want to deepen their alliances.

The Imperative for U.S. and UK Defense Cooperation

Mark Webber states, "in a seemingly indefinite period of defense austerity it is worth considering just how far a pooling of capabilities can extend." NATO is also calling for "multinational and innovative approaches." In 2014, Ms Hennis, the Minister of Defense of the Netherlands said that "it is imperative that all NATO member states embark on a higher degree of defense co-operation, as each and every ally is a link in the chain of total alliance security."

It is not just European leaders calling for increased defense cooperation. U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates, stated that NATO faced a "dim and dismal future" if the transatlantic resourcing gap was not narrowed. Gates's successor, Secretary of Defense Hagel, continued to argue that NATO defense budgets could be spent more strategically, meaning that NATO members should coordinate their defense cuts in order to ensure that essential capabilities were maintained. Hagel went on to say that, "no country today has the power to impose its will and values on other nations. As the new world order takes shape, America must lead by building coalitions of common interests, as we did after World War II."

So the case for further cooperation is compelling and whilst the UK will undoubtedly continue to work alongside other European nations, on balance it does not make sense to link the UK's national security too closely to any of them. "European military capabilities are limited, declining, and unlikely to rebound." Furthermore, in recent years, European nations have not had the same inclination to deploy on foreign adventures. Alan Macmillan postulates that the UK's strategic culture is such that it has more positive feelings about foreign campaigns than other European countries. Hence the UK's view of power projection differs markedly. The deepening of defense relationships between the UK and the European Union is also unlikely whilst the UK is negotiating to reduce its ties to Europe. The lack of capable and willing European partners makes the case for the UK to integrate further with the U.S. even more compelling.

Improved interoperability between the U.S. and UK is already underway. The U.S. recently established a Deputy Commander in the UK's Armored Division and the UK provides a Deputy Commander to the 82nd Airborne Division. In April 2015, one thousand British soldiers spent six weeks training with U.S. forces in Fort Bragg. There are 9,000 U.S. service personnel based in the UK, and 800 UK service personnel in the U.S., of which 200 are on exchange programs with all four U.S.

services. Additionally, a British Air Vice Marshall has just been appointed as a Deputy Director at the Defense Intelligence Agency, which shows how far interoperability can go in even the most sensitive areas of defense. The push for increased interoperability is happening and must continue apace but the discussion about the UK shaping its armed forces in recognition of its reliance on the U.S. has remained taboo; until now the British military was big enough that it did not seem so urgent to examine novel ways of maintaining the British military capability.

Smart Defense as a Model

Smart Defense was developed to identify capability areas where NATO allies could work together more closely to mitigate the decline in defense spending. It aimed to address concerns raised by the outgoing U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates, "as the price of military equipment rises and defense budgets decline, the Allies will have to identify what they can do jointly at a lower cost and more efficiently."

Smart Defense aims to develop, acquire, and operate capabilities collectively in order to be more efficient and coherent. It runs alongside a number of NATO initiatives such as the Connected Forces Initiative, which builds interoperability of NATO forces through education, training, and exercises. As John Deni recognizes, there are issues with trying to implement initiatives across the whole of NATO. Debates within NATO about how far it should encroach in the business of national governments continue, as does the process of trying to understand the nature and urgency of threats from Russia and terrorist networks. Those concerns are underpinned by "personnel cuts and zero-growth budgets in Brussels and Mons as well as mixed approaches to defense spending and investment among NATO allies." The breadth of interests in NATO, the range of strategic cultures, and the variations in defense spending, make implementation of models such as Smart Defense extremely difficult. Whilst Webber agrees with Deni that progress in those areas has been halting, he also highlights the benefits of initiatives such as Smart Defense in bringing NATO countries closer together and giving NATO increased cohesiveness. So there is consensus that the principle of Smart Defense is sensible but just too ambitious for the number and variety of nations in NATO. However, there are far fewer barriers to a similar model being used by the U.S. and UK.

U.S. - UK Defense Cooperation Options

Due to the one-sidedness of the defense relationship, the majority of any changes to improve defense integration would need to be made by the UK. The U.S. already has such a comparative advantage to any other nation in air power and combined arms armored warfare that the UK military cannot add enough jets, armor, armored infantry or artillery to make a significant difference to a U.S. conventional combined arms battle.

However, if the UK focuses its resources correctly, it may be able to maximize the benefits of integrating with the U.S., whilst maintaining its ability to defend its protectorates. For example, a UK focus on high readiness amphibious and airborne troops would benefit the U.S., and would still leave the UK with the ability to defend the Falkland Islands. Moreover, whilst the U.S. maintains an advantage in aircraft carriers, it still often finds itself having to take risk in areas where it would rather have carrier presence. So the UK may also be able to offer much needed support to the U.S. carrier fleet in return for the U.S. providing the logistic support and protection to the UK carriers.

This thesis will not explore all of the benefits that could be gained by closer U.S. and UK cooperation. However, it is likely that benefits could be gained through burden sharing on everything from procurement, research and development, equipment testing, concept development, and training. One example to illustrate the point is safety testing. The UK does not accept U.S. safety data for equipment such as body armor, helmets, and parachutes. Therefore, the UK spends time and money re-testing equipment that has already been tested and approved by the U.S. Department of Defense. The more areas such as that which can be addressed, the more effective both militaries will be.

The options below are designed to initiate the debate. Without detailed, classified, and protracted work between U.S. and UK planning groups, it is not possible to design the force structures that would most complement both nations. Therefore, the suggestions below are not intended to be a comprehensive plan but rather recommendations as to where the two countries may be able to form greater mutual security, whilst not taking further risk against their own national interests.

Naval Options

Since the UK announced its plans to procure two QEC carriers in 2007, spiraling costs and reductions in the UK's defense spending have forced a reduction in the ambition of the program. The carriers will not permanently carry their full complement of aircraft and one of the carriers will spend more time in port than originally planned. Furthermore, the requirement to provide a Carrier Group to support and protect the QEC carriers will put great pressure on an already heavily committed Royal Navy.

However, there is an alternative that would take the pressure off the Royal Navy to permanently sustain a Carrier Group but still leave the UK with the ability to project a carrier for specific tasks. The UK could integrate its carriers into U.S. naval formations. It is already clear that the carriers must be interoperable with the U.S., so the option of attributing the carriers to a U.S. task force would be achievable. If that option is taken, the UK could invest further naval capacity that could be used in areas where the UK has traditionally had a comparative advantage over the U.S., such as minesweeping. The option would also allow the Royal Navy the freedom of not having to permanently support a carrier. Therefore, in the instance that the UK had to work unilaterally, it could take the carrier from the U.S. carrier group and surge UK supporting assets for the duration of the task. As the Royal Navy became unable to sustain the surge, the carrier could return to the U.S. task force and the Royal Navy could start to recover and repair the supporting fleet.

Land Options

The British Army maintains one Armored Division. However, the Division contains only one operational armored brigade and the operational brigade only contains one heavy tank regiment. In comparison, even after reductions recently announced by General Odierno, the U.S. Army will have 12 armored Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), 14 Infantry BCTs, and 7 Stryker BCTs. So the advantage to the U.S. of the UK maintaining an armored brigade is minimal, especially when related to the cost and logistics of sustaining an armored brigade at readiness. As an alternative, the UK could field brigades of specialist infantry that could add a comparative advantage to U.S. forces. Investing in UK airborne, air assault, and amphibious forces would add capability and capacity to the U.S. military as well as supporting the UK's aspirations to project global power. These forces would also allow rapid deployment and hence offer the U.S. a coalition force that is trained and equipped to deliver effect within days of being tasked.

U.S. Generals, such as Lt Gen H.R. McMaster, are concerned about the loss of mass and war fighting troops in the U.S. Army. The British Army could help fill that ap. Moreover, with the recognition that the US Army cannot do everything, the British infantry could focus on areas in which the US Army views itself as vulnerable. The U.S. and UK could agree on areas in which the UK could specialize its infantry units in ways that both maintained the UK's ability to defend its protectorates and complement U.S. capability.

Air Options

One of the greatest areas of U.S. comparative advantage over it potential adversaries is in its high end air capability. The U.S. has the full suite of fighters, bombers, and associated infrastructure that are required to work in unison in order to defeat sophisticated air defense systems. Conversely, as the 2011 campaign in Libya demonstrated, the UK does not have enough jets to unilaterally sustain an air war.

The U.S.'s comparative advantage is such that uplifts in RAF F35s over and above those required for the carriers will be extremely expensive and only marginally increase the collective security of the U.S. and UK. Alternatively, the RAF could accept an extremely small but modern fighter capability consisting of the minimum number of aircraft required to fly from the QEC carriers. The cost verses benefit of buying more extremely expensive jets than the absolute minimum, does not add up when viewed through the lens of such U.S. air dominance. If the RAF made savings on excess jets, they would be able to spend more of their resources on lower technology aircraft that can help sustain and protect a deployed force with strategic and tactical air transport, support helicopters, and low tech close air support.

A focus on air transport and helicopters would allow the light infantry and airborne forces to deploy globally at short notice, give the UK the ability to conduct airmobile theater entry (albeit within an air corridor secured by U.S. assets), and be well suited to stabilization and humanitarian operations. In doing so it would allow the U.S. increased freedom to invest in fighting the most dangerous threats and to focus on its comparative advantages. Increased UK air transport could also directly support the fleet of U.S. transport planes and continue to be useful to the U.S. even in situations in which the UK has not authorized the use of force.

Further standardization of the U.S. and UK fleets should also be considered. For example, the UK's procurement of C17 from the US makes sense. But rather than seeking to make the whole UK air transport fleet interoperable with the U.S., the UK has also opted to buy A400M aircraft along with its European allies. When dealing with something as serious as national security, things such as procurement must be viewed through a realist lens. The advantages of procuring aircraft that are compatible with the most powerful and technically advanced country on earth, outweigh the benefits of linking with European nations. If done correctly, both nations could potentially gain from economies of scale and joint procurement. In doing so, interoperability would be built into the system.

Conclusion

When the pressures of complex global challenges are overlaid against a strategic context of decreasing defense budgets and an increasing emphasis on coalitions, there is a clear case for the U.S. and UK to examine their defense engagement. Interoperability is essential and happening, but the two nations should also look at sharing the burden of defense more effectively.

Any such move would come with risks and this is not something to rush into; alliances, "as human creations… are imprecise, prone to political interference, and always changing." But to ignore the possible benefits of enhanced defense integration due to a sentimental attachment to the conduct of unilateral operations in the case of the UK, or clinging to a waning hegemony in the case of the U.S., would be unwise. As Lord Powell explains: The United States, which most closely shares our outlook, cannot reasonably be expected to bear the burden of global security alone, particularly as its fiscal and economic management woes will increasingly inhibit the exercise of American power. Other European countries by and large lack the political will to handle the big security issues. Unless Britain continues to contribute to common causes above its "quota", America will become progressively less respectful of our interests. Our ability to ensure the best outcomes for Britain in a world populated by new behemoths will be unacceptably constrained.

From January to March 1941 U.S. and UK military leaders held a two month planning conference. During the conference the planning group devised the first stages of a U.S. - UK combined strategy to win WWII, even though the U.S. had not even entered the war at that stage. The timing and length of the conference, as well as the seniority of the officers involved, shows the kind of commitment required to find solutions to complex, emotive problems involving great complexity, expense, and scale. The detailed discussions needed to identify options for defense specialization will also take time and investment. But the time and effort will be worth it. For the UK, integration with the U.S. is a way of remain a major player in global defense; for the U.S., defense integration with the UK would offer a model for maintaining global power through more effective working with allies. To ensure the opportunity to maximize the two nation's use of resources is not missed, a combined working group must take a fresh look at the opportunities for closer U.S. - UK defense cooperation.

If, after an extensive study looking at all feasible options for two countries to manage their collective defense more efficiently, no progress is made, the UK is left with stark choices: The UK Government must either reassess the UK's national interest and accept steadily diminishing security, or plan for an increase in defense expenditure in order to rebalance ends, ways, and means. The consequences for the U.S. may not be as immediate, but they are no less serious. If the U.S. cannot find ways to integrate further with an ally such as the UK, it will find itself short on means to protect its national interests and unable to maximize the support of its allies, during a period of increasing threats.

About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel Nick Cowley commissioned from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst into an armored cavalry regiment in 2001. He served as an armored Troop Leader in Germany, Canada, Kosovo and Iraq. After joining a specialist unit he conducted three further tours of Iraq and one in Afghanistan. He worked on the Afghanistan desk in the Ministry of Defence before assuming Squadron Command in 2011. As a Squadron Commander he conducted two further tours of Afghanistan but relinquished command after being seriously injured. For his time as a Squadron Commander Lt Col Cowley was made a Member of the British Empire (MBE). Having recovered from injury Lt Col Cowley was assigned as the Chief of Staff of the UK's High Readiness Air Assault Brigade.

A Joint and Operational Approach for Security Assistance to Georgia and Ukraine

By Colonel Tim Kreuttner, U.S. Army;
Lieutenant Colonel Sami Alnaqbi, Navy of the United Arab Emirates;
Lieutenant Colonel Jarrod Knapp, U.S. Air Force; and
Major James Woodard, U.S. Marine Corps

Editor's Note: This thesis won the FAO Association writing award at the Joint and Combined Warfighting School, Joint Forces Staff College. In the interest of space the thesis is published here without research notes. To see the thesis with all research materials, visit www.faoa.org. We are pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.

After the break-up of the Soviet Union, both Ukraine and Georgia sought closer relationships with the West. In 1994, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) introduced the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program to build relationships based on individual member states goals and preferences for cooperation, primarily with former Warsaw Pact adversaries. PfP eventually evolved into an entry point for European countries seeking a potential path to NATO membership. Ukraine and Georgia were among the first to join, signing the framework document in February and March 1994 respectively. Since joining PfP, Ukraine and Georgia have participated in frequent multi-national exercises and in NATO operations, such as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean Sea. If accession to NATO were analogous to matrimony, after 20 years of close cooperation Ukraine and Georgia would each have met the common-law criteria to enter into wedded bliss with the Alliance. Potential partners in marriage, however, often must deal with "baggage" from previous relationships. Because of their geographical location and historical ties, Ukraine and Georgia have another suitor – one who is jealous of their affections. As NATO expanded eastward after the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia has become increasingly concerned about loss of influence in their traditional sphere as a result of strategic envelopment by the Alliance.

Russian ire came to a head in August 2008 with the campaign to seize control of South Ossetia and again in 2014 after the fall of the pro-Russian Yanukovych government with the annexation of Crimea and subsequent support to separatists in eastern Ukraine. Russia has clearly decided the Ukrainian and Georgian courtships with NATO are unacceptable to their strategic interests. Despite a NATO declaration at the 2008 Bucharest Summit that both Ukraine and Georgia would eventually become NATO members, their accession is unlikely for the foreseeable future. Russia's demonstrated willingness to engage in "warlike" activities with Ukraine and Georgia is preventing this because there is a NATO pre-requisite that requires applicants for membership to solve their internal conflicts before accession into NATO becomes an option. Nevertheless, Georgia and Ukraine remain key partners. The U.S. and NATO have responded to this Russian aggression with a deepening commitment to their long-time partners, enhancing security cooperation, and continually increasing deterrence measures.

The U.S. and NATO have provided Ukraine and Georgia tactical training and strategic advice on defense reform for many years. While both countries have benefited from training assistance, improvements in interoperability, and advice on institutional reform, there has been less emphasis in assistance to develop campaign planning and execution capability at the operational level. This is partly because Ukraine and Georgia are both lacking the basic tactical proficiency as it applies to the application of NATO doctrine and procedures. Given the precarious strategic challenge that both countries face with continued Russian aggression, now is the time to prioritize that training and assistance in joint and operational level competencies. An integrated joint approach to security cooperation focusing at the operational level with Ukraine and Georgia will strengthen those U.S. partners and aid in deterring further Russian aggression in Europe.

Some may argue that Ukraine and Georgia represent peripheral interests to the U.S. and do not warrant a level of security assistance that risks provoking Russia. While continued conflict and strategic tensions make NATO membership an impossibility for either country in the short term, the U.S. still has an interest in continuing to build Ukrainian and Georgian defense capability and capacity. As both countries are active contributors to U.S. and NATO operations, building their capacity strengthens U.S. and allied strategic depth by producing better military partners. While full NATO membership for either Ukraine or Georgia could risk provoking Russia to war, failure to support these key partners will encourage further Russian aggression against weaker states and ultimately against the alliance itself. Ukraine and Georgia currently face a powerful Russian threat that neither is fully prepared to address without substantial assistance. Emphasis on assistance in joint and operational level capability will help both countries provide their own defense and reinforce deterrence of Russian aggression.

Strategic Context and Russian Strategy

As Russia slowly regained strength after the post-Soviet turmoil, perceived threats to Russia's vital national interests from NATO expansion have driven Russian strategy development. Russia has protested that continued expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe has violated a negotiated agreement between the former Soviet President Gorbachev and the U.S. administration under President George H.W. Bush. The Soviet Union had agreed to allow German reunification on the condition that NATO would not expand east. Once the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact dissolved, with no binding legal authority to prevent increased membership, countries such as Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states hurried to join the alliance. Until 2014, NATO and Russia maintained a cooperative relationship. But Russian perceptions of Western influence during the Maidan protests in Ukraine changed the dynamic.

Russian strategy became evident with the annexation of Crimea, though it should have been clear from at least 2008 considering Russian aggression in Georgia. These actions are indicative of Russia's strategic objectives. First, Russia seeks to solidify its role as a leading global power after years of reduced stature following the Soviet dissolution; second, Russia aims to check NATO encroachment on its territorial boundaries, and lessening of its sphere of influence; third, Russia will protect the greater Russian-speaking community outside its borders; and finally, Russia must maintain control in the Black Sea to secure resource flows and access to the Mediterranean Sea.

> **Russia seeks to solidify its role as a leading global power after years of reduced stature following the Soviet dissolution**

To achieve its strategic objectives, Russia has significantly modified its military doctrine and concepts of employment over the last decade. Following the Russian intervention in South Ossetia in August, 2008, the Russian government identified the need to transform the military into a leaner, more mobile, and more capable force able to rapidly respond to local and regional crises, in some respects mirroring U.S. military strategy. This requires a better equipped and trained force able to conduct joint operations across all domains. Russia's operational concept employs hybrid warfare, integrating irregular warfare, covert action, cyberspace attacks, electronic warfare, and influence operations to achieve effects. The Russian invasion and subsequent annexation of Crimea without bloodshed demonstrated Russian ability to successfully employ a hybrid strategy.

Russia's 2008 incursion into South Ossetia and defacto control of Abkhazia within Georgia are a logical implementation of its strategy to check NATO enlargement and protect Russian-speaking people. The operation in South Ossetia employed hybrid tactics and over-whelmed unprepared Georgian forces. The U.S. and NATO were unable to provide lethal assistance to Georgia, avoiding direct conflict with Russia. In 2014, following the Maidan Square protests in Ukraine and the collapse of the Russian-favored Yanukovych government, Russia employed hybrid tactics to invade and ultimately annex Crimea. Considering the western preference of the new Ukrainian government, the threat of losing its lease of the naval base in Sevastopol, set to expire in 2017, was a factor in the Russian seizure of Crimea. Unidentifiable forces, referred to as the "little green men," created an atmosphere of ambiguity to obscure attribution and prevent a coherent response from NATO and the Western international community. Subsequently in eastern Ukraine, Russia supported "separatists" in the Donbas region, again relying on ambiguity to obscure Russian responsibility. Russia displayed an ability to employ a hybrid strategy while dominating in all domains, denying Ukraine the ability to respond effectively with air and maritime forces. Ukraine land forces could only achieve a stale-mate on the ground, leading to a state of "frozen conflict" that further served the Russian goal to frustrate Ukraine's aspirations for NATO membership. Russia's demonstrated improvement in operating as a joint force between 2008 and 2014 and willingness to use aggression to achieve their strategic goals highlights the need to build joint and operational capacity in Georgia and Ukraine.

U.S. & NATO Objectives & Programs for Ukraine & Georgia

With Russian aggression in Ukraine and increasingly assertive posture in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the United States reinvigorated defense commitments to Europe and NATO. In speeches in Poland and Estonia, President Obama emphasized U.S. commitment to the NATO alliance and defense of allies. While the U.S. priority was to strengthen the alliance, the U.S. National Security Strategy also includes security of partners as a priority. The United States has no formal treaty obligations to defend non-allied partners such as Georgia. Although the 1994 Budapest agreement regarding removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine guarantees its security from nuclear attack by the signatories, as a non-NATO member, Ukraine is not entitled to collective defense under Article V of the Washington Treaty. Support since 2014 has been primarily diplomatic and economic, with military support limited to non-lethal aid, training, and exercises. The U.S. approach has been a balance of deterrence through military cooperation and demonstration of allied military capability through exercises.

Russian and separatist air defenses have effectively limited Ukraine air power to medical evacuation and transport while the loss of Crimea has severely curtailed Ukraine naval capability

NATO's response to Russian aggression in Ukraine started in 2014 with establishment of the Readiness Action Plan (RAP), with its center-piece in expansion and heightened readiness of the NATO Response Force (NRF). RAP also included "assurance" of NATO members, mainly in the form of exercises which nearly always included non-NATO partner nations such as Ukraine and Georgia. While NATO activity has been robust, the approach in terms of assistance and support to partners directly facing the Russian threat has been more measured and cautious in order to avoid miscalculation and unnecessary provocation.

Ukraine

In 1997, NATO and Ukraine singed a charter for a "distinctive partnership." After the 2004-5 "Orange Revolution," Ukraine became more seriously interested in NATO cooperation and started on a path towards membership in 2008. Subsequently, Ukraine has been an active contributor to NATO operations and exercises, including in Afghanistan, and was the first partner nation to contribute troops to the NATO response Force (NRF).

Colonel Volodymyr Postrybailo, Ukrainian Army, writing for the Strategic Studies Institute's Project 1721, describes the state of the Ukraine Armed Forces (UAF) in 2014 and the challenges it faced then and now. After the departure of the Yanukovych government, Ukraine was unprepared for a military confrontation with a superior Russian threat and an enemy employing hybrid warfare. Deficiencies in joint capability were and continue to be a major factor: The conflict has already revealed many gaps in Ukrainian doctrines and concepts, mistakes made during planning and execution of combat missions, and shortages in a number of joint functions that could have been avoided and overcome if the UAF had utilized the best practices and experience of the NATO countries' Armies prior to the conflict.

Colonel Postrybailo further explains that the current fight is primarily in the land and cyber domains. Russian and separatist air defenses have effectively limited Ukraine air power to medical evacuation and transport while the loss of Crimea has severely curtailed Ukraine naval capability. He describes the ongoing transformation of the Ukraine military, including creation of a Joint Operational Staff (JOS), crediting NATO training and exercises for helping the UAF achieve improved tactical capability. He further suggests that to address the gaps in joint functions, successes in tactical training must extend to the operational and strategic levels.

Since 2014, the NATO-Ukraine Commission, the forum for alliance assistance to Ukraine, established two trust funds, later expanded to six, for institution building and assistance to Ukraine. In July 2016, the Commission announced establishment of the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) for Ukraine. The CAP focuses on security structures, oversight, economic reforms, and some non-lethal technical assistance, but does not directly address operational level capabilities and joint functions. A key gap remains.

Meanwhile, the U.S. has been active in support of Ukraine bilaterally as well as through NATO. In a July 2014 Senate panel, the Honorable Victoria Nuland, then Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs outlined U.S. policy towards Ukraine, though political, economic, and security challenges; diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the crisis; targeted sanctions on Russia and separatists; and loan guarantees. While U.S. expressed an urgent and strong desire to help Ukraine, policy makers perceived a real risk of direct confrontation with Russia and therefore tempered calls for lethal assistance. The Honorable Derek Chollet, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, suggested three lines of effort with respect to Ukraine, including (non-lethal) equipping; enhanced training and exercises; and reforming and rebuilding Ukraine's defense institutions. In the same panel, former Secretary of State Stephen Hadley noted that Russian President Putin tends to escalate when he does not meet resistance and advocated support to Ukraine: "we ought to be strengthening Ukraine's capacity to defend itself, and other states that are at risk for pressure from Russia." Former Secretary of State, Dr. Zbigniev Brzezinski advocated a judicious approach, warning against assisting with offensive capacity that Russia might perceive as a direct threat.

Practical assistance began in 2014-2015 with the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) for Ukraine, a joint Department of State (DoS) and DoD provision of non-lethal aid (mainly material). USEUCOM subsequently established the Joint Military Training Group for Ukraine (JMTG-U) in 2015 in partnership with the Canadian Armed Forces to provide training to Ukraine land forces and advice on strengthening institutions. Beginning with training of the Ukraine National Guard, the program, based at the Yavoriv International Peacekeeping Center, continues to train regular Ukraine land forces in tactical skills as well as battalion level staff planning and execution. To date, no similar program exists for Ukraine air and maritime forces.

With the repeated failure of cease-fires and conflict resolution efforts in eastern Ukraine there have been calls in Congress to authorize lethal aid. The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) and Commander, US European Command, General Curtis Scaparrotti, in his March 2017 testimony to the House Armed Services Committee gave his advice regarding the need for "lethal defensive weapons" for Ukraine to counter modern Russian equipment, further explaining that Ukraine needs additional training, equipping, government capacity-building, and security [institution] building. A long-term approach to building partner capacity should focus on organic institutions and force generation capacity that allow Ukraine to sustain its own defense.

Georgia

Cooperation between Georgia and NATO grew substantially after the 2003 "Rose Revolution" as Georgia moved for greater reform and alignment with the west. Georgia has contributed to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and continues as part of the Resolute Support Mission (RSM). The NATO-Georgia Commission formed in September 2008 for political consultations and to assist Georgia in its goals to achieve NATO membership. Another purpose of the commission was to help Georgia recover from the August 2008 conflict with Russia in South Ossetia. At the 2014 Summit in Wales, NATO reaffirmed the commitment to strengthening Georgia's ability to defend itself and further approved an assistance package at the 2016 Warsaw Summit. The "Substantial NATO-Georgia Package" (SNGP) includes measures to strengthen Georgia's defense capabilities, increase security cooperation, and improve interoperability at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The SNGP includes strategic level advice and liaison, defense capacity building, training, multinational exercises, and enhanced interoperability opportunities. Operational planning, focused on combat and crisis management using NATO operational planning processes is a part of the package, though so far, "operational" planning has been a brigade level program. Further highlighting Georgia's status as a high priority partner, NATO has established the NATO-Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Centre (JTEC) in Georgia to facilitate security cooperation. Georgia is a regular contributor to the NATO Response Force (NRF), was among the largest non-NATO contributors in Afghanistan, and is among the most capable NATO partners.

The U.S. bilateral partnership with Georgia includes frequent exercises and training opportunities linked to NATO-Georgia programs. The U.S and Georgia signed a "Charter on Strategic Partnership" in January 2009 covering multiple areas, including defense and security. The U.S. maintains support for Georgian aspirations for NATO membership. In 2016, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) Dr. Michael Carpenter signed a three-year security cooperation framework with Georgia which includes training, equipping in conjunction with the NATO SNGP. The U.S. and Georgia participate in multiple exercises, including Exercise Noble Partner to increase U.S. Georgian interoperability and preparation for the NRF duties. In recent years, Exercise Noble Partner has included demonstrations of mechanized, airborne, and marine forces. The Black Sea Rotational Force (BSRF) under Marine Forces Europe (MARFOREUR) conducts occasional training with the Georgian Armed Forces throughout the year, most notably the Agile Spirit series of exercises. The BSRF and U.S. Army National Guard troops from Georgia's state partner, the U.S. state of Georgia, help to prepare and certify Georgian units for deployment to Afghanistan for RSM. In the maritime domain, the U.S. regularly conducts port visits and maritime training with Georgia and other Black Sea states. Black Sea port visits, training, and patrols enhance maritime security and the naval capability of partners in the region, like Georgia. In the air domain, however, limitations to exercises reflect caution related to Russian air defense threats and risk of miscalculations.

Several key NATO exercises with U.S. participation and support are designed to improve Georgian Armed Forces capability and interoperability. The first exercise under the SNGP was Agile Spirit 2015, which changed focus from counter-insurgency in previous years to a conventional focus in 2015. A second exercise under the SNGP, the NATO-Georgia Exercise 2016, included an operational level focus with the Georgian General Staff and a multi-national brigade HQ leading a crisis response scenario. This type of exercise is a step in the right direction, though much more remains to be done to achieve joint integration and operational level campaign planning and execution.

As with Ukraine, the U.S. partnership with Georgia tends to heavily focus on tactical level training. The NATO SNGP and establishment of the JTEC are positive steps towards improving institutional capacity and joint capabilities. The SNGP recognizes the need for operational level development, but is only beginning to take shape. Georgia would benefit from a more integrated joint approach to combined exercises, including further development at the operational level.

Considering A Way Ahead

The objective of U.S. and NATO programs should be to develop partners that are interoperable and able to contribute to alliance and coalition operations as well as provide for their own defense. This necessitates an ability to plan and execute campaigns with joint-capable C2 structures. Training and education programs should be enhanced to focus on operational planning and execution in national level joint staffs and developing joint-capable headquarters. Existing programs requiring enhancement include Mobile Training Teams (MTT), military to military engagements, institutional advising and liaison, and use of International Military Education and Training (IMET). This will require reviewing and creating new curriculum, programs of instruction, and lesson plans, and applying the right expertise to deliver training and advice.

The U.S. and NATO ability to deliver training, education, and advice at the operational level may face some challenges. Synchronization of operational maneuver and the ability to integrate joint capabilities in a coherent campaign is something that even the best militaries have to work hard to do it well. The requisite expertise to train partners in operational planning and execution is not plentiful and usually resides in combatant command or other major command staffs, with the majority not dedicated to training, exercises, or other security cooperation activities. The subject matter experts capable of leading training are low-density, high-demand assets that owning organizations are often reluctant to part with for "secondary" security cooperation tasks – namely planners, strategists, joint fires qualified experts, and other joint doctrine and technical experts. The U.S. needs to manage the joint and operational expertise closely to leverage the right expertise at the right time while not levying an undue burden on owning organizations. But for our partnerships with Ukraine and Georgia to progress, this is necessary.

Conclusion

Ukraine and Georgia are on the front lines of strategic competition – both literally and figuratively. While the U.S. and NATO have provided robust tactical training and strategic development over the last twenty years, there is a gap in joint training and development at the operational level. U.S. and NATO security assistance to these geopolitically key nations contributes to deterrence of Russia while improving the interoperability and capability of important partners. An integrated joint approach to security cooperation focusing at the operational level will strengthen Ukraine and Georgia and serve as an appropriate deterrent to Russian aggression. A joint approach to partnership programs would significantly enhance the defense capability and interoperability of Ukraine and Georgia to participate in NATO operations and exercises. Expanding combined, joint interoperability at the operational level should be the next critical focus of our partnerships.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Intelligence War in Latin America, 1914-1922

Reviewer: Dr. Bill Spracher, Colonel, U.S. Army - retired

When we think about World War I -- that "war to end all wars" -- we primarily focus on the battlefields and trenches in Western Europe, where U.S. forces came late to the fight in 1917 and emerged victorious on November 11, 1918, after a relatively short period of intense combat. Probably the last part of the world that comes to mind is the Western Hemisphere, which despite hosting numerous smaller-scale conflicts over the centuries, to include some violent civil wars, has been fairly tranquil for most of its history. Yet, the "Great War" was truly a "world war" and involved many nations far from the sound of cannon and the bitter bloodshed. Latin America is often overlooked as a theater of both World Wars I and II, which is a mistake because of its intricate involvement through such connections as providing troops returning to fight for the mother countries from which they emigrated, serving as a backdrop for a number of great power proxy activities, and creating an environment where espionage, sabotage, assassination, and other forms of international intrigue played out. Even nations allied to the United States and residing in he same neighborhood proved problematic.

World War I is garnering a lot of attention in the U.S this year and next, as the nation is commemorating the centennial of its involvement in that conflict. For example, U.S. Army leaders decided the theme of the service's 242nd birthday on June 14, 2017, would be "Over There! A Celebration of the World War I Soldier." Many birthday balls have had a World War I theme. Moreover, the very month this review was penned, February, carries special meaning, as it was on February 27, 1917, that top U.S. officials reviewed a decoded message revealing that Germany had promised to return Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas to Mexico if that country joined an alliance against the U.S. When the so-called "Zimmermann Telegram" became public on March 1 of that year, its disclosure fueled the already growing resolve for the U.S. to enter the war. This factor will be discussed in more detail later. The last surviving U.S. military veteran of World War I, Army Corporal Frank Buckles, did not pass away until February 2011 at the age of 110 on his farm in West Virginia. Only two years earlier, Buckles was still politically active, testifying before Congress in an effort to lobby for a national-level World War I memorial to honor all his fellow "doughboys." Thus, the memory of the Great War is not that distant in the minds of at least some elements of society. Reading about it is not akin to ancient history.

The Intelligence War in Latin America, 1914-1922 was enabled by the declassification of large volumes of U.S. intelligence and security documents now residing in the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland. Records of the War Department's Military Intelligence Division (an early predecessor of today's Defense Intelligence Agency and Army G2), the Justice Department's Bureau of Investigation (forerunner of today's Federal Bureau of Investigation), the State Department, and the federal courts illuminated the aspects of intelligence critical to waging the war. The paucity of records prior to early 1917 reflects the small size of the U.S. intelligence establishment before President Woodrow Wilson and the Congress felt compelled to enter the war. The author, Jamie Bisher, confesses to excessive reliance on U.S. records, in part because many Latin American, German, and Japanese records have been destroyed, or lost, or are still inaccessible. He attempted to extract information from Mexican, Guatemalan, and Ecuadorian archives, among others, but came up empty, as many nations do not retain records carefully and for extended periods in the manner the U.S. government does. In addition, German consuls in this hemisphere were ordered to destroy most wartime documents in April 1919; many others were destroyed during 1945 aerial bombing raids of Berlin by British air forces.

Nevertheless, the author exhaustively dug through the records available and the result is a richly resourced book full of details, photographs, charts, and implausible story lines that make the game of intelligence in the early 20th century come alive in this large-format, coffee table-style volume (though it is paperback, not hard cover). Bisher is expertly prepared for such a daunting undertaking. He is a senior technical writer for a leading defense electronics firm in Maryland and has published many articles about World War I-era intelligence. He graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs and is a veteran of Cold War intelligence.

Those readers who know enough about World War I to recognize such contributing factors as the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand or the mysterious Zimmermann Telegram may not realize the close linkages to Latin America. The Archduke, heir to the Hapsburg throne of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was assassinated in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, by a Bosnian terrorist cell, which served as one of the main triggers for the conflagration that was soon to engulf practically all of Europe. That part of the story was familiar to me from world history studies in high school. What I did not know was that Ferdinand was the nephew of Emperor Ferdinand Maximilian, the short-lived Emperor of Mexico (installed by the French when the Americans were not paying attention due to distractions of the U.S. Civil War), who was executed by a firing squad in 1867. Interestingly, the individual who headed the squad, Aureliano Blanquet, was later the Mexican Minister of War as a general under the dictator General Victoriano Huerta, after Blanquet engineered the assassination of President Francisco Madero in 1913 during Mexico's own bloody civil war. When Huerta was later forced into exile in Jamaica, accompanied by Blanquet, the Germans gave him safe passage to ensure the protection of German property from revolutionary violence.

The Zimmermann Telegram is considered one of the principal triggers that drew the U.S. into World War I. The backstory was that for years Germany had been trying to stir up trouble between the U.S. and Mexico. The book describes in minute detail various twisted schemes, some of which could have emanated from the creative brains of fiction writers devising a sub-plot for the latest James Bond movie. As just one example, a Mexican general bankrolled an African-American agent to incite a mutiny among the legendary "Buffalo Soldiers" of the U.S. 10th Cavalry Regiment deployed on border duty in the Southwest. One of Mexico's feuding presidents, Venustiano Carranza, proposed bold schemes for a Mexican-German alliance to the German Legation in Mexico City, which included offers to construct U-boat bases months before the Zimmermann Telegram incident.

Earlier, in the spring of 1916, President Wilson dispatched U.S. Army Brigadier General John J. Pershing at the head of 12,000 troops on his questionable "Punitive Expedition" into Mexican territory. Pershing's campaign failed to capture the bandit leader Pancho Villa or avenge the latter's raid on Columbus, New Mexico. However, the military effort broadened U.S. intelligence-gathering experience and forced policymakers in Washington, along with field commanders, to deal with the modern-day dilemmas posed by signals intelligence (SIGINT) and intelligence-sharing with other agencies. At the time of Pershing's withdrawal in February 1917, U.S. intelligence was flooded with reports of unusual German activity throughout Mexico. On February 5, the SIGINT intercept that was famously dubbed the Zimmermann Telegram was revealed by a British Royal Navy officer to a skeptical Foreign Office in London. While the Foreign Office pondered the veracity of the telegram, officials acted rapidly to protect the secret that British Naval Intelligence was tapping and decoding German communications, and perhaps those of other enemy and friendly countries as well. They decided to make it appear as if the Zimmermann Telegram had been compromised after being decoded in the Americas, which was clearly an early effort at what would be characterized nowadays as denial and deception.

The actual encrypted telegram is pictured in the book with the British decryption hand-written above the ciphers. On March 2, 1917, the front page of The New York Times publicized details about the SIGINT intercept that came to be known as the Zimmermann Telegram (alternatively the Zimmermann Note or Cable). It sparked a heated debate in the U.S. Congress. Dated nearly two months earlier, on January 19, the telegram contained the instructions of German Foreign Secretary Arthur Zimmermann to Minister Heinrich von Eckardt in Mexico City to propose an alliance among Mexico, Japan, and Germany in case the resumption of aggressive submarine warfare brought an end to U.S. neutrality in the war. It was clear that in Mexico the Germans were playing a subtle game of secret deals and covert aid. Revelation of the contents enraged American public opinion, especially after Zimmermann publicly admitted the telegram was genuine on March 3, and helped generate support for the U.S. declaration of war on Germany in April.

Bisher structures his book in a linear, chronological fashion, which makes it easy to read, but it suffers a bit from such simplistic linearity. World War I was complex, and its root causes were cross-cutting in nature. Similarly, the role of Latin America was complicated and perhaps could have been explained more persuasively by a more functional, or even geographic, approach. The work is put forth in three parts (Part I – European Wars in the Americas, 1914-1916; Part II – Strategic Sideshow in

Latin America, 1917-1918; and Part III – Endgame of the Intelligence War in Latin America, 1919-1922). The three parts offer, respectively, three chapters (1914, 1915, 1916), two chapters (1917, 1918), and three chapters (1919, 1920, 1921 and beyond). Chapter notes are at the end of the entire volume, by year, which is convenient for the reader. There is a well-crafted epilogue, two interesting appendices (one on blacklisted and suspect firms, the other on secret messages), and a glossary that is not only useful but explains many foreign terms, especially those in German and Spanish not familiar to the average reader.

Bisher obtained invaluable assistance from an expert on World War I intelligence and the Zimmermann Telegram at the International Spy Museum in Washington, DC. He also tapped the knowledge of the eminent historian David Kahn, who has written prolifically about cryptography and military intelligence, and the National Security Agency in particular. In addition, Bisher consulted with the librarian at the National Cryptologic Museum at Fort Meade, Maryland, researchers at the U.S. National Archives, officials at the German Foreign Ministry, and several other national counterparts in Latin America and Europe.

In addition to serving as a rich historical treatise, Bisher's book is especially useful to modern-day intelligence practitioners because of the lessons learned it paints for the U.S. intelligence enterprise that is so globally intertwined today. There is an excellent section on the "Birth of the U.S. Intelligence Community," which discusses the key role of noted Army Colonel Ralph van Deman, after earlier exposing the "Haphazard Roots of U.S. Intelligence. The intelligence efforts of the State Department, which is where the bulk of pre-war intelligence was practiced, are portrayed, as are those of the Justice Department's Bureau of Investigation, which was founded in 1908. Also mentioned is the Espionage Act of 1917, a wartime piece of legislation with which American citizens are still living today. After the fighting ended, the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and the Washington Naval Conference of 1921 mandated the disarmament of the world's global powers that in part led to just the opposite end result it was designed to produce. Instead of permanent peace the world was treated to the regeneration of German and Japanese military might that spawned another world war barely two decades following the end of the war to end all wars.

The author describes the intelligence war in Latin America as "a sideshow to the gruesome death march in Europe." However, what was significant was that Latin America figured prominently in Germany's global war strategy, even as that strategy adapted through the years of the conflict. Bisher argues that "the United States stumbled into its leading role in the Americas, haphazardly filling the vacuum left by the preoccupied belligerents."The book shows clearly that the intelligence war truly made the conflict a world war, "touching lives in the Andes, Amazon, and Atacama far beyond any belligerents' borders, vessels or missions." The hook to the challenges for U.S. intelligence in the 21st century is expressed by the author's aspirations for his audience: "Hopefully the book may expand the 'corporate memory' of the U.S. intelligence community, which seems clouded by amnesia before 1941." Those U.S. practitioners of today can read clearly how such inattention between the two world wars should studiously be avoided in the future or else we could be facing an even more perilous World War III.

I heartily commend this somewhat lengthy, but fascinating and well-researched, volume not only to Latin American history buffs and intelligence practitioners but also to any discerning U.S. citizen who desires to know more about the importance of our hemispheric allies for U.S. national security and well-being. Although the Western Hemisphere is relatively peaceful at present and allied cooperation is fairly robust, outside forces can pierce that façade without too much effort. The fact it happened a century ago and helped contribute to the first global military conflagration signals that, without careful intelligence collaboration and vigilance, the same thing could happen again. We must not be lulled to sleep by our perceived superior military strength, nor by the fact we are surrounded by two large oceans and blessed by having friendly neighbors to our north and south. After all, it was one of those cautious next-door neighbors which the Germans tried to court during World War I to the detriment of the U.S.

About the Reviewer:

Dr. William C. (Bill) Spracher is a professor at the National Intelligence University (NIU), where he has served on contract since 2004. A former Latin America FAO, Colonel (U.S. Army-Retired) Spracher taught at the National Defense University's William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies and prior to that was Defense Attaché in Colombia and Army Attaché in Peru. Earlier he served on the staffs of the U.S. Southern Command J2 in Panama and the Army G2 in the Pentagon, and was the School Battalion Commander of the U.S. Army School of the Americas at Fort Benning, Georgia. For six months in 1992 he took a break from Latin America and deployed to Africa to serve as U.S. Contingent Commander and Military Advisor to the Commander of the Military Force in MINURSO (UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara). He is a founding member of the FAO Association.

A Review of Douglas Waller's Book, Disciples

Reviewed by Colonel Andrew "Buster" Crabb, U.S. Marine Corps (retired)

The history of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) is one of daring, courage, and ingenuity. Its leader, William "Wild Bill" Donovan, quickly built an organization that throughout World War II marked incredible strategic achievements. Donovan's OSS, composed of "glorious amateurs," is frequently cited as the forerunner to, and held up as a model for, today's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and U.S. Special Operations Command. However, while Donovan's acolytes were talented professionals, many went on to experience difficulty as they tried to replicate in the Cold War the OSS' wartime achievements. In particular, Donovan's top lieutenants -- Allen Dulles, Richard Helms, William Colby, and William Casey -- all went on to become Directors of the CIA, only to have their reputations and accomplishments permanently stained.

In his book, Disciples: The World War II Missions of the CIA Directors Who Fought for Wild Bill Donovan, author Douglas Waller focuses on the OSS operations these men led as a means to frame the larger (and, frankly, more interesting) story of their interrelationships, interplay with Donovan, and ultimately how that all influenced them as CIA Directors.

Among Donovan's leaders, Allen Dulles had the pedigree (both his grandfather and his uncle became U.S. Secretary of State) and the experience (as a former Department of State Foreign Service Officer) the OSS sought. Time would also prove that he clearly was one of its most talented members. It was his network of spies and contacts that produced the biggest intelligence breakthroughs of the war. As with many of the OSS elite, Dulles was an Easterner who made his fortune in the banking industry. His father was also a career State Department diplomat, and of course his brother (John Foster Dulles) went on to fame as President Eisenhower's Secretary of State.

Early in the war Dulles established a spy network centered in Bern, Switzerland. While stationed there, his sources identified and put him in contact with the Nazi resistance inside Germany (the "Abwehr"), a huge coup and one that provided a trove of intelligence. Following the war, Dulles was made the first Director of the CIA. In this role he helped to reestablish our strategic intelligence capability, and by all rights should have gone down in history as one of our preeminent spy-leaders. Unfortunately, as the CIA's Director, the failed Bay of Pigs debacle was attributed to him. He resigned and became the first to enter the pantheon of disgraced former OSS leaders.

In 1966, Richard Helms was chosen to lead the CIA and attempted to recover its reputation and influence. Helms was a former reporter who joined the OSS station in London, but really made his mark at the end of the war by overseeing a spy network in East Germany. Unlike Dulles, Helms had a subdued and measured personality, with a talent for management and administration. Helms led the Agency through the difficult Vietnam War period, where the CIA pioneered controversial initiatives like the Phoenix Program (assassination), undermining leftist foreign governments (Chile), and using the Agency to target Americans (Daniel Ellsberg being one). When pressed under oath by a Senate committee on the CIA's operations in Chile, Helms chose to lie. He resigned from the Agency in 1972.

If Dulles was the spymaster, and Helms the quietly efficient spy-administrator, William Colby was the spy-commando. A member of the OSS' famed Jedburgh Teams, he was dropped behind enemy lines in France and Norway to lead guerillas against the Nazis. Following the war, he quickly rose in the CIA, and went on to lead the Far East Division in the early days of Vietnam. Colby was then chosen to lead the CIA in its darkest days, when the Agency was under attack by a radical post-Nixon Congress. To start anew, he felt strongly that he was under obligation to turn over to Congress the "Crown Jewels" of all the CIA's covert actions against foreign governments. Many in the Agency, most of his former OSS colleagues and most especially Richard Helms, would never forgive him. For them, he was and would always be a pariah; it hurt Colby more deeply than he'd publicly admit.

The final OSS veteran to return to lead the CIA was Bill Casey. Casey was physically unattractive, a slob, and had a speech impediment that made it sound as if he was constantly mumbling. Beneath that repugnant veneer was a brilliant leader with a tireless work ethic. In the OSS, Casey quickly became one of Donovan's favorites, and he eventually rose to lead the London station and much of the OSS' efforts against the Nazis. Post-WWII, he left the OSS to make a fortune on Wall Street. When he rejoined the spy trade as Director of the CIA, little did he know he would be the final OSS veteran to leave in disgrace. In his case, the downfall was precipitated by a classic OSS-like scheme to trade arms to Iran for assistance in freeing U.S. hostages in the Middle East, returning the profits to illegally fund the Nicaraguan Contras.

Douglas Waller has written an outstanding and highly readable account of these four brilliant but flawed individuals. His book uncovers fascinating details of the men and the OSS operations they led during WWII. Much like The Nightingale's Song, a classic book detailing the inter-relationships between four key figures in the Iran-Contra scandal (all of whom were Naval Academy graduates), Douglas uses the confluence of OSS experience and associations to relay how these men shaped, and were shaped by, the OSS and CIA. The result is a true standout literary work and, in a field crowded with OSS books and articles, one that is a true "Wild Bill" Donovan-like accomplishment.

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