

THE FOREIGN AREA OFFICER ASSOCIATION JOURNAL OF

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

VOLUME XVIII // NUMBER 2 // FALL 2015

WWW.FAOA.ORG

“Effective International
Engagement Requires
Explicit Foreign Policies”

40

TURKEY & THE WEST 8

BUILDING A MIDDLE EASTERN ALLIANCE 5

15 | Pakistan's significance to U.S.
Foreign Policy in South Asia

20 | Countering a Resurgent
Iran, Recasting the U.S. & GCC
Relationship

25 | Operation Enduring Freedom &
Logistics Lessons from Alexander the
Great

27 | Russia's Shale Gas Revolution

32 | Ukraine Unrest: A FAO Reports
from Kyiv

35 | The Whole of Government
Approach Demands Interagency
Coordination

38 | News from The Field: The
Security Cooperation Office: Stranded
American Citizens in Baja California,
Mexico

44 | Civil-Military Cooperation Centre
of Excellence: Building Relationships
& Training for Missions

48 | News From the Field: The
Regionally Aligned Forces Brigade
Foreign Area NCO

51 | Land Disputes: Unearth Shaky
Legal Foundation, Will Liberia's Land
Reform Provide Stability?

Cover Image: Bregana, Slovenia - September 20th, 2015 : A Syrian refugee on the blocked slovenian border with Croatia in Bregana, Slovenia. The migrants are waiting for the authorities to open the border crossing, so they can continue to the northern european countries.

SUBSCRIPTIONS & MEMBERSHIPS

Subscription to the journal comes with membership in the association. Library and institutional rates and bulk discounts are also available. Membership and subscription information may be obtained online at www.faoa.org

SUBMISSIONS

Contributors should email articles to editor@faoa.org. Further information of submissions, format requirements and assistance can be found on the back cover of this issue and online at www.faoa.org

EDITORIAL BOARD

Joseph Bincarousky, Maj, USAF
Mark Brice Chakwin, COL, USA (ret.)
Mike Ferguson, COL, USA (ret.)
Jeff Hoffmann, USAFR (ret.)
Jason C. Howk, MAJ, USA
David Mack, LtCol, USAF (ret.)
Jason Nicholson, LTC, USA
Dan Singleton, MAJ, USA
Phil Yu, CAPT, USN
Vincent Alcazar, COL USAF retired
Vincent Duenas, CPT US Army
Robert Friedenberg, COL US Army retired

The Editorial Board uses a "peer review" method for coordination of journal submissions. Board members represent varied International Affairs backgrounds from all services including active, civilian, reserve, and retired. If you are interested in serving on the editorial board, please email editor@faoa.org

ISSN 1551-8094

STAFF

Graham Plaster, LCDR USR,
Editor-in-Chief

John B. Haseman, COL US Army-Retired
Chairman, Editorial Board

Craig Byrnes
Webmaster

Maridee Hargus,
Administrative Assistance

BOARD OF GOVERNORS

PRESIDENT
Kurt Marisa, Col, USAF (ret.)

VICE PRESIDENT
Robert Timm, COL, USA

SECRETARY
John Krause, Maj, USMC (ret.)

TREASURER
Jeff S. Hoffmann, USAFR (ret.)

MONTEREY Rep
Mark Chakwin, COL, USA (ret.)

EDITOR IN CHIEF
Graham Plaster, LCDR, USNR

CONTENT EDITOR
John Haseman, COL, USA (ret.)

Ivan Raiklin, MAJ, USA

Robert Fagan, COL, USA (ret.)

The Foreign Area Officer Association (FAOA) Journal of International Affairs is the publication for Regional and International Affairs professionals of the FAO Association, a 501c(19) non-profit Veterans' organization. The views expressed are those of the authors, not of the FAOA, the Department of Defense, or the Armed services or any DoD agency, and are intended to advance the FAO and defense international affairs profession through academic dialog.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Politico-Military Affairs | Intelligence | Security Cooperation
Volume XVIII, Number 2 — Fall 2015



WWW.FAOA.ORG

IN THIS EDITION

5 | BUILDING A MIDDLE EASTERN ALLIANCE, Dror Altman, Lieutenant Colonel, Israeli Air Force

8 | IS TURKEY SLIPPING OUT OF THE WEST'S ORBIT? Colonel Chris William Chronis, U.S. Army

15 | PAKISTAN'S SIGNIFICANCE TO U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTH ASIA, Major Matthew Crowe, U.S. Army, Lieutenant Commander Ryan Gaul, U.S. Navy and Major Ron Connolly, U.S. Marine Corps

20 | COUNTERING A RESURGENT IRAN, RECASTING THE U.S. / GCC RELATIONSHIP, Commander Qasem Alharbi, Royal Saudi Naval Force, Major Andrew Hubbard, U.S. Army; Major Glen Langdon, U.S. Air Force, Lieutenant Commander Mark Steliga, U.S. Navy

25 | OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM & LOGISTICS LESSONS FROM ALEXANDER THE GREAT, Lieutenant Colonel Brittany Stewart, U.S. Air Force; Lieutenant Colonel Joe Harris Jr, U.S. Army; and Major James S. Johnson, U.S. Army

27 | RUSSIA'S SHALE GAS REVOLUTION, Ralph E. Winnie, Jr.

32 | UKRAINE UNREST: A FAO REPORTS FROM KYIV, Major James H. Harvey, U.S. Army

35 | THE WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH DEMANDS INTERAGENCY COORDINATION Lieutenant Colonel Ira C. Queen, U.S. Army (retired)

38 | NEWS FROM THE FIELD: THE SECURITY COOPERATION OFFICE: STRANDED AMERICAN CITIZENS IN BAJA CALIFORNIA, MEXICO, Lieutenant Colonel Joel Bolina, U.S. Air Force

40 | FOREIGN AREA OFFICERS: EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT REQUIRES EXPLICIT FOREIGN POLICIES, Lieutenant Commander Daniel Bradshaw, U.S. Navy

44 | CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE: BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS & TRAINING FOR MISSIONS, Captain Tilman M. Engel, German Army

48 | NEWS FROM THE FIELD: THE REGIONALLY ALIGNED FORCES BRIGADE FOREIGN AREA NCO, Sergeant First Class Ivan J. Alvira and Staff Sergeant Clareyssa T. Hall

51 | LAND DISPUTES: UNEARTH SHAKY LEGAL FOUNDATION, WILL LIBERIA'S LAND REFORM PROVIDE STABILITY? Major Lauren N. DiDomenico, U.S. Air Force

Fellow Foreign Affairs Professionals
at Home and Abroad,

It is with heavy hearts that we offer our
sincere condolences to our friends in France.

The terrorist attacks of November 13th were the deadliest on French soil since WWII and the deadliest in the EU since 2004's Madrid train bombings. France's immediate military reaction, two days later, was to send 10 aircraft into Raqqa with 20 bombs during Opération Chammal. Applications to join the French Army jumped to 1,500/day during the week following the attacks. A three month state of emergency was declared, giving police additional powers to increase security at the expense of certain personal liberties. French nationalism had been rekindled, reminding us of the American zeitgeist immediately following 9-11.

As we stand in solidarity with France, we know that the values of liberté, égalité and, fraternité are being tested and hang in a precarious balance. FAOs must lead the way in building bridges to preserve key relationships.

Since then, and indeed, long before the attacks, the western world has been grappling with significant immigration challenges, certainly as a domestic issue, but also as foreign policy and national security concerns. Syrians have formed the largest group of refugees entering Europe, changing the face of Europe and accelerating cultural shifts, clashes and reactions. In early 2015, the largest numbers of Syrian refugees crossing into EU states were recorded in Germany and Sweden. More than 100k refugees crossed EU borders in July alone. As of September 2015, it was reported that more than 8k refugees crossed into Europe on a daily basis.

As of September 2015, the United States had resettled 1,500 Syrians, up from 90 in 2013. By September 10th the number for acceptance of the refugees had been increased to 10,000, and just two weeks later, Secretary of State John Kerry announced that the Obama administration would be increasing the limit to 100,000 in 2017, "a significant increase over the current annual worldwide cap of 70,000." It is important to note that these initiatives were underway prior to the 13 November attacks in Paris and should be seen as a larger



Graham Plaster
Editor in Chief,
FAO Association
Journal

Follow on Twitter
[@FAOAssociation](https://twitter.com/FAOAssociation)

response under the umbrella of President Obama's foreign policy for dealing with Syria.

In both the EU and the US, concern has risen over Trojan horse terrorism embedded in the flow of peaceful immigrants. Videos are surfacing online showing aggressive, militaristic men running across open borders into EU states. These can be contrasted with groups of women and children photographed sleeping under bridges while they trek, as best they can, away from danger. The situation is complex to say the least, and FAOs who grasp that complexity are in demand.

At the time of publishing, we are also witnessing the terrible events unfolding in San Bernardino, California. We will go to print before much more is known, but for now it appears to be relevant to the events in Paris and on 9-11. We offer our deepest condolences to the families of those who were killed during those attacks.

With these complex issues in the forefront, we have organized this edition with a concentration of papers on Middle East topics. Despite the lengthy peer review process and backlog of excellent submissions, the articles that made it into this edition are incredibly timely and prescient. The FAOA editorial board offers them to you for your professional reflection and discussion. Please feel free to leave comments in the Foreign Area Officers Association LinkedIn group regarding any of the content, or shoot us a letter to the editor <editor@FAOA.org>

Sincerely,

Graham

P.S. If you are looking for practical ways to assist with Syrian refugees, one option is this nonprofit Refugee Assistance Program promoted by our friends at *Young Professionals in Foreign Policy*:
www.yppf.org/refugees

“

**Give me your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. Send these, the homeless,
tempest-tost to me, I lift my lamp beside the golden door!**

*From The New Colossus by Emma Lazarus, engraved on the Statue of Liberty, built by
Gustave Eiffel and dedicated on October 28th, 1886 as a gift to the United States from the people of France.*

BUILDING A MIDDLE EASTERN ALLIANCE

By Dror Altman, Lieutenant Colonel, Israeli Air Force

FAO ASSOCIATION WRITING AWARD WINNER - AIR UNIVERSITY

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense or Air University. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.

ABSTRACT This paper examines the U.S. global position in a rapidly changing world. In particular it addresses the situation in the modern Middle East (to include countries of the Persian Gulf, the eastern Mediterranean countries, and North Africa) and proposes a new approach, forming a “Middle Eastern Treaty Organization” (METO). The paper examines both U.S. and regional countries’

Declarations of an imminent decline of the U.S. as a super power are frequently in the headlines. The war on terror, the battle over Iraq and Afghanistan, and battles against non-state actors such as al-Qaeda and ISIS, have made the U.S. appear to be war-exhausted. The U.S. military is spread worldwide with deployments in South Korea, Germany, Japan, the Gulf peninsula and elsewhere. Political instabilities and crises, such as Russia challenging the international order over Crimea, China’s growing engagement in the Pacific islands, and Iran repeatedly avoiding nuclear resolutions have damaged the U.S.’s political-diplomatic status in the world. China’s rising economic strength together with Brazil, Russia and India, is changing the status quo. But is the U.S. really declining? Is it only a natural economic-power balancing? Answers vary as to the degree, but there is unquestionably a change. In addition, the U.S. financial deficit brings the requirement for military downsizing and requires a different approach to foreign policy.

Traditionally, the U.S. has been able to use both carrot and stick, threats, coercion and sometimes have even resorted to the unilateral use of force. Now, the rise of other players, combined with economic restraint, requires more consulting, more considerations, and the forming of partnerships in a much more multilateral approach. The diverse instruments of policy: diplomatic, information, military and economic (DIME) need to be handled differently. Responding to the growing world instability, President Obama and his administration emphasized a key factor in their strategic papers - Partnership. One of the most complex and unstable area is the modern Middle East, filled with serious threats.

The Middle East has been, and remains, a battle ground for numerous conflicts over borders, regimes, ideologies and more (for recent history of the Middle East see Appendix B). President Obama, addressing the conflicts in the modern Middle East, proposed that: “these objectives are best achieved when we partner with the international community and with the countries and peoples of the region.” Although some of the modern Middle East countries are well equipped with state of the art western military forces, they look at the U.S. to “do something”, while, at the same time, are suspicious of U.S. motives and interests.

The essay will begin by examining the need for a U.S. led Middle Eastern alliance from the U.S. perspective, current status and grand strategy, followed by an evaluation of key advantages and disadvantages such an alliance might have to the U.S.. It will then proceed reviewing the potential partners of such an alliance, and their need. Finally it will explore the possible implementation of NATO model to METO by reviewing NATO and suggesting some applications.

Thesis

This paper proposes building a Middle Eastern alliance to confront some of these issues and threats. The alliance should be U.S. led, with as much resemblance to NATO as possible. This “Middle Eastern Treaty Organization” (METO) would also have to be somewhat different due to its potential partners, widely differently cultures and regimes.

UNITED STATES - CURRENT POSITION, STRATEGY AND THE NEED FOR METO

U.S. Position as a World Leader

The United States is facing a challenging era. Its current position as a political, economic and military world leader is strong, but far from unchallenged. Since the end of the Cold War following WWII the U.S. became the only super power in the world. Since then, for different reasons, it has waged wars in various countries. 9/11 was a turning point with a steep growth in active military operations. Nowadays, the U.S. military is spread across many countries, and is engaged in combat daily. Although the Obama administration withdrew the majority of U.S. soldiers from Iraq, the emerging situation with ISIS required extended use of force in Iraq and Syria. U.S. military is over-extended; moreover, U.S. domestic opinion has been war weary for quite some time. As former Secretary of State Gates noted: “increasingly impatient and war-weary American people”.

Economically, the challenges continue. China has just overtaken the U.S. as the largest economy in the world (although China is still far behind on GDP per capita). In addition, U.S. debt is now over \$18 trillion. These are potential strategic

threats to America as debt interest continues to rise. One of the methods to deal with such a deficit is by downsizing the military, including reduction in personnel, armaments, contracts, facilities and more. So, how can the U.S. keep its global position as world leader, influencing decisions, promoting values, when a huge part of that was done by utilizing its military for peace as well as violent operations? Using its hard power to support its soft power? It most definitely requires a strategy!

U.S. Strategy

“No one nation can meet the challenges of the 21st century on its own, nor dictate its terms to the world”, noted President Obama as he proclaimed the need to build partnerships and alliances. The Obama National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2010 as well as 2015 extends this idea of building partnerships by relying on existing institutions and alliances such as NATO. The emphasis over these institutions goes beyond security and peace keeping, but also includes advancing prosperity, promoting values, burden sharing and basic cooperation. The strategy also directs the building of “new spheres of cooperation.” The uses of existing institutions and organizations combined with these new spheres are key factors. “It means building upon our traditional alliances, while also cultivating partnerships with new centers of influence. Taken together, these approaches will allow us to foster more effective global cooperation to confront challenges that know no borders and affect every nation.” Moreover, “regional organizations can be particularly effective at mobilizing and legitimating cooperation among countries closest to the problem.” General Dempsey also emphasizes partnerships: “Achieving our national military objectives also requires that we develop and evolve our relationships with our interagency and international partners. “ Thus, in addition to the existing partnerships, it is clear that the U.S. should consider some form of METO. The remainder of the paper considers the major opportunities and risks involved with creating a METO.

U.S. Advantages and Disadvantages

There are numerous advantages of having such a METO alliance, spread across many different areas. Having such an institution - another big, international co-operative organization in addition to NATO - increases American global power immensely. That power enables U.S. to have better influence in the specific Middle Eastern region and in the whole world.

Militarily, a METO would form a long-term alliance, bringing air, ground and naval capabilities to an area greatly in need for such a force. ISIS and other non-state terror organizations undermine Middle Eastern stability now and in the future. The partners of such an alliance could fight a battle against ISIS, or its equivalent, but also could confront future crises rising from either state (Iran for example) or non-state threats; much like NATO currently does in Europe and elsewhere. In an ideal world such alliance would have the time needed in order to build its structure and organizations, time for training and integration, several iterations of exercises, debriefs and improvement – all

“

The NATO alliance is not based on expediency or a common enemy as its primary justification, but based on shared values that have gradually deepened and created a security community with long-standing inter-Alliance cooperation.

of those before operational engagement. Lack of resources (especially money and personnel) and imminent urgent threats are likely to change this timeline.

The U.S.-led alliance would work together creating a structure that would enable it to fight a fully coordinated air, ground, and sea campaign. The alliance’s main purpose is to overcome current obstacles and at the same time prepare for the next crisis. This is a very different approach to the current one being fought against ISIS, where an ad-hoc coalition has been forged, with minimum integration, fragile trust and luck of long-term objectives. A fully integrated military force will take longer to achieve. There is a need for time to train, build the framework and obviously build trust among the participants. Such military force could later possibly extend its reach, to other parts of the region, possibly even beyond the borders mentioned earlier. Such an alliance could also easily form joint coalitions for ad-hoc instances, where the use of the METO alliance may not be necessary or possible. The structure, the training and the trust, would already exist (much like the use of NATO). Such alliance would also reduce potential American casualties, which is crucial to the war effort and to American political and domestic support.

Diplomatically, a METO alliance would create partnership, promote cooperation and build trust. Having an organization communicating day to day, training together and fighting side by side, would bring the people (and their countries) closer. Getting to know one another can remove barriers placed a long time ago by fear and luck of trust. The strong military leadership that exists in many of the Middle Eastern countries will help persuading its government and its people that such relationship with the United States is important to their interests.

Another important diplomatic advantage of having such Middle Eastern alliance is that it would cement the presence

of U.S. in that important and enormous area; it would therefore discard other global actors with aspiration to gain power (politically, diplomatically, militarily, economically, culturally or else) to access the territory. Different players with different interests and agenda are always considered as potential threat. By forming a METO alliance such risk becomes considerably lower.

METO would also provide a great opportunity to promote America's values. Currently, most countries in the region are not democratic and have very different cultural views about issues such as liberty, human rights and women role in the society. METO partnership with its structure and organization can be a wonderful platform to promote values and ideas such as peace and democracy (it will obviously take time but it is the right direction). NATO research paper on the subject claims that NATO "contributed to the process and the final end of democracy building". It continues to talk about contribution to the development of some "fundamental conditions for a democratic security community to emerge:

(1) the establishment of institutions of liberal democracy (formal democratic institutions and procedures, rule of law, respect of fundamental freedoms and rights);

(2) The diffusions of norms and values of liberal democracy; and

(3) They created the conditions for the development of many-sided and direct relations amongst states and societies."

Such "diffusion of norms" together with NATO's policies and practices contributed to the "spread of liberal-democratic norms." NATO's research paper focuses a great deal on the social elites (military and political). It stresses their importance and emphasizes the learning process they require. It states that NATO's "social learning amongst the local elites ... produced institutional adaptation." METO would have to influence leaderships and elites from the Arab culture, a much different culture from those in Europe; these elites may, in some countries, possibly even feel resent to democratic norms or American values. However, over time, the values of the institution and its processes would likely diffuse and these elites slowly adopt the values to which they may, at first, object. Finally, METO has a good prospect of reducing the possibility of war, where the potential belligerent would choose diplomacy over combat when confronted with such an effective alliance.

Economically, President Obama has emphasized the importance of a strong U.S. economy in many occasions calling it "the foundation of our strength in the world." METO potentially generates more burden sharing. Most of the states involved in the region have their own military capabilities so there should be little need for American forces (especially ground troops which bring the real problematic issue for the U.S.). Taking some of the load off the American economy would enable a downsizing of the U.S. military without dropping national security, or taking under risk against potential threats. Building such partnerships would also create a fertile ground for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) transactions and other potential economic opportunities that are not possible currently due to bad relationships or other restrictions. FMS would also help the private sector through

the military industry, but as a second or third order effect, other civilian sectors once the relationship with these countries becomes more open, relaxed and trusted.

Finally, the last major opportunity and advantage brought by a METO alliance would be increased peace and stability in the region. As seen in NATO, an alliance helps the stability and thus promotes peace. Stability is very rare in the Middle East and peace is a long-term aspiration. Building the trust between member countries (whether METO includes Israel or not) through the organization, bureaucracy and training, and by providing the platform (if required, under a U.S. umbrella) for conversation, sharing of ideas and debate, on neutral ground, could be exactly the solution the region needs for a cooperative peace and stability effort. This would mirror such initiatives to the IF program at AWC or the ACSC in the Air University at Maxwell AFB.

Risks

The main risk that needs to be considered when forming such an innovative alliance is centered on the very nature of its partner states. Most of them are not democratic. The behavior of non-democratic states differs from that of democracies; they are less affected by domestic opinion, the state usually controls the media, and many have a tendency towards corruption and nepotism. However, they too aspire for stability and so should not be dismissed. Having another regional platform for negotiations might help resolve conflict prior to them becoming violent; should a disagreement occur it will be dealt in the organization of the alliance, as it does in NATO. Frank R. Douglas further acknowledges disputes inside NATO writing that "Disagreement within the alliance is nothing new.... Now there are potentially many combinations of "coalitions of the willing". This new NATO endorsement for the idea of separable but not separate supports the new U.S. strategy of Forward Presence." Peter Duignan also refers to that subject: "Some NATO allies may choose not to join a military response or even man a peacekeeping force." Therefore, a METO disagreement should not be different than a NATO one.

Another risk comes from creating a mainly Arabic alliance is the so-called "Arab Way of War". In his masterpiece "Arabs at War" Kenneth Pollack analyzes military effectiveness throughout the years 1948-1991. "Since 1945 the Arab states have experienced problems that have denied their armed forces the success on the battlefield... The source of this problem is often referred to as the "human factor" or military effectiveness." Pollack examines several categories and comes to a conclusion that amongst the categories he studied, "four areas of military effectiveness stand out as consistent and crippling problems for Arab forces":

(1) Tactical Leadership;

(2) Information Management;

(3) Weapons Handling and

(4) Maintenance.

Very similar conclusions appear in Norvell B DeAtkine's more controversial essays "Why Arab Lose Wars" and "The Arabs as Insurgent". DeAtkine emphasizes culture as the root

cause for a long and unimpressive record of Arab military performances since 1960. He reinforces Pollack reasons in his research and adds: Training; Leadership; Predictability and Conformity. Such group of problems is not easily overcome. Nevertheless, by crafting the alliance carefully it is not insurmountable.

The U.S. would lead this alliance by providing equipment and taking full responsibility for key parts of the alliance. The U.S. should do so in a subtle, sensitive way, in order to prevent the rise of public opposition in the Arab member countries. The key areas for U.S. leadership would be: command and control; information management (intelligence - gathering and analysis); and training. The U.S. would thus strengthen the alliance in its weak spots and in return would benefit from a controlling influence in the region. Having more American influence is beneficial to the U.S. of course, but also supports preventing the alliance going astray. Having the United States directing the heart of the alliance infrastructure prevents it from conducting a military operation without U.S. approval. This would thus resolve the last major risk of forming the METO alliance – the potential that, with majority of Arab non-democratic countries amongst its members – it would attack, pre-emptively, non-Arab nation in the region (especially the long standing U.S. ally, Israel).

Middle East Interests - motivation to join METO

The first and foremost reason for a Middle Eastern country in joining METO is security. “Balance against threats” is the most common motive for alignment. The regime or government must protect their national sovereignty. Protecting the state through a military alliance, with multiple forces, led by the world superpower is an important guarantee in a restless, sometimes chaotic environment such as the Middle East. To the weak countries it brings military capabilities beyond their individual reach. To the stronger countries, it brings extra capabilities and increased numbers. The combining of forces in such an alliance - air, sea and ground forces, as well as command and control, technology, and intelligence capabilities – would provide a force well superior to any regional actor. Such a force could than operate against a range of enemies, ranging from terror activity and insurgency to a full-scale conventional war. The U.S. contribution to the alliance may also include extending its protective nuclear umbrella to other members of the alliance, thus maybe also reduce Middle Eastern countries desire to proliferate nuclear weapons.

Besides a common threat of a radical ideology and terror organizations (such as ISIS today), the interests for a METO alliance are diverse. Peace, prosperity and stability are probably also key aspirations in the majority of the countries. A regime always wishes to stay in power and thus promotes stability. The more open and westernized regimes will also promote prosperity. With regard to peace, I believe it is an even higher wish and one where trust is needed to be constructed before full implementation of the phrase. Economic benefits are also an important part of the objectives of a METO ally, taking ad-

vantage of good military relations to achieve other needs. Some countries would like the International recognition, while others are just bandwagoning because of their size and/or power. Having a U.S. led METO will keep the global world leader in the region, thus protecting the interests of its countries. As a second and third order effect, America is likely to invest more money in the countries’ economy and in their military; it will probably provide better infrastructure (military bases, runways, etc.), and it will thus make the METO partners more influential in the international arena. From big to small, weak to strong, being a METO partner is extremely beneficial.

NATO – DEFINITION & PURPOSE, STRUCTURE AND THE APPLICATION INTO METO

What Is NATO?

Before deciding to be somewhat “like NATO” it is important to understand what NATO is. NATO has changed and evolved since 1949, not only expanding from its 12 original countries to 28, but NATO has also changed in structure, missions, operations and more. Brian J Collins examines the question and recognizes that “NATO is a complex international organization, and the answer to the question what is NATO depends on both the context of the question and your understanding of NATO.” NATO’s purpose is no longer “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”, a phrase attributed to Lord Ismay, NATO’s 1st Secretary General.

The U.S. Department of State tries to answer the question, adding some background (underlined sentences reflect areas where I believe to have common ground with METO): “Formed in 1949 with the signing of the Washington Treaty, NATO is a security alliance of 28 countries from North America and Europe. NATO’s fundamental goal is to safeguard the Allies’ freedom and security by political and military means. NATO remains the principal security instrument of the transatlantic community and expression of its common democratic values. It is the practical means through which the security of North America and Europe are permanently tied together. NATO enlargement has furthered the U.S. goal of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty -- that an attack against one Ally is an attack against all -- is at the core of the Alliance, a promise of collective defense. Article 4 of the treaty ensures consultations among Allies on security matters of common interest, which have expanded from a narrowly defined Soviet threat to the critical mission in Afghanistan, as well as peacekeeping in Kosovo and new threats to security such as cyber-attacks, and global threats such as terrorism and piracy that affect the Alliance and its global network of partners. In addition to its traditional role in the territorial defense of Allied nations, NATO leads the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and has ongoing missions in the Balkans and the Mediterranean; it also conducts extensive training exercises and offers security support to partners around the globe, including

the European Union in particular but also the United Nations and the African Union.” NATO website provides an intuitive and graphic answer to the question “WHAT IS NATO?” It talks about a political and military alliance that its “essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom and the security of its members”.

As seen, many areas of similarities can be applicable to METO: ideology, objectives, cooperation and more. Collins, after considering some definitions such as: “collective defense”; “alliance of democracies”; and “prototypical security community” concludes in his aftermath: “NATO is an evolving collective security organization, whose identity is shaped by its members and through their interactions.” After briefly examining the history and understanding the definitions, it is time to comprehend NATO’s main structure and more importantly, key features that enabled it to work and becoming “the most successful alliance system in the history of the world.”

NATO organizational structure is complex with both civilian structure, military structure and other organizations and agencies. NATO is a highly bureaucratic and yet extremely capable political and military organization.

Implementation of NATO model to METO

NATO alliance at its core was an alliance formed to face a common threat. Article V in particularly acknowledges the commitment to one another. I have discussed earlier the need to make compromises due to the nature of the mainly Arab, non-democratic states occupying the larger Middle East area. The METO alliance can implement structure and even processes. Nevertheless, the basic lack of trust will not allow it to have the exact same treaty. Patricia A. Weitsman identified a range of six commitment levels that alliances may provide: “(1) a promise to maintain benevolent neutrality in the event of war; (2) a promise to consult in the event of military hostilities with an implication of aid; (3) promises of military assistance and other aid in event of war but without prepared or explicit conditions specified in advance; (4) a promise to come to the active assistance of an ally under specific circumstances; (5) an unconditional promise of mutual assistance, short of joint planning, with division of forces; and (6) an unconditional promise of mutual assistance in the event of attack with preplanned command and control and the integration of force and strategy.”

Alliances were formed earlier in times without article V. METO can initially adopt a more moderate strategy that enables a wide common interest in order to maximize its partners. Somewhere near Weitsman’s second type of alliance only with

already existing infrastructure, processes and mutual training. That will establish a wonderful platform allowing the alliance to evolve into a more committed alliance after trust is achieved. A narrower alliance would probably be possible also with Weitsman’s third or fourth type as well. Having such alliance is also a great platform to conduct a military operation joined by some of METO members without mobilizing METO forces due to consensus problems (as it happens in NATO). The U.S. will have its legitimacy and regional forces applying the violence, thus keeping U.S. power and influence while reducing American involvement, American casualties and American budget. An aspiration to reach Weitsman’s last level of commitment (similar

to NATO’s article 5) is important so no member would assume it can take more risks, provoking or even attacking a rival, assuming METO will ultimately protect it, as happened in World War I.

The current ideological threat to the region is from terror organizations such as ISIS. While many believe the expansion of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is a relative small issue, others believe it has a potential to be “more extensive and fraught with danger than the war on terror.” The latest Congressional Research Service (CRS, 8 Jan, 2015) states that the Islamic State threatens Syria and Iraq and “potentially several other countries in the region” and also “considered a direct threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East.” President Obama has formed an ad-hoc

coalition with western countries as well as regional countries, conducting air attacks. It is clear then, that the ideologists’ extremist in the Middle East form a threat. Another current obstacle to the stability of the region comes from Shi’a Iran, where a majority of METO potential member states are Sunni, sharing worries with the U.S. and Israel as well. While ISIS and its equivalent are ideological terrorist organizations, Iran is a state, and a potential METO member should it change its current policy after evaluating the advantages of being a METO member to its interests.

However, even without such threats METO is relevant and supports regional interests. Much like the case with NATO, Collins states that “the NATO alliance is not based on expediency or a common enemy as its primary justification, but based on shared values that have gradually deepened and created a security community with long-standing inter-Alliance cooperation.” Duignan emphasizes the outdated role of the Soviet Union threat as the reason for the alliance and discusses extensively about NATO role in the future claiming that “The primary functions of NATO today and tomorrow are peace-keeping, crisis management, conflict resolution, and encouraging cooperation among the community of states that make up the

“

The primary functions of NATO today and tomorrow are peacekeeping, crisis management, conflict resolution, and encouraging cooperation among the community of states that make up the European continent. This is exactly what METO should do within its region.

Continued on page 56

IS TURKEY SLIPPING OUT OF THE WEST'S ORBIT?

by Colonel Chris William Chronis, U.S. Army

FAO ASSOCIATION WRITING AWARD - ARMY WAR COLLEGE

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

Is Turkey Slipping Out of the West's Orbit?

Is Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan slipping out of the West's orbit, and what are the impacts of the rise of political Islam on Turkey's relationship with the West? Further, how can the West maintain—and possibly improve—its influence and relations with the Turkish people, Turkish business community, and Turkish military in the era of Erdogan? Since coming to power in 2003, President Erdogan and his Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) have altered the political, judicial, military, and social landscapes within Turkey's traditionally secular Muslim majority society in ways unimaginable since the era of Ataturk and the founding of the republic in 1923. Erdogan's provocative statements, conspiracy theories, internal purges, and heavy-handed responses to protests and opposition forces have negatively affected Turkey's relationships with the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States, and Israel in ways that have stunned and alarmed these traditional allies, and caused them to reevaluate their diplomatic, economic, and military relationships with Turkey.

The West must make every effort to keep Turkey—a longtime ally and emerging economic power—within the post-war economic and military framework that facilitates free trade, inter-dependence, open markets, collective security, civil liberties, democratic values, and the resultant stability and prosperity that ensures the survival and expansion of a secular, modernized, and pro-western Turkish society, economy, and military. To understand the dynamic at work today in Turkey, one must first understand the factors that forged the modern Turkey—the Ottomans, Ataturk, and the Cold War era. Because of these eras, Turkey is very much a nation with “multiple personalities.” One personality is western, and it is apparent in the nation's economy, legal system, military, and the cosmopolitan culture of its urban centers. The other personality is still very much eastern and linked to Islam, and this personality prevails in the rural areas and in the local lives of every day Turks—particularly the middle and lower classes. As the old saying goes, “all politics is local,” and Turkey's local politics— informed by religious beliefs and centuries of traditions—are reshaping the political and social landscape of the nation. In the



twelfth century the Mongols under Hulagu Khan, the grandson of Genghis Khan, swept into Anatolia and defeated the Seljuks and the Turkomen princes. The subjugation of the Turks by the Mongols was short lived, but the Mongols would come again in the fourteenth century under Tamerlane, and the ancestors of the Ottomans would become subservient states within the loosely controlled Mongol empire for a second time. During these centuries, the ancestors of the modern Turks continued to move across Anatolia, establishing the center of their culture in Northwestern Anatolia around the present day village of Sogut in the Marmara Region of modern day Turkey. It was in this region where Osman I was born and where the great Ottoman Empire would spring forth onto the pages of history.

The Grey Wolf

Having emerged from the First World War as a national hero, and having further distinguished himself at the head of what remained of the Turkish Army during the Allied occupation and the Turkish War of Independence; General Mustafa Kemal intimidated the Allies into a favorable peace and then deposed Sultan Vahdettin and his government. In October 1923, Mustafa Kemal—later Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the “Father Turk”—proclaimed the birth of the Turkish Republic with himself as President, head of the Grand National Assembly, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, leader of the sole political party—the Republican People's Party—and as absolute dictator.

Ataturk immediately set about implementing a series of

radical western oriented reforms to Turkish society which were nothing short of a “cultural revolution” and which would wrench Turkey out of the Islamic world, with its seventh century Arabic influences, and plant it squarely in the modern and secular world of Twentieth Century Europe. Ataturk had antipathy towards religion in general—and Islam in particular.

Many of Ataturk’s initial reforms were as symbolic as they were substantive, with the intention of removing Islam from the fabric of Turkish life and government. His reforms included abolishing the Caliphate, eliminating the political power of the Imams and the Muslim Brotherhood, adoption of European legal codes vice Sharia law, banning the Islamic Fez and encouraging western style dress, legalizing the production and consumption of alcohol, lifting the Koranic ban on human representation, and sweeping educational reforms that secularized education and closed the Madrassas.

Next came the empowerment of women as equal citizens of the republic, the lifting of requirements for women to wear headscarves and other religious garments, and legal reforms granting secular western style equality to women. Additional reforms included the abolition of the Arabic alphabet, the Islamic calendar, and Friday as the holy day—all links to Islam. Almost overnight, a nation of mostly illiterate Muslim Turks learned to read a new Latin based alphabet, to worship on Sundays—like Europeans—and to embrace life in the year 1926. All of these reforms (and many more) were enshrined in the Turkish Constitutions of 1921, 1923, and 1924, and then ruthlessly implemented across the nation. The point of these profound changes, and the societal upheaval they caused, was simple—Ataturk’s Turkey was to become a modern, forward looking, secular, progressive, westernized republic with a modern constitution, a European style legal system, and a fierce sense of Turkish identity not based on an Islamic, Arabic, or Ottoman legacy. Initially, this “cultural revolution” would occur under the watchful eye (and iron fist) of the “Father Turk,” and upon his death in 1938 by loyal “Kemalists” and his beloved Turkish Army for decades to come.

Islam Rising

From 1994 to 1998, Erdogan served as Mayor of Istanbul and though his administration enacted many successful reforms regarding improvements to municipal services, the environment, and quality of life. His religious views were also on display and led to policies that raised the eyebrows of many in the secular Turkish government. Chief among these was a ban on the sale of alcoholic beverages at municipally run restaurants—clearly, a symbolic policy position rooted in his Islamic faith and out of coincidence with Turkey’s secular western values. This gave Turkish society, and the Turkish ruling classes, a window on Erdogan’s soul and an indication of his religiously inspired

political views. Later tried and convicted of “incitement to commit an offense” and “incitement to religious or racial hatred” after the 1997 coup, Erdogan served four months of a ten-month sentence. The chief charge against him was his public recitation of an Islamic poem in December 1997, which contained the following statement: “The Mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets and the faithful our soldiers.”

By 2003, Erdogan was Turkey’s 25th Prime Minister and the nation’s most openly devout Muslim leader since the last Sultan and era of the Caliphate some eighty years prior. The first years of Erdogan’s administration had many positive aspects, which both Turks and western observers alike could rightly call progres-

WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE RISE OF POLITICAL ISLAM ON TURKEY’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE WEST?

sive, responsible, and modernistic. Under Erdogan and the AKP, there were much needed upgrades to infrastructure in the forms of airports, high-speed rail, and road networks. Improvements to education came through upgrades to infrastructure, the addition of new facilities, and the acquisition of computers and internet access for teachers and students across the nation at unprecedented levels. There were also positive reforms to the health care system, greater attention paid to environmental issues, much greater recognition of Kurdish and Armenian grievances—to include recognition of historical injustices and massacres—something no other Turkish leader had dared to do. There were also tremendous improvements to the Turkish economy in the form of debt reduction, increase in GDP, growth of cash reserves, foreign investment, and decreases in inflation that brought praise from none other than the World Bank.

Turkey in the first decade of the new millennium became an economic powerhouse—“the Anatolian Tiger”—and its partnership and preferential trade status with the EU under the Customs Union Agreement and European Free Trade Agreements has flourished as trade has increased in both directions across the Bosphorus and Turkey’s economy has exploded. In 2013, Turkish foreign trade with the EU reached \$146 billion dollars and trade with the US reached \$19 billion dollars. In the last decade, under the leadership of Erdogan and his economic policies, Turkey’s GDP reached \$1.4 trillion dollars and ranked 17th in the world. Turkey’s place in the Group of 20 nations (G20) seemed solidified with her future as a regional and potential global economic power announced to the world, but membership in the EU—pending since 1999—still eluded her.

The Purge

The nation's economic vitality, unprecedented growth, and pending EU membership kept Erdogan and the AKP in office and expanded their power and influence to unprecedented levels during the first decade of the century. The power and political capital that prosperity brings gave Erdogan the latitude and flexibility to settle old scores with the military, judiciary, police, political rivals, to chart a more independent course for Turkey on the world stage, and to reshape the social and cultural landscapes in ways never imagined in the post-war "Deep State" era. His actions would challenge and eventually neuter the traditionally secular pro-western powers in Turkish society, shock and alienate traditional allies, re-introduce Islam to Turkish politics, suppress opposition, curtail civil liberties, and roll back the secular and westernized conduct of Turkish society. Asserting that the military and the courts were politicized, dictatorial, and a de-facto parallel government—the "Deep State"—Erdogan and the AKP set to dealing with Turkey's guardians of secularism in a ruthless and efficient manner. They cited the existence of a secret network of military, judicial, academic and media personalities known as the "Ergenekon," and claimed that this group were plotting everything from assassinations to bombings to starting wars in order to undermine and eventually unseat Erdogan and the AKP.

By 2013, fifteen percent of the Turkish military's senior military officers were on trial for conspiracy—including several former members of the Army Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council. This resulted in the convictions of over 300 officers for alleged participation in previous coups dating back to 1980, or for allegedly plotting a future coup against Erdogan and the AKP. Additionally, the arrests and conspiracy trials of hundreds of senior active duty and retired officers sparked a wave of mass resignations and retirements across the Turkish armed forces, that resulted in hundreds of officers leaving the service in fear. Concurrently, the police and the judiciary faced similar allegations, arrests, and curbs on their power. By 2014, Erdogan had sacked more than two thousand police officers and had replaced them with officers whose loyalty to himself and the AKP was beyond question. Additionally, Erdogan fired more than ninety judges—many for alleged involvement in plotting a future coup or for involvement in a corruption probe of Erdogan and his political supporters. Erdogan then offered legislation that would facilitate the appointment of party loyalists to the judiciary—the Turkish version of "court packing." Once granted, Erdogan and the AKP had an iron grip on both the executive and legislative branches of the government.

Head East Young Turk

Domestic military and political foes neutralized, Erdogan began to chart a new course for Turkey on the world stage—a course that raised concerns among allies. Far from acting like the Cold War era "puppet" of the West, Turkey become more independent, defiant, and often uncooperative. The first sign of the political winds changing in the AKP's Turkey came in 2003 when the AKP majority Turkish Parliament refused to allow the U.S. Army to disembark in Turkish ports and transit the country

in order to invade northern Iraq via the Habur Gate. The fact that a NATO ally and U.S. client state with deep military ties extending back decades would obstruct the U.S. invasion of Iraq seemed unimaginable and resulted in an immediate cooling of relations.

More recently, Erdogan has opposed U.S. led sanctions against Iran and its nuclear program, ordered a massive police crackdown on political activists during the Taksim Square protests in 2013, and then ordered subsequent restrictions to civil liberties and internet social media sites. Additional causes for concern are Turkish-Israeli relations in the era of Erdogan. One of Israel's original allies and the first majority Muslim nation to recognize the State of Israel in 1949, Turkey and Israel have deep social, economic and military ties extending back to the 1950s.

However, relations began to sour during the Gaza War of 2008-09—resulting in Turkey barring Israeli Air Force participation in an annual multi-lateral military exercise known as "Anatolian Eagle." That same year at a World Economic Forum conference in Davos, Switzerland, Erdogan so roundly criticized Israeli actions in Gaza that a heated exchange ensued between himself and Israeli President Shimon Peres—resulting in Erdogan storming off the stage and out of the conference. In the aftermath of the 2010 Gaza Flotilla incident where Israeli special forces killed ten Turkish citizens, Turkey withdrew its ambassador to Israel, downgraded diplomatic relations, and demanded that Israel publicly apologize and compensate the families—something Israel refused to do until 2013. Later that year in Vienna, while speaking at a UN event, Erdogan called Zionism "a crime against humanity" and equated it with anti-Semitism, fascism, and Islamophobia. Further friction occurred after Turkey refused to support U.S. led sanctions against the Iranian government and its nuclear program—which Israel supported—and after allegations surfaced of Turkish involvement in exposing Israeli intelligence operatives in Iran in 2013.

Because of this troubling set of circumstances, the U.S. suspended arms sales to the Turks and President Obama stated that future arms sales would depend upon changes in Turkish policies and behaviors. In 2014, an Istanbul criminal court handed down another impediment to warming relations with Israel—arrest warrants for four now retired Israeli officers who planned and approved the Gaza Flotilla raid—including the former Israeli Army Chief of Staff and former head of Israeli Military Intelligence.

Lastly, concurrent with the downturn in Turkish relations with the U.S. and Israel, there has been improvements in Turkish relations with Russia, China, and Iran. Putin and Erdogan met in December of 2014 and appear to have moved beyond—or set aside—their previous differences over Syria and Ukraine as they focus on future economic cooperation, particularly in the area of natural gas. Additionally, Erdogan is actively seeking membership in China's Shanghai Cooperation Organization—an economic body that seeks to circumvent the post-war western economic structure.

With regard to Iran, Erdogan visited Tehran in early 2014 to discuss cooperation on Syria and to expand trade in

spite of global sanctions against the regime and U.S. warnings not to do so. To make matters worse, while in Tehran, Erdogan said that Iran “feels like a second home.” A troubling statement when the democratically elected head of a NATO member nation, and EU aspirant, calls the capitol of an authoritarian Islamic theocracy “home.” Turkish leaders before Erdogan—all staunch allies of the U.S., Europe, and Israel—would never have uttered such provocative and alarming statements or charted such a defiant and independent course for Turkey.

Analyze This

Given all this, what can the West make of Turkey under Erdogan and what does it bode for the future of Turkey’s relations with the EU/NATO, the U.S., and Israel? Since becoming a republic in the 1920s, Turks have looked to the West and to modernity as the model for how to conduct themselves on the world stage and in domestic affairs. A secular pro-western nation with European customs, habits, and culture was Atatürk’s vision, and he commanded his people to follow him. After the Second World War, and with the start of the Cold War, Turkey moved closer to the West and it raced to join western political, military, and economic organizations. Turkey played key and essential roles in the UN response in Korea, the formation and growth of NATO, the containment of Soviet Communism, and the stability of the Middle East—especially with regard to Israel. Further, Turkey began its formal integration into the economy of Europe in the late 1950s and since then has patiently waited in Europe’s anteroom for full membership into the EU.

However, despite its robust economy, explosive growth, burgeoning GDP, and ascension to the G20 family of nations over the last thirty years, the EU continues to reject Turkey. Initially EU members had concerns over human rights and the oppression of the Kurds, political instability associated with the various coups, and Turkey’s retention of the death penalty among other issues. Later came objections—primarily from Greece and the majority Greek Republic of Cyprus—over Turkey’s invasion after the Cypriot coup of 1974 and the subsequent partitioning of the island into Greek and Turkish zones of influence. More recently, various EU members have objected to Turkey’s heavy-handed crackdown on protests and infringements to civil liberties during the Taksim Square incidents of 2013.

Despite the hostile words and alarming deeds of the last decade, Erdogan states that he expects full EU membership by 2023—the one hundredth anniversary of the republic—or he says Turkey may end membership negotiations. Threats and delusions aside, it seems almost certain that the EU will continue to reject Turkey’s bids for membership, and this will only seek to alienate the Turks further. One wonders if in the minds of every Turk there is an understanding of the damage done to their position with the EU by their leader. Perhaps not—perhaps there is only the ironic juxtaposition of the EU’s continuous rejections of Turkey—an economic

“

there are metamorphoses underway in Turkey - an economic metamorphosis, a cultural metamorphosis, a political metamorphosis, and a religious metamorphosis...

dynamo—alongside the EU’s seemingly unending coddling of two economic basket cases—Greece and Cyprus—both traditional enemies of Turkey and the same two countries that have thwarted Turkey’s membership for decades? Ironic to be sure, but one cannot deny the plausible Turkish perception that the EU’s rejections hinge on something that Europe’s secular progressive elites will never discuss aloud.

With regard to the future of U.S.-Turkish relations, frankly one cannot say what the future of those will be, as U.S. foreign policy seems to lurch from supporting friendly authoritarian or quasi-democratic regimes to one of criticizing and embargoing them—Egypt par exam—depending upon which U.S. political party is in power at the time. However, it is safe to say that the U.S. government, and certainly the U.S. military, wants a relationship akin to the one it had with the Kemalist Turkey of the Cold War era—that unconditionally pro-western ally with nested geo-political interests undergirded by economic and technological dependence.

Though the times and conditions may have changed profoundly on the ground in Turkey, U.S. interests and values have not. The U.S. will continue to condemn Erdogan’s treatment of his political opposition, of protestors, and his infringements on civil liberties and internet access. It will condemn his actions and rhetoric regarding Israel, his anti-Semitic statements, his conspiracy theories, and his overtures to Iran while seeking to circumvent U.S. led sanctions. The U.S. will remain cautious of Turkey’s diplomatic and economic relationships with Russia and China as well. Further, the U.S. senses a lack of commitment on Turkey’s part to dealing with the Islamic State and its bloody rampage through Syria and northern Iraq. Lastly, there is the issue of the Islamification of Turkish politics—the rise of political Islam.

Therefore, rejected by Europe and receiving mixed message from a United States that is shrinking from the world stage, Turkey will no doubt look to the east—and not the west—as it becomes a regional military and economic hegemon with deeper ties to the Muslim world, to Russia, and

to China. This nationalistic and independent twenty-first century Turkey is not going to wait for the EU and it is not going to be encumbered by the alliances and allegiances of the past. It will do what is in the best interests of Turkey, and this may from time to time put it at odds with the EU, NATO, the U.S., and Israel. There is a nationalistic spirit sweeping the country in the era of Erdogan—fueled by his populist rhetoric, open defiance of the West, and economic pride—and there too is a rediscovered pride in the Ottoman era, the Caliphate, and in Islam. The prognosis could not be clearer—there are metamorphoses under way in Turkey—an economic metamorphosis, a cultural metamorphosis, a political metamorphosis, and a religious metamorphosis. What remains opaque is whether these metamorphoses will be Kafkaesque.

What to Do

Keeping Turkey in the West's orbit will require a concerted effort by the EU/ NATO and the U.S. that utilizes the appropriate elements of their national power—Diplomatic, Economic, Military, and Informational. The West must keep Turkey within the western political, military, and economic order that encourages and facilitates free trade, inter-dependence, open markets, collective security, civil liberties, and the resultant prosperity that ensures the survival and expansion of Turkey's educated and westernized middle-class and its officer corps. If not, we may find Turkey aligning itself more closely with nations and ideologies (Russia, China, and Iran) that seek an alternate economic and social order not based upon these principles.

On the diplomatic and information fronts, the U.S. must aggressively advocate for expansion of the European Customs Union between Turkey and the EU in the near term, and an immediate restart of EU membership talks in the long-term, with a stated (and highly symbolic) U.S. desire of full membership by 2023—the centennial of the Turkish Republic. Additionally, the U.S. should publicly state that it believes that opposition to Turkish membership may be based on historical ethnic, cultural, and religious grievances harbored by some EU members (who will remain unnamed), and that these grievances are anachronistic and inconsistent with the values of twenty-first century secular, progressive, western democracies.

On the multilateral economic front, the U.S. and EU should expand Turkey's role in several western post-war economic institutions: the International Monetary Fund, General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, the World Bank, and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development to name a few. Additionally, the Group of Seven (G7), should be expanded to the "G7 + 1" to afford Turkey the same status once offered to Russia (prior to its suspension from the body in 2014) in recognition of its economic and political importance to the global community in general, and to the western economic structure in particular.

On the bilateral economic front, the U.S. should endeavor to make our economic relations with Turkey on par with our traditionally strong military relations. Trade between the U.S.

and Turkey has yet to reach its true potential, and it lags far behind Turkish trade expansion with the EU, Israel, and China. While U.S.-Turkish trade has expanded six-fold since the 1990s to approximately \$20 billion in 2012, Turkish trade with China expanded 76-fold to approximately \$24 billion that same year. In 2009, President Obama and Prime Minister Erdogan announced a Framework for Strategic Economic and Commercial Cooperation (FSECC) that sought to address the unrealized potential of the US-Turkey trade relationship through alliances between private enterprises, cooperation on innovation—particularly in the fields of science, technology, and health care—and the promotion and exploitation of clean energy sources.

Lastly, the U.S. should move forward with the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) initiative with the EU and make the addition of Turkish membership a prerequisite. The TTIP would give Turkey unprecedented access to not only U.S. and EU markets, but also expand her access to global markets—as the TTIP would stretch from the west coast of the U.S. across Europe and to the shores of the Black Sea and the Levant. Inclusion of Turkey in the TTIP would also advantage Turkey in future EU membership negotiations, while simultaneously evidencing further U.S. support for both Turkish prosperity and for her continued membership in the post-war western financial order.

Military

The one area where U.S.-Turkish relations have come closest to realizing their strategic potential is in the area of military cooperation, both within the framework of NATO and bilaterally. Though U.S. and NATO influence within the Turkish armed forces has diminished with the rise of Erdogan and his subsequent removal of hundreds of pro-western Turkish officers, ties remain and the framework for continued positive relations still exists. With this in mind, the U.S. should advocate for a greater leadership role for Turkey within NATO—one that is both symbolic and commensurate with the size of its armed forces.

Further, the U.S. should advocate for increased NATO training exercises in Turkey, and for a larger NATO presence within Turkey—to include the addition of a second NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Headquarters in Turkey. On the bilateral front, the U.S. should strengthen our traditionally strong defense cooperation with Turkey in the following areas: Missile Defense, access to Turkish bases and transportation corridors, expanded Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and greater military-to-military contact through the International Military Education and Training program (IMET). With the potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range delivery systems in the Middle East, Turkey's geographic location makes it both a potential target and a suitable location for elements of the NATO Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) shield.

Further goodwill and cooperation could be engendered by the maintenance and expansion of FMS between the U.S. and Turkey. Turkey no longer receives annual Foreign Military

Continued on page 57

PAKISTAN'S SIGNIFICANCE TO U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTH ASIA

By Major Matthew Crowe, U.S. Army
Lieutenant Commander Ryan Gaul, U.S. Navy
and Major Ron Connolly, U.S. Marine Corps

FAO ASSOCIATION WRITING AWARD - JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE

Fourteen years following the U.S.-led international intervention into Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the region of South Asia as a whole, stands at a crossroads. The U.S. and its NATO allies are drawing down their forces, and other concerns in the Middle East and East Asia are drawing Washington's attention away from the region. While al Qaeda has been all but driven from the region, and the Taliban finally persuaded to join Kabul at the negotiating table, the region is far from secure. In Pakistan, decades of mistakes and misperceptions have led to a public sphere dominated by extremism, an economy crippled by corruption, and a deteriorating regional position. If Pakistan is unable to overcome its current crises, the stability of all of South Asia, and with it U.S. foreign policy objectives for the region, will be in jeopardy.

South Asia, comprised of Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, is home to nearly two-thirds of the world's population living on one-third of the world's landmass. Although the U.S. focus has shifted away from South Asia, continued efforts should be made to influence Pakistan's future, as Pakistan remains central to pursuing and achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives for the entire South Asian region. First, we will lay out the current U.S. foreign policy for South Asia, following which we will demonstrate why Pakistan remains critical to the success of U.S. foreign policy objectives. Next, we will present two possible scenarios for a future Pakistan. These will highlight how Pakistan's actions can have both far-reaching positive and negative effects on the entire South Asian region. To conclude, we will provide some recommendations for U.S. to directly engage Islamabad in an effort to support Pakistan's movement to security and stability.

U.S. Foreign Policy for South Asia

Long considered a "strategic backwater" from the U.S. perspective, South Asia has emerged in the 21st century as increasingly vital to core U.S. foreign policy interests. The Obama administration's South Asian foreign policy was outlined, in part, in "The Obama Administration's Policy on South Asia" by Robert O. Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs. He stated, "Our goal was, and remains, to support the development of sovereign, stable, democratic nations, integrated into the world economy and cooperating with one another, the United States, and our partners to advance regional security and stability."

Today, U.S. interests in South Asia are not anchored on a

single set of issues, but instead a set of core, interconnected issues; security, stability, and access.

Security

While there are numerous countries within the region, including Pakistan, that remain at least somewhat supportive of Washington's Foreign policy and physical presence, the U.S. has grown weary of the protracted "War on Terror." With U.S. attention, including military power, engaged in other regions of the globe, it falls to the South Asian nations to maintain security of the region gained over the last 14 years.

Counter-terrorism remains the key portion of security, as every state in South Asia is currently, or has fallen, victim to terrorism related activities. In this regard, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India are presently affected by terrorism and extremist violence on their soil. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has attempted on numerous occasions to create regional responses to common challenges posed by terrorism, but has so far been held hostage to the political hostility between the two main South Asian actors – India and Pakistan.

Stability

It is this long standing animosity between India and Pakistan that remains the greatest threat to stability in the region. In South Asia, the main concern of nuclear non-proliferation, a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy, comes from the tension between India and Pakistan, and the way nuclear energy and weaponry are developed, stored, transported, and used. While the nuclear status of Pakistan and India largely rules out a scenario of total war between the two nations, there remains the concern that even a minor border dispute could escalate out of control and lead to a nuclear exchange.

Admittedly, this scenario remains quite low. However, unless relations improve, the military and security situation in the field of nuclear and technological advance over the next ten years will lead to an arms race with both India and Pakistan scrambling to acquire more fissile material, warheads, along with ballistic and cruise missiles; signaling a deteriorating of relations to a point of no return. There is, of course, more to the stability concerns of South Asia than the relationship between Pakistan and India. However, none of those concerns are as significant, or have as far reaching impacts on the entire region, both positive and negative, as this relationship.

Access

An editorial in the Indian Newspaper, Dawn, summed up this issue in one profound sentence:

“The staggering potential trade and economic linkages among one and a half billion people in the three countries (referring to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India) is seemingly forever thwarted by the inability of the political and security establishments of these three countries to come together and find mutually beneficial solutions.”

Washington has recognized the positive potential of trade and cross-border economic investments in South Asia, and is already supporting the countries of the region as they build the economic and energy linkages that is hoped to transform their individual and collective economies. While the U.S. supports many cross-border economic projects such as CASA-1000, which will bring surplus hydropower from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and TAPI, the Turkmenistan- Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline, its primary effort has been the New Silk Road vision. Through the New Silk Road vision the U.S. has been focusing efforts in four key areas:

- **Creating regional energy markets that link Central Asia with South Asia;**
- **Boosting transportation routes and investing in critical infrastructure;**
- **Improving customs and borders; and**
- **Linking businesses and people.**

Why is Pakistan critical to achieving U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives?

There still remains a huge trust deficit between Pakistan and the U.S. Many American officials and members of Congress have openly expressed frustration at Pakistan’s lackluster efforts to combat militant groups like the Haqqani Network, who pose a direct threat to U.S. interests. Some have even called for a complete cessation of ties with Pakistan.

The truth of the matter, is that Pakistan remains critical to U.S. foreign policy in South Asia despite the drawdown of U.S. and NATO presence in Afghanistan. The U.S. and Afghanistan leadership have known for years that peace will not be possible unless the Pakistani military wants to make it happen. The army command is almost solely responsible for the country’s national security, with little to no oversight of the elected civilian government in Islamabad. The Pakistani military also maintains close ties with the Afghan Taliban, making them a crucial part in the ongoing Peace negotiations between the Afghan Government and the Taliban.

Even putting Afghanistan aside, Pakistan’s geographic location means it will remain significant to U.S. foreign policy. In the words of Council on Foreign Relations senior fellow Daniel Markey, “a country of 180 million people [now 200 million],

likely to be 300 million by mid-century, that borders India, China, Iran and the Arabian Sea, will matter to the U.S., no matter what it did or did not do with bin Laden.”

Finally, the U.S., as well as Pakistan’s immediate neighbors, its close allies and friends, as well as those countries with whom it has a complicated relationship, agree that a stable and secure



Left to right: Lt Col Gerald Clouse, USAF (Seminar Team Leader); MAJ Matthew Crowe, USA; LCDR Ryan Gaul, USN; Maj Ron Connolly, USMC.

Pakistan, capable of dealing with its internal economic, social, political and security challenges is an absolute prerequisite for regional stability and the mitigation of potential far-flung risks. Simply put, the future of Pakistan will have a direct impact on the security, and stability of South Asia and thus is critical to the U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives.

Worst Case Scenario

To demonstrate Pakistan’s importance, we will present two future scenarios. The first will highlight the very real risks if Pakistan is unable to address its well-known security, economic and governance deficiencies, as well as the repercussions this will have for the region. In this scenario, Pakistan has been unable to overcome its angst of Indian dominance, and continues to struggle to improve relations with Afghanistan and India. Pakistan’s long-desired objective to reach military ‘parity’ with its arch-rival India has been the driving factor of Pakistan’s foreign policy for decades. “The parity doctrine, as well as the emphasis on Kashmir, is rooted in ideology and the two-nation theory that was the basis of Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s demand for Pakistan,” explains former Pakistani Ambassador to the U.S., Husain Haqqani, “For a country to base its foreign policy for over 60 years on the same assumptions is unusual. As the world around us changes, so must a nation’s foreign policy. But Pakistan has yet to embrace pragmatism as the basis of its foreign and national security policies.”

Two ways Pakistan has attempted to reach parity with India

is to first, ally itself with stronger nations, like the U.S., to garner military aid to bolster its military effectiveness, and second, to utilize Islamic insurgent groups to strike at India's interests and tie up Indian forces while maintaining plausible deniability. Without an improvement of relations with India, Pakistan will continue to use insurgent groups in a bid to further its own objectives in Afghanistan and India. Pakistan's unwillingness to stop utilizing violent insurgent groups, who have long-standing connections to elements in military and intelligence agencies, to further its national security objectives will further erode its future relations with India, Afghanistan, and damage relation with the U.S. A decline in relations with the U.S. will likely include a reduction, or even cessation, of vital economic and military aid to Pakistan, which in turn will further degrade the security situation. This is made even more troubling by the fact that Pakistan remains a nuclear power, and a degradation of security increases the threat of a nuclear device falling into the hand of extremists. It is unlikely other nations, even China, will step up and replace that funding, as even Chinese investment cannot succeed in such an environment of insecurity.

Continued instability, and the alienation of neighbors and investors will not help the Pakistani economy either. Pakistan that cannot achieve strong growth will have cascading negative effects for the region. Regional economic projects such as the above mentioned TAPI pipeline, which would go a long way to solving the energy crisis in Pakistan, will not reach fruition. International trade will also decrease, with Afghanistan and India simply subverting Pakistan and using Iran's Chabahar port to link South Asia to the Central Asian States and the Middle East. A continually underperforming Pakistani economy would harm not only this generation of Pakistanis, but future generations as well.

Negative development indicators for the region at large would undermine progress that has already been made in combating abject poverty. Finally, in this deteriorating scenario, we should expect a continued disconnect between Pakistan's leadership and its population. A loss of confidence in the government will likely fuel the advance of terror attacks from the Tharik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other insurgencies. In response the international community, instead of focusing on building relations with Pakistan and providing aid, would instead turn to Afghanistan and India with security assistance programs in an effort to contain the instability emanating from Pakistan. While this course of action might stem the spread of extremism and violence coming out of Pakistan, it doesn't stop it from festering within. Pakistan would continue to deteriorate, viewed by the international world purely as a counterterrorism problem.

Best (Desired) Scenario

Ideally, the U.S. would like to see Pakistan serve as a catalyst and corner stone for a new era of wider regional cooperation that takes the opportunity of the Western drawdown in Afghanistan to improve relations with its neighbors. The currently faltered move towards India-Pakistan normalization would be re-energized, starting with a dialogue to de-escalate and prevent further clashes along the Line of Control. Military- to-Military

interactions between Indian and Pakistani militaries, would build confidence to allow further political discussions through dialogue of the Foreign Ministries. Additionally, Pakistan would continue its stated support for the Afghan-led reconciliation process between the Ghani-led government in Kabul and those Taliban willing to negotiate an end to the insurgency. Pakistan would have to accept that India will play a crucial role in trying to sustain post-2001 developments in Afghanistan, something that should also be a priority for Pakistan. Islamabad would conduct discussions at the diplomatic and political level to enforce essential economic and humanitarian focus of Indian assistance.

As mentioned under the first scenario, international and regional trade are critical for the economic development of Pakistan. Currently, South Asia is cited as one of the least economically integrated regions in the world. However, an outwardly engaged Pakistan would be well positioned as a transit point for wider regional trade and economic cooperation. The trade potential with India alone is significant. The current bilateral trade between the two nations is currently \$2.4 billion, but has the potential to soar to \$6 billion over the next two years alone as long as both countries grant each other "most favored nation" status. By taking advantage of its new trade relationships, Pakistan would be positioned to provide jobs for its booming population, two-thirds of whom are under the age of 30.

Just as security provides space for economic growth, good governance ensures its sustainability. The current Pakistani Prime Minister, Sharif, campaigned on a platform of economic growth, putting particular emphasis on improving Pakistan's infrastructure. An economy in which the annual gross domestic product continues to rise steadily, and in which the government is collecting more revenue, together with delivery of electricity to its businesses will go a long way to reversing the declining confidence of the Pakistani people in their government. Solving the problems of the energy sector in particular has been identified as a key first step to correcting Pakistan's economic problems. Not only does the importation of expensive fossil fuels drain Pakistan's financial resources, power-outages brought on by insufficient power production interrupts commerce and industry throughout the country.

Recommendations

Between 2009 and 2014, the U.S. committed \$4.38 billion in economic aid to Pakistan, spread amongst the five primary areas of energy, economic growth, community stabilization, education and health. This total includes a sizeable increase in recent years, reflecting a total Congressional authorization of up to \$1.5 billion per year in civilian aid. In addition, approximately \$2 billion in military aid is provided on an annual basis to support counterterrorism efforts, strengthening government support to serve the populace and securing the nuclear program. As should be expected, this aid is consistent with U.S. Department of State objectives for engagement with Pakistan.

Unfortunately, while the total aid provided to Pakistan is sizeable, there is more that can be done. Fortunately, much

of it can occur without necessarily increasing the overall aid package. Contingent upon Pakistani efforts, the U.S. can utilize the targeted expenditure of current investment monies, provide support for international efforts to develop Pakistani energy and energy infrastructure, conduct coordinated efforts to enhance bilateral trade with India and increase U.S. to Pakistan military interaction so as to better achieve National strategic objectives.

It is widely recognized that there is an inverse relationship between economic conditions and the appeal of terrorist organizations. Economic conditions that stimulate job creation and wage growth also encourage stability and limit the volume of disenfranchised persons as well as the appeal of violence to those who are employed.

Similarly widely recognized is the fact that limited access to energy also restricts economic growth. Where access to energy is limited the ability of the populace to leverage it for the development of industry and the means to distribute goods is also impinged. With these realities in mind, our first recommendation is that efforts to improve Pakistan's internal stability and the appeal of violent extremist organizations (VEOs) should start with improved access to energy. Recent surveys of Pakistan's energy infrastructure today and over the next quarter century highlights the fact that domestic energy supply is unlikely to meet demand. Pakistan's neighbors realize this fact as well. Iran, China and the Central Asian Republics have each offered individual programs, including the construction of power plants and pipelines to build energy infrastructure. As the Century Foundation recommends, U.S support to international efforts to improve Pakistan's energy infrastructure, such as those from the Central Asian States, China and even Iran, could have great effect and would do so without additional U.S. investment.

In order to achieve the primary U.S. objective of counterterrorism and improved security conditions, this U.S. support cannot come without preconditions. Unilateral Pakistani counterterrorism efforts should be understood as a requirement. First and foremost, Pakistan must recognize that there is no difference between "good terrorists" and "bad terrorists." Militant groups such as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the group responsible for the Peshawar school attack and that is heavily involved in instability along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, and Lashkar-e-Tayyba (LeT); responsible for repeated violence in disputed Kashmir, must be acknowledged simply as terrorists, rather than a national policy tool. While ongoing counter terrorism operations, such as Operation Zarb-e-Azb, to root out militants in North Waziristan, appear to be succeeding, additional efforts are required. Demonstrable efforts to address LeT, in particular, will be vital to improving relations with India in coming years.

Improving relations between Pakistan and its neighbors will be of vital importance to increasing regional stability. Taking action to combat and eliminate TTP and LeT are just the first steps in improving these relations. Another key step in this effort must be the normalization of trade with Afghanistan and India. Strategically located at the nexus between central and western Asia, with access to the sea as well as the Central Asian States, India, Afghanistan, Iran and China, Pakistan has

the capability to leverage its position to become a corridor for global trade. Unfortunately, violence, combined with physical and regulatory barriers limit Pakistan's ability to take advantage of its fortuitous position. According to some estimates, Pakistan's trade with India, for example, is currently only a tenth of its capacity. Along with improving internal economic conditions, increased trade can also serve as a stepping stone to the normalization of relations between states. It is important to note that there is wide-ranging popular support in Afghanistan and Pakistan for relations to normalize, particularly with regard to increased trade. Securing the border and eliminating trade barriers are among the efforts that Afghanistan's newly elected President Ghani has been pursuing with Pakistan. The U.S. must take action to encourage Pakistan to support these efforts.

Among the options that should be considered are U.S.-led multilateral discussions to open trade barriers. Understanding that U.S. involvement can be perceived as meddling, particularly among the people of Pakistan, it may also be beneficial for the U.S. to pursue the participation of a United Nations arbitrator to negotiate a trade deal suitable to all participants. Ultimately, a deal which reduces physical and administrative trade barriers and provides a means of cross-border access for investors would benefit all involved nations and contribute to better quality of life across the board.

Acknowledging the importance of counterterrorism efforts in Pakistan, the role of the U.S. military in any engagement must be significant. Following the Osama bin Laden raid in Abbottabad in 2011, U.S. engagement with the Pakistani military dropped precipitously at Pakistani insistence. In order to ascertain the results of Pakistan's unilateral counterterrorism efforts, as well as build the capacity of Pakistani forces, the U.S. must increase its engagement with Pakistan. While the U.S. should pursue the placement of forces in Pakistan to enable combined training and bilateral exercises, popular sentiment is widely hostile to U.S. presence. As a result, this effort will take time and other means must be employed to build relationships and mutual understanding. Potential U.S. engagements should include opportunities for U.S. forces to interact with Pakistani service members while remaining clear of the populace. With multiple ports along the Indian Ocean and a sizeable fleet, the conduct of naval exercises are one means by which these activities could take place. The exchange of liaison officers as well as combined planning efforts would be invaluable. It must be noted, however, that these activities must be of a non-threatening nature to neighboring India, in order to avoid upsetting the regional balance. Humanitarian relief planning, search and rescue exercises and smuggling interdiction are all examples of potential combined training efforts. The U.S. should also consider increasing the number of Pakistani officers that are accepted to American Service Schools such as the War Colleges. The interaction that take place in an academic environment precisely match the candid exchange of ideas that build mutual trust and understanding. As these coordinated efforts progress and understanding develops between the two parties, the opportunities for further coordinated training in Pakistan will increase with it. Using a gradual approach, the U.S.

can leverage the trust that has been built to expand its footprint and support future cooperative security efforts which are capable of reducing the threat of extremist organizations.

Conclusion

Pakistan is a nation with great resources, key strategic location and tremendous possibilities. Beset by widespread extremism, insecure borders and economic hardship brought on by a lack of energy security, access to regional trade, and the reckless pursuit of nuclear ambitions, it has so far been unable to take advantage of them. The U.S. and the international community have roles to play in support of a best case scenario – a stable and secure Pakistan, empowered by a vibrant and growing economy and regional trade ties which marginalizes the appeal of violent extremism. The energy sector and trade reform, as well as direct military to military engagement will serve as the tools in accomplishing this task. A failure to positively engage Pakistan threatens U.S. Foreign Policy, and even the stability of the entire South Asian region. The cost of failure is immeasurable, and significantly outweighs the cost of action. It is imperative that the international community, with the U.S. as the lead, take the necessary actions and dedicate the required resources to accomplish them.



Transparent Language is the developer of the CL-150 Matrix for Critical Languages (CL-150). The CL-150 is a constantly evolving infrastructure of innovative technology, content and services providing economical and effective learning, sustaining and assessing of 120+ foreign languages for the Joint FAO Program and the greater U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and Intelligence Communities.

The purpose of the CL-150 is to improve the economics and effectiveness of language learning for both general use and for special purposes such as humanitarian relief, international relations or military liaison.

The CL-150 is available to all FAOs via FAOweb (fao.nps.edu) and all U.S. Government personnel (with a .gov or .mil address), language schools, and language programs via the Department of Defense's language portal, Joint Language University (jlu.wbtrain.com). Access is sponsored by the Defense Language and National Security Education Office and by Joint Language University. For more information, visit

TRANSPARENT.COM/GOVERNMENT

The graphic is a dark blue rectangle with a diagonal line pattern. On the left side, there are two vertical red lines. A yellow star is positioned to the left of the main text. The text is white and reads: 'In military life, the one constant is change.' Below this, it says 'We know what to do. We've been there.' At the bottom left, there is a yellow arrow icon followed by 'USAA.COM/MILITARYLIFE or 800-531-8722'. At the bottom right is the USAA logo, which consists of a stylized white 'A' shape above the letters 'USAA' with a registered trademark symbol. At the very bottom, in small white text, it says: 'No Federal endorsement of sponsor intended. USAA means United Services Automobile Association and its affiliates. © 2014 USAA. 205456-0614-G'.

COUNTERING A RESURGENT IRAN RECASTING THE U.S. / GCC RELATIONSHIP

By Commander Qasem Alharbi, Royal Saudi Naval Force
Major Andrew Hubbard, U.S. Army
Major Glen Langdon, U.S. Air Force
Lieutenant Commander Mark Steliga, U.S. Navy

FOREIGN AREA OFFICERS ASSOCIATION WRITING AWARD - JOINT AND COMBINED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL, JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE

The contents of this submission reflect our writing team's original views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

Iran's influence across the Middle East is the greatest it has been since the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Despite the sectarian tone of Iranian foreign policy since then, its primary strategic goal has been to establish hegemony in the Middle East. The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 upset the regional balance of power between Iran and the Gulf States and greatly facilitated Iran's pursuit of this goal. The Arab Spring further tipped the balance in Iran's favor by providing opportunities to exploit instability in Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen. America's policy response to this new political environment appears fragmented and incoherent. It has avoided decisive engagement to address the crisis in Yemen, not articulated a viable strategy in Syria, and has struggled to influence an Iraqi government that is increasingly friendly to Iran. The U.S. has historically sought to maintain a balance of power in the region in order to ensure access to the regions' energy supplies, which sustain the global economy, and to preserve the ability to transit the region, which is required in order to project power globally. Iran's recent geopolitical successes threaten these goals, requiring a new approach.

To secure its strategic goals, the U.S. needs to strengthen its relationship with the Gulf Arab States to counterbalance Iran's burgeoning influence in the Middle East. America can help its Arab allies reestablish balance in the Middle East by ensuring the success of the newly founded Arab regional military while continuing diplomatic engagement to enable Iran to deescalate from its current trajectory and enabling a strategic communications campaign to expose Iran's activities and build support for the new alliance.

Iran's Resurgence is About Power, Not Religion

The scale and impact of Iran's influence in the Middle East stretches from Baghdad through Damascus, Beirut, and Sanaa, representing the zenith of Iranian power since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Its success validates their support for proxies in weak Arab states to undermine these governments, export the Islamic revolution, and expand Iranian power. In Iraq, Iran provides ground advisors to Iraq's security forces, weapons and funding to its Iraqi Shi'a proxy militias, and reconnaissance to inform operational commanders. This assistance is arguably more essential to enabling Iraqi forces to effectively counterat-

tack Islamic State forces than any other foreign government's aid, including that of the U.S.-led multinational coalition. In Syria, Iran's military and financial support for President Bashar al-Assad's regime has kept him in power and expanded Iranian and Hezbollah influence in that state. In Lebanon, the political wing of the Iranian-backed Hezbollah party dominates domestic politics, while its military wing threatens Israel with sophisticated weaponry and provides crucial support to the Assad regime. In Yemen, Iran is expanding its influence by allegedly providing funding and weapons to the Houthis, the Shi'a group that recently deposed the internationally recognized and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-backed President, Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi.

On the surface, the struggle between Iran and the Arab States seems to fit conveniently within a religious sectarian frame, yet this is an oversimplification. Though both Saudi Arabia and Iran use religious narratives with their domestic audiences to bolster their rule, religion does not drive either state's foreign policy. Rather, Riyadh and Tehran are engaged in a balance of power struggle for regional hegemony. Both use religion in pursuit of this goal, but this is merely a vehicle to extend influence in the contest for regional power.

Simply explained, Balance of Power is an international relations theory from the realist school of thought that describes how states achieve equilibrium among themselves. The theory posits that security is enhanced when military power is evenly distributed between states in a multistate system because these states balance each other. When a system is out of balance, the primary means a state uses to increase their power relative to the state or states they seek to balance is through armaments and alliances. Iran's military strategy and its military and financial support to like-minded governments, political parties, and proxies in the region has upset the balance of power in the Middle East and negatively affected U.S. and Gulf State security interests.

Since 1979, Iran has challenged neighboring Arab states by penetrating them with Shi'a proxies as a vehicle to export their Islamic Revolution and implementing an asymmetric military strategy to challenge regional Arab forces, with the ultimate goal of increasing their influence to shift the balance of power from the Arab states towards Tehran. Militarily, Iran provides


unconventional support to regional Shi'a proxies and threatens its neighbors and civilian commerce with the Revolutionary Guard Corps, which routinely harasses regional shipping with highly aggressive, unsafe maneuvers and small arms attacks. Iran's conventional military supports this asymmetric strategy through its use of free-floating mines, ballistic missile forces capable of striking U.S. bases and regional capitols, and rapidly deployable coastal defense cruise missiles which, if employed, would have a profound and negative impact on the free flow of energy from the region and the global economy.

To counter Iran's strategy, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar formed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981 to maintain the security and stability of the Gulf countries by strengthening their economic, social, and political ties. Despite its members' overwhelming cultural homogeneity, since its inception the GCC has struggled to deepen integration and act as a unitary organization to advance its members' interests. Subsequent global and regional geopolitical events have inadvertently provided fertile soil for Iranian influence, particularly the U.S. overthrow of Saddam Hussein, who acted as a brake on Iranian intentions, and the Arab Spring, which spawned government transitions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen; a catastrophic civil war in Syria; a burgeoning civil war in Libya; and ongoing unrest in Bahrain. Iran recognized these events as unique windows of opportunity, and capitalized by significantly expanding their regional influence via support for Shi'a minorities these states, further destabilizing their governments and the region.

Iran's involvement in Yemen is of particular concern to the Gulf States. Iran's penetration of Yemen began in the 1990s when the leader of the Houthi minority, which observes a form of Shi'a Islam, traveled to Qom, Iran for religious studies. While in Qom he developed ties with Iranian religious and political leaders. By 2006 Iran had successfully penetrated the Houthi leadership, opening the door for significant Iranian influence. Iran increased its investment in the minority Shi'a population during this time, marked by regular Government of Yemen complaints about Iranian meddling, including Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps training of Houthi militants.

Iran's interest in Yemen is more geopolitical than sectarian. The Arabian Peninsula's geography dominates the Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Red Sea, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Bab al-Mandab, the latter two being strategic maritime chokepoints. The peninsula's strategic geography coupled with its enormous hydrocarbon reserves make it a geostrategic prize for international and regional powers. If its Houthi allies consolidated control in Yemen, Iran would gain de facto control over the Bab al Mandeb, and with it, control over the strategic line of communication between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea and a greatly expanded strategic position in the Middle East. Together with Iran's advantageous geography on the Strait of Hormuz, its influence in Yemen could link both ends of the Shi'a Crescent and enable it to dominate the most militarily significant choke-points in the region.

SHIITE POPULATIONS IN THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST



Fear and Loathing in the Gulf

At first blush, U.S. policy in the Middle East appears incongruent, with the U.S. negotiating with Iran to limit its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief and supporting an Iranian-backed Iraqi government in the fight against the Islamic State while simultaneously supporting a Saudi Arabian-led combined Arab Force against the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen. Although currently in disequilibrium, these actions reflect America's long-standing objective of maintaining a balance of power between the regional actors in the Middle East.

A balanced Middle East is an important and enduring U.S. interest for several reasons, the principle one being that it helps the U.S. avoid becoming involved in another regional conflict due to the stable nature of bipolar balance of power relationships in equilibrium. A balanced Middle East would enable the United States to pursue an economy of force strategy, allowing it to reallocate military forces to other global priorities, such as reassuring NATO allies in light of Russia's revanchist policies or reassuring Asian allies against a rising China. A properly balanced region is also considerably less expensive to maintain, an important factor given the ongoing U.S. budgetary struggles and wiling domestic appetite for military adventurism.

America's present policies in the Middle East gravely concern the Gulf States, specifically the negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. These states perceive that any U.S. nuclear deal will significantly expand Iran's economic power by releasing billions of dollars' worth of frozen assets, giving Tehran the financial means to increase their meddlesome regional tactics. One senior Gulf official noted that the "agreement gives the impression that Iran can be a regional hegemon... the [Iranian] regime is embattled financially, but it has nevertheless been pushing aggressively. Now it will have recognition and financial solvency. This is a serious worry for us."

Despite their common adversary's ascendancy and concerns over the United States' policy direction, the Gulf States have been unable to mount a cohesive deterrence. A principle reason for this is that these states' agendas are driven by nationalism,

differing political agendas, and a fear by the smaller states of Saudi dominance. However, the most significant divide between the Gulf States has been over the role of political Islam, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. This disagreement resulted in GCC states supporting opposing sides in the ongoing Libyan civil war, in which Qatar supports the Islamist-leaning Libya Dawn, while the UAE supports more moderate forces in eastern Libya.

When Egypt conducted air strikes against Islamist rebel groups, probably with UAE support, the disagreements over the Egyptian strikes became so heated that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors to Qatar over that state's support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Such political disagreements are hardly a solid foundation for a unified coalition to confront Iranian influence in Arab States.

Despite the ongoing political disagreements between the GCC members, Iran's ascendance in the Middle East, particularly its potential nuclear agreement with the United States and alleged support for the Houthis in Yemen, finally created the collective political will to take serious military steps to confront Iran's rise. During its March 2015 summit in Egypt, the Arab League resolved to establish a standing Arab military force to 1) maintain, promote, and protect Arab national security and unity and 2) directly intervene in countries exposed to internal or external threats. The force will reportedly have a land command component consisting of up to 35,000 troops, an air command with up to 1,000 personnel, and a maritime command with between 3,000 and 5,000 sailors. This force is an extension of a previously-proposed GCC military force, and includes contributions from Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and other GCC states, with the GCC covering much of the costs. Although some analysts rightly conclude that this development highlights the lack of confidence Arab states have in their Western allies, this new force also presents tremendous opportunities for the U.S. to help its Gulf State allies police the region themselves and restore the balance of power in the Middle East by ensuring the success of this new multi-national Arab military force.

How Can the U.S. Help Reestablish the Balance of Power?

Historically, some of the United States' most important strategic goals in the region have been to ensure access to the region's energy supplies to sustain the global economy, preserve its ability to transit the region to project power globally, and prevent the rise of a regional hegemon that could threaten these objectives. Iran's ascendance as a result of the changed strategic environment has upset the balance of power between Iran and the Gulf States, destabilizing the region and jeopardizing U.S. interests.

To reestablish the balance of power, the United States must recast and strengthen its relationship with the Gulf States to reassure and assist them in countering Iran's influence in the region. The most cost effective, strategically feasible and acceptable way to accomplish this is by using an indirect

approach through providing military advice and support to the newly formed multinational Arab Force in order to guarantee its success. Two other initiatives that supplement and must accompany this are sustained diplomacy with Iran to transparently convey U.S. objectives, enable de-escalation, and prevent miscalculation; and assistance to the Gulf States with a coordinated messaging campaign to expose and deter further destabilizing Iranian activities.

Militarily, the U.S. should help guarantee the new Arab military force is capable of achieving the objectives the Arab League gave it. This multinational force will undoubtedly face interoperability issues, command and control challenges, training and equipment shortfalls, intelligence capacity and capability gaps, and logistical hurdles. The U.S. can help them overcome these challenges through combined training exercises. The purpose of these exercises is twofold. First, these exercises will increase the new coalition's interoperability, command and control effectiveness, and capabilities. Second and perhaps more important, these exercises will convey Gulf State resolve, unity, and commitment to Iran, perhaps deterring it from undertaking further destabilizing actions. In order to maximize these exercises' effectiveness, the U.S. must conduct a broad range of training with the new Arab Force prior to commencing them. This includes providing advice on multi-national command and control; intelligence collection, processing, analysis, and integration into operations; and logistics processes, systems, and planning to improve the interoperability and efficiency of the multi-national Arab force. The U.S. must, however, ensure that its participation in the exercises is conducted in a supporting role, with Arab coalition members leading the effort with U.S. assistance. Over time and through numerous repetitions, these exercises will instill confidence in and increase the multinational forces' capabilities, help overcome national differences, and enhance interoperability. More importantly, the resultant force will have the ability to operate as a unified, independent, and effective force capable of supporting Arab government regional policy objectives.

The U.S. should also provide direct maritime support to and conduct joint maritime operations with the new Arab Force to ensure freedom of navigation through strategic waterways, particularly the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al Mandeb, in order to prevent Iran or its non-state actor proxies from dominating or threatening regional access through these key waterways. On 28 April 2015, Iran seized a Marshall Islands-flagged cargo ship during its inbound transit through the Strait of Hormuz. The U.S. subsequently began escorting U.S. and British flagged merchant vessels through the Strait of Hormuz to ensure their safe passage. Doing this unilaterally is suboptimal – the U.S. must begin conducting operations such as this jointly with its Gulf State partners in order to show resolve and unity, and ultimately to enable the Gulf States to conduct these operations themselves. At the 14 May 2015 U.S.-hosted GCC summit, the GCC members decided to “increase their participation in international maritime task forces on counter-terrorism and counter-piracy.” This is an encouraging start towards building an interoperable and effective force, but the

U.S. must encourage the GCC and its Arab allies to expand their focus to encompass combined joint training exercises focused on maintaining freedom of navigation and interoperability with Arab coalition ground and air forces.

Another essential area of U.S. military support for the Gulf States is ballistic missile defense capabilities. The United States should continue and expand its foreign military sales of advanced U.S. ballistic missile defense assets to ensure the Arab coalition that it can defeat Iranian ballistic missiles. The president recently stated such a policy preference during a meeting with Arab state leaders at Camp David, promising Gulf state leaders that the U.S. would help them create an early-warning capability for regional missile defense. The United States should not only provide training to the Arab coalition on this equipment, but ensure that the radar network for these systems is integrated with those of U.S. assets in the region to ensure an accurate operational picture.

Lastly, the U.S. military can be employed in a supporting role to show strength, resolve, and unity with its Gulf State allies to deter Iranian actions. The U.S. and many members of the new Arab coalition have long-standing bilateral relationships, which enabled the U.S. to quickly respond to the new coalition's request for U.S. assistance in its operations against the Houthis in Yemen. Although the U.S. military is not taking direct military action in Yemen, President Obama authorized it to provide "logistical and intelligence support to GCC-led military operations [and establish] a Joint Planning Cell with Saudi Arabia to coordinate U.S. military and intelligence support." American support for the Arab coalition in their actions against the Houthis must not be a one-off event. The U.S. gleaned a wealth of intelligence, planning, and operational C2 experience during the past fifteen years of sustained combat operations that must be passed along to the multinational Arab coalition through a committed, continual, and enduring relationship to enable this force to reestablish the regional balance of power and bear primary responsibility for regional stability.

While the United States maintains pressure on Iran through the indirect methods advocated in this paper, policy-makers must simultaneously keep the diplomatic lines of communication open with Iran in order to transparently convey U.S. and its Arab allies' intentions and enable de-escalation when events threaten to spark a wider conflict. Transparent communication is essential to maximize the effects of a states' deterrent operations and avoid miscalculation. As Robert Jervis notes:

"[I]f a policy is to have the desired impact on its target, it must be perceived as it is intended; if the other's behavior is to be anticipated and the state's policy is a major influence on it, then the state must try to determine how its actions are being perceived."

Sustained diplomacy will enable the United States and its regional allies to clearly and transparently convey their intentions to Iranian leaders, thereby increasing their impact and reducing the chances misinterpreted actions escalate tensions with Iran. Most importantly, diplomatic relations will enable Iran and the

Arab states to deescalate their respective military actions and defuse tensions should either side misinterpret or miscalculate.

Strategic communication and messaging is essential to this strategy's success. These messages must target Arab audiences to develop backing for U.S. actions in support of the new Arab Force and expose and deter Iran and other malign actors. Clear and consistent strategic messaging regarding U.S. intentions must underlie its behavior in the Middle East in order for it to succeed. To put it bluntly, the U.S. thoroughly lacks credibility with large population segments in the Middle East. However, in order to implement the aforementioned military strategy, the U.S. must maintain close and continual coordination with its Gulf State partners. While additional U.S. military commitments in the Middle East may appear to be a toxic policy option with both U.S. domestic and Middle Eastern audiences, "local, Arab, and Muslim sanctioning would obviate any criticism of yet another American war in the Middle East against the Islamic ummah." Cooperation with the Gulf States thus must manifest itself through consistent strategic communication. Without this sort of coordination, U.S. military assistance measures to the new Arab Force will be short-lived or ineffective due to lack of support from Arab populations.

Strategic communications should also expose malign actors' destabilizing actions in the region. The current security environment in the Middle East enables destabilizing state and non-state actors, such as Iran and the Islamic State, to thrive by exploiting religious differences to support their objectives. The U.S. simply does not have the religious legitimacy to counter these actors' themes and messages. This provides a unique opportunity for the Gulf States and recognized religious establishments to seize the ideological narrative by expressing the true nature of religious identity and denouncing violence and subversion. This unified approach would also delegitimize the Islamic State, which has advocated a corrupted version of Sunni Islam at tremendous cost to human life and regional stability.

The Gulf States must also help expose Iran's malign activities in the region to internationally shame them. For example, they should consistently expose how Iran's support for the Syrian regime enables it to mercilessly kill innocent civilians, including women and children. Additionally, the Gulf States should convey how Iran's meddling activities in Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, and Bahrain are destabilizing the region at a time when all regional states—including Iran—should be unified to fight the Islamic State. The U.S. can assist in this endeavor by providing accurate supporting information when necessary.

Lastly, the U.S. should continue its current policy of direct strategic communication with the Iranian people to encourage their reintegration as a responsible member of the international community. The U.S. hopes this sort of communication will influence Iranian citizens to demand a more responsible government that is integrated with the international community. For example, on 19 Mar 2015 President Obama issued a Nowruz holiday greeting to the Iranian people, the primary purpose of which was to provide an update to the Iranian people on nuclear negotiations. In it, President Obama offered them an alternative

vision of Iran's future in the world if it agreed to restraints and transparency on its nuclear program, remarking that "together we have to speak up for the future we seek." Although it is difficult to measure the efficacy of this communication, the U.S. should continue to conduct it due to its low cost and potentially high reward.

By relying on regional powers to provide the security necessary to achieve its objectives, the U.S. will incur strategic risk. David Rothkopf recently articulated the perils associated with such a strategy, noting that they include:

"[t]he inability to influence outcomes so that they advance or protect vital U.S. interests, the problems associated with having allied armies inadequate to tackling the problem at hand trying and then failing to achieve a goal that might have been achievable with greater U.S. involvement, and the danger of being forced by expediency to support or align ourselves with bad actors, thus making matters materially worse for us and our allies."

Despite these very real risks, these concerns can be mitigated by clear, consistent, committed, and deep diplomatic engagement and close military cooperation with the new Arab Force. Moreover, there are no viable alternatives to this strategy. More direct U.S. involvement is simply not economically, culturally, or politically feasible, nor is it strategically wise given the other geopolitical challenges around the world. As Robert Kaplan recently noted, major powers should not


"[g]et too deep into a situation where [their] civilizational advantage is of little help...the United States has only limited ability to determine the outcome of many conflicts, despite being a superpower; America is learning an ironic truth of empire: you endure by not fighting every battle."

Although the strategy advocated in this paper carries strategic risk, if effectively executed, it could prevent the U.S. from having to commit its forces to future battles in the Middle East, where it has a demonstrated inability to influence favorable outcomes or bring its civilizational advantage to bear.

A Strengthened Relationship is Essential to Restore Global U.S. Freedom of Action

The U.S. invasion of Iraq and the Arab Spring provided Iran an unprecedented opportunity to achieve its goal of becoming the regional hegemon in the Middle East. The United States' enduring strategic goals in the region have been to maintain a balance of power in the region in order to ensure access to the regions' energy supplies to sustain the global economy and preserve its ability to transit the region and project power globally. The balance of power in the Middle East is

HISTORICAL SHIA DYNASTIES



in disequilibrium, placing the United States' strategic goals in jeopardy. The most practical method the U.S. can pursue to reestablish the balance of power in the Middle East is to ensure the recently announced Arab military force succeeds by providing military support, particularly through sustained joint training exercises to help them overcome the interoperability issues inherent in multinational coalitions.

The U.S. must supplement this effort by assisting the Gulf States to conduct a concerted strategic messaging campaign to discredit Iran's actions in the region while simultaneously maintaining diplomatic engagement with Iran to prevent miscalculation and enable Iran to deescalate its military provocations. At the May 2015 summit with Gulf state leaders, President Obama outlined an "extensive program" of military cooperation between the United States and Arab Gulf states, including assistance with a regional missile defense program, increased maritime security collaboration, and more joint training exercises. However, most of the proposed cooperation measures are less comprehensive and robust than those advocated in this paper, and are unlikely sufficient enough to reestablish the balance of power. If executed in an enduring manner, the strategy outlined in this paper could provide our Gulf partners the capacity and capability to reestablish the regional balance of power, enabling the United States to achieve its regional goals at a reasonable cost and focus its military assets on other geostrategic problems.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS: Commander Qasem Alharbi, RSNF, is currently serving as an Information Officer in RSNF HQ, Riyadh. He was commissioned through the King Fahad Naval Academy in 1999. Major Andrew Hubbard, U.S. Army will be assigned to the United States European Command J2 Section. He was commissioned through the United States Military Academy at West Point in 2002. Major Glen G. Langdon, U.S. Air Force, is currently serving as Chief, USEUCOM Deployment and Distribution Operations Center, in Stuttgart, Germany. Lieutenant Commander Mark A. Steliga, U.S. Navy, is currently serving in the United States Strategic Command J2 Section.

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM & LOGISTICS LESSONS FROM ALEXANDER THE GREAT

By Lieutenant Colonel Brittany Stewart, U.S. Air Force;
Lieutenant Colonel Joe Harris Jr, U.S. Army; and
Major James S. Johnson, U.S. Army

DEAN'S AWARD WINNER - NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

The contents of this submission reflect our writing team's original views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates greeted General Duncan McNabb on his first day as Commander, U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) in 2008 with a quote from Alexander the Great: "My logisticians are a humorless lot . . . they know if my campaign fails, they are the first ones I will slay". Like Alexander, General McNabb was responsible for ensuring logistics support for combat operations in Afghanistan, but unlike the Macedonian king, he did not have a designated role, authorities, or resources to forge the relationships necessary to create or maintain flexible international logistics routes to support operations. That role falls to Geographic Combatant Commanders, whose theater plans historically center on building partnership capacity for interoperability and combat burden sharing and do not necessarily accommodate long-term logistics considerations. As a result, the United States faced tremendous logistics challenges in Afghanistan. If modern Combatant Commanders studied lessons from Alexander's Afghanistan campaign, they might have realized that they must focus on enduring relationships – balancing headline-grabbing combat operations with comparatively banal logistics support – to manage issues that might jeopardize partner support for U.S. operational requirements.

Building a Bridge to Afghanistan

"Support for our forces in Afghanistan is the most difficult logistics assignment we have faced since World War II."

**Jack Bell, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense
for Logistics and Materiel Readiness**

When the United States retaliated against al Qaeda terrorists in Afghanistan for the attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, it lacked means to cross over or through cautious-to-hostile states to transport and supply the 38,000 pre-surge troops who engaged al Qaeda and the Taliban in combat. Shocked by the terror attacks, many key nations quickly offered basing and/or overflight support. Combatant Commands identified which potential partners lacked necessary precursors for access, then the State Department worked to fill these gaps as U.S. Central and European Commands (USCENT-

COM and USEUCOM) cashed in on prior military-to-military contacts to create an air bridge. On 7 October 2001, Uzbekistan opened Karshi-Khanabad Air Base to combat support operations, followed by air refueling operations from Bulgaria and passenger and air refueling from Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan. The speed at which these relationships developed led to initial reliance on airlift and airdrop options from these bases as work continued to establish ground logistics routes and U.S. troops gained a foothold within Afghanistan.

A hostile relationship with Iran and Turkmenistan's neutrality precluded U.S. transit arrangements through these countries and focused attention on the deep-water port of Karachi, Pakistan, to become the hub for ground sustainment routes for U.S. operations in Afghanistan. For the first seven years of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, American forces relied on Pakistani contract carriers to transport sustainment cargo and ammunition across one thousand pilferage- and attack-plagued miles to Kandahar and Kabul.

The high cost of airlift and the risk in relying on a single nation for logistics throughput pushed USTRANSCOM to develop logistics alternatives to supplying a force that had surged to 100,000 by 2010. For four months in 2008, the command established logistics relationships with 15 nations to design the Northern Distribution Network, a series of multimodal routes to move non-lethal cargo from the Baltics through Central Asia and finally into Afghanistan. Pakistan, however, remained the preferred logistics solution.

Just as the United States sought revenge against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks, Alexander the Great sought vengeance for the loss and destruction of Greek city states during centuries of warfare with the Persian Empire. He moved swiftly through Persia, integrating operations and logistics planning and using the decimation of Thebes to send a strong message to cities along his path: avoid destruction by forming an alliance to become a sustainment node for the advancing Macedonian army. Only Alexander's most trusted generals were placed in charge of requisitioning supplies from conquered cities, restocking and distributing supplies from food depots, synchronizing movement of the baggage train and supply ships with the main army, and moving spoils used to

finance the war.

Alexander did not consider an Afghanistan campaign until Bessus, the Persian governor of Afghanistan, claimed the defeated Persian king's crown and retreated into modern Central Asia, starting a 1500-mile, 8-month "merry chase" with Alexander and his cavalry. Along the way, Bessus destroyed local crops to attrite Macedonian forces, a tactically sound move to limit Alexander's pursuit options that backfired as it severed Bessus' relationship with local populations. Alexander on the other hand generally forbade pillaging and capturing local inhabitants for slaves to encourage cities to renounce ties to Persia and pledge their allegiance to contribute supplies to sustain Macedonian operations. Through these practices, he "became famed for his fairness" in partnering with local cities.

The Vulnerability of Logistics

"This is the logistics challenge of our generation."

**Vice Admiral Mark Harnitchek,
Deputy Commander USTRANSCOM**

As Operation ENDURING FREEDOM continued, initial overwhelming support for the United States began to fray, weakening commitments to relationships that provided logistics access to Afghanistan. According to U.S. academics Alexander Cooley and Daniel Nexon, U.S. global military presence during the operation relied on special relationships, clientism, and patronage-oriented policy to maintain relationships initially created around shared values, security concerns, and agreements. They concluded that disconnects between U.S. and host nation perception of the bilateral relationship coupled with differences in access agreements increased the risk of alienation over time. Their prediction played out in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan – key partners for surface supply routes into Afghanistan.

Pakistani political scientist A.Z. Hilali was the first to characterize the United States – Pakistan bilateral relationship as "opportunistic:" a partnership of two unequal powers based on self-interest with no mutual objectives. He and other similarly-minded Pakistani commentators tied the deteriorating relationship to minimal coordination on the raid that killed Osama bin Laden, lack of U.S. legal action against a CIA contractor, and drone strikes within Pakistan. Islamabad reached its breaking point in November 2011, when the United States ignored requests for an official apology after NATO helicopter raid killed 24 Pakistani soldiers at Salala Border Post. In response, Islamabad closed its borders to U.S. and coalition cargo.

At this point, USTRANSCOM lacked any military-to- military leverage other than to rely on USCENCOM's security assistance resources and authorities, which focused on combat capability and interoperability. USCENCOM was more interested

in subduing elements in Pakistan supporting terrorist safe-havens rather than on Pakistan's role in the logistics network and agreed to use security assistance to force Pakistan to reopen its borders. Pakistan remained cut off from over two billion dollars of security assistance until it reopened routes in July 2012.

Pakistan's lock-down did not degrade support to combat operations because of relationship building done in 2008 – ninety percent of sustainment and construction cargo was rerouted to the Northern Distribution Network.

The Northern Distribution Network continued to shoulder a significant amount cargo up to a year after the borders opened as Pakistani domestic politics kept containers in "logistical limbo" and did not allow cargo flow to normalize.

Another logistics partnership casualty was Uzbekistan, whose bilateral relationship began on a foundation of shared concern for terrorism but ended when U.S. political considerations trumped the need for logistics support to combat. After 9/11, Uzbekistan quickly authorized the United States to use Karshi-Khanabad Air Base for special operations missions, humanitarian relief efforts, combat search and rescue, ground and air refueling, and passenger processing. In return, Uzbekistan received U.S. pledges for \$300 million in security assistance and targeting of the al Qaeda-aligned Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan during operations in Afghanistan. The relationship soured over lack of U.S. follow-through to provide agreed upon assistance, denial of \$23 million in U.S. coalition support funds for airfield maintenance and repair, growing Uzbek concern over the perceived U.S. role in popular Eurasian regime changes collectively known as "color revolutions," presidential focus on "democracy promotion," and Congressional decertification of Uzbekistan for human rights. Uzbekistan finally asked U.S. forces to depart in late 2005 after Washington publicly condemned the government's response to violent unrest after a prison break in Andijan. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers criticized U.S. decisions that drove Uzbekistan from basing and logistics support as the unclear focus of the bilateral relationship – logistics, human rights,



shared terrorism concerns, democracy agenda – cost the United States use of a regional staging base and forced relocation of some missions to Manas Air Base, Kyrgyzstan.

The United States was able to overcome the lack of shared security concerns and convince Kyrgyzstan to allow American forces to operate from Manas Air Base through economic incentives and pay-offs to the political elite. Payment for the first three years to host combat operations, air refueling, aero-medical evacuation, and passenger processing at the base topped eight million in rent and over one-hundred ten million dollars for the ruling family in the form of ad hoc landing and parking fees, access to foreign private goods, and Defense Logistics Agency fuel contracts. U.S. praise for Kyrgyzstan's democratic potential after the 2005 "Tulip Revolution" (a "color revolution") followed by the U.S. military's eviction from Karshi-Khanabad Air Base opened the way for the new regime to renegotiate the original lease for \$770 million over five years in rent and aid. The new Kyrgyz political elite also took control of the fuel contracts. Kyrgyzstan suspended combat operations and rebranded the base as the Manas Transit Center for passenger processing and air-refueling. When this government collapsed in 2010, the interim president honored existing agreements, but her successor did not support the bilateral logistics relationship. He leveraged Russian resurgence in Kyrgyz politics and economy to raise the rent further and finally terminate the logistics relationship on 11 July 2014.

Stability and predictability in the logistics support network for combat operations in Afghanistan suffered from mismanagement of relationships as U.S. and partner goals and motivations diverged. Alexander faced similar challenges in Central Asia when a one-time supporter broke the partnership to start a guerilla-style war of attrition targeting Macedonian logistics nodes and routes.

Once Alexander was in Uzbekistan, the Afghan noble Spitamenes surrendered Bessus to Macedonian forces, triggering a pause after the eight-month chase through Central Asia. The Macedonian army returned to a well-provisioned winter camp near Mazar-e-Sharif, "pivotal node of the king's complex logistics," and integrated 22,000 Macedonian and allied surge troops. Meanwhile, Alexander founded additional cities on the route to Herat as forward logistics bases to support his planned march to India. Frustrated by Alexander's use of local cities for logistics support, Spitamenes announced his logistics-based insurgency by attacking the northern logistics hub in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, and subsequently raiding the outskirts of Mazar-e-Sharif to scatter cattle gathered to feed garrisoned troops. Because of the resulting shortfall in winter provisions, Alexander repositioned the main army in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to pay for quarter in villages and live off the land in mobile groups, also denying local resupply to Afghan insurgents.

Even though a local noble was trying to turn the populace against Alexander, the Macedonian policy of fostering relations for logistics support continued to pay dividends. Local inhabitants near modern-day Karshi-Khanabad Air Base resupplied Alexander's horse companies and turned over guerillas hiding in the city. Spitamenes' wife also chose to ally with Alexander:

because of starvation and devastation of repeatedly burned fields, she beheaded Spitamenes and presented his head to Alexander to end the war of attrition.

Returning Home

President Obama outlined the plan for transitioning security to the Afghan government and reducing U.S. troop presence, and the United States scrambled to secure retrograde routes through existing partners already suffering from deep schisms in relations. The Northern Distribution Network was the centerpiece for overall U.S. relations with Central Asia from 2008 to 2014, but this was not enough to overcome disconnects in U.S. policy and lack of follow-through on diplomatic and military promises since 9/11. In addition, over emphasis on the temporary nature and flexibility of basing agreements compounded the problem of convincing the region of U.S. resolve to maintain military relationships after the retrograde.

When retrograde, reset, redeployment, redistribution, and disposal officially began in 2012, USTRANSCOM could not overcome regional politics to guarantee access to surface routes out of Afghanistan. Pakistan was the preferred route of choice due to cost and relaxed regulatory requirements, but its borders were intermittently closed to U.S. and NATO cargo. When open, cargo movement was unpredictable and dangerous due to worker strikes, insurgent attacks, and threats to local drivers. The Northern Distribution Network also proved not to be an immediately viable retrograde option. U.S. diplomatic and military-to-military efforts did not understand bureaucratic hurdles in reversing cargo flow through Central Asia and proved to be too little, too late. This, combined with USCENTCOM and U.S. Embassy Kabul could not agree on funding for logistics infrastructure required by "reverse transit" agreements inked in 2011. As a result, the route was not fully operational until late 2013, limiting its utility for retrograde. Meanwhile in Kyrgyzstan, rent negotiations for Manas Transit Center failed, forcing troop processing functions to transfer to Romania.

Because of continued missteps in managing logistics-focused relationships with Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, USTRANSCOM had to rely on military and commercial airlift for the vast majority of retrograde operations. In 795 U.S. bases in Afghanistan, 44,000 vehicles and 107,000 containers had to be disposed of or moved out of country while 10,000 tons of equipment and 8,500 passengers departed Kandahar Air Base a month at the peak of the retrograde. The final cost for U.S. forces and equipment to return home was approximately \$5.7 billion. So in the end, retrograde, reset, redeployment, redistribution, and disposal successful, even if ugly and inefficient.

Despite inability of established surface routes to reverse flow and absorb retrograde operations, U.S. logistics relationships had not disintegrated completely. In summer 2012 after reopening the borders to U.S. cargo, the United States and Pakistan signed a Memorandum of Agreement authorizing U.S. and coalition movement through Pakistan until January 2016, securing freedom of movement for one year beyond the end of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. The Northern Distribu-

tion Network also remained a success, providing reliable, stable sustainment routes into Afghanistan. Previous contention over basing did not degrade Uzbek and Kyrgyz support for the southbound routes. After Russia annexed Crimea, military logistics planners feared losing the geographic center of the network, but Russia allowed cargo to move unhindered toward Afghanistan.

Alexander, too, suffered relationship setbacks in Central Asia. Unlike the United States in the run-up to retrograde, however, he was able to recover fully from the loss of the main supply depot at Mazar-e-Sharif and ensure continued ample support from his logistics network. While preparing logistics for the march out of Afghanistan, Alexander and his army were caught in a mountain ice storm which devastated supplies and provisions. The local governor quickly replenished the army's losses and provided enough additional for rations to sustain six days on the march. The detour led Alexander through the lands of a formerly hostile governor. Alexander bloodlessly accepted the governor's surrender, leading to a feast to celebrate the new alliance. During the festivities, Alexander fell in love with the governor's daughter Roxane and took her as his wife.

During the winter pause, Alexander's forces amassed supplies, built boats, and created fortified cities, garrisons, and outposts to support the march into India. Alexander's envoys preceded the army to negotiate with rulers around Kabul for resupply of local horses and elephants. Alexander synchronized the first leg of the march to India with the harvest and ordered the burning of superfluous gear, including his, to ease the spring crossing of the Hindu Kush as the army followed to Kabul. This time, he used the Salang Pass, modern site of a decrepit Soviet-built tunnel that is the only ground link between northern Afghanistan and the south, a vital transit point for the onward distribution of goods brought into country via the Northern Distribution Network.

Alexander triumphantly departed Afghanistan in 326 BC for his India campaign with a total force of approximately 100,000, including 75,000 soldiers plus service suppliers and camp followers. An additional 23,000 Macedonians remained in Central Asia to maintain the empire and provide resupply gathered as a result of Alexander's enduring logistics-based relationships.

Learning from Alexander

Ancient and contemporary historians praise Alexander the Great for applying the noblest aspects of Greek philosophy and higher learning in amassing one of the largest empires in known history without suffering a defeat. However, they rarely delve beyond his kingly and martial achievements and thus miss the key to his success: he "better understood the logistics capabilities and limitations of his logistics system than perhaps

any other commander, before or since." Alexander achieved unity of effort between his combat and logistics operations throughout the Afghanistan campaign and overcame stresses on his logistics network so that he was able to depart victoriously with full logistics support. He integrated logistics considerations into strategic calculations and delegated implementation to his most trusted generals, similar to USTRANSCOM's modern role. As the equivalent to a Geographic Combatant Commander,

"Never slay the logisticians – they are too hard to replace."

Joe Lynch, Veteran Logistics Professional

Alexander built and maintained focused, equitable relationships to support his logistics train, a level of advance preparation that afforded great flexibility in meeting military objectives.

General Gregory Martin, Commander, United States Air Forces Europe and Allied Air Forces Northern Europe on 9/11, hailed the air bridge to Afghanistan, the modern equivalent of Alexander's ground logistics routes, as a "feat of diplomacy and coalition building." He understood Alexander's lessons and urged the use of international relationships to meet logistics requirements and counter politically-motivated loss of access. However, five months after the transition from Operation ENDURING FREEDOM to NATO's Operation RESOLUTE SUPPORT, senior Pentagon logistics officers lament the military's habitual failure to "set the theater" and maintain access after the end of contingencies.

It is a reality that USTRANSCOM, the lead logistics advocate for the U.S. military, remains reliant on "geographic combatant commanders, the Department of State and others to ensure the United States establishes the appropriate relationships to ensure access." Alexander would applaud that for a brief time from 2010 to 2014, both State and Defense Congressional testimony highlighted Central Asia for its key role as a sustainment node for operations in Afghanistan. Likely he would bemoan the return to status quo ante bellum in 2015 as focus transitioned back to only the region's warfighting relationship.

Sadly, we have yet to institutionalize the 2,300 year-old lesson that commanders must build and preserve relationships of all types, including enduring logistics partnerships, to ensure U.S. freedom of access for future operations. On 15 May 2015 Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev officially severed the United States' hard-fought victory to create the Northern Distribution Network. His one-page decree marked the "end of an era in Russia's relations with NATO and United States" by revoking authorization for "rail, automobile, and air transport of military equipment and hardware to Afghanistan and reserve transit through the territory of the Russian Federation."

RUSSIA'S SHALE GAS REVOLUTION

By Ralph E. Winnie, Jr.

Shale oil production in the United States has soared, reversing a decades old decline in America's crude output. One of the principal reasons is because of fields like North Dakota's Bakken shale, which could yield 24 billion barrels of oil in the decades to come. The Bakken is a huge boon both to the economic health of the Northern Plains states, but also to the petroleum balance of the USA. From just 60,000 barrels per day five years ago, the Bakken is now producing up to 500,000 barrels per day, with 210,000 barrels per day coming in just the past year.

However, as great as the Bakken is, there is another oil shale play called the Bazhenov, which is perhaps more significant. The Bazhenov is in western Siberia and while the Bakken is big, the Bazhenov covers 2.3 million square kilometers or 570 million acres, which is the size of Texas and the Gulf of Mexico combined -- 80 times bigger than the Bakken.

Getting access to the Bazhenov is the focus of a new joint venture by both Exxon Mobil and Statoil with the Russian Federation's Rosneft to jointly develop light oil production techniques in western Siberia. The exploration work to establish if the reserves are commercially viable will take years. According to analysts, it won't be hard for companies like Exxon and Statoil to export their shale fracking techniques to Siberia and, if Russia is able to deploy 30 drilling rigs to the area, the Bazhenov could be producing one million barrels per day by 2020. The Russian Federation already produces about 10 million barrels of oil per day, putting it about a million barrels a day ahead of Saudi Arabia, the largest producer in the Middle East.

Given the fact that last year Russia's President Putin announced tax incentives for exploration of shale oil in western Siberia and has forecasted production of two million barrels per day by 2020, the potential for profit from Russia's shale gas boom is enormous. This is quite evident now that Russian oil companies such as Gazprom Neft, Rosneft, and Lukoil have teamed up with international players like Exxon Mobil, Total, Statoil, and Royal Dutch Shell to share costs and obtain the technology needed to explore for unconventional oil.

Lukoil's Andrei Kuzyaev estimated that the cost of one horizontal well in Russia is \$15 to \$20 million compared to around \$3.5 million in the United States -- a figure which dropped from around \$8 million recently due to the highly competitive environment among drilling companies. Consequently, while Alexander Dyukov, CEO of Gazprom Neft, Russia's fourth largest oil producer, acknowledged that Moscow is five to seven years behind the United States in terms of technology needed to drill for unconventional oil, the gap is narrowing. With the help of their technology partners, Russian oil companies will eventually achieve the requisite knowledge.

The United States Energy Information Administration

estimates that Russian recoverable shale oil reserves at 75 billion barrels, more than the 58 billion barrels held by the United States, which is now the leader in shale oil production. Furthermore, Dyukov told reporters that Russia might look to domestic suppliers or those in Asia for drilling rigs, which may allow the pumping of another one million barrels per day by 2020 to 2022 from the Bazhenov formation alone. To extract these volumes, Russia needs an additional 250 to 300 heavy drilling rigs, either domestic or Asian -- most notably Chinese -- to facilitate Russia's shale gas revolution.

However, Russia's shale gas revolution could be hampered by Western sanctions, already preventing some companies from making new investments in Russia -- which needs advanced technology to explore for unconventional oil. In fact, the United States and the European Union could ban exports of modern technology and application for use in the Russian oil sector, which would affect further oil production. While this measure is only a possible option, according to a recent statement by Alfa Bank, it could affect primarily Arctic shelf projects as well as hard to recover oil projects where foreign technology is required the most.

An interesting point to note is that despite the push by Western governments to isolate Moscow because of the situation in Ukraine, energy giants are deepening their relationships with Russian oil and gas companies by investing more money in the country. Exxon Mobil's Exploration Chief, Neil Duffin, recently signed an agreement with Igor Sechin, head of Rosneft, to expand its joint ventures to drill offshore in the Arctic Ocean, to explore for shale oil in Siberia, and to cooperate on a liquefied natural gas plant in Vladivostok. This deal came just weeks after the United States imposed sanctions on the personal dealings, though not the corporate activities, of Mr. Sechin, who is a longtime aide to President Vladimir Putin. Along with Exxon Mobil, British Petroleum and Total of France also signed contracts at a Russian business forum in St. Petersburg to explore for shale oil. Furthermore, Exxon Mobil plans to drill its first exploratory well offshore in the Russian sector of the Arctic Ocean. Statoil of Norway is in talks for another shale joint venture; Shell's CEO, Ben van Beurden, met with President Putin and said to him, "Now is the time to expand," referring to a liquefied natural gas plant project.

Many CEOs of global oil and gas companies acknowledge that they are taking a calculated risk, given the threat of further sanctions, but they also want to protect their long-term interests in Russia, the world's largest energy exporting nation. According to David Goldwyn, who served as the State Department's special envoy and coordinator for international energy affairs during President Obama's first term, "They are likely to continue to engage until there is a clear policy signal that they should

stop. It is not rational to think they would act in any other way. If the government wants them to stop, it needs to say louder that they should stop.”

So far, the United States and the European Union have imposed only limited sanctions aimed at individual Russians and a handful of companies. The existing sanctions don't explicitly bar the energy giants from operating in Russia. Though President Barack Obama authorized an executive order on March 20th, 2014 that could outlaw such deals, it has not yet been put into effect by the Treasury Department.

The risk for energy companies is that the next stage of sanctions will be broader, cutting off dealings with major sectors of the economy like finance, metals, and energy. The United States and its allies proposed these kinds of sanctions at a Group of Sevens summit, to be carried out if the violence in Ukraine did not subside.

The energy companies are walking a fine geopolitical line and are betting that the Russian oil and gas industry won't be hit by direct sanctions. The energy industry provides financing for the Russian government and its military, making sanctions a threat to action in Ukraine. Depending on the evolving situation in Ukraine, the United States and Europe are likely to tread cautiously, given the industry's strong role in affecting world markets. In short, most analysts and corporate CEOs believe that Russian energy companies like Rosneft are too big to punish.

With Russian-West tensions high, Moscow has started to look closer to home for partnerships. Russian has already secured a 400 billion contract to supply natural gas to China. Furthermore, Gennady Timchenko, President Vladimir Putin's key person for developing ties with China, stated publicly that Russia could also import technology from China that would be very beneficial to Russia's oil and gas industry.

Over the course of 30 years, the \$400 billion deal will involve piping natural gas from Russia's Far East to China starting in 2018. There was initial skepticism that the deal would come to fruition because for almost two decades China and Russia slowly moved along the path of energy politics, attempting to carve out their respective roles. Russia wants to sell, the “voracious” Chinese market needs to be satisfied as millions of Chinese are moved out of poverty and into the middle class. Between 2006 and 2013 Chinese gas demand tripled from 56 billion cubic meters to 169 billion cubic meters, China is set to receive 38 billion cubic meters of gas under the deal over a 30-year arrangement starting in 2018.

According to analysts, the China-Russia \$400 billion energy deal has made it imperative for European countries to diversify their gas imports away from Russia. Gazprom has kept an eye on Europe in terms of their desire to find other markets. The Chinese arrangement in that sense works out perfectly, as it provides Russia's energy industry an outlet to sidestep any kind of dependency and offers options for developing the Russian Far East, which is a much-neglected part of the Russian Federa-

tion. A huge investment will be required, but it is a gamble President Putin is willing to take. From the Chinese perspective, natural gas is seen as vital to curbing China's pollution problem, which has caused many affluent Chinese to leave the country and settle elsewhere. This issue will continue to be on the reform agenda for some time given that Premier Li Keqiang has called for a “war on pollution.”

The other side of the deal is what it will do to other exporters. The United States is pertinent in this regard. The shale gas revolution not only weaned the U.S. from any pending sense of energy dependence, but also allowed the U.S. to turn its eye towards becoming a key supplier of natural gas to the East Asian region and Europe. In fact, in 2012 Barack Obama claimed that the United States was becoming “the Saudi Arabia of natural gas.”

The Russian-Chinese energy pact is Moscow's statement to Washington that it too has an interest in the Far East and Asian markets. Some analysts search for a Cold War mentality in the

“

The Russian-Chinese energy pact is Moscow's statement to Washington that it too has an interest in the Far East and Asian markets. Some analysts search for a Cold War mentality in the deal, pointing to the backgrounds of Gazprom's managers and the alleged shadow of the KGB.

deal, pointing to the backgrounds of Gazprom's managers and the alleged shadow of the KGB. Russia is building its clout as an energy supplier while diversifying its customer base.

While the Obama administration has tried to curb Chinese ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region with its statement of a “pivot” to the region, the Russians are exerting a tremendous amount of patience and resourcefulness in an effort to forge alliances and potential new energy markets. It can be inferred that other deals are bound to follow in an effort to exert energy independence and identify new sources of energy markets with countries such as India, Japan, and South Korea. Furthermore, the \$400 billion deal between China and Russia to supply 38 bcm of natural gas a year has been widely interpreted as setting a new benchmark for what the Asian market can pay for gas. While the price was not disclosed, sources have put the price around \$10 per million British thermal units (BTU), which is close to what Russia receives for supplies sent to Europe. An improving Russian economy will allow its limitless resources to enable the country to emerge as a major gas supplier to the Asia Pacific as well.

Finally, some Russian analysts have criticized the China-

Russia deal, believing that the deal was rushed through to neutralize worries of political isolation and to convey the impression that Russia can easily switch sales to the East. Mr. Putin's arch critic Boris Nemtsov said that the terms, to the extent that they are known, amount to "total loss and robbery" leaving Russia to foot the bill for \$55 billion of investment needed to find the gas and build the pipeline infrastructure.

It will be four to six years before any gas is shipped to China. The Kremlin said that China may advance up to \$25 billion to help defray the costs, but has conceded that this is not a fixed obligation, a point that has been widely discussed on Russian blogs. The haggling on terms has been contentious because, according to President Putin, "Our Chinese friends are difficult, hard negotiators."

In the Russian Federation, people have been funneling their money into usable assets like refrigerators, computers, or cars. This effect has kept the country afloat for now and should prevent contradiction of GDP this year. The IMF expects growth in Russia to be 0.2 percent this year, but figures could be worse if major sanctions go into effect. Therefore, Russia's shale gas revolution presents many opportunities and challenges for the nation as it seeks to expand its role as a global energy superpower and create viable economic and political relationships.

New economic data from China shows that Russia has succeeded in capturing a larger share of the massive and growing Chinese oil import market. China's imports of Russian oil skyrocketed by 36% in 2014. The rapid rise in Russian oil exports to China is displacing other sources such as Saudi Arabia and other OPEC members. The Wall Street Journal reports that China's oil imports from Saudi Arabia fell 8% in 2014 and imports from Venezuela fell 11%.

The data suggests that Russia and China are finally forging closer trade ties based on energy. They share a lengthy border, but have been unable to capitalize on what has long appeared to be a well-matched economic opportunity -- Russia is a huge energy producer while China is the world's largest importer of petroleum products. While the issue over China taking equity stakes in Russian energy projects was of a concern to Russia in the past, this is no longer the case. As of November 2014, a subsidiary of CNPC gained access to a major oil field in Russia. CNPC will take a 10% stake in ZAO Vankorneft, a subsidiary of Rosneft, which is seeking to develop an oil field that could produce one million barrels per day by 2020. More upstream acquisitions by Chinese firms in Russia continue to be in the works as Russia and China are forming a much stronger symbiotic relationship.

Russia's natural gas giant, Gazprom, says it is ready to begin deliveries to China in a huge pipeline deal just as soon as the so-called Western Route is completed in Siberia. The pipeline has the capacity to ship 30 billion cubic feet of natural gas annually to China. The pipeline is part of a number of Gazprom-China deals worth roughly \$400 billion over the next ten years. The bigger pipeline is the Power of Siberia line, which is projected

to supply 38 billion cubic meters of gas annually over a 30 year period beginning in 2018.

Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller and China Petroleum Corporation Vice President Wang Dongjin signed an agreement on May 8th, 2015 defining the conditions of natural gas supplies from Russia to China via the Western route. China and Russia have been moving aggressively on deals linking the economies together. The national stock exchanges of China and Russia have signed agreements making it easier to transact in renminbi and rubles instead of dollars on the local exchange. China and Russia have announced a joint investment bank whose first investment is in Chinese agribusiness. Furthermore, according to Xinhua, on May 9th, 2015 China's biggest hydropower developer, China Three Gorges Corporation, has signed an agreement with Russian hydropower firm RusHydro to jointly build a hydropower plant in Russia. The 320 megawatt plan would be located on Russia's Bureya River in the east and would help to control floods in the region. Electricity generated from the plant would be transmitted back to China. Details about the value of the investment were not available, but economists and politicians are keeping a close eye on the deal.

The deal was one of a series of 32 contracts totaling roughly \$250 billion that were signed between China and Russia on the sidelines of a parade in Moscow that was attended by Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping to mark the end of World War II. These deals included billions of dollars in infrastructure loans for Russia, including a 300 billion ruble (\$6 billion) loan to build a high-speed railway link. President Putin indicated that Russia would welcome the involvement of Chinese companies in tapping the giant Vankor oil and gas fields in eastern Siberia. Specifics are being worked out. The two leaders also discussed the Silk Road Economic Belt, an ambitious Beijing project intended to encourage infrastructure development in formerly Soviet Central Asia. While conducting the project, China plans to coordinate closely with the Eurasian Economic Union, an economic alliance that includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. According to President Putin, "It means reading a new level of partnership that envisions common economic space on the entire Eurasian continent." He also went on to state, "Our interstate interests coincide on the majority of positions and this is exactly what forms the basis of our relationship today. In the sphere of international relations, we coordinate our work at the UN Security Council level and within the framework of the United Nations. And this coordination is a very important part of the creation of a fairer more democratic world order today." The president gave this interview in a film by Alexei Denisov entitled "Russia and China. The heart of Eurasia."

Consequently, at a recent Houston conference, a senior Chinese official touted what he described as a "new system of power in China and the world." This official, Zhiwei Wang, was referring to energy as the ultimate global unifier, describing a future power grid that would straddle the globe linking all nations to the world's best resources through transcontinental

Continued on page 57

UKRAINE UNREST A FAO REPORTS FROM KYIV

By Major James H. Harvey, U.S. Army

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Many experts on Ukraine predicted that on 22 November 2013, Ukrainian President Yanukovich would sign the Association Agreement with the European Union (EU). He did not sign. This agreement would not have guaranteed EU membership for Ukraine. However it would have symbolized the country's intent to part ways with Russia regarding Ukraine's direction and support. As a result of Yanukovich's refusal to sign the agreement, the revolution began. Thousands of upset Ukrainians took to the heart of Kyiv, Independence Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti). The name is in reference to the closely situated European Square and Independence Square.

Much has been written about the revolution, the direction Ukraine is headed, and its precarious relationship with Russia. This paper will not be an attempt to argue or confirm the latest speculation about Ukraine's future. I offer only my observations gathered from being assigned to U.S. Embassy – Kyiv from August 2013 to July 2014. I saw the crisis evolve from; pro-EU protests, the annexation of Crimea, to conflict in the east. More than anything, I was impressed by the tactics, ingenuity and civility of Kyiv's "EuroMaidaners."

Revolution

Ukraine's Orange Revolution of 2004 successfully created an independent Ukraine but failed to establish a Western-style government. President Yanukovich's refusal to sign the Association Agreement ignited the revolution just days prior to the summit in Vilnius. In response to Yanukovich's announcement, angered Ukrainians began holding protests in Independence Square (Maidan). In addition to proclaiming their EU aspirations, the protesters were provided a long-awaited chance to criticize Yanukovich publicly. For every pro-EU flag sign on the square, there was also a sign assailing Yanukovich's corruption. It also allowed for other political showings of support. Mini-camps around the square supported political parties and political figures such as the imprisoned Yulia Tymoshenko,

Yanukovich announced that he wanted a three-way agreement, one that included Russia along with the EU. This was shocking to most experts but in a way, brilliant on Yanukovich's part. An agreement involving Russia would have forced the EU to decide how to support Ukraine and to what extent. It would also allow Yanukovich to benefit indefinitely from both Russia

and the West. Yanukovich's opposition was also angered that he accepted terms with Russia based on the promise of 15 billion dollars in assistance. According to State Department personnel, the first installment of four billion dollars disappeared within 24 hours. Presumably the money went directly to Yanukovich, as no deposit to any state fund could be identified.

Berkut Clear the Square

In the early hours of 30 November, Yanukovich ordered his special unit police force, the Berkut, to clear Maidan of any protesters. The Berkut did so by force. The footage of them beating protesters went viral overnight, enraging Ukrainians throughout the country.

On December 1st, an estimated 250,000 Ukrainians descended on Maidan. The crowd was not composed of strictly military-age males but of all generations of Ukrainians. On this day, a protestor was firing up the crowd from the stage in the center of the square. Despite the masses of angry, fed-up protesters, it was calm. Everyone was noticeably reserved, while simultaneously chanting "Revolution!"

As I left I saw thousands of protesters entering Maidan carrying the banners of their respective political parties; Svoboda, Batkivshina, and Udar. They walked together without any provocation of the different parties. As I passed Kyiv's City Hall, a crowd broke into the building. This being Sunday, the building was vacant. Although they broke in, I witnessed only one window and door actually damaged (which the protesters later repaired). Some protesters sang and played Ukrainian folk songs from the balconies, resembling a celebration rather than a protest.

December Stalemate

By mid-December, it was clear that this protest was more than an intermittent group of upset people. The main street, Khreshatuck, was lined with tents all the way to Maidan, (approximately one-third of a mile). Typically these were Army tents staked into the asphalt. The protesters also built barricades. They were made of sharpened planks, tires, palettes, and just about anything else – a sort of formed junkyard. Only a narrow opening on the sidewalk allowed passage through the barricade. This is how one would enter Maidan from either end. Signs at each entrance read "no alcohol allowed", a policy strictly enforced by the "Self-Defense Force" of Maidan.



Trade Union Building: 20 February 2014
Photo by Author

The organization and foresight of Maidan was remarkable. There were multiple “Information Center” tents, aid stations, HQ tents, and soup kitchens. I felt the EuroMaidaners took pride in policing themselves and maintaining the moral high ground. This was in part reflected by the church. Religion was a central theme throughout Maidan events and Orthodox priests maintained a constant presence. Prayers, symbols, and songs were everywhere on Maidan. The nearby and world-renown St. Michael’s Cathedral served as a collection point for medical supplies as well as sanctuary.

The consensus was that Yanukovich would simply wait for the EuroMaidaners to leave Kyiv’s cold winter streets. However, Yanukovich exacerbated the relative calm with his announcement of anti-protest laws. This essentially made all protesters criminals and liable to prosecution. This rejuvenated the EuroMaidaners’ cause and ushered in the first real violence seen on the square.

January

In January the protesters became even better organized and adopted a military aspect. The barricades were arranged in-depth around Maidan along with ‘hedgehog’ metal anti-tank obstacles. The streets of the Maidan area no longer had bricks. They were pried loose and formed into protective walls and stacked as ammunition throughout the area. Molotov cocktails also appeared. Stashes of empty bottles were strategically placed as well as a constant supply of cloth and flammable liquids, creating a sort of assembly line operation.

The first death occurred on Maidan at this time - Serhiy Nihoyan, who died by gunshot. Both the EuroMaidaners and

former government blame each other for the shooting. This was just the beginning of the confusion, blame, and propaganda involving deaths on Maidan. Propaganda and blatant untruths were used to blame or justify violence on both sides. There were accusations against the Berkut claiming the use of lethal rounds, kidnappings, torture, and beatings. Yanukovich’s regime countered with claims that the EuroMaidaners were using lethal rounds and being trained by the U.S. in the embassy’s basement. A turning point in the level of hostility and tactics used by police and the EuroMaidaners had been reached. The following excerpt from the daily update describes the situation by the end of January:

Maidan Protester Update: Dead: 4 (+2 unconfirmed); Missing: 27+; Detained: 175; Journalists Attacked: 116; Medics Attacked: 20+; Other Attacks: 36; Number of Attackers Arrested: 0”

Maidan was filled with all walks of Ukrainians, willing to endure harsh conditions for their cause. Despite the cold and ice, I saw elderly EuroMaidaners working to clear the street gutters of any debris. They did this so the police’s water cannon run-off wouldn’t stagnate, turning European Square into an ice rink. Just yards from fighting, families viewed a make-shift memorial of flowers and uprooted street bricks. They were paying their respects to the first protester killed on Maidan just a day before. The area was filled with protesters as well as patrons of shops and cafes, the majority of which remained open.

Localized Protests, not Widespread

News coverage of the revolution, gave the impression that

the entire city was in chaos, but this was not the case. You could walk one block in any direction from Maidan and, except for the noise, never know a revolution was taking place. One particular January night was a good example. Everything seemed relatively normal. Upon turning a corner however, the scene was total chaos. A wall of fire, Molotov cocktails, and various explosions occupied the space directly in front of Dynamo stadium. I could see through the thick tire smoke that there was a line of police beyond the fire. They were using a water-cannon in a vain attempt to stop the fire. I also saw what appeared to be police throwing Molotov cocktails back at the protesters.

As I made my way out, the wrought iron gate of an alleyway flung open. A team of men emerged, pulling what appeared to be a catapult. It had been assembled and welded in a make-shift metal shop down the alley. It was successfully tested on site and placed at the front line behind a barricade on Hrushevs-koho Street.

At this stage of the protests, the Maidan Self-Defense Force was completely functional. It was comprised of several sub-units which worked in shifts. From home we often saw squads with home-made battle gear headed to or from their shifts on Maidan.

February Escalation

It was clear now that the status quo of the protests could not be maintained. Yanukovich would either step down or end the revolution through extreme violence. On 18 February the rarely-heard-from President gave the protestors a deadline to clear Maidan by that night. Immediately following this ultimatum, roads into and out of Kyiv were blocked. The metro was also stopped, and some Pro-Maidan TV stations were taken off the air. Over the next 48 hours approximately 70 people were killed on Maidan. The majority of deaths occurred in the Trade Union Building; a EuroMaidan-owned HQ, sick bay and gathering point. The deaths resulted from a fire which both sides blamed the other for. The bulk of the other deaths came as EuroMaidaners fought their way uphill on Instikutskaya Street. Despite up to 15 protesters already being killed there by sniper fire, protesters continued uphill. The morning of the 20th saw no police presence in the square. Only smoking debris remained from the last stand between the EuroMaidaners and

the police.

Yanukovich fled during the night, making his way to Rostov, Russia to "...visit a friend." He took with him all of the incriminating records he could carry. Those he couldn't carry were tossed into the river, retrieved later by authorities. During the next 72 hours, many embassy family members, including mine, were evacuated to Europe.



Independence Square/European Square.
Photo by Author

Summary

Over a year later, the EuroMaidaners are still waiting to witness the fruits of their efforts. Though it appeared the EuroMaidaners won, they remained on Maidan. They remained in order to ensure free and fair Presidential elections which were scheduled for May. This is testament to their desire to see the revolution through, to "get it right this time." Maidan has since been cleared of debris and become a memorial to "The Heavenly Hundred" – those killed during the revolution. On 22 February an acting President and Parliamentary figures were chosen. I was fortunate enough to observe the elections and from all accounts, they were executed freely and fairly.

The convictions that were forged on Maidan still exist in Ukraine's fight against the rebels. Despite escalating violence and military challenges, President Poroshenko has constantly pleaded for restraint from his troops. This reflects Ukraine's horrible dilemma of defending the country against its brethren. It also reflects Ukraine's intention of fostering a good relationship with the West.

Ukraine enjoyed overwhelming Western encouragement during the revolution but now experiences uncertainty and reluctance regarding assistance. Ukraine's leadership has reiterated its commitment to the West in both dialogue and its management of the conflict. For the majority of Ukraine's citizens, choosing the West versus Russia was never a dilemma. Russian ties are strong with many Ukrainians, but so is the desire to maintain a unified country, free of threats to its sovereignty.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Major James Harvey is a Eurasia FAO, formerly an Air Defense Artillery officer. He conducted his In-Region Training in Kyiv from August 2013 - August 2014. He served his first six months in the Office of Defense Cooperation and the remaining six months in the Defense Threat Reduction Office. Upon return to the U.S. he was assigned as an analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Ft. Leavenworth, KS. He is now Chief of the POW/MIA Office, U.S. Embassy Moscow.

THE WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH DEMANDS INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

By Lieutenant Colonel Ira C. Queen, U.S. Army (retired)

Any opinions, analysis, recommendations, or conclusions should be attributed to the author(s), and is not necessarily the view of DISAM, DSCA, DoD, or the USG.

Recently the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council conducted an analysis of the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC). The Task Force that undertook this endeavor was a mixture of retired senior military officers, diplomats, and academics; all of whom had experience working at or with various GCCs. As part of their process, they met with and interviewed many former GCC commanders, ambassadors, and national security advisors. The result of their study was a document entitled “All Elements of National Power Moving Toward a New Interagency Balance for U.S. Global Engagement”.

The reason they undertook this study was to make recommendations that would help improve interagency coordination, at the GCC level, in order to better conduct foreign and defense policy execution with our allies and partners. Having seen firsthand how disjointed some attempts to implement foreign and defense policy were executed, I am very glad a group of senior leaders undertook this study, and I hope our government will do something to improve the process of interagency coordination as well cooperation between our allies and partners. However, this would be no small undertaking.

Having worked at a GCC, at an Embassy, and for the Department of State, I have experienced how difficult interagency coordination can be as well as how difficult it is to find out what different countries and organizations are doing with a ‘recipient’ country. Not only are most of the U.S. organizations internally stove-piped, most of the interagency is stove-piped from the rest of the government. Furthermore, most countries will not tell you what they are doing with a ‘recipient’ country and the ‘recipient’ country will not tell you what they are receiving or from whom; they want to receive all the resources they can. This leads to a lot of redundancy and waste of resources; thus, the topics brought out in their study need to be taken seriously, so that we, as a nation, can try to find ways to implement a better system that allows us to coordinate activities with ‘recipient’ nations.

While working in the J5 at European Command and as the Chief of the Office of Defense Cooperation in Bucharest, I witnessed time after time how the different Component Commands and organizations failed to coordinate the training of their personnel in or with a host nation, as well as a myriad of other military-to-military contact events. Well-meaning officers and NCOs worked tirelessly with different host nations to arrange needed training or military-to-military contact events

without knowing other officers and NCOs from another U.S. military organization were planning similar or even repetitive events with the host nation; a lot of times, these activities were not even coordinated with the U.S. military personnel at the Embassy in country. This was not intentional but rather was caused by a lack of training and understanding. Unfortunately, too many of our officers and NCOs are assigned duties of this nature without receiving the proper training. Too many times in my career, I have learned of training, humanitarian assistance, or military-to-military contact events being cancelled at the last minute, after months of planning, because they did need not meet the goals or objectives outlined in the Geographic Combatant Command Country Plan for that country. Most countries gladly and willingly want to work with the U.S. military, but assume that we all know each other and that we are coordinating amongst ourselves; why would they need to de-conflict our activities with them?

Unfortunately, this lack of synchronization is not limited to the U.S. military. While working for the Department of State, I was constantly running into other agencies that were involved in activities similar to mine with a ‘recipient’ country. Not all the time, but enough times to really frustrate me, I would try to find out what the other agency/organization was planning with the ‘recipient’ country but the other agency/organization was reluctant to share that information. It was as if they were afraid that by us working together their funding would get cut and they would be out of a job.

At the time, these different agencies/organizations were all involved in Counter Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs but were all conducting their activities independently with the ‘recipient’ nations, not coordinating their activities. These agencies/organizations were from across the executive branch and for whatever reason, just did not think it important to coordinate their activities with each other—even though they were all operating out of the same embassy. Since there was so little coordination at the embassy level, you can imagine how much coordination was taking place at the regional level. While I paint a bleak picture, there is hope on the horizon. Recently, steps have been taken to start improving the interagency coordination, but there is still a long way to go.

Impressed with the way the Department of Defense went through the process of the Quadrennial Defense Review, how it provided a strategic plan that forced hard decisions about priorities, and made sure those priorities were reflected in the budget,

in 2010 the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development issued the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). This was a way to start directing and coordinating the resources of all of America's agencies at the different embassies so that they could advance our national interests and better partner with the U.S. military.

While still not fully implemented, the QDDR calls for the development of Joint Regional Strategies (JRSs) – three-year documents jointly developed by the Department of State and USAID regional bureaus, which identify U.S. foreign policy and development priorities for a given region. It also calls for Integrated Country Strategies (ICSs) – three-year documents developed by an embassy's Country Team, which identify U.S. foreign policy and development priorities for that specific country. Although the JRS and ICS do not focus on military matters, the Security Cooperation Office (SCO) at each embassy does have input into the ICS; in fact, it is their responsibility to make sure the DoD equities are included in the ICS. The JRSs and ICSs are very similar in nature to the Geographic Combatant Command Theater Security Cooperation Plans and Country Campaign Plans, except they include all agencies that have activities in the region/country. Also, just as the different U.S. Military Functional Combatant Commands have worldwide plans, the different functional bureaus inside of the Department of State have Functional Bureau Strategies. As mentioned, this process is not yet fully implemented, but all of the ICSs should be completed soon.

I would also like to point out that USAID has a document entitled "USAID Policy Framework 2011-2015" that provides their staff and partners worldwide with information on their core development priorities, and from this document, for some countries, USAID develops a Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS). The development priorities for a 'recipient' country are to be included in the ICS along with the goals, objectives, strategies and policies for every agency/organization at the Embassy.

Having personally experienced disjointed and uncoordinated actions, I am very glad that one of the things that is emphasized in training at DISAM is that all personnel involved in any type of Security Cooperation need to read not only the Theater Campaign Plan and Country Campaign Plan for the region and countries they are working with, but also read all of the Department of State, USAID and other agency/organization documents mentioned above. In fact, the personnel working at the Embassy Security Cooperation Office are supposed to be heavily involved in helping to write the ICS and the Mission Resource Request (MRR).

Another example of forward movement is the 'Interagency Directorates' at all of the GCCs and U.S. Special Operations Command. While the names, staffing levels, and exact composition of each 'Interagency Directorate' are different, they all have the same function: to bring in a wide range of perspectives from the many different agencies and organizations outside of the Defense Department. They are all staffed by military members, DoD civilians, and agency partners from throughout the federal government, so they can better execute operations.

A few of the organizations and agencies that are represented in these directorates are as follows:

- **Department of State**
- **Department of Treasury**
- **Department of Energy**
- **Drug Enforcement Administration**
- **Customs and Border Protection**
- **U.S. Agency for International Development**
- **Immigration and Customs Enforcement**
- **Department of Justice**
- **Federal Bureau of Investigation**

These 'Interagency Directorates' embody a 'whole of government' approach. Their staffs can reach out to entities within and outside of the U.S. Government, including academia, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, private businesses and international organizations. In addition, more and more military officers and NCOs are being assigned to work alongside interagency partners within the National Capitol Region. While we have already made some organizational changes, the biggest issue still seems to be in making sure personnel are properly trained and educated and that a 'cultural' change takes place within the interagency.

Luckily, the U.S. is not the only country to realize the 'whole of government' approach is the only way to move forward. Many countries have taken this approach: the British call theirs the 'Cross-Whitehall Approach'. The first Cross-Whitehall Conflict and Stabilization Lessons Event took place on

9 November 2010. This event brought together personnel from across the Whitehall conflict lessons community and included representatives from their interdepartmental agency known as the Stabilization Unit (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department for International Development, and Ministry of Defense) as well as other government departments. Also, there are several studies out on how some of our allies have moved forward, with varying degrees of success, all of which could serve as lessons learned as we move even further toward improving out interagency coordination.

Finally, there is even more good news. In April 2013, President Obama signed Presidential Policy Directive -23 (PPD-23), U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy. This policy was crafted with the aim of improving the ability of the U.S. to help allies and partner nations build their own security capacity.

PPD-23 outlines the fact that the U.S. must pursue a new approach to enable partner nations to provide security for their own people. PPD-23 outlines the goals for Security Sector Assistance, but more importantly, it provides guidelines for all government agencies to "plan, synchronize, and implement security sector assistance through a deliberate and inclusive whole-of-government process that ensures alignment of activities and resources with our national security priorities." (PPD-23 fact sheet). These guidelines emphasize consistency, transparency, synchronization and coordination across all U.S. government organizations. It emphasizes the regional and functional strategies as well as the country strategies mentioned earlier. While PPD-23 has not yet been fully implemented, steps have

been taken to start synchronization and coordination across all U.S. Government organizations.

The Department of State, in coordination with other agencies involved in Security Sector Assistance, has developed a plan to implement the strategic planning process described in PPD-23. This plan includes how the Department of State will incorporate interagency assessments, planning, and evaluations into existing and projected interagency planning processes, and outline how key interagency stakeholders will participate and coordinate in each stage of the process. In fact, in March 2014, the Department of State and Department of Defense provided a joint update to Congress on Security Sector Assistance (SSA) PPD Implementation. Through the course of the briefings, it came out that overall, Congress is supportive of Security Sector Assistance investments, but they want to make sure that program dollars are being applied in a synchronized manner across departments and agencies, but they also want to make sure we are effectively measuring how well these investments are being implemented.

As you can see, there are some steps already being taken toward improving interagency coordination, but as the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council points out, there is still a long way to go. They provide a lot of valuable information and propose several things we could do to move forward, but, in my opinion, none more important than changing our interagency culture. Until we implement serious efforts to change the interagency culture, we are not going to see the effects we desire. In order to achieve

this cultural change, we need to increase personnel exchanges between different agencies and enact reforms and/or legislation such as those that helped create our military joint structure. Also, we need to establish some type of training mechanism that will allow us to “strengthen Security Sector Assistance workforce skills and knowledge of, and capacity for, the full range of Security Sector Assistance activities in the United States Government”. (SSA PPD Implementation Guidance). Thus, we need to enhance training and education programs, which promote interagency cooperation and support for Security Sector Assistance requirements.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Ira C. Queen is a retired Army Special Forces and Foreign Area Officer and is currently an Instructor at the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, as well as the Course Manager for the Security Cooperation Management-Action Officer (SCM-AO) Course. Mr. Queen has served as an International Political Military Affairs Officer in the EUCOM J5 Section, as the Chief of the Office of Defense Cooperation in Bucharest, Romania, and as a Foreign Affairs Officer for the Department of State. In addition Mr. Queen has served on several Joint Combined Interagency Task Forces.



HAND-ROLLED PREMIUM TOBACCO BY PUCHO CIGARS COMPANY, LLC

AN AMERICAN COMPANY SINCE 1996

"SHARE THE EXPERIENCE"

MICHAEL "PUCHO" PALMA

SEMPER FIDELIS

PUCHOCIGARS@YAHOO.COM

703-225-9953

WE CUSTOMIZE BLENDS AND LABELS

(MINIMUM ORDER REQUIRED)



**9451 LEE HIGHWAY, #1015,
FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA 22031**

**WE SHIP TO
APO/FPOS
WEBSITE COMING SOON**

NEWS FROM THE FIELD

THE SECURITY COOPERATION OFFICE: STRANDED AMERICAN CITIZENS IN BAJA CALIFORNIA, MEXICO


By Lieutenant Colonel Joel Bolina, U.S. Air Force

On the evening of 14 September 2014, the most intense land-falling tropical cyclone on the Baja California peninsula slammed into its southern tip. A Category 4 hurricane (winds in excess of 125 mph) named “Odile” affected the two largest population centers of Cabo San Lucas and San Jose del Cabo and left 92% of the population without electricity and water, and approximately 23,000 international tourists stranded. Furthermore, there were reports of looting that caused concern for the safety and security of the area. Local communications were extremely limited as a result of the damaged physical infrastructure, which inhibited the Government of Mexico and the United States Government’s abilities to assess and understand the magnitude of the on-ground situation and the resources needed to evacuate stranded American citizens (AMCITs).

All of these factors highlighted the necessity to send a U.S. team to Cabo San Lucas to assist with evacuating AMCITs. With the Government of Mexico’s (GoM) first-ever official request to the United States Government (USG) for assistance, U.S. Army Aviator COL Brian McNaughton and U.S. Air Force Civil Engineer Major Joel Bolina, both from the Security Cooperation Office (Office of Defense Coordination (ODC) of the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, deployed to Cabo San Lucas from 17-19 September 2014, as part of a small U.S. interagency team to facilitate the evacuation of AMCITs.

The Security Cooperation Office in Action

Upon the GoM’s request for USG assistance to evacuate AMCITs, it was imperative to send a U.S. interagency advance



Hurricane Odile Summary

echelon (ADVON) team as soon as possible to assess the situation and the determine the requirements due to several initial reports, all with various levels of accuracy, about the number of stranded AMCITs, the safety and security of the area, and the condition of the Los Cabos airport and its ability to operate as a viable Aerial Port of Embarkation (APOE) for the AMCITs. However, due to the lack of available commercial airlift and the challenges of using ground transportation driving towards the Los Cabos Airport from adjacent operational airports, it was necessary to look for other means of transportation.

US military airlift (MILAIR) was considered, but since the AMCIT evacuation was a Department of State (DoS) led mission and despite United States Northern Command’s (USNORTHCOM) anticipation to provide assistance to the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, a formal request from the DoS to the

Department of Defense (DoD) had not been issued. This prevented DoD's ability to provide U.S. MILAIR and associated personnel to coordinate for future MILAIR. Therefore, the most feasible option was to seek the help of the Mexican military (MEXMIL) since they possessed aircraft that could land under austere conditions. Shortly thereafter, due to the great working relationship between the ODC and the MEXMIL, a Mexican CN-235 transported COL McNaughton, MAJ Bolina, and two U.S. consulate agents to the Los Cabos Airport.

Upon arrival into the airport, the U.S. consulate agents immediately began processing the AMCITs for evacuation while the ODC team began assessing the airfield capabilities in preparation for potential incoming U.S. MILAIR and communicating the overall on-ground situation and its potential implications to USNORTHCOM.

Equally important was U.S. Army LTC Andrew Leonard and Mr. Victor Maciel's 24-hour-a-day support provided from the ODC in the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City when coordinating with the DoS, USNORTHCOM, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), and the MEXMIL; and their ability to interface with the U.S. Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) throughout the decision making process.

The Results

For the next three days, the ODC team continuously provided on-ground facts and assessments of the on-going AMCIT evacuation and airfield activity and capability, which allowed USNORTHCOM and USTRANSCOM to make timely and quality decisions. In addition to providing continuous assessments and updates to higher headquarters, the small ODC presence (in their U.S. military uniforms) had a universal calming and morale-boosting effect on the crowds. The ODC team used it to the advantage of the U.S. interagency team to pass out information to the information-starved AMCITs, but ensured that the U.S. military was not the 'face' of the evacuation. Furthermore, even though the MEXMIL was pre-occupied with host nation evacuations and disaster relief to the local population, the ODC team provided AMCIT related updates to them, which further contributed to increased trust between the two militaries.

In addition, one of the important outcomes from the AMCIT evacuation was the opportunity for the DoD team to exercise the aspects of providing disaster response assistance to Mexico such as the flight clearance process, aircraft support request process, lines of communication between U.S. agencies, and lines of communication with the MEXMIL.

Lastly, and most tangible, was the successful evacuation of AMCITs by numerous commercial flights, four DoS chartered flights, and one MILAIR flight. And although there was only

“


... it illustrated the importance of joint, combined, & interagency relationships [and] highlighted how SCOs not only execute the Geographic Combatant Command's ABCs but also... how the SCO can be the first on-ground in support of a GCC mission.

one MILAIR flight, it symbolized the fact that this was the first known evacuation of AMCITs using U.S. MILAIR from the Mexican territory and significantly contributed to strengthening the relationship and cooperation efforts between the United States of America and Mexico.

Conclusion

While the AMCIT evacuation from Cabo San Lucas was a Department of State led mission, the execution of it illustrated the importance of joint, combined, and interagency relationships. It further highlighted how SCOs not only execute the Geographic Combatant Command's (GCC) ABCs (e.g. Access, Building partnerships, and Capacity building) – but also demonstrated how the SCO can be the first on-ground in support of a GCC mission.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Lieutenant Colonel Joel Bolina is the Chief, Air Force Section and Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief Program, Office of Defense Coordination (ODC) of the US Embassy, Mexico City, Mexico. His primary Air Force Specialty is as a Civil Engineer, but is currently serving as a Regional Affairs Strategist for the Latin American Hemisphere. Major Bolina has deployed to the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility in support of conventional and unconventional operations during Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn, and Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa.



FOREIGN AREA OFFICERS: EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT REQUIRES EXPLICIT FOREIGN POLICIES

By Lieutenant Commander Daniel Bradshaw, U.S. Navy

FAO ASSOCIATION WRITING AWARD - NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

There comes a point in many classic war movies when a lone hero rides out into the middle of two armies on a battlefield to meet the enemy for one last attempt to find a non-violent solution before war breaks out. For the sake of movie ticket sales, these negotiations often fall short in the movies, but they are increasingly successful between governments with disagreements in real life. There are many good explanations for why countries like China, Russia, and the United States (U.S.) are proving capable of having disagreements on some major international issues while cooperating at the same time on others; however, the role of the explicitness of foreign policies in producing such subtle non-violent outcomes in state-state cooperation is under-explored.

When states better understand the foreign policies of their counterparts, it is easier to find avenues for cooperation and avoid major conflict. Of utmost importance, then, is to understand how the foreign policy systems of two states interface and how to improve foreign policy communication between them. Key leadership in the U.S. foreign policy system appear to intuitively understand the importance of foreign policy explicitness in facilitating state-state cooperation; the recent reinvigoration of the U.S. Navy's Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program and the increasing use of multi-track diplomacy are evidence of this. Policy-makers should do more, though, to facilitate and empower the rest of the U.S. foreign policy system to work towards shared foreign policy objectives.

FOREIGN POLICY: A SYSTEMIC FEEDBACK LOOP

Though they are rarely represented as such, foreign policies are systems comprised of discreet key elements that interact with each other in a feedback loop. Within the U.S. foreign policy system there are many such interacting elements, but four of the most important are:

1. **citizens,**
2. **government,**
3. **foreign policy executive agents, and**
4. **foreign states.**

The foreign policy system flows in one direction, from the aforementioned element 1, to element 4, and back to element 1; but, the speed and effectiveness of this feedback loop varies widely between states and is different depending upon the foreign policy issue at hand. The following is a brief walkthrough of these four core elements.

In countries like the U.S. and China, where the legitimacy of the government is (to varying degrees) dependent upon the buy-in and continued support of the citizens it represents, foreign policies developed and implemented by the government contain a fundamental element of citizen support. Wildly unreasonable or untenable foreign policies are selected-out in favor of more reasonable and broadly supportable foreign policies. For example, when a large enough majority of citizens becomes overly tired of war, they are less likely to support a war-hungry foreign policy, and by proxy will not support a government that espouses such a foreign policy. As such, public opinion on foreign policies forms the initial supply of legitimacy to any given foreign policy.

From there, it is the job of representative governments to consolidate public opinion and craft foreign policies that are representative of the will of the governed. This is not an easy or enviable task, but in one way or another all governments have some means of determining what its citizens want, and thereafter go about crafting foreign policy in a way that sustains the government's legitimacy to lead. The leaders of each state observe the world outside their borders, orient their state's defenses and offenses according to perceived opportunities and weaknesses, and interact with external states each according to their particular set of circumstances. Thus, each state conducts foreign policy in its own unique way. Whereas the Russian people may tend to be more supportive of realist foreign policies, American leadership may choose a more liberal or constructivist set of foreign policies.

Once a given foreign policy has congealed enough to be worthy of action, the policy-making arm of a government passes the foreign policy on to the executive arm of the government for strategic, operational, and tactical planning and implementation. A given foreign policy may have both diplomatic and military components, and may involve the complex interactions of many government agencies, but fundamentally it is given by policy-makers to policy-doers for execution. The unique bureaucratic characteristics of each state's foreign policy executive arm, like the ability (or inability) of the U.S. Department of State (DOS) and U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) to cooperate on a shared foreign policy, often weigh heavily on how effectively foreign policy is implemented.

At the point of execution by government foreign policy representatives, foreign states are often exposed to U.S. foreign policy for the first time. Even at the point of execution, though, foreign states may still not have a clear idea of what foreign policies are informing the derivative strategies, operations,

and tactics that are being executed. Often times it is difficult or impossible to trace a particular U.S. military or diplomatic activity back to its roots as a foreign policy. Even in the clearest of circumstances, foreign policy provenance can only be speculated at.

With the U.S. foreign policy system thus broadly described, there is clearly a problem. No person or institution in the system outlined above actually knows or could refer to some place where U.S. foreign policy is actually written down. U.S. foreign policy does not reside in a centralized place that can be confidently referred to as “America’s foreign policy.” The U.S. is not alone in this. Foreign policy in many (if not all) countries is molded ad hoc, documented piecemeal in a wide variety of international agreements and treaties, and communicated via unpredictable channels between each element in the foreign policy system. This *modus operandi* may have worked fine in the past when states utilized only one primary channel for diplomacy and interaction with the outside world, but there are now many more potentially useful actors in the foreign policy system; explicitly codified foreign policies are necessary in order to coordinate the actions of these new foreign policy actors.

Increasing U.S. Foreign Policy Explicitness: FAOs and Multi-Track Diplomacy

Foreign policies need to be clearly and explicitly defined in order to be effectively executed. In describing systems that have been engineered with multiple stakeholders in mind, systems engineering professor Gary Langford at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) notes that strategies should be aligned “toward a common goal” from the outset in order to improve outcomes. Properly defined and available for reference, foreign policies can provide the organizational mechanism that allows multiple stakeholders in the U.S. foreign policy system to act in union. Such a coordinating mechanism is becoming increasingly necessary as institutions like the cross-service military FAO community and Track II discussions are being called upon to assist in improving the effectiveness of U.S. foreign relations.

FAOs: The Tip of the Foreign Policy Spear

With language, regional expertise, and cultural sensitivity, FAOs are typically viewed broadly as advisors to U.S. military and political personnel regarding matters that overlap the fields of military, diplomacy, and foreign culture. From a foreign policy systemic perspective, though, it is perhaps better to broadly view FAOs as operating at the nexus between U.S. and foreign national foreign policy cycles. FAOs are not just a domestic asset; they advise key actors on both sides of an international conversation on how best to interface with each other. American FAOs are not simply advising American actors on how to play nice with foreign partners, they are also helping foreign actors better understand how to interface effectively and constructively with the United States. Operating at the edges of the U.S. foreign policy system, FAOs are often alone and unafraid, representing both the U.S. military, and the U.S. government more broadly, to foreign partners. In some

corners of the world, they may be the only ones doing so. It is important, then, that FAOs have an explicit understanding of the traditionally tacitly defined foreign policies they are being tasked to execute.

It is only within the last decade that the U.S. Navy has dramatically revitalized its foreign area officer (FAO) community. As an epistemic community, FAOs across all four military services in the DOD and their Foreign Service Officer (FSO) brethren in the DOS represent key components of the executive arm of the U.S. foreign policy system. Fundamentally, the FAO converts tacit knowledge from both sides of a foreign policy exchange between two countries into explicit knowledge that can be understood by both sides. The Institute for Defense Analyses recently conducted a study on “The Strategic Value of Foreign Area Officers” and came to the same conclusion about the strategic value added by FAOs. Amongst the other useful functions they perform, FAOs are local experts that execute foreign policy, and provide feedback on needed changes and new metrics at the critical outer edges of the national foreign policy network. FAOs are integral to the continued improvement of relations between the U.S. and foreign states because they increase the explicitness of U.S. foreign policies and help to convey the foreign policies of external states back to the U.S. in more explicit ways as well. From a systems engineering perspective, FAOs improve the quality of the connections between two disparate foreign policy systems.

Mai’a Davis Cross recently published a retrospective along these lines on the topic of epistemic communities. Epistemic communities consist of experts who can advise professionally and authoritatively on policy-relevant issues, and are growing in importance because of the internationalization and increasing complexity of transnational issues. Though traditionally confined to civilian academic institutions, epistemic communities do not necessarily need to be restricted to the academic realm; they can be formed within communities of diplomats, judges, and members of the military as well. Cross notes that “specific groups of high-ranking military officials who interact transnationally have the potential to form epistemic communities by virtue of their shared professional norms and expertise, as long as they seek collective policy goals as a result of these qualities.” While it is clear that the potential exists to better unify the activities of all members of the FAO epistemic community, it will remain difficult to unify the efforts of FAOs without a common set of foreign policies by which to facilitate cohesive discussion.

In order to build a more effective working relationship between FAOs and the broader foreign policy executive community, the broader U.S. Government needs to define a common set of foreign policies from which all U.S. foreign policy executors can define and coordinate their missions. The development and growth of the FAO community is a direct result of the institutional understanding that foreign policies need to be communicated more explicitly; increased foreign policy explicitness at the whole-of-government level can not only help the FAO community be more effective, it can also help to solidify a more cohesive multi-track whole-of-government team as well.

Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Motor, but no Rudder

Increased foreign policy explicitness can improve the coordination of foreign policy activity across all three diplomatic tracks. While traditionally foreign diplomacy has taken place primarily at the Track One level, like that which broke the ice between the U.S. and China in 1972, there is room for greater collaboration between the diplomatic tracks. In 1981, William Davidson and Joseph Montville grouped national policy interactions between states into two “tracks.” Track one diplomacy consists of official state-to-state interactions. Track two diplomacy consists of unofficial contacts between academics or NGOs in two states that seek to improve bilateral relations. Though these two tracks are useful in explaining constructive interactions by informed actors that are aware of each state’s policy stances, they do not incorporate the grass-roots interactions of businesses, drunken fishermen, tourists, or angry rioters that can also have a big impact on relations between two states like the U.S. and China. Diana Chigas groups these uninformed, grass-roots actors into a third track.

The importance of all three tracks on the overall bilateral relationship between two states lies in how explicitly states communicate the full complexity of their foreign policies to all three tracks on both sides of an international relationship. For example, whereas track one and track two actors may be in agreement that continued Sino-Japanese trade is important, track three Chinese citizens that are in receipt of mixed Chinese government domestic messaging have proven capable of acting counter to the national interest by rioting and senselessly destroying Japanese businesses. The U.S. is not immune to similarly uncoordinated messaging. In the U.S., disparate track one messaging over the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea prevents all three diplomatic tracks from acting in harmony. On the other hand, though, explicit and coordinated messaging like Robert Zoellick’s “responsible stakeholder” policy has found resonance and consensus across all three tracks. In aggregate, the U.S. has honed an admirably subtle but deft hand at executing foreign policy across the full array of three-track diplomacy, but there is certainly still room for growth.

The domestic unity of messaging and action between all three tracks of diplomacy has a direct effect on how constructively two states can interact. Accordingly, it is clear that three-track consensus may also improve the effectiveness with which a state can implement and communicate its policies. From a systems engineering perspective, though, the key to this improvement is increasing foreign policy explicitness to a point that can enable such three-track coordination of effort.

The Missing Piece: Common Objectives

With FAOs, academics, and many others acting at the edges of the American foreign policy system, is it possible to keep everyone “on message?” While it is not possible to

“

U.S. foreign policy needs to be explicitly defined in a single, openly available and easily accessible place

control chaos, it is certainly possible to organize it a bit with a key missing element: explicit, clearly-defined U.S. foreign policy objectives. There are many examples of how complex systems were brought under control with the addition of a few key organizational elements informed by systems engineering principles.

Making Foreign Policies Explicit: Central Nodes in the Foreign Policy Network

In order to harmonize the efforts of FAOs, Track Two academics, and the rest of the foreign policy executive community, U.S. foreign policy needs to be explicitly defined in a single, openly available and easily accessible place. This is important not only for creating a shared understanding of common foreign policy objectives, but also from a systemic perspective for consolidating all the data and metrics that are associated with each individual foreign policy. In order to validate the effectiveness of foreign policies, one must establish metrics by which to observe change within the foreign policy system, and provide the general public full and easy access to the resulting datasets.

This idea is no longer a novel one within the foreign policy system or the U.S. Executive Branch. In recent years, many organizations like the DOS have taken very interesting steps toward improving the explicitness and quality of foreign policy metrics. To continue making progress at the whole-of-government level, though, these same best practices must be established from the top of the Executive Department and spread downward throughout the entirety of the foreign policy system. Indeed, this process is in progress, but should be reinforced.

Applying Systems Engineering Principles to Foreign Policies: Building Blocks

A foreign policy that is both modular and unique has a few key characteristics that make it compatible not only with

one state's foreign policy, but has the potential to help all states' foreign policies more compatibly interact. A foreign policy that is modular, like "Build Security Globally," is a discrete, explicit statement of foreign policy. Its modularity allows it to be pointed to as a reference node not only by subordinate foreign policies, but also by strategies devised to enable its achievement, operations undertaken to achieve strategic effects, and tactics used in particular operations. At each step, modular nodes in this chain should ideally have the ability to trace their origin of legitimacy back to "Build Security Globally." The potential benefits of such modularity are numerous.

Uniqueness and modularity are two principles that have come to the forefront of the systems engineering community in the past few decades as a primary means of organization in the field of Internet data management. Within digital systems, uniqueness allows individual entities to be targeted directly. For example, each Uniform Resource Locator (URL) on the internet is a unique address for the content that lies behind it. As a complementary example, in Twitter, each hashtag (#) label like "#Diplomacy", "#ForeignPolicy" and "#Russia" serves as a unique digital reference at which individual tweets can be targeted, and around which a chaotic and global conversation on those topics can be aggregated. In the midst of chaotic systems, uniqueness and modularity provide a framework around which to build organized systems.

The principle of uniqueness is similarly applicable to foreign policies that have been made modular, broadcast publicly, and made digitally accessible. Not only can subordinate strategies, operations, and tactics in the foreign policy system be sourced through linked chains back to the uniquely identified policy "Build Security Globally," a whole host of other aspects of the foreign policy system can be directly linked as well. For example, all the metrics identified as being germane to the effective execution of "Build Security Globally" can be easily aggregated digitally and used to evaluate the performance of the foreign policy system as a whole. The same could be done for the budgeting that is applied to the full spectrum of U.S. activities undertaken in support of "Build Security Globally." The two fundamental systems engineering concepts of modularity and uniqueness have the potential to form the foundation of an optimized foreign policy system.

FAO Effectiveness: Explicit Foreign Policies Required

FAOs exist at the interface between the foreign policy systems of the U.S. and foreign states, ensuring that both sides of the interface work compatibly and cooperatively to discover and accomplish shared objectives. Try admirably as they might, FAOs cannot effectively prioritize their work or measure their progress without explicit foreign policies to execute. The existence of explicit foreign policy objectives aids the FAO in accomplishing this goal by providing a clear mission and means to consolidate metrics and other mission-essential data. The current state of the foreign policy system in the U.S. is not there

yet. Many clever people are working on the problem of measuring diplomacy, the foreign policy system as a whole is being held back by the lack of explicitly defined foreign policies.

Conclusion

While it would certainly be a praiseworthy success for the U.S. to explicitly define all of its foreign policies and allow more active participation in the evolution and execution of foreign policy, FAOs have a crucial role to play in continuing to refine the foreign policy systems of the U.S. and its partners towards a more perfect union. It is not enough to simply explain U.S. foreign policy to outsiders; the final stage of the foreign policy system feedback loop involves the U.S. foreign policy system periodically reorienting itself to the outside world in order to more effectively accomplish changing national priorities. Through its increased focus on improving FAO programs, multi-track diplomacy, and quantitative analysis of the foreign policy system, the United States is definitely moving in the right direction by continuing to improve key elements on the execution side of its foreign policy system. These efforts are also clear evidence that the U.S. has intuitively learned the importance of foreign explicitness and is seeking more of it. More should now be done on the policy side of the foreign policy system to improve the clarity of mission for the system as a whole so that the next time a hero needs to ride into the breach and represent his country's interests to their foreign counterparts, they need not ride alone.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Lieutenant Commander Bradshaw was commissioned as a navy surface warfare officer from The Ohio State University's ROTC program with a bachelor's degree in Japanese. After several deployments at sea he was selected for lateral transfer into the FAO community in 2012 and for attendance at the Naval Postgraduate School, where he completed a master's degree in security studies with a focus on East and Southeast Asia. Lieutenant Commander Bradshaw is now a military professor and course coordinator at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in Honolulu, Hawaii.

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE: BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS & TRAINING FOR MISSIONS

By Captain Tilman M. Engel, German Army

Particularly during the final stages of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) engagement in Afghanistan in the spring of 2014, the core contribution of the NATO accredited Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Center of Excellence (CCOE) came to full fruition in support of the deployment mission. Then, and as mandated by their national governments and NATO leadership, ISAF forces in RC North were already in full re-deployment, massively reducing soldiers and capabilities, while basically just operating from Camp Marmal, near Mazar-i-Sharif.

As a key element to disengage from the Hindu Kush and to hand over full operational and institutional authority to national and regional authorities, the Afghan Presidential Elections of 2014, and thus the desired peaceful transfer of power to a new administration, played the dominant role in the desired ability of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) to exercise executive authority throughout the ravaged country.

The Presidential elections of 2009 and the much contested balloting and results contributed significantly to challenge the political credibility of the outgoing GIROA administration. The international community was determined to avoid a similar controversy the second time around. In stark contrast to the previous electoral round, the 2014 elections were fully organized and executed by the respective GIROA institutions alone (namely the IEC – Independent Election Commission). The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) provided key financial and administrative support. In order to avoid any notion of ISAF interference in the election process, in order to protect acceptance of the next administration, allied forces were ordered to stay away from any operational aspect of the overall election process.

Given the dominant political impact of the elections on the civilian landscape in the nine Northern provinces, as well as on public perception of the ISAF role in the



CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE

New logo of CCOE - with artwork indicating overlapping efforts leading to a unity of purpose in CMI.

contributing nations, the CIMIC CJ9 (Combined and Joint) branch in RC North was thus faced with the challenge of balancing a drastically minimized footprint on the ground with the need to provide the senior leadership with daily updates on the development of the election preparation process across the entire area of responsibility. Just a handful of CJ9 officers were challenged to monitor and report in real time on the general developments at over 7.000 polling sites and more than 2,000 polling centers at the IEC, with over 35.000 ballot workers, the distribution of 3 million ballots, as well as the effective training of 4.000 female searchers.

Without operating tactical CIMIC teams and having yielded most civilian side contacts in the areas beyond Mazar-i-Sharif,

CJ9 staffers had to exercise their CCOE training to the fullest degree to analyze and facilitate support for the election process from a distance.

As the governing body of NATO for CIMIC doctrine and Civil-Military Interaction (CMI) in deployment areas, CCOE training, education, teaching and practice focuses on close interaction and mutual understanding of Military CMI experts with their civilian counterparts. In joint training and networking, relationships and bonds are forged, which are expanded upon in mission activities.

Thus, CJ9 officers in RC North reached out to a plethora of outside civilian sources, forging daily working relations with



Afghan Presidential Election Campaign boards, March 2014, Mazar-i-Sharif (Source: Author)

Governmental Organizations (GOs), International Organizations (IOs) and Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), diplomatic representatives, European Union (EU) observer missions, European Union Police Mission to Afghanistan (EUPOL) instructors, and Afghan official and ground sources to compile and present a reliable daily scenario of a rapidly changing electoral environment. At the same time the CJ9 branch became the key coordination point between both sides, especially during the delivery and recovery of the ballots.

CIMIC COE within NATO

Initially launched in 2001 as the CIMIC Group North Headquarters (CGN HQ), as a direct result of the need for advanced Civil-Military Cooperation during and after the post-Yugoslavian conflicts, CGN HQ was merged into the CCOE in 2005. Status as “Centre of Excellence” was granted in 2007, and since 2014, the CCOE has been granted “Unconditional Accreditation” within NATO Quality Assurance. As one of 21 Centers of Excellence, it is tasked with providing advice and subject matter expertise on Civil Military Interaction (CMI), Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and the comprehensive Approach (CA) for civilian and military customers.

Currently, the seven Sponsoring Nations (SN) are Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, and Slovenia.

Accomplishments and Programs

Between 2010 and 2014 the CCOE provided education and training to 1,800 civilian and military students from 52 countries. Courses offered provide training for field and staff workers, functional specialists, liaison, and CMI/CIMIC higher command assignments, including a specialist support course on the NATO Comprehensive Approach (CA). Since 2014, an annual course is also conducted in cooperation with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA).

With CCOE internships and academia partnerships, students and graduates conduct funded research and projects on CMI topics.

CCOE Vision 2020

Under the command initiative of COL Roel Been, the year 2015 established a new benchmark in the positioning of the CCOE at the heart of CM interaction, indicated by its recent relocation to The Hague, the city of Peace and Justice. Being located among more than 25 international organizations and 140 NGOs at and near the Dutch capital, underlines the center’s multi-year 2020 vision “to become the preferred network campus to connect people, share collective knowledge and to gain unity of purpose in the field of Civil-Military interaction.”

This claim is supported by an upcoming comprehensive communications and marketing campaign, aiming at the international community, government administrations. and media both at the new home as well as beyond in the core European centers of CMI and humanitarian relief coordination.

Commencing in 2015, the CCOE reaches out to the entire humanitarian community by making its unique “Mission App” openly available, by forming partnerships with academic institutions and inviting civilian stakeholders to join in the formulation of Lessons Learned, CIMIC doctrine and initia-



New home of the CCOE at The Hague, Netherlands


Source: CCOE / PAO

tives. The future CCOE “Network Area” will allow external CMI experts to join online in the design of CMI projects, while social media presence on Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn allows for continuous exchange throughout the extended community of CMI interest.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Captain Tilman Engel, German Army, is a CCOE and German Army Center for Civil-Military Cooperation trained CIMIC officer. He is assigned as a reservist to the PAO Office at the CCOE. He previously served as the Head of the ISAF HQ Regional Command North (RC North) Afghan Election Monitoring and Analysis Group from February through July 2014 in Camp Marmal, Mazar-i-Sharif. In civilian business, following 20 years as a senior executive with NFL Europe and Qatar professional football, he works as a consultant for communication and market entry strategies in Arab Gulf states, with rights owners, agencies and event organizers in international sports business.



ISAF air delivery of ballot boxes and sensitive election material to civilian airport Mazar-i-Sharif, May 20th for second round of Presidential elections. Supervised by Afghan IEC and UNDP.



Pictures (by author) CIMIC 05 AND 06: Initial return of ballots from Northern provinces for nationwide recount at Kabul at Camp Marmal, July 17th, 2014.





Hand over of ballots and sensitive election material to IEC officials from Northern provinces of RC North. Supervised by Afghan IEC and UNDP (May 20th, 2014, Mazar-i-Sharif)



Loading of ballot boxes under supervision of IEC, UNDP and campaign staffers for transport with ISAF airlift for recount in Kabul, July 18th, 2014.

NEWS FROM THE FIELD

THE REGIONALLY ALIGNED FORCES BRIGADE FOREIGN AREA NCO

By Sergeant First Class Ivan J. Alvira and Staff Sergeant Clareyssa T. Hall

Our Army is prepping and shaping the battlefields of tomorrow. The Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept, pioneered by Army Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno, is helping do just that. A strategic initiative of the past revitalized and enhanced to capitalize on the lessons learned by a battle hardened and experienced Army, a RAF is an expeditionary force that gives the geographic Combatant Commands (COCOM) a ready, trained and available force that can be employed for full-spectrum operations within the COCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). More importantly, RAF supports the COCOM's strategic objectives by reassuring our allies of U.S. commitment to peace and stability in their regions. In April 2014, the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), of the 1st Cavalry Division (1-1 Cav), became the first RAF unit to be aligned with the European Command (EUCOM) and U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR).

The development of the RAF concept has highlighted the importance and need for a foreign area professional on the staff of each regionally aligned brigade. Foreign Area Officers (FAO) are in high demand, and the two-to-four years of training required before returning to the force places them on the list of the Army's most critical shortages.

In July 2012, USAREUR's Command Sergeant Major David S. Davenport Sr., initiated a program that not only helps augment this much needed personnel asset, but also allows for a renewed focus on security cooperation efforts that at times may be neglected or misrepresented. The program is called the USAREUR Foreign Area Non-Commissioned Officer (FANCO) program.

So why has the FANCO not existed until now? The answer is simple: the roles of the NCO at the strategic and tactical level have evolved. The demand for NCOs with institutional knowledge is on the rise, and the professional development and education levels of today's NCOs are higher than their predecessors. These factors combine with the high demand for foreign area professionals to make the NCO Corps a viable option in the foreign area arena. The evolution of the NCO corps has not gone unnoticed. While addressing members at an AUSA breakfast General Odierno said:

"The one thing that every day is apparent to me, as I think about where we are going, is the change or the continued development of our non-commissioned officer corps. When I deal with Sergeants Major, when I deal with Master Sergeants, when I deal with Sergeants First Class, the level that they are at is so much higher than it was just ten, twelve years ago... Their

mental agility, their understanding of the issues we have, is at the highest levels I have ever seen, and we have to continue to develop that, because that's what makes us different than anybody else. It's our non-commissioned officer corps."

In order to bridge the gap and solve problems you must build relationships with the countries in which you are regionally aligned. As a RAF FANCO, networking and keeping the lines of communication open are keys to building those relationships, and SFC Ivan Alvira, the 1-1 Cav RAF FANCO, came to USAREUR to do just that. Alvira came to USAREUR in a FANCO capacity to participate in an educational and broadening experience offered by USAREUR for a select few FANCOs. As part of this experience, Alvira and another USAREUR FANCO, SSG Clareyssa Hall, attended a three-day workshop organized by the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) Chief in Prague, Czech Republic, Lieutenant Colonel Stephanie Bagley. The visit allowed the two FANCOs to experience first-hand the inner workings of a U.S. embassy. The FANCOs met with and learned from key embassy staff members, including LTC Bagley and Colonel Patrick T. Sullivan, the Senior Defense Official / Defense Attaché (SDO/DAT). The experience and insight provided by these career foreign area professionals reinforced the training that FANCOs receive in Monterey, California, and through the Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management (DISAM). During the workshop these FANCOs were also able to sit in on security cooperation military-to-military coordination meetings with senior enlisted leaders of the Czech Republic Army. Although the visit was not as long as a traditional FAOs in-region training, it served a dual purpose for these NCOs, allowing them to gain experience of the foreign area career field and start building relationships.

FANCOs are a new, much needed asset at the table of security cooperation, especially in partner nations where building an NCO Corps is often a priority. The FANCO provides valuable insights that can assist nations in building and maintaining a strong NCO Corps. These insights can also help non-NATO nations working to professionalize their militaries while preparing to become members of NATO.

The RAF FANCO is no different, and can serve as the grass roots conduit for fusion between tactical and strategic level cooperation. The RAF FANCO is critical to the commander's mission success in a multinational environment, serving as an advisor to the brigade commander and staff on all matters concerning multinational coordination. In conjunction with the brigade information operations officer, public affairs officer,

and civil affairs officer, the RAF FANCO can ensure that the commander's themes and messages, mission priorities and intent are in sync with the COCOM and the U.S. embassy country team's Country Cooperation Plan.

The evolution of the NCO Corps over the past decade has proven that NCOs can, and do, play significant roles in strategic multinational operations around the globe. Time and again, the NCO Corps has proven the capacity to accomplish the most complex tasks, and the RAF FANCO will be no different. Our modern, educated NCOs have the means, motivation and competence required to enhance success at the combined operational and strategic levels. It is for these reasons that the Army FANCO program will grow over the course of the next few years, proving they are ready and capable of meeting the significant requirements within staffs at the brigade level and above.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Sergeant First Class Ivan J. Alvira assumed his duties as FANCO in the S-3 (operations) section, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division on 10 April 2014. He is a Military Police NCO. His previous assignment was Provost Sergeant, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas. Staff Sergeant Clareyssa T. Hall assumed her duties as a FANCO in the Office of the Command Sergeant Major, Strategic Initiative Group, at U.S. Army Europe on 11 July 2014. She is an Intelligence Analyst. Her previous assignment was Collection Management NCO, United States Army Europe G2.

BOOK REVIEW: GENERAL PETRAEUS, COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE, AND POLICY MISSTEPS: AN ANALYTICAL ESSAY

By Dr. John Fairlamb, Colonel, U.S. Army - Retired

While I have never been a fan of counterinsurgency warfare, Fred Kaplan has produced a highly readable and interesting history of how General David Petraeus tried, against heavy odds, to instill counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine in an Army facing an insurgency in Iraq without the war fighting strategy or doctrine to succeed. In the process, Kaplan has produced a primer on the principles of waging counterinsurgency warfare derived from writings of T. E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia), David Galula, the legendary French paratroop officer, British Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templar who defeated the Malayan insurgency, among others. From these classic studies and histories of insurgent warfare, Kaplan provides a number of very useful short summaries of the core principles and tactical guidelines that differentiate counterinsurgency warfare from the more traditional (firepower focused) American way of war.

Despite personal reservations concerning the subject, I thoroughly enjoyed the book, partly because the history and personalities span my own 45 years serving the U.S. Army during which I worked with many of the key players. Also, Kaplan does an excellent job of mapping how Petraeus employed alumni of the West Point Department of Social Sciences, sometimes referred to as the "Sosh Mafia" (of which I am a proud member), in a bold attempt to move the conservative and traditionally focused U.S. Army leadership to adopt a strategy and tactics more suitable to waging the war they found themselves facing in Iraq from 2004 onwards. The Social Sciences Department alumni network has always done an exceptional job of placing capable people in key military and civilian positions throughout the U.S. national security structure. Kaplan accurately demonstrates how Petraeus used this network effectively to get his doctrine writing team's products read, accepted, and as importantly, to work around institutional roadblocks to produce a high quality doctrinal document that was accepted by a skeptical Army in record time.

Until I read this book, I always felt General Petraeus embraced waging counterinsurgency warfare out of necessity -- it was the war he was handed when he took over in Iraq in 2007. However, as Kaplan traces the totality of General Petraeus' career, he shows how Petraeus engaged in efforts to refocus the Army on what has sometimes been called Low Intensity Conflict dating at least from his service as a major when he was a military assistant to General John Galvin in 1986. As the U.S. Southern Command Commander, Galvin chafed at facing a variety of low intensity conflicts and insurgencies in Latin America, which the Army as an institution was largely ignoring.

Kaplan tells this engrossing story without becoming an advocate for waging counterinsurgency warfare. I highly recommend this book as a case study for senior defense officials seeking a basic understanding of counterinsurgency warfare, or how to work the Army and Pentagon bureaucracies to get a Field Manual written and published. But, as Kaplan concludes, despite the Herculean efforts of Dave Petraeus and his Sosh Mafia Team, "In the end, they didn't, they couldn't, change -- at least in the way they intended to change -- the American way of war." Perhaps proof of this statement is that "Insurgents" is not on the Army Chief of Staff's current Reading List, while Douglas Porch's "Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War," a scathing criticism of U.S. Army leadership and doctrine and the sad history of various nations' attempts to fight counterinsurgency wars, is.

The Army should have a Field Manual on Counterinsurgency (COIN) Warfare on the bookshelf, given the need to be prepared to wage full spectrum warfare, and should countering an insurgency again be thrust upon the Army. The Bush Administration did not set out to wage counterinsurgency warfare in Iraq. The initial goal was to remove Saddam Hussein and his murderous government through a conventional heavy force invasion, which the Army executed in splendid fashion. Unfortunately, as a result of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's willful refusal to plan for what would happen after the Army ran

off Saddam and his henchmen, coupled with two incredibly bad decisions made by L. Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, to disband the entire Iraqi defense apparatus and ban former members of Saddam's Baath Party from holding office in the "new Iraq," a vacuum in government control was created.

This lack of host country control rapidly spawned an insurgency against what became to be perceived as a U.S. occupying force. Bremer's unilateral decisions were allowed to stand even though, as Kaplan points out, they took Washington by surprise and ran contrary to Administration policy guidance established for the Iraq campaign. Bush Administration political authorities own the blame for the Army soon being faced with a full-blown insurgency.

Achilles only had one vulnerable heel but it was enough to fell him. Employing COIN doctrine has at least two such vulnerabilities that can rarely be overcome. Key to combating an insurgency is winning over the people to support an indigenous government perceived as willing and able to provide them with the essentials of community life, physical and economic security, and that is not corrupt and holds out a vision of a better future for its citizens. Had such a government been in place to begin with, an insurgency would have been unlikely to germinate. Historically, the U.S. has proven inept at creating governments in other nations that are able to garner such popular support. The second fatal hurdle is the factor of time needed to wage a successful counterinsurgency. First, liberating armies have a very short shelf life before they inevitably become viewed by the locals as armies of occupation, which then become the focus of public outrage when the indigenous government is unwilling or unable to provide the basics of secure community life. The second sharp edge of time is the characteristic unwillingness of the American people to sustain long military adventures. So, as Kaplan stresses, waging counterinsurgency warfare is a long, slow slog described by T. E. Lawrence as "eating soup with a knife." But the lengthy time needed to defeat an insurgency is rarely granted by the American political system. One can only hope American political authorities will make every effort not to commit military forces to counter insurgencies in the future since the costs in lives and treasure are high and the prospects for success are low.

Not long ago I read an article purporting to glean lessons learned from the Army's "long wars" in Iraq and Afghanistan. In my view, the paramount lesson to learn from these long wars is not to get into them in the first place. As Winston Churchill so wisely said, "Democracies don't fight long wars." Many have been amazed that we sustained large forces in Iraq and Afghanistan as long as we did. The main reason is probably that no one could figure out how to extract ourselves from two serially failing regimes without it becoming absolutely clear that a lot of lives and national treasure have been expended in efforts doomed to fail. COIN (the U.S. Army acronym for Counter


Insurgency Doctrine) is a road to perdition for the U.S. The only scenario in which employing COIN doctrine might work is if it is implemented by an indigenous government with a level of legitimacy sufficient to provide a base from which to win over enough of the population to defeat an internal insurgency. An external power can't succeed, as the frustrating history of such endeavors attests.

Some reading this might recall that while I was teaching national security and foreign policy in the Social Sciences Department at West Point shortly after Russia invaded Afghanistan in 1979, I commented during a colloquium that I was glad the Russians had gone into Afghanistan because in a few years they would be begging to get out and that it would become their Vietnam. Those of us who paid attention during our service in Vietnam know that COIN didn't work there and resurrecting a failed doctrine to try to salvage something in Iraq and Afghanistan was doomed to failure because, once again, we are an external power trying to prop up corrupt, quasi-legitimate regimes that can't garner the support of a

majority of their own people. So since we didn't learn either our lesson from Vietnam or the Russians' lesson from Afghanistan, we'll be sorry that, once again against all odds and historical evidence, we tried to turn two failed nations into something they are unlikely ever to become.

Those looking for lessons learned from our failed attempts at nation building in Iraq and Afghanistan would do well to heed the wisdom expressed in a February 2011 speech by then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to an audience of West Point cadets. Gates bluntly told the cadets that it would be unwise for the United States ever to fight another war like Iraq or Afghanistan because the chances of carrying out a successful change of government in that fashion were slim. As Gates said, "In my opinion, any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should have his head examined."

ABOUT THE REVIEW AUTHOR Colonel (retired) John Fairlamb, PhD, served the U.S. Army for 45 years (30 commissioned and 15 as a Department of the Army Civilian) during which he commanded a company in Vietnam, served two four-year details in the Department of State, and spent seven years in embassies as the Defense and Army Attaché in Belgium, Luxembourg, and Austria. In his last assignment, he served as the Political-Military Affairs Advisor to the Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command. He holds a Master's Degree in European Area Studies and a PhD in International Relations from the University of South Carolina.



LAND DISPUTES

UNEARTH SHAKY LEGAL FOUNDATION WILL LIBERIA'S LAND REFORM PROVIDE STABILITY?

By Major Lauren N. DiDomenico, U.S. Air Force

**FOREIGN AREA OFFICERS ASSOCIATION WRITING AWARD
AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE**

The entire thesis is too long to be published in this hard-copy edition of the FAOA Journal, so the author has authorized the printing of this summary version. The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the

Abstract

The phenomenon of land grabs, also referred to as the “new colonialism,” is particularly widespread in Africa where resource rich land is considerably susceptible to exploitation. Within post-colonial and post-conflict African states, years of exploitation and displacement of customary collective landowners has fostered resentment. This resentment combined with the competition over land has resulted in internal conflict and potential instability. With the rise of resource competition, globalization, and spread of terrorist organizations, stability in Africa is of increasing importance to the international community. Like many other sub-Saharan African states, Liberia is attempting to implement land tenure reform in order to ensure stability and reduce ethnic and class tension. In May 2013, the Liberian Land Commission drafted a landmark land tenure reform policy recognizing the rights of customary landholders. Successful implementation of land tenure reform is essential for stability in Liberia; however, in light of Liberia’s complicated history, implementation of new laws may present challenges as landowners and communities seek to formally claim and manage land. The land rights policy and its recommendations may not prevent local elites, chiefs, and bureaucrats from abusing their power by selling, leasing, and transferring land without representative decision by the community, which has been deeply engrained in Liberia’s complex history. In order to successfully implement the recommended land tenure reform, thereby lessening internal conflict and class tension, the Government of Liberia must provide the political will for land reform by offering robust and trustworthy government agencies to ensure collective community landowners’ rights are protected, eradicate fraud, corruption and abuse of power by the bureaucrats and local community leaders, and provide affordable access to government institutions and a fair legal system honoring customary rights rather than favoring local elite or foreign investors.

Introduction

Three weeks into my 6-month tour in Liberia, I was just beginning to get used to navigating the city on roads without traffic laws. One morning, I tested my skills on the way to an

early meeting with the Armed Forces of Liberia legal staff. While enroute, I encountered a crowd forming in the street, which quickly began blocking the road. One of the children in the neighborhood started directing traffic, ordering cars to turn around or take an off-road detour. My paralegal asked the boy why the crowd had formed, to which the boy replied, “land dispute.” We turned around just before the assembly turned into a riot, shutting down a main thoroughfare out of the city for hours. Eventually the Liberian National Police was called in to break up the riot. This particular riot followed a lengthy court battle between squatters and post-conflict returnees. Land disputes like this one have tied up Liberian courts and are the leading cause of disputes in the country. This was the first time I experienced the potential destabilizing effect of land disputes, particularly on a post-conflict state like Liberia. This experience inspired me to investigate the cause, effects, and potential solutions to the many land tenure issues in sub-Saharan Africa.

Global Land Grabs and New Colonialism

Globalization and resource competition have inspired large-scale acquisition of tracts of land by foreign investors in the developing economies of Africa, South America, and Southeast Asia, primarily facilitated by government appropriation of resource-rich land. Twenty-first century land grabs, as this phenomenon is referred, are fueled by international trade agreements, foreign direct investment in the global south, US and European desires for bio-fuels, like soybeans and palm oil, and depletion of water reserves. “As of May 2012, it was estimated that between 32 and 82 million hectares (between approximately 80 and 200 million acres) of global farmland had been brought under foreign control, with the amount constantly increasing.” Land grabs of farmland around the world have resulted in the exploitation and displacement of customary collective landholders.

The phenomenon of land grabs, also referred to as the “new colonialism,” is particularly widespread in Africa where resource rich land is considerably susceptible to exploitation. Land in Africa is so susceptible to exploitation because of the commoditization of land, the individualization of landholding,

and the appropriation of land by governments. Additionally, “in post-colonial societies of West Africa, land is seen as a form of political space — territory to be controlled both for its economic value and as a source of leverage over other people” by both governments and local officials. As a result, within post-colonial and post-conflict African states, years of exploitation and displacement of customary collective landowners has fostered resentment. This resentment combined with the competition over land has resulted in “conflict, sometimes violent, about legitimate authority over land among traditional leaders, government at multiple levels, and land-users.” Many theorists have over-emphasized the ‘ethnic’ character of current conflicts in Africa, and have failed to acknowledge that “so-called ‘ethnic conflicts’ are linked simultaneously to ‘preoccupations about land’ and to contests over political power.”

With the rise of resource competition, globalization, and spread of terrorist organizations, stability in Africa is of increasing importance to the international community. The stability of West Africa is of particular importance in light of recent conflict in Algeria and Mali stirred up by radical Islamist organizations, like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb, the continued attacks by Boko Haram in Nigeria, and potential conflict in the Niger-Delta over oil resources between impoverished local communities and the government and oil companies.

Many states in sub-Saharan Africa have attempted to implement land tenure reform advocating the return customary land to the communities. Several motives for land reform include: a desire to make legal land sales available to foreign investors; concerns about land scarcity; a desire to restore community lands to displaced people; to reduce ethnic and class tensions; and to give order and accountability to corrupt or inefficient land management. Many African states have struggled with implementing land reform. Ambreena Manji noted five reasons for slow progress in land reform implementation in Africa: 1) unclear policies and procedures within the government department responsible for land matters; 2) lack of staff and trained personnel; 3) lack of political will to carry out policy changes; 4) conflicts at the community level; and 5) hindrance by bureaucrats implementing the policy.

Liberia, likewise, may face challenges in resolving longstanding land tenure issues and ethnic and class tension. In May 2013, the Liberian Land Commission drafted a landmark land tenure reform policy recognizing the rights of customary landholders. Successful implementation of land tenure reform is essential for stability in Liberia; however, in light of Liberia’s complicated history, implementation of new laws may present challenges as landowners and communities seek to formally claim and manage land. The land rights policy and its recommendations may not prevent local elites, chiefs, and bureaucrats from abusing their power by selling, leasing, and transferring land without representative decision by the community, which has been deeply engrained in Liberia’s complex history. In order to successfully implement the recommended land tenure reform, thereby lessening internal conflict and class tension,

the Government of Liberia must provide the political will for land reform by offering robust and trustworthy government agencies to ensure collective community landowners’ rights are protected, eradicate fraud, corruption and abuse of power by the bureaucrats and local community leaders, and provide affordable access to government institutions and a fair legal system honoring customary rights rather than favoring local elite or foreign investors.

Case Study: Liberia

Liberia is particularly susceptible to land grabs because it contains more than half of the rich Upper Guinean tropical forest left in West Africa (4.4 million ha of ca 8 million ha) and is home to substantial mineral wealth (iron ore, gold, diamonds, manganese and silica) combined with weak land laws to govern them. Studies indicate the Government of Liberia has committed itself to land use rights to foreign investors over an area totaling approximately 75% of the total Liberian land mass. In addition to the communities displaced as a result of land grabs by the government and foreign investors, 500,000 or so people were also displaced by years of civil war. Before one can understand potential challenges facing legal reform, a history of land tenure in Liberia and its effect on ethnic and class relations and internal conflict must be examined. Liberia, the first independent state in Africa, has an entirely unique and complex history of treatment of land tenure and internal conflict. “The complex and largely unresolved issues of ownership and claims over land are in the views of most Liberians the primary source of social tensions in the country.” Even the Liberian Supreme Court recognizes the increasing violence and instability resulting from land disputes:

Land and related disputes are proving to be a constant reminder of the agonizing experiences attendant to acquisition, ownership, sale and transfer of realty in this jurisdiction. Further, these land disputes carry unbearable costs both in time and material resources. But the most troubling is the undeniable reality that land disputes have increasingly become a major source of our nation’s conflict. Violence consequential of land controversies has, in notable instances, witnessed loss of precious and irretrievable lives in Liberia.

Conclusion

Land tenure issues in sub-Saharan Africa probably seem completely inconsequential to American strategists and military leaders, however, an understanding of the impact of the global competition for resources on a developing states’ stability is critical. The historical treatment of land tenure by colonists, and by contemporary governments, has a significant impact on a state’s economic development, stability of the government, and ethnic and class tension. American political leaders should be aware of the complexity of land tenure issues when engaging developing countries and should invest in assisting reform implementation.

Liberia is still trying to mitigate the effects of colonization,

Continued on page 59

FAIR TRADE

AN ECONOMIC MODEL FOR STABILITY AND SECURITY

By Lieutenant Colonel (USAF-retired) David Palmer,
Ms. Connie Piper, and Ms. Taliah S. Muhammad

If anyone has ever heard of the term “Fair Trade,” they might think of coffee, tea, and chocolate. However, Fair Trade has grown tremendously, especially in the last 20 years. It is now considered a micro-enterprising model and another means of economic development in numerous countries, and especially those experiencing conflict and instability. The Fair Trade system can mitigate conflict and deter violence, since it offers disadvantaged and marginalized people a livelihood and a sense of hope.

More than one billion people live below the international poverty line and lack access to clean water, health care, education and basic social services - according to a 2008 United Nations Development Group Program. The gap between rich and poor is widening, with the world’s richest 20% consuming over 75% of the world’s resources while the world’s poorest 20% consume only 1.5% - according to a 2008 World Bank Resource Institute report.

Traditional multinational business models do not always fit the needs of the poor noted in this gap. These poor include small artisans and farmers at the sub-national level. Many have a product that can be easily produced using local indigenous resources that mitigate the demands on the local environment and/or available workforce. The next step is telling the story of these products and that is where the military can help out in a low-cost, innovative, public-private collaborative manner. This unique commerce system can be introduced at the military unit level by very low cost education presentations given by Fair Trade professionals.

Being aware of this unique commerce system and being knowledgeable of the numerous Fair Trade non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can be beneficial to a Civil Affairs unit, Foreign Area Officers, and National Guardsmen involved in the State Partnership Program. The United States military services are expected to engage in various steady state activities such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, training partner nations’ military and security forces, supporting delivery of good governance and rule of law, stabil-

ity operations, and more. Part of these U.S. personnel’s training regime should include awareness of Non -Governmental Organizations (NGO) that encourage economic development at the sub-national level of societies, such as farmers or artisans producing traditional products and crafts available to the Fair Trade global market. U.S. Military Civil Affairs units and the National Guard are perfectly postured for such an initiative.

The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) is a twenty-plus year old program focusing on international relationships between partner nations’ Ministry of Defense (or similar entity) and the National Guards of the states and territories of the United States. Its purpose is to cultivate and build personal and institutional relationships with partner nations throughout the world in order to mutually benefit the national



North Dakota Lt. Gov. Drew Wrigley and Maj. Gen. David Sprynczynatyk, Adjutant General of the North Dakota National Guard, meet with Adm. Mathew Quashie, Chief of the Defence Staff, Ghana Armed Forces, at Burma Camp, Accra, Ghana on Jan. 8, 2014. (N.D. Army National Guard photo by Chief Warrant Officer 3 Kiel Skager, Joint Force Headquarters/Released)

security of the United States and that partner nation.

The State Partnership Program is administered by the National Guard Bureau on behalf of the Department of Defense and guided in its actions by the Departments of State and Defense, while the participating U.S. State's Adjutant General executes the activities. Approval and oversight of these activities in the partner nation is derived from the U.S. Ambassador or Chief of Mission and in coordination with the Defense Attaché/Senior Defense Officer (DATT/SDO) and Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) in the U.S. Embassy in that partner nation. A National Guard Bilateral Affairs Officer (BAO) located in most U.S. Embassies with a SPP is a key link to the ODC. Many times the Chief of the ODC is also a Foreign Affairs Officer (FAO).

In addition to military to military activities with the partner nation, the SPP can leverage whole-of-society activities and relationships that mutually address economic, governance, education, health, and cultural issues. Fair Trade is one of those whole-of-society programs that the SPP could easily help leverage as appropriate with that particular partner nation. How is that possible?


The National Guard's soldiers and airmen provide a unique capability manifested in their status as part-time soldiers and airmen, a capability not readily found in the full-time active duty components of the U.S. Armed Forces. These citizen soldiers and airmen bring skill sets from their full-time civilian status that many times can aid in addressing needs and opportunities in a partner nation. For example, a citizen soldier who is self-employed as an independent business person would be able to identify an indigenous craftsman who is producing a product for which there exists a market in his or her state or community. Another citizen airman might be the Director of the local Chamber of Commerce in his or her local community at home and be able to assist that indigenous craftsman in obtaining micro credit to bankroll such an effort.

One can look to a recent example at the state level, whereby a U.S. state's Trade Office conducted a trade mission to its SPP partner nation. That particular trade mission, leveraged by the SPP, may result in some economic opportunity on both sides of the relationship. That opportunity could easily benefit some

indigenous craftsmen and their Fair Trade products marketed in their nations SPP partner state. In fact, Fair Trade products are already sold at a number of Army and Air Force Exchange (AAFES) stores throughout the United States.

Today the SPP includes 65 partnerships with 71 nations throughout the world. Many of these partner nations have Fair Trade products looking for a market. Where these two needs can come together and support each other is a win-win for public-private collaboration in supporting mutually beneficial international diplomacy and development. The National Guard, through the State Partnership Program and its citizen soldiers and airmen can be that conduit to bring these two markets together, fairly, and one nation at a time.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS David Palmer is the Organizational Network Subject Matter Expert at the U.S. Air Force Air Advisor Academy at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, NJ. He retired from the USAF in June 2013 after 37 years of service in the Air Force, Air Force Reserve, and Pennsylvania Air National Guard. He is a 2009 graduate of the U.S. Air War College with a Master of Science degree in Strategic Studies. Ms. Connie Morales-Piper is the International Military Student Office Manager at the U.S. Army Logistics University, Fort Lee Virginia. She has a Masters of Arts degree in The Humanities from Old Dominion University. Ms. Taliah Muhammad is a social entrepreneur and fair trade advocate. She works with artisans in Ghana, The Gambia, and Kenya. Taliah holds a Bachelor of Political Science degree from Virginia State University.



ultra-high-voltage power lines. It has been inferred that he was referring to geopolitics. He may as well have been talking about China's energy security and the rest of the world's energy security -- most notably Russia and the United States -- that are increasingly linked to China's rise.

Russia made a startling proposal to Europe: Dump the United States and join the Eurasian Economic Union. President Putin claims that Europe is now realizing that as a result of the Western economic and financial blockade of Russia, it is Europe itself that is suffering the most. Germany was the first to acknowledge this late in 2014, when its economy began to slow down and is now on the verge of a recession, but now others are speaking out. The former head of the European Commission and Italy's former Prime Minister Romano Prodi told *Messaggero* newspaper that "The weaker Russian economy is extremely unprofitable for Italy. The lowering of oil and gas prices, in combination with the sanctions pushed by the Ukrainian crisis, will drop the Russian GDP by 5% per annum and thus it cause cutting of Italian exports by about 50%." According to Prodi, regardless of the ruble rate against the dollar, which is lower by almost half, American exports to Russia are growing while exports from Europe are shrinking. It is not the financial exposure to Russia or the threat of financial contagion should Russia suffer a major recession or worse. Something far simpler, is alleged, that will cause the biggest harm to European economies. The issue is lack of trade, because while central banks can monetize everything, leading to an unprecedented asset bubble which may boost investor and consumer confidence for a limited time, they can't print trade which is the all important driver of growth in a globalized world.

Therefore, Russia has a not so modest proposal to Europe; "Dump trade with the United States whose calls for Russian "costs" has cost you another year of declining economic growth and instead join the Eurasian Economic Union." Russia feels the European Union should renounce the free trade agreement with the United States (TTIP) and enter into a partnership with the Eurasian Economic Union instead under the belief that a free trade zone with its European neighbors would make more sense than a deal with the United States. Russia further made a dig at health standards in the U.S. food industry when Vladimir Chizhov declared, "We don't even chlorinate our chickens."

China and India have now recently signed 26 business deals worth more than \$22 billion in such areas as renewable energy, ports, financing, and industrial parks. According to Indian embassy officials in Beijing, since China is keenly interested in opportunities in India's two trillion dollar economy. On May 16th, 2015 Namgya Khompa of the Indian Embassy in Beijing highlighted the importance of the China-India business deals after a three day visit by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during which he sought to boost economic ties and quell anxiety over a border dispute between China and India.

At the same event,, Prime Minister Modi encouraged Chinese companies to embrace opportunities in India in manufacturing, processing and infrastructure announcing, "Now India is ready for business" with an improved regulatory environment. "You are the factory of the world whereas we are the back office of the world, Modi stated. "You give thrust on production of hardware while India focuses on software and services." These 26 deals were in addition to 24 agreements signed on May 15th, 2015 between China and India.

This represents Chinese President Xi Jinping's vision of creating greater economic ties between China and India. When President Xi first went to India last year he announced \$20 billion in investment over five years, including construction of two industrial parks. Progress has been slow in part because of difficulties Modi has had in getting political approval for easier land acquisition laws which have now been resolved.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Ralph E. Winnie, Jr. is Director of the China Program at the Eurasian Business Coalition, where he is also the Business Development Representative for North America as appointed by the Guangxi Province Investment Promotion Agency, where he has been responsible for the promotion of business development, tax and trade between Guangxi province in the People's Republic of China and the United States. Mr. Winnie Jr. graduated magna cum laude from Touro College's Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center in 1999. He studied international law at Oxford University (Magdalen College), United Kingdom and Moscow State University, Russia.



Companies and governments trust JTG's expertise, client-focused processes and efficient use of technology for developing and deploying their global initiatives.

We combine tested localization procedures with cultural insight to support global objectives with true intelligence. Our multidisciplinary subject matter experts understand the complete spectrum of communication services, working as an extension of a client's team, to address projects from every angle and deliver consistent value and ROI.

JTG-INC.COM

European continent.” This is exactly what METO should do within its region.

As for METO’s structure and institutions, the alliance can copy NATO’s basic structure, starting with simple but crucial organization and moving up from there as time goes by. Decision making and processes can be taught and trained. Simple theoretic exercises should be done and rehearsed; leaders and instructors should participate and graduate from a joint training program, all before commencing mutual training. In an ideal world, all forces should have the time, money and space

“Achieving our national military objectives ... requires that we develop and evolve our relationships with our inter-agency and international partners.”

General Dempsey

to prepare and train. However, since there is never enough time nor money, I would suggest METO start by focusing on the air component. Air power is a major player in recent NATO or U.S. led operations. It is the easiest force to use without entering with ground forces into the country, leaving a large and perhaps long-lasting ground force presence. And, it can be done from the participant country home base. The Air Force has another advantage for many of the countries already send their pilots to the U.S. for basic or advanced training, flying on U.S. built aircrafts. Conducting air operations first will enable the alliance to enter gradually to the phases of ground and sea with less pressure to show immediate results, for a usually much larger force like the countries Army. “Air Force first” concept will allow METO to be effective relatively fast. It will pave the road with standards and relationships for the other forces. The Army, Navy or Marines in the respective countries would enjoy the patience needed to enter the alliance, train and get prepared in order to be able to engage air land or sea operations for which the alliance was formed.

Conclusion

History is full of surprises, and alliance history is no different. NATO was founded to oppose a Soviet threat. The threat is long gone but NATO is still extremely relevant and

influential. Having another effective alliance in a different part of the world is meaningful. Implementing such endeavor with the U.S. leading the institution and the U.S. controlling the heart of the military organization (in order to make up for the alliance partners inefficiencies) can be exactly what America needs right now. The economic problems, the downsizing of the military, the declined diplomatic power and the exhaustion from wars, can all have a turning point. Leading a Middle Eastern alliance will reduce the required military budget (in the long run) and assist financially across sectors. The alliance could wage the wars

with regional actors and troops, instead of the U.S.. It will reduce American casualties. METO will put the U.S. in its strongest political, diplomatic position it had ever been in. Such alliance would no doubt promote American values of Peace and prosperity, but also stability in a place where it is scarce. The regional countries can also profit from taking part in a METO alliance. Whether it is economically, diplomatically, militarily or even bandwagoning, being allied with the world super power is a good enough reason. It can also bring peace, stability, prosperity and a regional platform to resolve conflicts – diplomatically. This could be a breakthrough

in the entire area’s relationships amongst themselves and with the international community. NATO model is a good model for that and it can be implemented with a basic structure, basic decision making processes and ideology. There are of course many questions with need for an answer (which countries will be members of METO? What degree of mutual security will it hold? etc.) and many risks needs to be addressed (How will other key players in the world react? Especially Russia and China; how will the Sunni-Shi’a-Christian- (and maybe Jewish)-relationship works? etc.). However, when it seems that threats multiply, instability rises and great powers decline – it is time for hope! Maybe, as oppose to the words of John Lennon, we don’t need to imagine there’s no countries and no religion too in order to have nothing to kill or die for. Then we could really “imagine all the people living life in peace”.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Lieutenant Colonel Dror Altman is assigned to the Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. He graduated from IDC Herzliya in 2009 with a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science and Business Management, and graduated from “PUM” (the Israeli ACSC version) in 2010. He commanded an AS565 Panther, Maritime helicopter squadron (2010-2012) and an Apache Longbow Squadron (2012-2014).

Continued from page 14

Financing (FMF) aid from the U.S. for the purchase of U.S. equipment, but they do remain an important consumer of U.S. defense products—including the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the F-16C, several helicopter variants, and various missile systems including Patriot. However, as the political and military dynamic has changed within Turkey, it has moved away from dependence on U.S. military technology, training, and the support that accompanies U.S. weapons systems. This has resulted in a loss of both economic revenue and influence for the U.S. To reverse this trend, the U.S. should resume annual FMF aid, approve Turkey's long-standing request to purchase Unmanned Aerial Systems, and increased defense cooperation and collaboration on projects such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

Lastly, the U.S. should increase funding for the IMET program from approximately \$5 million annually to a figure that more accurately illustrates our commitment to the strategic importance of the relationship and our desire—in the wake of Erdogan's military purges—to renew and cultivate relationships with Turkey's military leadership at all levels. Annual funding for Turkish attendance at every level of the U.S. military education system, from Non-Commissioned Officer through War College level, should exceed those for all other allies. Increased IMET would cultivate relationships, improve understanding, promote U.S. interests, and ultimately expand U.S. influence with an officer corps that may one day re-assert itself domestically as a secular, educated, pro-western bulwark against anti-western sentiment and the rise of political Islam—just as Ataturk envisioned.

Turkey at the Crossroads

Today's Turkey sits at a crossroads both literally and figuratively. Long the bridge between Europe and Asia literally by virtue of its geography, Turkey remains a thriving center of trade and a melting pot of western and Oriental cultures, ideals, values, and interests in a vital and troubled region. Figuratively, Turkey sits at a crossroads with regard to which global system it will be a part of in the coming century. Will Turkey continue to look to the West and remain a member of the western political, economic, social, and military institutions that have brought her prosperity and security—or will she strike a new course for herself and seek new alliances that will bring her into conflict with the West? Lastly, Turkey sits at the crossroads of religion, politics, and modernity. Can Islam coexist with a westernized twenty-first century representative democracy, or is Islam, as Ataturk believed, an anachronistic and malignant force that will only keep Turkey from realizing its true potential and its rightful place in the community of nations? There is no debating that Ataturk's secular, pro-western, democratic Turkey has prospered immensely since the nation's transformation in the 1920s—but there is debate—and great concern over how much longer Turkey's interests and values will remain intertwined with the West's in the era of Erdogan and with the rise of political Islam.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Colonel Chris W. Chronis graduated from Central Washington University in 1991 with a commission into Aviation Branch. He served the next 17 years as an Aeroscout and Attack Helicopter Pilot in Air Cavalry Squadrons and Apache Attack Helicopter Battalions in several infantry, armor, and cavalry divisions and brigades. the 5ID, 2AD, 3ID, 4ID, 6th Cavalry Brigade, and the 21st Cavalry Brigade. From 2008-2011, Chronis served as the Installation Commander of Fort Greely, Alaska – home of the nation's only strategic ballistic missile defense capability. From 2011-2014, Chronis served as a J5 Strike Planner, and later as the Chief, Joint Fires Element, J3, US Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Nebraska. Colonel Chronis holds a BA from Central Washington University, a MS from Central Michigan University, and a Master of Strategic Studies from the US Army War College, where he was a Distinguished Graduate in 2015.

Continued from page 52

class tension, and years of exploitive land grabs by foreign investors. The Government of Liberia has taken a groundbreaking first step in drafting the new land tenure policy to be enacted into law. But a complex history of land tenure, and complicated dual legal system, will not resolve the problems overnight. The Government of Liberia must be prepared for a protracted effort to implement reform as many other sub-Saharan African states have faced, including acknowledging customary traditions within the statutory system. Most importantly, the Government of Liberia must eradicate fraud, corruption and abuse of power by the bureaucrats and local community leaders, and provide affordable access to government institutions and a fair court system honoring customary rights rather than favoring local elite or foreign investors. Land reform is necessary to maintain security and social stability. But no efforts to implement land reform will be successful without protecting communities from the greed and corruption surrounding the global competition for scarce natural resources.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Major Lauren DiDomenico serves as the Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, 502d Installation Support Group, Joint Base San Antonio–Lackland, Texas. Major DiDomenico also served as the Chief of Military Justice at the 56th Fighter Wing, Luke Air Force Base, Arizona and at the 8th Fighter Wing, Kunsan Air Base, Korea. She deployed to Iraq in support of TF 134, to Djibouti in support of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, and to Liberia in support of Operation Onward Liberty. She is admitted to practice law before the Supreme Court of Illinois, the Supreme Court of Hawaii, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.



SPONSORS & PARTNERS

FAOA would like to thank its corporate members and partners who make it possible to serve the Foreign Area Officer community.

To become a FAOA sponsor, please contact president@FAOA.org



JOINT FOREIGN AREA OFFICER PROGRAM



Oak Grove Technologies



Walsingham Group



USMCU - Gray Research Center



SPONSORS & PARTNERS



Center for Army Lessons Learned



We know what it means to serve®



FAO Association
PO Box 295
Mount Vernon, VA 22121

Return Service Requested



Get information and become a
member online
at www.FAOA.org

FAOA Journal Submissions Writing Guidelines

When submitting articles, book reviews or letters to the editor for potential publication, please email them as word documents, single spaced, in Times New Roman, size 11 font to EDITOR@FAOA.org. Insert any graphics or maps within the text at the appropriate locations and include a short "About the Author" bio with personal photo at the end of the piece. Photos, maps and graphics are highly encouraged, especially high resolution pictures that might make for a good cover image. Footnotes/endnotes are generally not printed, but may be included in an online version of the article, so include critical references within the text body and provide an extended copy for online publishing if applicable. All regular articles are peer reviewed by the Editorial Board before being approved for print. Letters to the Editor receive minor edits for spelling and are printed at the discretion of the Editor-in-Chief.

EMAIL SUBMISSIONS TO EDITOR@FAOA.ORG

