

THE FOREIGN AREA OFFICER ASSOCIATION JOURNAL OF

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

VOLUME XVIII // NUMBER 3 // WINTER 2015

WWW.FAOA.ORG



COLD WAR NOUVEAU

RUSSIAN ECONOMIC VULNERABILITIES 11

5 Why Moscow's recent move to reintegrate Crimea was drastic, risky and shows that Crimea has strategic value.

"We were aware [of the threat of reprisal], but the referendum was our only chance for freedom. We feared if we delayed further, we might not get another chance." 30

"Why aren't you toasting?" the Russian asked through his interpreter. "You see, General," the American replied, "I am a recovering alcoholic and I cannot touch a drop." 42
The words were translated, and the General replied, "In Russia, we do not have that problem."

Cover Image: Wikimedia Commons

SUBSCRIPTIONS & MEMBERSHIPS

Subscription to the journal comes with membership in the association. Library and institutional rates and bulk discounts are also available. Membership and subscription information may be obtained online at www.faoa.org

SUBMISSIONS

Contributors should email articles to editor@faoa.org. Further information of submissions, format requirements and assistance can be found on the back cover of this issue and online at www.faoa.org

EDITORIAL BOARD

Joseph Bincarousky, Maj, USAF
Mark Brice Chakwin, COL, USA (ret.)
Mike Ferguson, COL, USA (ret.)
Jeff Hoffmann, USAFR (ret.)
Jason C. Howk, MAJ, USA
David Mack, LtCol, USAF (ret.)
Jason Nicholson, LTC, USA
Dan Singleton, MAJ, USA
Phil Yu, CAPT, USN
Vincent Alcazar, COL USAF retired
Vincent Duenas, MAJ, US Army
Robert Friedenbergl, COL US Army retired

The Editorial Board uses a "peer review" method for coordination of journal submissions. Board members represent varied International Affairs backgrounds from all services including active, civilian, reserve, and retired. If you are interested in serving on the editorial board, please email editor@faoa.org

ISSN 1551-8094

STAFF

Graham Plaster, LCDR USR,
Editor-in-Chief

John B. Haseman, COL US Army-Retired
Chairman, Editorial Board

Craig Byrnes
Webmaster

Maridee Hargus,
Administrative Assistance

BOARD OF GOVERNORS

PRESIDENT
Kurt Marisa, Col, USAF (ret.)

VICE PRESIDENT
Robert Timm, COL, USA

SECRETARY
John Krause, Maj, USMC (ret.)

TREASURER
Jeff S. Hoffmann, USAFR (ret.)

MONTEREY Rep
Mark Chakwin, COL, USA (ret.)

EDITOR IN CHIEF
Graham Plaster, LCDR, USNR

CONTENT EDITOR
John Haseman, COL, USA (ret.)

Ivan Raiklin, MAJ, USA

Robert Fagan, COL, USA (ret.)

The Foreign Area Officer Association (FAOA) Journal of International Affairs is the publication for Regional and International Affairs professionals of the FAO Association, a 501c(19) non-profit Veterans' organization. The views expressed are those of the authors, not of the FAOA, the Department of Defense, or the Armed services or any DoD agency, and are intended to advance the FAO and defense international affairs profession through academic dialog.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Politico-Military Affairs | Intelligence | Security Cooperation
Volume XVIII, Number 3 — Winter 2015



WWW.FAOA.ORG

IN THIS EDITION

REGIONAL

- 05 | RUSSIAN INFORMATION OPERATIONS
Major Kris Barriteau, Major Jeremy Cole, Major Ben Pierce
- 11 | CAGING THE RUSSIAN BEAR BY CONTROLLING HIS DIET
Colonel Dave W. Burton, Lieutenant Colonel Eric S. Fajardo,
& Colonel Scott A. Jackson
- 17 | U.S. AGENCY IN THE SAUDI ARABIAN NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION PUZZLE
Major Peter J. Kalogiros II
- 26 | MUST A RISING SUN DISTURB THE MORNING CALM?
Brendan M. Murray
- 30 | LEARNED THROUGH TRAGEDY AND TRIUMPH IN TIMOR-LESTE
Lieutenant Colonel Douglas D. Jackson

NEWS FROM THE FIELD

- 21 | **Shadows in the Jungle**
Major W. Seamas Whitesel
- 24 | **“Je ne suis pas Charlie.”**
Major Clifford Anderson

FEATURE

- 42 | **PRACTISE TO
DECEIVE: LEARNING
CURVES OF MILITARY
DECEPTION PLANNERS**
An Address by
Denis Clift

Fellow Foreign Affairs Professionals at Home and Abroad,

Unfortunately, here at home, many important world events have been upstaged by a sensational presidential race that thrives on personality rather than problem solving. FAOs abroad, true #problemsolvers, are tracking an array of increasingly complex issues that, to them and our partners, merit much attention.

In the wake of the Brussels and Paris bombings, investigations continue to show how terrorist networks have extended across Europe, taking advantage of permissive environments to expand and plan attacks. The resultant cultural Balkanization within European states is understandable, perhaps inevitable, but potentially exacerbating to the situation. Many worry, perhaps the experiment of Western pluralism has been stretched too thin. As the poet Yeats put it, “Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world.” Although that poem was written nearly a century ago to describe the atmosphere of post-war Europe, the sentiments are being echoed again today in Europe’s social media and political speeches.

ISIS now controls a large portion of eastern Syria and northwest Iraq. Russia has been bombing anti-ISIS rebels in Syria that the Pentagon regards as partners. Assad’s indiscriminate bombing is inflicting casualties on civilians that make the numbers of ISIS victims look small by comparison.

Iraqi forces spent months trying to retake Ramadi, the Anbar province capital, and at the end of December finally succeeded. The next goal will be to grasp Mosul back from the clutches of ISIS.

Turkey’s long conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) continues to escalate with recent, devastating suicide bombings claiming many civilian lives. Ankara worries that cross-border Kurdish solidarity will further strengthen demands for a separate state.

The Saudi-led war in Yemen, backed by the U.S., U.K., and Gulf allies, has been slouching forward. Nearly 6,000 people have been reported killed, half civilians. Over 2 million people have been displaced and an additional 120k have fled the country. The conflict fuels the fire of terrorism across the entire Arabian Peninsula.

In Libya, following NATO’s ouster of Qaddafi, various tribes, political parties, and militias have contended for power over oil and gas resources. The country has been governed by two rival factions, so no true leadership is actually established.

Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon face a mounting threat from Boko Haram. Over the past six years, the group has grown from a small movement in northern Nigeria to an organized terrorist network capable of devastating attacks across the Lake Chad basin. Military countermeasures have had minimal success stopping Boko Haram’s suicide bombers, many of whom are



Graham Plaster
Editor in Chief,
FAO Association
Journal

Follow on Twitter
[@FAOAssociation](#)

young women and girls.

South Sudan is at risk of descending into full-blown civil war. Over the past two years, over 2.4 million have been displaced, and tens of thousands have been killed. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which mediated the peace agreement, and international powers (including China, Norway, the U.S., and the U.K.) must find a way to compel South Sudan to respect their peace deal commitments.

In Burundi, Nkurunziza’s re-election in July, following a failed coup, prompted a series of conflicts between government forces and armed opposition. Dead bodies are appearing in the streets almost daily. So far, the crisis seems more political than ethnic. But more than 200k people have fled the country and U.N. officials have warned of potential mass atrocities if the violence continues unchecked.

Afghanistan remains embroiled in conflict 14+ years after U.S. intervention. Today, the Taliban, despite internal factions, remains formidable; while al Qaeda and ISIS also maintain footholds. The U.S. now says it will keep troop levels at around 10k for most of 2016, and NATO has committed financial support to Afghan security forces through 2020.

The South China Sea is set for a U.S.-China face-off, as we challenge their land reclamation and construction efforts. China’s assertion of territorial rights conflicts with a number of Southeast Asian nations in an area rich with fisheries and possible oil or gas resources. Secretary Carter has called for an immediate halt to Chinese land reclamation and announced that the U.S. “will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows.” The White House announced an aid package worth \$259 million over two years to support maritime security for Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia. In what might prove a landmark case, The Hague is considering a request for arbitration filed by the Philippines accusing China of violating international law. The case could galvanize international opinion and slow China’s soft imperialism.

But this is only wave tops, as we say in the navy. There are many more world events worth mentioning here, and the truth of every scenario is much more complex and rapidly evolving than a sentence or paragraph can do justice. As with every FAOA journal edition, it is our hope that the articles and award winning papers included here will spark the kinds of important discussion that lead to real solutions. Please feel free to leave comments in the Foreign Area Officers Association LinkedIn group regarding any of the content, or shoot us a letter to the editor editor@FAOA.org.

Sincerely,

Graham

RUSSIAN INFORMATION OPERATIONS A MEANS SEEKING AN END

BY MAJOR KRIS BARRITEAU, U.S.
MAJOR JEREMY COLE, U.S., AND
MAJOR BEN PIERCE, U.S.

Editor's Note: This thesis won the FAO Association writing award at the Joint and Combined Warfighting School. In the interest of space we publish this version without the authors' research notes. To see the full thesis with research notes, please visit www.FAOA.org and follow links for FAOA members only content.

Author's Disclaimer: The contents of this submission reflect our writing team's original views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

ABSTRACT

Russia is on a crusade to reshape its global image and the West is not doing anything about it. In a move to break with an unsavory past, Russian Information Operations (IO) is boldly pushing a global-reassertion campaign. This campaign intends to reestablish Russia to global super-power status. Inflammatory actions diluted through state-driven IO threateningly suggest this message is gaining ground. This global reconstruction via IO aims to ensure strategic access, counter Western influence and secure Russian territorial integrity. Strategic access enables this global resurgence image, counters NATO's expansion along Russia's flanks and intends to provide physical buffer zones for self-protection. Interestingly, the conflict in Ukraine makes clear that Russian IO efforts to counter Western influence are mixed. Traditional areas of support remain true for now, yet globalization is orienting many Ukrainians to the West. Finally, Russian IO is working to undo perceived existential threats. These include, undermining Europe's "foot in the door" efforts in Ukraine, some 'house-keeping' concerns all projected under a blanket of legitimacy.

INTRODUCTION

Russia is on a crusade to reshape its image. With the demise of the USSR, many former republics, tired of propaganda, oppression and terror, broke away and declared independence. Twenty years ago, Russian Information Operations (IO) aimed to undo a bleak image where unfavorable characterizations of daily life -- endemic corruption at all levels, rampant organized criminal networks, muted social unrest, widespread financial hardships and an oppressive information environment -- were commonplace. Today's Russian IO efforts meld these past tendencies with a threatening boldness. Hence, 'opportunities' like Ukraine or Syria ensure Russia stays at center stage. The shrewd use of US media to influence

US military options for Syria or the support for Hungary's recently announced ideological break with the European Union (EU) suggest these IO efforts are gaining traction. Putin's recent statements alluding to "new strategic nuclear weapons," expressed during a recent Crimean conference designed to quell rumblings among Crimean legislators, exemplify a global threat. Unimpeded, Russian IO will continue to press forward to enable Russia to reassert itself on the global stage through strategic access, countering Western Influence and securing its territorial integrity.

RUSSIAN IO THEORY AND DOCTRINE

Any discussion of Russia's IO practices must begin with an analysis of their theory and doctrine. Deduced from comments of Russian experts and recent operations, Russian ideas of IO appear more broad and encompassing than the US. They divide IO into a technical branch, containing things the US would consider electronic warfare, cyber ops, and info-denial operations, and a psychological branch, including psychological warfare, strategic communications, deceit / deception, etc. Russian IO also includes Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence, disinformation and degrading enemy communications. They place as much emphasis on disorganizing their enemy's information as on gathering and safeguarding their own. Part of that is manipulating the opponent's cognitive process to suit their goals. Finally, Russian doctrine implicitly integrates cyberspace operations into IO clearly seen in the 2008 Georgia campaign, recently in Crimea and currently in eastern Ukraine.

STRATEGIC ACCESS

Moscow's recent move to reintegrate Crimea was drastic, risky and shows that Crimea has strategic value. An initial glance, could suggest Crimea offers little. The much-vaunted Sevastopol naval base houses the critical Black Sea Fleet, but Ukraine agreed to a long-term extension, with caveats, of the lease back in 2010. Additionally, a new Black Sea Fleet base at Novorossiysk reduces the criticality of Sevastopol. Yet Sevastopol still holds an important place in Russia's expanding world-view because the Black Sea Fleet is at the center of a new Mediterranean Task Force. The Task force became prominent in 2008 when it ferried troops to the Russo-Georgia war, resumed permanent operations in the eastern Mediterranean, delivered munitions to Syria, removed their chemical weapons, and conducted anti-piracy patrols in Somalia. So on its face,

Crimea does not have much strategic value, but the answer requires us to open our aperture in terms of Russia's 'reassertion' vision.

Russian resurgence, most recently demonstrated in Crimea and continuing in eastern Ukraine, has three components: to reassert itself as a world power, to counter NATO's expansion, and to create buffer zones along its periphery. These elements depend on physical access as a prerequisite to advance the Russian IO cause. Accordingly, Putin has, for the past decade, been on a campaign to increase Russia's power to rival the US. In a recent "State of the Union" address, he specifically described the world as "multi-polar," directly countering the US National Security Strategy that describes the US as the "sole global superpower." Secondly, Putin's campaign is a reaction to perceived NATO encirclement of Russia, especially along its southwestern flank, and a wider objection to the increased western orientation of its border states. Finally, Putin's campaign is a resumption of traditional Russian international politics intending to secure non-threatening buffer states along its periphery affirming it will interfere quite decisively to achieve this goal. The most recent IO and cyber operations thus are simply an evolution in tactics, not of worldview.

The top objective for President Putin, aside from his own political survival, is the re-elevation of Russia to the rank of superpower: "[Russia is] on a quest to restore its influence on at least some of the strategic positions it enjoyed prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union and reassert its former status as a world power." Putin's New York Times letter and his role as mediator in getting Syria to give up its chemical weapons show global IO image reshaping. Ironically, Putin is no stranger to challengers of his IO themes, and he warns his people about the "threat" of Western ideology and influence. Along those lines, even Russia's IO doctrine and approach incorporates this strategic conflict of ideology and vulnerability of national culture to outside influence.

Secondly, Putin is seeking to counter the expansion of NATO and increasingly western orientation of former USSR states. Putin's attitude toward the dissolution of the USSR is well-documented -- "a major geopolitical disaster of the century." But even beyond Putin, the Kremlin never lost a focus on the territories it once possessed. Moscow reacted with hostility and no small sense of betrayal when NATO not only continued its operations, but also actually increased its assertiveness (ALLIED FORCE in 1999 and OPERATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR in 2011) expanding into former Warsaw Pact countries, which the Kremlin believed the West promised it would not do. It's no shock then that Moscow reacted aggressively toward the Ballistic Missile Defense initiative. Nor does a bold Crimean land grab or a very risky intervention in Ukraine seem farfetched when revolution threatened to reverse Ukraine's orbit from Moscow-centered to EU-centered.

To counter the expansion of NATO, Putin turned inward, to strengthen Russia against the encroachment of Arab Spring-style revolution and Western ideas, and outward to re-orient its border states back toward the Kremlin. President Putin has, for the past decade, been on a campaign to "preserve its national

and spiritual identity" against what they see as a "well-directed propaganda attack" from the West. Putin's goals, in his own words, include "strengthening the spiritual and moral fabric of society...enshrining our traditional values" from what he sees as Western encroachment. While Putin may have some heartburn for a loss of traditional Russian values, the true reason he fears western ideology was its potential to displace his own rule of Russia. The Ukrainian revolution in late 2013 "confronted the Kremlin with an existential threat to its own fragile legal order. The wave of uprisings that have transformed political systems in the Middle East suddenly washed up on Russia's own shores."

Russia in the early 90s was prostrate due to political and economic paralysis in the wake of Communism, but once Russia recovered economically it immediately turned to its former satellites and desired to resume its former status as the center of their orbits. Beginning with the 'Stans' of central Asia, Moscow has sought to increase its influence in North Korea, Cuba, Belarus, Georgia (through less peaceful means), and over Eastern Europe in general (via their reliance upon Russian natural gas). The recent seizure of Crimea had the collateral benefit of increasing the defense of Russia's broad southwestern flank by stationing advanced Surface to air missiles on the peninsula.

Given the USSR's perceived fall from grace, Russian IO has worked to rebuild a strong image through strategic access to enable the reassertion of a world-power image, to push back against NATO encirclement and to create buffer zones. Russian activity as outlined has bolstered its image on the global stage.

COUNTERING WESTERN INFLUENCE

In 1991 as the Iron Curtain collapsed and Ukraine gained its independence, Ukraine was suddenly in a position to reinforce and expand its culture, manage existing Soviet cultural influence and welcome in new cultural experiences from the West. In the years following their independence, the Ukrainian-national-cultural identity became severely degraded. This reduction in cultural growth is attributed to the "rapidly increasing flow of mass-cultural imports from the West and from Russia." Globalization and the competing Western/Russian fight for cultural influence greatly affected Ukrainian society. Hollywood movies and TV shows saturated the market while Russian book sales and distribution dwarfed the existing Ukrainian system. While the youth in Ukraine (primarily located in urban areas) mostly emulate Western culture and media, the elder generations who live in the less economically vibrant areas of rural Ukraine usually prefer Russian media and ties to a Soviet culture not quite forgotten.

Perhaps the most accurate measurement of effective cultural influence is the pervasiveness of a specific non-native language. Although the Russian language has a long history in Ukraine, as the two nations are geographically very close, English is rapidly emerging as the language of choice in Ukrainian universities, corporate communities and throughout the public and private education system. Many young Ukrainians are now focusing only on Ukrainian and English; Russian

is no longer a priority. Ukrainian youth are adapting to the current world order and have recognized that future prosperity resides in the West, not Russia. Ukrainian students who desire to achieve the highest levels of advanced education must speak English to use a variety of distance learning opportunities, to be successful in college and advanced schooling exams such as the GRE.

Western influence, the English language in particular, has permeated Ukrainian culture to the point where the Ukrainian language is rapidly adjusting and morphing in order to capitalize on the overwhelming amount of technological, business, media and educational opportunities that exist only under the umbrella of Western civilization. Several major Ukrainian newspapers and other publications are only printed in Ukrainian and English; Russian is no longer included.

Powerful Western corporations such as McDonalds, Sony and Coke, as well as their associated advertising, are prevalent throughout Ukraine yet the letters and symbols cannot be transliterated in Ukrainian or Russian. Ukrainian written text is assimilating those Latin letters into its linguistic structure as a necessary step in adapting to the significant Western culture influencing the nation. Advertising from Western business is extensive and covers not only the Internet but also TV, billboards and printed media. The English/Ukrainian language blend in urban areas is easily identifiable.

Ukrainian youth are particularly susceptible to Western cultural influence. Urban youth in particular, emulate Western youth with tattoos, clothes, music, fashion and behavior. Slang is another way Ukrainian youth express themselves. They frequently borrow English slang words and incorporate them in their vernacular. Youth from major urban centers, with constant access to the Internet, Western movies, TV and advertising, use slang much more than their rural counterparts. The apex of Western slang and youth culture is the establishment of the American Music television (MTV) network in Ukraine. In 2007, MTV established a 24-hour TV, Internet and satellite channel whose broadcasts reach nearly three million Ukrainian households.

Western and Russian culture influenced Ukrainian society to such a level that in 2007, the “Constitutional Court of Ukraine ruled that starting in 2008 all foreign-language movies in the country should be translated into Ukrainian using dubbing or synchronous translation.” This ruling aimed to protect traditional Ukrainian culture from a potential ‘Russian’ or ‘Western-influence’ takeover. In her thesis “The influence of English on Ukrainian, with a focus on the language of youth”, Viktoriya Polyarush argues that Ukraine’s primary concern is the risk of the country reverting to a time when a Russian takeover of the Ukrainian language and culture was a legitimate concern. She also argues that while the majority of the population welcomes Western influence and the English language as a positive step towards Western prosperity and opportunity, the country’s primary concern is to maintain Ukrainian cultural identity.

Russian and Western interests continue to maneuver for cultural control in Ukrainian society. Russia’s influence and close historical, ethnic and language ties with the south and

east of Ukraine have allowed for a sympathetic population that wholly supports using the Russian language and accepting increased Russian influence in the region. The remainder of Ukraine is more open to Western influence, advertising, education and the English language.

SECURING TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

History lends credence to the idea that a Russian conspiratorial mindset exists among its people and especially its leaders. For example, preoccupations with the Bolshevik movement post 1917 “translated into a permanent obsession with conspiracies and plots. In the Lenin period, this culminated in the great terror.” Another example is the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 in which Russian gains, dismissed via the San Stefano Treaty, were plastered across the media. Both exemplify national narratives deeply rooted in belief structures supported by conspiracy theories. A more recent Russian threat assessment reflected this mindset: “The Russian intelligence community is seriously worried about latent social processes capable of leading to the beginning of civil wars and conflicts on RF [Russian Federation] territory that can end up in a disruption of territorial integrity...” Combining this mindset and threat perception, concern over Russia’s territorial integrity continues to drive its IO. These efforts in Ukraine aim to undo EU intervention efforts, to ensure Ukrainian and Russian internal security and to project legitimacy of its actions among its people.

As casualty counts increase and refugees escape ongoing fighting in eastern Ukraine, Russia is more worried about money. Therefore, Russian IO efforts to undermine and dismiss EU financial sanctions and discredit recently signed EU Association Agreements make sense. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin recently leveraged international outrage of the shoot down of the civilian airliner over eastern Ukraine by alleged pro-Russian rebels to call the EU to task, “the EU must send a clear message of solidarity with and support for Ukraine, which [is] now being punished for its EU aspirations.”

European Prime Ministers’ response criticizing Russian unwillingness to “control the flow of arms and heavy weapons across the border to the eastern regions of Ukraine” drove increased-sanctions not the downed aircraft. While the EU works to develop further sanctions, cold financial facts will likely give insight to future Russian IO messaging. Because the EU is Russia’s largest trade partner and Russia is EU’s number three partner, this quid-pro-quo relationship is unlikely to draw too much fire. To this end, Russian officials coolly pointed out that EU sanctions are “counterproductive...cynical... [and] useless.”

Despite EU’s increasingly stiff sanctions, Russian media insist the “reunification” with Crimea was legal, while conversely rejecting Western allegations of interference in east Ukraine. Some European media sources are ambivalent regarding sanctions saying they’d have “limited consequences.” Yet the latest sanctions prevent EU nations from selling dual-use (military-civilian) items worth 20B EURO (\$26.8B USD) to Russia while its arms companies will only lose an estimated 3B EURO (\$4B USD) in sales to EU nations. More targeted measures will impact Russian state-owned banks, oil and sensitive technology

industries and government officials. These measures will negatively impact Russia and, more problematically, EU nations. Nevertheless, tougher sanctions communicate EU political resolve. Unfortunately, they'll likely impose greater unwelcome financial burdens. Barring unprecedented conflict escalation, it's unlikely European countries could impose sanctions that would greatly hinder Russia's existence.

Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova recently signed association agreements (AA) with the EU. These agreements, if adhered to, pave the way for the signatories to integrate politically and economically with Europe. Russian IO messages show clear disdain for this agreement in various ways. Russian officials said they'd take measures to protect their interests and trade relations. Associated messages revisited these topics and suggested Ukraine had very little to offer the EU. Yet Russian reliance on Ukrainian military-industry firms for ICBM guidance systems, rocket motors and turbofans, among other military wares, decries this assertion. Russian government critics believe the AAs will change virtually nothing in Russo-Ukraine trade relations. While official pronouncements suggest Moscow considers these AAs a serious financial threat, it's also plausible this financial union represents an unsavory political threat to the integrity of the nation. Given the aforementioned economic ties, the overall IO message regarding EU sanctions seems unconcerned. However, AA signatory activity, probably Ukraine in particular, have spawned official "protective measures" declarations. These statements address serious financial threats, but the underlying message intimates a broad concern for Russia's security as a national interest.

Russia's internal IO goal is to quell in-house security concerns. This messaging centers on the protection of national identity, media-moderation campaigns and applying lessons learned from the 1999 war with Chechnya. To begin with, views of the heart of Russian ethos reveal strong ties to Ukraine. These ties extend back a millennium linking history, language, culture, descendants and religion all originating from Kiev. Putin believes in this legacy and shares his view often: "We [Russia and Ukraine] are not merely close neighbors... but are in fact, as I have said many times, one people... All the same, we cannot be one without the other." Putin shared this conviction at the Bucharest NATO summit in 2008, with then US President George W. Bush explaining that Ukraine exists in large part because of Russian magnanimity. He underlined its inherent value to Pres. Bush with a threat summarized by known-expert Professor Nikolas Gvosdev: **If any effort was made to pull Ukraine completely into the Western orbit and into position vis-à-vis Russia (specifically referring at the time to extending Ukraine a Membership Action Plan**

for NATO), then Ukraine would cease to exist as a state and Russia might be forced to take steps to detach Crimea and eastern Ukraine from Kiev's control.

These prophetic words communicated a clear concern of US intentions to help exacerbate or mitigate a crisis. Russian annexation of Crimea shows Putin's message was authentic. Ukraine had sought EU membership for a number of years. In late February of this year, with popular tensions increasing across Ukraine (including Crimea), the EU finally gave Ukraine the green light. Shortly thereafter, reports of unidentified

UKRAINE, GEORGIA AND MOLDOVA RECENTLY SIGNED ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS (AA) WITH THE EU... TO INTEGRATE POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY WITH EUROPE. RUSSIAN IO MESSAGES SHOW CLEAR DISDAIN FOR THIS AGREEMENT

armed men appearing across Crimea popped up. Combining Putin's strong belief in Russia's Ukrainian heritage with his words of warning, the Crimea land grab seemed a logical Russian follow to the EU nod. Subsequent conflict with tacit Russian support in eastern Ukraine also makes sense in this light. Putin's actions seem logical for someone interested in securing the image of the cradle of modern-Russian civilization.

In Crimea, eastern Ukraine and the mainland, Russian IO activity seeks to balance, stabilize and secure the populace emphasizing heavy-handed, excessively-regulated or financially-imposing tactics. According to a UN report, since Crimea's annexation "activists who opposed the 16 March referendum" have been persecuted politically, socially and physically. The report also says "several Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar media outlets are under threat of closing...the only Ukrainian language newspaper in Crimea, received an order from the Crimean authorities to leave the premises which they have been renting for years."

Similar media-shaping activity in eastern Ukraine is clamping down on journalists, telling them what to report, requiring registration with local authorities and replacing Ukrainian programs with Russian-TV broadcasts. Interestingly, near the end of the 2008 Russo-Georgia war, Russian journalists also had to get "special accreditation" to continue reporting on the conflict. The change was meant to weed out journalists

not telling the correct story for the internal Russian audience. Numbers from 2008 suggest 96% of Ukrainians have TVs in their homes, and most likely access to news reporting. Combine these numbers with a recently approved new law banning advertisements on paid TV. This law appears to have two effects. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) representative on Freedom of the Media, Dunja Mijatović, alluded to one effect, monopoly creation for state-run stations through overregulation. The second effect negatively impacts viewers and regional broadcasters. Viewers will have to pay increased fees, which will likely decrease audience size. Regional broadcasters, unable to hurdle the digital switchover, will have to stop broadcasting. In this manner, the state-run stations come out on top. The OSCE confirms this thought suggesting this law will “further limit media pluralism and free flow of information in Russia.” Combined Russian efforts to censor media reporting, provide pro-Russian views and impose fiscally-irrational laws across the information environments of Crimea, eastern Ukraine and Russia provide compelling evidence of a persistent narrative aimed to cast Russia in a positive light in the minds of the people living in these areas.

Russian IO showed its value during the second Chechnya war by winning popular support. Understanding that the Chechen goal was to break up the Russian state, authorities acted swiftly using IO to help them. Professor Stephen Blank says the Russians waged a “systematic campaign to capture Russian hearts and minds in order to...make public support the lubricant of the armed forces, use the media campaign to seize that public support, isolate the insurgents from domestic and foreign support, and frame the war as a terrorist campaign.” The popular support gained via IO enabled Russia to cage extremists’ efforts bent on breaking them up. To summarize, Russian IO aims to quiet internal security concerns across the nation. IO messages emphasize the inextricable nature of Russian ties with Ukraine and employ physical, financial or legal tactics to assure messages stay in tune. Additionally, lessons learned from Chechnya demonstrate a proven capability to gain popular support in defense of Russia’s territorial integrity.

The final piece to Russia’s territorial integrity security puzzle is IO to impose legitimacy of its actions to its people across nationwide. This is visible through Russian attempts to mirror Western principles, appeals to international law and calls to defend Russian citizens abroad. The 2008 Russo-Georgia war is one of Russia’s most notable uses of western concepts to justify bellicose actions. To be fair, Russia did warn Georgia it was conducting peace enforcement operations in South Ossetia in July of the same year. Yet when combat operations began, Russia couldn’t tell their story in Georgia due to successful Georgian IO in Tbilisi painting Russia as the aggressor.

As operations continued, some suggest Russia went into an information defensive followed by an information offensive. Defensive elements included accusations to undermine Georgian efforts and culminated on the last day of the conflict with confessions from captured Georgian troops preparing “terrorist attacks” shown on state-run TV covering most of Russian

and parts of the Commonwealth of Independent states. While Georgian IO efforts gained a local advantage during conflict, Russian IO was in full offensive swing by its end. During this period, Russian media touted Western-oriented principles -- defending minorities oppressed by the majority, humanitarian intervention, preemptive action, proportional use of force and the desires of the people -- to go into Georgia. These ideas provided credibility at home with further IO actions proving Georgian media provided “fabricated interviews and photos” creating an internal victory for Russian IO.

Russian calls on international law to legitimize its actions during the 2008 Russo-Georgia conflict were unsuccessful. One Russian Defense authority claimed Russia didn’t need UN authorization to go into Georgia because Article 51 of the UN charter ensures a state’s right to self-defense. Interestingly, Article 81 of the Russian constitution states, “war can be declared only in the event of aggression against Russia or the immediate threat of aggression.” It’s possible Russian peace enforcement personnel in South Ossetia, since the 90s, felt threatened. However, Georgian sovereignty should have prevented Russia from invading. Legal analysis supports this: “No international or domestic act can justify the Russian military invasion of the sovereign territory of the Republic of Georgia, or the recognition of the self-proclaimed independence of Georgian separatist regions by the RF [Russian Federation].” While it appears Russia crossed the legal line, it was fruitless because the perplexing nature of Russian and international law undermined the messaging effort.

Russian IO to justify a ‘defense of Russian citizens abroad campaign’ have had mixed results. One side of the 2008 Russo-Georgia conflict says this necessity to defend fellow countrymen from ‘genocide’ was touted as justification for Russian-military actions. The other side says Putin’s actions likely “contradict[ed] Russian domestic-military legislation. These contradictions explain why the ‘Western-legitimacy’ tact received the lion’s share of the media coverage in 2008. Today, despite failed attempts to sell this message well to the public, Putin again said he’d “defend the interests of ethnic Russians abroad,” most likely referring to pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine. Despite the legal contradictions, this people-centric message, laced with powerful pathos, rings true with many Russians living abroad. Hence, seeking legitimacy through IO means in support of national integrity has mixed results. Russian IO struggles then success in the Russo-Georgia conflict, most likely helped gain popular support. Legal contradictions shushed appeals to international law while the call to defend Russian interests abroad surely warmed the hearts of a few select individuals.

Russia is striving to counter threats to its national integrity by using IO to counter Ukraine’s EU pathway, to ensure concerns about internal integrity are squashed and to capture legitimacy in the minds of its people. Current IO efforts aim to undermine EU intervention and AAs minimizing financial benefits and emphasizing financial impositions for Ukraine and its European partners. EU’s financial sanctions accompany the Russian concern of Ukraine’s newfound EU political alignment. Internal IO policing efforts insist deeply-rooted

ties with Ukraine must continue. As a result, the media environment must change to ensure mother Russia stays relevant. To do so, any opportunity to wage a campaign to win the 'hearts and minds' of the people will be necessary. For this campaign to be successful, legitimacy must answer tough questions. Luckily, western tactics abound across the information domain and are much more successful than complicated legal appeals, faster than getting approval and give time to share kind words of concern for troubled-countrymen abroad.

With the end of the USSR's glory days, Russian IO efforts to undo the past and rebuild future perceptions continue. Putin's aggressive boldness provides a frightening model for these activities. These efforts depend on strategic access to reassert a Russian world-power image. Russian 'outreach' intends to offer the world another super-power option. Discomfort with logical consequences of globalization resulted in Russian actions to counter perceived geographical caging and, if worse comes to worst; the idea of a buffer zone provides some comfort. Increased Western influence in Ukraine is another fruit of globalization. Russian IO continues to pursue avenues of approach to counter this influence. In traditionally supportive areas, these efforts meet with some success. Nevertheless, Ukrainians don't value Russian culture like they used to. Linguistic changes, Western cultural references and influences are adapting to embrace Western ideals because they pave paths to successful living. Much like the conflict zones in Ukraine, these influences will continue to be 'contested-areas' where support for pro-Russian rebels continues. As conflicts rage on, Russian IO efforts will seek to ensure territorial integrity. IO to minimize and chastise EU actions, whether financial or political, will surely ring true given Russia's limited media options. Where necessary, Russian IO may be required to legitimize Moscow's actions which most assuredly will have some 'Westernized' flavors. Barring action by the West and given today's globalized IO environment, Russian IO appears to be on track enabling a new global 'reassertion' image through strategic access, countering Western influence and securing their territory.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS:

Major Kris Barriteau, U.S. Army, is a Special Forces Officer assigned to SOCEUR. He was commissioned through ROTC at the University of Massachusetts - Amherst in 2000. Major Barriteau earned a BA in Sociology and an MS in Defense Analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School. Prior to his current assignment, he served as the Executive Officer, 1-10th SFG(A).

Major Jeremy Cole, U.S. Air Force, serves in the ISRD section of NATO's Deployable Air Operations Center in Poggio Renatico, Italy. He was commissioned through Officer Training School in 2002. Major Cole earned his BA in Spanish from Weber State University in 1999 and an MA in Spanish from the University of Kansas in 2001. Prior to his current assignment, Major Cole served as the Chief of Strategic Communications at the Inter American Air Forces Academy, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas.

Major Benjamin Pierce, U.S. Air Force, serves in the J-2 office, USEUCOM, in Stuttgart, Germany. He earned his BS in Political Science and was commissioned through the U.S. Air Force Academy in 2002, and earned his MS in International Relations from Troy State University in 2009. Prior to his current assignment, Major Pierce served as the Chief of Wing Intelligence at Kunsan AB, South Korea.



JTG
inc.

Companies and governments trust JTG's expertise, client-focused processes and efficient use of technology for developing and deploying their global initiatives.

We combine tested localization procedures with cultural insight to support global objectives with true intelligence. Our multidisciplinary subject matter experts understand the complete spectrum of communication services, working as an extension of a client's team, to address projects from every angle and deliver consistent value and ROI.

JTG-INC.COM

Caging the Russian Bear by Controlling His Diet

An Economic Assessment of Russian Vulnerabilities

BY COLONEL DAVE W. BURTON, U.S. MARINE CORPS;
LIEUTENANT COLONEL ERIC S. FAJARDO, U.S. AIR FORCE;
AND
COLONEL SCOTT A. JACKSON, U.S. ARMY

Editor's Note: This thesis won the FAO Association writing award at the Joint and Combined Warfighting School, Joint Forces Staff College. We are pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship. To see the full paper with research notes, please visit www.FAOA.org and follow links for FAOA members only content.

Author's Disclaimer: The contents of this submission reflect our writing team's original views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

Throughout its history, Russia as a nation-state has oscillated between strength and weakness, between friend and foe with respect to Western European Nations and eventually the United States. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia wallowed in a decade of regression and weakness as she struggled with the traumatic transition from nearly eight decades of communist rule to something moving towards a democratic state. In mid-1998, with the bail out from the International Monetary Fund and the appointment of Vladimir Putin as the Prime Minister by President Boris Yeltsin and his subsequent 2003 election as Russian President, Russia began the long process of reclaiming its former position of authority and respect amongst the community of nations. Putin's efforts to rebuild Russian power resulted in the reassertion of influence in former Warsaw Pact countries, including the 2008 military action in Georgia, territorial expansion into portions of Ukraine, and the annexation of Crimea. This resurrection of power and influence has caused many regional nations from the former Warsaw Pact to reassess the risk associated with an aggressive Russia, and to determine the most appropriate way-ahead to retain their autonomy. Given the relatively recent history of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, some see the military-centric Western approach to contain the Soviet Union as a potential strategic template for resisting Russia. Confronting Russia today, however, in the same manner as the Soviet Union of the 20th Century would be a mistake. The Cold War, born out of competing ideologies which won World War II, was largely a balancing of military strength, supported by the other elements of National Power.

During the Cold War, the United States' view of the Soviet threat was primarily focused on the Soviet military alliance's conventional military capability and the underlying strength of its nuclear arsenal. As a result, the United States' main intelligence collection efforts were devoted to counting nuclear warheads and to assessing the locations of the various delivery systems in ever more sophisticated attempts to determine the correct "correlation of forces" balance between the two superpowers. Because of this myopic focus on the military instrument of Soviet power, the United States failed to correctly assess the overall structural deficiencies in the Soviet Union evidenced mostly by a failing economic system, and was subsequently surprised by its collapse in 1991. Yegor Gaider describes the Soviet Union in the 1980s, as a structural economic basket case too inefficient to feed itself with uncompetitive industries overly reliant on petrochemicals and extracting industries. He states, "(T)he combination of large costs of importing grain (which could not be reduced because they were the result of long-term problems in domestic agriculture and weather conditions), an uncompetitive manufacturing sector, and the unpredictability of raw materials prices (which could have been used to offset the food imports) became the Achilles' heel of the Soviet economy by the mid-1980s. In the period 1981-85, under the influence of increasing difficulties in supplying food, the share of machinery and equipment imported from the capitalist countries was reduced from 26 percent to 20 percent, and the share of imported food and consumer goods rose to 44 percent."

In the United States, policy makers at the highest levels of government failed to consider the Soviet economy in assessing its overall military capability, and consequently missed the central cause of the Soviet demise. As stated by George Kennan, the main architect of the U.S. containment strategy in the Cold War, it was, "hard to think of any event more strange and startling, and at first glance inexplicable, than the sudden and total disintegration and disappearance...of the great power known successively as the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union."

The United States and Western governments, in formulating policies to address a newly assertive Russia, are likely to

repeat the mistakes made in correctly assessing the Soviet Union's capability if they focus only on Russia's military strength, actions, and competency. The best way to address the 21st Century Russia is to view the confrontation with the West as a contest of balancing economic power primarily, and that the elements of economic power, focused on the critical vulnerabilities of the Russian economy, offer the best opportunities to curb Russian international aggression.

PUTIN'S STRATEGY

Before determining an effective means to counter a nation's strategy, you must first understand the strategy. Russia's strategic goals are shaped by its history of invasion and occupation by other European powers. During the Soviet empire, a critical part of the defense of Russia was the geographic buffer of distance, provided by the layer of allied states separating "The Motherland" from her primary enemies. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the expansion of NATO eastward, and the drifting of the former Warsaw Pact states to the West, significantly reduced that protective barrier. This has resulted in Russia having a weakened defense posture and has reduced its position of influence in the World. The aim of Putin's current strategy is to return Russia to her rightful position of power with respect to its neighbors and to the other world power centers, and reestablish its protective buffer of compliant buffer states.

The mechanics of Putin's strategy rely on rebuilding the visible components of Russian hard power evidenced by efforts to modernize and to demonstrate Russia's military capability. The Chechen Wars ending in 1996 went badly for Russia's military, and since then, with Russia's coffers full because of the high price of oil, Putin began working to restore the Russian military to a position of regional qualitative supremacy through a significant modernization program. Putin has used this revitalized military power to pursue limited objectives aimed at reasserting the regional influence lost after the fall of the Soviet Union in areas he considers the "near abroad," by conducting operations in Georgia and Ukraine, and by seeking to intimidate the Baltic States and other former Warsaw Pact countries to return to Russia's sphere. Putin's actions have, however, sought to avoid direct confrontation with the West. Overt confrontation will threaten his primary requirement of needing to participate in the global economic system in order to apply the economic leverage of Russia's energy resources to his weaker, more vulnerable neighbors in the region.

Drawing on the lessons of his post-Soviet predecessors, Putin's first priority was to implement extensive internal reforms. His goal was to 'right the ship' of a struggling Russian economy following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the economic underperformance of the Yeltsin regime to set the conditions for external expansion and to solidify his internal support base while removing opposition oligarchs. After establishing economic stasis, he then shifted focus to asserting Russia's economic power associated with its resource base. Largely built around the Russian oil and gas industry, Putin has maintained a positive trade balance since 2000 and grown the

Russian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) consistently, with a tenfold increase in GDP from 1999 to 2013 that was almost exclusively driven by the increase in crude oil prices (\$11 per barrel in 1998 and \$94 in 2013).

The former Soviet Republics in Eastern and Southern Europe previously formed a military buffer zone between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Russian heartland. With the demise of the Warsaw Pact, Putin sought to reestablish its protective barrier through energy dependence. The near total reliance on Russian oil and gas in these countries has allowed Putin to exert strong political influence. The admission of twelve former Warsaw Pact Countries into NATO and the creation of the European Union (EU) complicated the hitherto exclusive application of soft economic power and likely precipitated the military intervention in Crimea and Ukraine to regain the initiative in Russia's sphere of influence. Furthermore, Russia's participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and its creation of the Eurasian Economic Union are two other examples of Russian attempts regain the initiative.

In evaluating Putin's strategy of economic leverage, coupled with military hard power to create strategic space and enhance national standing, one has to determine if this strategy is intended to counter US interests. Although Russia no longer represents the counter to American democracy previously epitomized by the Soviet Union, its nuclear arsenal still presents an existential threat to the US. Therefore, a dominant Russia is worthy of close observation and actions taken by the United States to contain Russian influence are necessary. Putin's strategy is Russian centric, utilitarian, and strongly promotes the idea of national sovereignty and Russia as a world power. A current example of that strategy is the ongoing Russian support to the Assad Regime, under the guise of counter-ISIL operations, informed by the instability in Iraq and Libya that Putin believes resulted from Western regime change. While the majority of the Western world acknowledges the extremely destabilizing effects of Islamic extremism and terror, Russia would subvert Western efforts to confront this threat in order to maintain a sovereign pro-Russian regime, in the form of Syria, in the Middle East. In Europe, Russia has shifted from wanting to be part of the European security system, to wanting to fracture the existing security system so it cannot overwhelm Russia as a collective entity. Russia requires a strong economy to execute its strategic imperatives and its adversarial energy centric strategy should be opposed by the U.S. and its Western partners.

THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY

Throughout history, Russia (and the Soviet Union), has possessed the tools for sustained strong economic performance on the European continent. As the Library of Congress Russian Country Study states, "Russia is one of the world's richest countries in raw materials, many of which are significant inputs for an industrial economy. Russia accounts for around 20 percent of the world's production of oil and natural gas and possesses large reserves of both commodities. This abundance has made Russia self-sufficient in energy and a large-scale exporter of fuels. Oil and gas were primary hard-currency



Figure 1: Russian GDP, 2006-2007

earners for the Soviet Union, and they remain so for the Russian Federation. Russia also is self-sufficient in nearly all major industrial raw materials and has at least some reserves of every industrially valuable nonfuel mineral.”

In spite of abundant resources, modern Russian history has been shaped by the ineffective exploitation and usage of those resources, mainly due to lack of diversification of industry and inability to transform its economy to a market driven model. In his stewardship of Russia’s resurgence, Putin is repeating Russia’s historical mistake by overly relying on its natural resources and by failing to modernize its economy. Instead of promoting economic strength and shared prosperity through developing a diversified economy with technological and institutional development, Putin consolidated power through economic cronyism. He has been seduced by the seemingly ever increasing price of oil and has linked Russia’s long term economic viability to the price of the commodity. According to Edward Lucas in *The New Cold War: Putin’s Russia and the Threat to the West*, “Russia’s finances looked dizzyingly good, especially for those who remembered the blizzard of bad news that marked most of the 1990s...(but) as the oil price plunged, the Russian stock market slumped by three-quarters. Industrial production showed signs of collapse.”

The reforms needed to structurally change the Russian economy cannot be implemented by Putin as they would “risk the development of independent centers of economic (and ultimately political) power. It would endanger the scams in oil and gas export providing billions of dollars for the regime’s slush funds. It would encourage scrutiny of the grotesque corruption in public administration, such as in tax inspection,

the security services, and custom offices.” With the price of gas elevated, the economy emplaced in Russian enabled Vladimir Putin to meet his short term goals of intimidating neighbors, and funding military upgrades and adventurism abroad. However, the over dependence of Russia’s economy on oil and natural gas without other areas for economic development can only meet Russia’s short-term financial requirements during periods of high oil prices, but will result in the same long term unsustainability evidenced in Soviet history when the commodity price declined.

The recent historical health of the Russian economy is seen in Figure 1 below. It shows Russia has enjoyed a steadily increasing GDP for the last 10 years, with the exception of the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis. Until recently, average growth has been between 5% and 10% annually, making it one of the fastest growing developed nation economies in the world. Resultantly, it is now the 8th largest economy in the world. However, Russia is still far behind the United States and the West. Although the Russian economy has improved since the lows of 1998, per capita GDP in 2011 was the same as it was in 1989 and is currently only \$6843, a paltry 54% of the world average.

Another strength of the Russian Economic system has been its trade balance with its neighbors. It enjoys an almost equal balance of trade with the major European nations - 53% of Russian Exports go to the EU, while 45% of Russian imports come from the EU. Further, since the core of Russian exports is highly desired natural gas and oil products (Russia provides 1/3 of required EU imports), while the EU Exports are consumer goods, Russia enjoys the benefit of providing vital, necessary, resources, which brings with it substantial

leverage on its energy dependent neighbors.

ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL/WESTERN POWER

The most effective counter to Russia's energy centric strategy is a symmetric economic strategy to balance or reduce Russian influence in critical areas, particularly the oil and gas markets of Western Europe. The other components of National Power (Diplomatic, Information, and Military) should be used to support and reinforce the economic focus. Reliance on diplomatic efforts to reduce Russian influence is insufficient and will not achieve decisive effects. Increasingly, the importance of Russia's energy resources to Europe is the more persuasive consideration for countries choosing sides in diplomatic disputes between the U.S. and Russia. Given the increasing role of the United Nations in this new multi-polar world, Russia's ability to control the agenda is becoming less a factor of a Security Council veto and more a factor of economic leverage against Western governments who vote against the U.S. and for their economic self-interest.

The restricted information available to Russian society poses a significant challenge to applying informational power against the Russian populace. Putin will continue to suppress internal media outlets in an attempt to control all aspects of the narrative. As the isolation of the Russian people increase due to his policies and the economic backlash from the West, Putin will continue to play on perceived historical grievances and nationalistic fever to galvanize his support base. As we have seen in Crimea and the contested areas in Ukraine, the Russian population is largely uninformed, except for what President Putin wants to tell them. The information domain remains a significant but not easily exploitable vulnerability to Putin as any perception of weakness will damage his cult of personality, and threaten his control on the Russian people.

Despite the demise of the Soviet Union, and the elimination of the Soviet military threat, Russia remains a credible and capable military force, particularly with respect to its neighbors. Western application of military power in any contested area with the Russians (either directly or through proxies) contains high risk for escalation. Based on this inherent risk, military power must be carefully and precisely applied. Using Western military power in the form of deterrence to achieve decisive effects, is unlikely to alter Russian strategy due to the constraints of Western political realities, as seen in Ukraine in the last two years and most recently in Syria.

The application of economic power to counter Russia, however, is very appropriate. The Russian petro economy is the engine driving the Russian strategy. As long as crude oil prices are high, it provides leverage for Russia's diplomatic influence and intimidation. It provides the means to fund its

military operations and modernization. More importantly, it drives Putin's personal center of gravity, support of the Russian people through continued satisfactory quality of life (a COG that Gorbachev and Yeltsin failed to protect) and international prestige. The direct linkage of Putin's credibility, in the eyes of the Russian people, to Western financial and energy markets make him vulnerable to Western influence and leverage.

ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMIC VULNERABILITIES

Despite Russia's excellent position with respect to energy resources, and its decade long period of relative growth as measured by GDP growth and trade balance, the Russian economy has many inherent vulnerabilities and emerging weaknesses that can be leveraged in conjunction with a Western strategy to contain Putin's international influence. Economist Marc Chandler highlights four specific areas of concern: Lack of economic diversity, globalization, impact of growing national debt and lack of access to further borrowing, and vestigial effects of the Soviet system.

RUSSIA RANKS AMONG THE TOP FIFTH OF MOST CORRUPT COUNTRIES. UNFORTUNATELY, POOR AND CORRUPT GOVERNANCE MEANS THAT RUSSIA ALSO EXPERIENCES THE SECOND-LARGEST VOLUME OF ILLICIT MONEY OUTFLOWS.

LACK OF ECONOMIC DIVERSITY

The primary driver of the Russian economy and the cornerstone of its domestic economy has been and continues to be its crude oil and natural gas exports. Oil and gas alone account for 16% of Russia's GDP, 52% of budget revenues, and over 70% of total exports. The World Bank stated in its assessment of the Russian economy, "the oil-and-gas sector has experienced double-digit annual export growth in the last decade and accounted for nearly 69 percent of the value of Russia's exports in 2010." But the assessment went on to conclude, "Such strength originating from so few sectors may already be a risk in the economy."

Figure 2 displays Russian balance of international trade with the world crude oil index price to demonstrate the effect of oil prices on Russia's 'bottom-line' and clearly shows that over time Russian trade revenue increases when crude oil prices exceed \$90/barrel, and decreases when oil goes below \$50/barrel. To compensate for lower oil prices in 2015, Russia has had to increase the total volume of crude oil pumped, reaching an all-time production high in September 2015. This increase in volume has been directed at new markets (Asia/China) to compensate for loss of market share in Western markets. An example of this is for the second month in a row, Russia has




Figure 2: Russian Trade Balance vs. World Crude Oil Index

bested Saudi Arabia in Chinese market share. These efforts have dampened the effect of the oil price drop, but as Figure 1 showed, still resulted in a significant contraction in GDP.

While Russia could cut off oil and gas supplies to Western Europe like it has to Belarus and Ukraine, it is unlikely to do so since it is largely dependent on the revenues from its oil and gas sales to Western Europe. This economic balance sheet provides Russia a very solid economic foundation on which to build strategy, but it is unlikely to change or diversify their economy unless crude oil prices stay at or below their \$40 per barrel production cost long enough for Russia to deplete its cash reserves. If crude oil prices do not rise above \$50 per barrel, Russia's reserve funds will be depleted by 2017.

In addition to price reductions, Russia is vulnerable to loss of world market share through cooperative agreements and emerging technologies. An example is a recent British Petroleum announcement which said it secured a series of 25-year sales agreements to deliver more than 500 billion cubic feet of natural gas per year to European markets from the Shah Deniz gas field offshore Azerbaijan. Additionally, Ukraine recently reported it may have enough natural gas locked in shale reserves to ward off any future "gas wars" with Russia." As Ukraine currently receives 100% of its crude oil gas imports from Russia, this is a significant threat to Russian leverage.

The World Bank states, "the [Russian] economy, which had averaged 7 percent growth during 1998-2008 as oil prices rose rapidly, was one of the hardest hit by the 2008-09 global economic crisis as oil prices plummeted. Russia now faces an 8.2 percent drop in output in 2015 and a projected 6.4 percent decline in 2016, as a collapse in oil prices and Western sanctions sent the economy into a sharp contraction."

Similarly, the International Monetary Fund's August 2015

report on Russia states that Russia is expected to be in recession in 2015 due to the sharp drop in oil prices and sanctions. GDP is expected to decline by 3.4 percent driven by a contraction in domestic demand weighed down by falling real wages, higher cost of capital, and weakened confidence.

The West is able to impact the Russian economy through energy trade sanctions, exploiting new sources of supply, and by efforts to reduce Russian market share in the international oil and natural gas markets. Accomplishing this will require unified action between nations to not only mitigate Russian influence but also to manage internal economic damage and impacts to Western nation's industrial production. The potential effect of a unified strategy against Russia is neatly summarized by economist Daniel Graber, "Its dependence on oil and natural gas exports, meanwhile, exposed the Russian economy to additional risks. With Europe finding new sources of natural gas, and Asian economies looking at Canadian markets, the Russian economy is starting to retreat behind the former Iron Curtain."

GLOBALIZATION

Today's economic environment is global and interconnected, and Russia is not immune. Large swings in the global market have significant impacts locally. Due to its insular, and state-controlled, economy under communist control, the Soviet Union was largely unaffected by the Great Depression, and unlike the rest of the world, recovered very quickly. Twenty-First Century Russia is not isolated and is thoroughly dependent on the global economy as seen in the 2008 global financial crisis. "In the decade until the financial crisis of 2008, Russian output raced ahead at an average 7% a year, boosted by surging oil and gas prices. But the recovery after the 2009 recession

was less impressive, with growth averaging 4% in 2010-12.” This dependence on the global economy provides a direct lever on Russian behavior, placing Russia ‘in the same boat as other nations’ with respect to economic outcomes, and creating a dampening effect to influence unacceptable behavior.

FOREIGN DEBT

A nation cannot advance economically if it doesn’t grow, usually through capital investment, either from foreign or domestic sources. Domestic investment is dependent on access to credit, and in Russia’s case, a heavy reliance on foreign credit. Currently EU banks hold 75% of Russia’s foreign debt. Jason Bush said “According to central bank data, Russian companies and banks need to repay \$109 billion in foreign debt in 2015, a heavy burden at a time when low oil prices have sunk export earnings and Western sanctions have stemmed capital inflows.”

Further reinforcing the centrality of the oil/gas industry to the Russian economy, the two largest debtors, the state energy companies Rosneft and Gazprom, are alone believed to be sitting on tens of billions of dollars (of debt). The assessment of this debt is measured in a country’s credit rating. Currently Russia maintains a “BB-“credit rating and trending negative 45 credit score (compared to the United States “AAA” rating and stable 97 credit score). Servicing the debt payments for these loans will in time become a significant source of leverage for EU nations as the primary holders of that debt, and the inability to service the debts will further degrade Russian access to credit creating a dampening effect on the Russian economic growth, and in the end, slowing the economic engine that drives its strategy.

VESTIGES OF THE SOVIET UNION.

Despite the market and systemic reforms associated with the transition from communism to sovereign democracy, Russia as a nation-state retains vestigial connections with this authoritarian past. These connections will reduce economic growth and make the Russian economic system less resilient and adaptive to market influences. Three vestigial factors that will impact the economy are lack of a middle class, lack of innovation, and corruption.

In Russia today, small and medium-sized firms account for only a quarter of Russian employment compared with half, on average, among countries belonging to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Reliance on large state-owned business dulls competition and makes the system more vulnerable to outside influence. Analogous to ‘company towns’ in the history of the United States, when the market for that company disappears, so does the town. Large state enterprises rely on artificial regulation which as the history of the Soviet Union showed us in 1990-1991, only made the economic (and social) collapse traumatic and sudden, instead of adaptive and gradual.

A corollary of the reliance on large enterprise is a general lack of creativity and innovation, which is vital for long-term growth. Competition drives innovation, and the lack of a

middle class means that innovation is largely supported by the large state owned industry or within government sponsored R&D and seldom meets the needs of the market. Both of which have not been priorities for the current Russian regime, according to the OECD and Development.

Above all, Russia is held back by corruption and the lack of the rule of law. Russia ranks among the top fifth of most corrupt countries. Unfortunately, poor and corrupt governance means that Russia also experiences the second-largest volume of illicit money outflows. It has lost an estimated \$880 billion between 2002 and 2011 to such illegal expenditures. Corruption violates the social contract between a government and the people. Exposure of corruption and its impact on the economic health of the people can reduce the influence of external entities, creating a more stable environment. Western governments should strive to locate and freeze corrupt officials’ foreign assets, thereby reducing support for Mr Putin within Russia’s ruling class – and support for the elite among the general public.

CONCLUSION

The most apparent and threatening source of power for Russia and Vladimir Putin is his military; however, it is not the center of gravity for his strategy. It is the Russian economy which forms his source of power, and the entity which he must protect. Diplomatically, the Russian economy is the ‘stick’ that enables his international relations. Militarily, the Russian economy provides the ‘means’ for not only overt military coercive actions, but also the modernization program which is so important for Putin’s long-term military credibility and capability- a weakened economic position will undercut these military efforts giving Putin the choice to either curtail his military efforts to save his economy, or further exacerbate the economic regression by pushing on and putting his country and regime at increased risk. But the greatest threat caused by a weakened Russian economy is to the regime’s fiat to govern.

Putin has established ‘a new norm’ for the people of Russia with respect to access to consumer goods and sustained GDP growth of 7%. Under his policies and direction disposable incomes more than doubled, and the volume of consumer credit increased by 45 times, fueling private consumption. Poverty levels also dropped from 30 percent in 2000 to 14 percent by 2008. Any regression from this new norm will be seen as a return to the days of his predecessors, Gorbachev and Yeltsin, when the long bread lines became the front battle lines for the regime, a battle that Putin does not want to wage.

This economic center of gravity should be the focus for the Western world’s efforts to contain and shape Putin’s strategy against the West due to its vulnerabilities and weaknesses, with manageable risk (unlike a direct/indirect military efforts). In a direct approach of COG vs COG, the West will win, as long as it remains unified, and should therefore be the decisive element of national power.

RULING THE KINGDOM

U.S. AGENCY IN THE SAUDI ARABIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PUZZLE

BY MAJOR PETER J. KALOGIROS II, U.S. ARMY

With the agreement between the P5+1 and Iran, fears are on the rise that Iran may go the path of North Korea by weaponizing under the framework. This has led many to speculate what the response would be from other regional actors such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (the KSA), Egypt, Turkey, and Israel. Will the nuclear dominoes fall, causing a cascade effect among proximal states? Who may be able to influence this problem and how? To answer these questions, we must begin with the premise that Iran has acquired a nuclear weapon and that others have allowed this to occur. The U.S. declared that a weaponized Iran will not be tolerated and Israel threatened military force. Some argue that weaponization is improbable, just as some posit that it is probable. At the heart of the discussion are security assurances and alliance effectiveness, nonproliferation regime integrity, and U.S. credibility. In addressing these questions we uncover the effects of alliances on proliferation and how to modify the terms to impede proliferation. The larger issue is the nonproliferation regime, which has prevented widespread proliferation in some cases but failed in others.

In my view, the U.S. can make use of existing resources coupled with minor policy alterations to compel the KSA down a path of nuclear nonproliferation. I begin with the premise that Iran possesses a nuclear weapon and consider if existing security arrangements give the U.S. coercive power to prevent KSA proliferation. I also assume that the KSA has denied security commitments from Pakistan and has refrained from pursuing a twin-track program, which is congruent with the literature.

U.S. AGENCY AND MANEUVER SPACE

The U.S. holds many cards in the KSA's proliferation game, but if they will be played remains the question. While the KSA is still a leading producer of oil and the U.S. is reliant upon its exports, imports from the KSA have dropped 50% since 2014 and are at one of their lowest points in the last two decades. The recent "oil war" between the KSA and the U.S. illustrates the desperation of the regime to preserve market share. While achieving "energy independence" is doubtful due to both consumption rates and economic interdependence, this decrease in U.S. dependence on KSA oil exports creates space for diplomatic and economic power maneuvering. While blanket multilateral sanctions are improbable because of their fragile nature and the economic influence of the KSA, targeted

sanctions and import/export controls are not inconceivable and would harm the KSA's liberal economy.

U.S. action is also credible because of a desire to maintain relative stability in the region. This is paramount for the U.S. and others, in particular Asian nations. Asian nations received 68% of the KSA exports in 2013, and while this may decrease their desire to come to an agreement on multilateral sanctions, if the alternative is an arms race between Iran and the KSA, they may be enticed to agree on some form of diplomatic and economic power expression. Coercion within any issue area is often unsuccessful in a vacuum or in a bilateral nature. With nuclear proliferation, multilateral efforts were key in preventing proliferation cascades in Asia. If there were a case where the dominos should have fallen it was in North Korea. South Korea and Japan faced a direct security threat from North Korea but security assurances by the U.S. contributed to the decision to forego proliferation.

The security assistance and security cooperation portfolios for the region offer a considerable amount of leverage and maneuver space to influence the KSA. The U.S. Military Training Mission (USMTM) and the Saudi Arabian National Guard Improvement Program (PM-SANG) focus on modernizing and making the KSA's military interoperable with that of the U.S. and other allies. Interoperability of not just equipment but also doctrine is paramount for a successful security regime in the Gulf. Modernization of the KSA's equipment comes in the form of a foreign military sales (FMS) portfolio focused on ensuring that American equipment and ideas are fielded. For the KSA, recent sales have included F-15s, M-1 Abrams tanks, and AH-64 helicopters, all of which are far more advanced than Iranian systems. These capabilities will allow the KSA to boast their conventional capability in the event they choose a nonproliferation track. However, the instance they suggest a weaponization track, this conventional dependency on U.S. equipment and financing creates another area for compelling KSA behavior.

Regionally, the U.S. has taken efforts to establish a defense against medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles. Kuwait purchased Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile systems while the United Arab Emirates purchased the same systems in addition to a Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system. These types of agreements could be extended to the KSA and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states would champion the deal because it increases overlapping

coverage of key terrain and infrastructure and the deterrent capability directed at Iran.

The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program also serves as a pressure point to influence the KSA. It enhances military relationships while increasing interoperability. The latest appropriation request may lead one to believe that IMET is undervalued since it was for a mere \$10,000. However, this request allows the KSA to take advantage of millions in discounts on their training when coupled with their FMS portfolio. Limiting IMET funding can affect the millions required for the KSA to operate equipment obtained through FMS and other programs. The U.S. could also offer additional university research exchanges. This would allow the KSA to move forward with their peaceful program

under the eye of the international community. The KSA has plans for a peaceful program focused on electricity production to curb its dependence on oil. Increasing their technical capability through education programs may serve as a carrot and avoid the proverbial stick.

Another area in which the U.S. can influence the KSA is missile defense and mining. Like assurances given to South Korea aimed at influencing proliferation decisions during North Korea's weaponization, the U.S. can choose to increase or decrease missile defense assets in the region contingent upon KSA cooperation. Missile defense cooperation seems to have

influenced states' decisions to forego proliferation in the past and the U.S. has a blueprint that could be applied to the Gulf. The Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) in Europe includes a myriad of systems that are present in the Gulf region or could be placed there through existing FMS or deployment cycles.

Part of the U.S. Navy's contribution to ballistic missile defense is the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System (ABMD). It is a conglomerate of weapons, command, control, and communication systems. The ABMD in the Gulf can be integrated into a PAA comparable to Europe's. Most Gulf countries have a missile defense capability but each purchased its own system with little attention to interoperability. While FMS has facilitated some interoperability, a Gulf missile defense regime would enhance interoperability of existing assets. Given the threat from the Iran missile program, THAAD and PAC-3 would defend the region against limited ballistic missile attacks.

While a Gulf missile defense regime is quite the carrot for the KSA to weigh against the benefits they would gain by proliferating, the U.S. does possess more vast capabilities to up

the ante. Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) technology could be integrated into the regime, but do not exist in the region and would incur a hefty cost to develop and assess their efficacy at such short distances. Furthermore, the more expansive the missile defense capability in the Gulf, the more negative externalities in terms of other regional and global actor reactions will arise. Russia's stance will be similar to their reaction to NATO and its missile defense deployments. For this reason, missile defense must be a part of the portfolio and not the portfolio itself.

While missile defense is a large part of the incentive package to influence the KSA, Iran and its defense apparatus are capable of projecting other forms of power and threats

while exploiting its nuclear weapon capability. Even with the current deal regarding Iran's nuclear program and the lifting of economic sanctions, a weaponized Iran would face a new and more intense sanctions regime. Iran would likely express its military element of power through control over the Strait of Hormuz and its influence in Gulf waters. Iran possesses an elaborate mining capability that could be used to limit exports from other Gulf countries, which in turn would have dire effects on the global economy. To mitigate this, the U.S. could provide the KSA and other regional actors with an increased anti- and counter-mining capability to counter Iranian Gulf mining operations. Four Avenger class ships, the U.S.S. Ardent, Cardinal, Dextrous, and Raven, are forward

WHILE THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE KSA HAS BENEFITED FROM THEIR OIL INDUSTRY, RECENT DECLINES IN OIL PRICES COUPLED WITH DECREASED DEMAND DUE TO ECONOMIC CRISES HAVE SHED LIGHT ONTO THEIR DEPENDENCY DILEMMA

deployed to the Gulf to ensure continued access and conduct mine countermeasure missions. These ships are approaching their maximum service lives and the last will retire in 2024. As the U.S. Navy continues to upgrade and field forces such as these, including them in the FMS portfolio seems logical and using this as a means to influence proliferation decisions seems essential. While mining the Gulf affects Iran's economy just as it does the KSA's, if Iran is suffering at the hand of a sanctions regime limiting its exports through the Strait of Hormuz, the incentive to at least limit navigability of the Strait becomes higher and expressions of power in the Gulf become greater.

Outside the Gulf, the phenomenon dubbed the Arab Spring has redrawn the lines of allegiance and restructured the power hierarchy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). What were once concrete alliances have devolved into an unknown as many countries contend with domestic issues, regime changes, and in some cases even civil war. While the dust has not settled and will continue to stir into the near future, security guarantees from dependable partners are not as

concrete as they once were. New alliances are forming around new threats and the U.S. can use this shortened shadow of the future to influence the KSA by emphasizing its commitment to the Gulf through existing security assurances.

Another area that eludes most recent literature on the KSA's nuclear ambitions is that of international organizations (IOs) and U.S. ability to influence them. U.S. voting share alone in IOs such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank make it a formidable force. This coupled with the reality that most states with heavy voting share hold similar proliferation views enable the U.S. to exploit its share and informal influence as a means of power to affect the KSA. The U.S. holds a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, with veto power. Each of the other permanent members is also reliant on KSA oil exports, namely China. For that reason, broad multilateral sanctions are unlikely since the KSA holds the position as the globe's largest oil supplier. While replication of the Iranian or North Korean sanctions regime is unlikely; the U.S. could propose targeted multilateral sanctions akin to the Russian case.

According to recent IMF reporting, oil accounts for over 45% of the KSA's GDP, 90% of its fiscal revenues, and 80% of export revenues. While there is no doubt that the KSA has benefited from their oil industry, recent declines in oil prices coupled with decreased demand due to economic crises have shed light onto their dependency dilemma and how serious the results may be in the future. Targeted multilateral sanctions by importing countries would have dire effects on the KSA's economy and could lead to events seen in the rest of the MENA since 2011. The KSA is a liberal economy that requires trade and openness to survive and these principles encourage nonproliferation.

Economic sanctions are not the only means of coercing the KSA into foregoing weaponization. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) offers another option to utilize as leverage. The KSA is not as self sufficient as Iran, and is the Middle East's largest consumer of oil. While Iran bled for years because of sanctions and closure from much of the outside world, it was able to survive due to its multifaceted economy and ability to adapt to the sanctions regime. Rallying support for economic sanctions would be difficult because of the KSA's position in the global oil market. However, limitations on FDI would have more financial and social effects in areas such as unemployment in a growing population. Recent events in the MENA indicate that the Arab world is still in a predicament defined by unrest in large part due to socio-economic disparity and resource allocation. Pressuring KSA society by limiting FDI, coupled with the above means of leverage, would shift the sands of the KSA domestic order.

While this article does not seek to delve deep into Israel's reactions to KSA nuclear proliferation, it is necessary to address how the U.S. may use Israel and its response(s). The question of nuclear cascades is daunting and when superimposed onto the MENA it becomes even more convoluted. Israel's nuclear program operates on a strategy of nuclear amimut, or opacity. However, it is accepted that Israel began its pursuit of nuclear weapons in the 1950s and tested a weapon in 1979. Their

current policy is not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. However, they are believed to have between 75 and 200 nuclear warheads. If Israel conducted a test and is believed to possess weapons, then why has the region not seen more cascade effects? Quite simply there is more to committing to weaponization than the security dilemma that is posed by Israel or other actors.

In the event of Iranian weaponization, the U.S. must assure the KSA that it will remain committed to the region in some capacity. The security cooperation and assistance structure and the missile defense options are a step above where the U.S. is today, but additional assurance must be given that Israel will not make significant changes to its nuclear posture or policy. This is not only in the best interest of the KSA but also to the U.S. and Israel. If Israel were to declare their nuclear weapons program and jettison the amimut strategy, the U.S. would then have to take a stance in regards to it. The implications of this action could be catastrophic to the nonproliferation regime. Israel would become a violator of international nonproliferation norms and the U.S. would have to choose between two polarized sides; all the while the KSA would be situated between two actors that possess nuclear weapons.

Israel's reliance on the U.S. and other western powers puts it in a position of dependency, both militarily and diplomatically. While audacious at times, Israel's missile defense program and other critical parts of their strategy are held in the hands of external actors. The U.S. must use its military and diplomatic leverage to keep the genie in the bottle while balancing this with the KSA's proliferation ambitions.]

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

U.S. interests in the Middle East are plentiful and other powerful global actors share many of those interests. Issue areas such as economics, energy, international order, and security are valued by outward-looking states. The existence of congruent interests among actors such as the U.S., France, China, and the United Kingdom makes a multilateral effort more plausible. However, given the risk of sanction busting and conflicting state interests, the U.S. must be prepared to act bilaterally and exercise its influence on the international stage. An effectual path forward must not diverge from current U.S. strategic and regional interests. Allocating resources to contend with KSA proliferation, along with an approach that produces desired outcomes, does not require drastic policy changes, but rather an adjustment of current resources with minor tweaks to existing policy. This approach is critical, since the U.S. faces constraints to increase capability because of budgetary and fiscal challenges as well as domestic and political tensions. Nevertheless, strategy, while constrained by resources, must take into account the cost in blood and treasure juxtaposed to the cost of a nuclear-armed KSA and the resulting regional and global consequences.

Reliable U.S. security guarantees have produced positive results in the past, but moving forward the U.S. must continue to hold nonproliferation near the top of the agenda. A policy of nonproliferation as a priority illustrates to other actors that the issue is being taken seriously on the international stage.

Furthermore, keeping the discussion at the forefront places other capable states in a position to address the issue, thereby increasing the likelihood of multilateral efforts. Current security assurances facilitate cooperation and interoperability in the Gulf but much is to be done in regard to organizing a regional security regime. The framework is in place along with the resources but increasing the level of missile defense systems in the region along with strengthening KSA conventional forces through FMS is key to influencing the KSA and other regional actors. In addition to FMS, the U.S. should increase levels of interoperability through IMET as well as university exchanges. In exchange for KSA's nonproliferation guarantees, these two points of leverage provide the heart of the KSA's defense apparatus knowledge base.

Exploiting programs such as these do not require additional resources and in fact results in a net gain by the U.S., as we benefit from FMS and reduce the inventory of dated equip-

MOVING FORWARD THE U.S. MUST CONTINUE TO HOLD NONPROLIFERATION NEAR THE TOP OF THE AGENDA

ment. Missile defense policy is one area that requires more of a policy shift. Gulf states possess systems capable of contending with limited medium and intermediate range ballistic missile threats but they are not coordinated nor does an effective C4ISR apparatus manage them. Naval Central and Fifth Fleet can provide an enhanced C4ISR capability that would allow for the coordination of such systems by integrating them into the regional defense plan without having to expand the U.S. nuclear umbrella, which should be avoided at all costs. Long-term policy should address the need for an enduring means of managing systems by regional actors. As U.S. systems become dated, inserting them into FMS for the KSA and other regional actors would provide a low cost and effective C4 system.

CONCLUSION

While the above discussion is optimistic, there are many factors external to this study that play into the equation. The KSA's dependency on U.S. security assurances, equipment and funding, along with missile defense requires that their proliferation decision(s) include these variables. Not weighing these costs results in a negative trade to a less capable actor, namely Pakistan, which the KSA is not yet interoperable with. The economic implications of proliferation are many given the KSA's position in the global oil economy, coupled with their own dependence, which all play a large part in proliferation decisions. U.S. influence within the IO regime-complex enables it to exercise a considerable amount of both formal and informal leverage with other state actors aimed at preventing proliferation cascades.

The policies and practices recommended here do not easily generalize to other cases in the nuclear issue area due to conditionality. However, the concepts of security assurance and supra-state actor influence do hold true and future research should continue to explore the correlation and causal factors associated with them. While the future of the KSA and its nuclear program is open to speculation, the fact that proliferation is a continued danger to the international system is certain. For this reason, state and non-state actors must continue to seek alternative means of influencing proliferation decision while taking into account that 21st century technology jettisons the idea of nuclear have and have nots codified in the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major Peter J. Kalogiros II is a U.S. Army Special Forces officer and Middle East/North Africa FAO. He is conducting In-Region Training (IRT) in the State of Kuwait. He holds a Master of Arts in Strategic Intelligence from the American Military University and a Master of International Studies from North Carolina State University. Upon completion of IRT, Major Kalogiros will return to Washington, DC to attend attaché training.

NEWS FROM THE FIELD

Shadows in the Jungle

BY MAJOR W. SEAMAS WHITESEL

The Bengal tiger is the national animal of the People's Republic of Bangladesh. They live in the Sundarbans, which is the world's largest mangrove forest and a UNESCO World Heritage site located on the India-Bangladesh border at the northern tip of the Bay of Bengal. Unfortunately, these solitary and majestic creatures are approaching extinction within the country. Some are killed when human settlement encroaches on their territory, but the majority are taken to supply the demand for tiger parts on the Chinese black market, where each tiger can be worth as much as \$400,000. As the annual per capita gross domestic product of Bangladesh is just under \$1100, their value makes tigers a lucrative target for criminals. While preventing the extinction of the Bengal tiger is predominantly a conservation problem, this challenge also shares many factors with security and counter-terrorism concerns; the pirates who trap and kill tigers also prey on local Bangladeshis, and smuggle humans, weapons, and drugs along the same routes used for tiger parts.

Within the Government of Bangladesh, overlapping jurisdictions and competing interests hinder conservation and enforcement efforts. In order to address problems involving a variety of organizations and institutions, the Embassy must utilize a coordinated, interagency response. The tiger conservation effort of the U.S. Embassy, Dhaka shows how interagency teams can address such complex problems. The Embassy sent a team of officials from the US Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of Justice (DOJ) and Department of Defense (DoD) to meet with Bangladeshi conservation, law enforcement and security agencies in order to help build sufficient governance capacity to counter tiger smuggling. I accompanied this team as a part of my in region training (IRT), and gained a unique look at how the interagency can work together to advance American interests.

DYSFUNCTIONAL GOVERNANCE

The Sundarbans is largely ungoverned, as responsibility for security in the forest is shared among three, poorly-coordinated agencies: the Forest Department, local police, and the Coast Guard. The Forest Department has final jurisdiction over the Sundarbans, and carefully guards its bureaucratic territory. This organization dates from the British Raj, but is undermanned, undertrained, and underpaid. It does not have an effective presence in its area of responsibility for three main reasons: its



Bengal tiger in the Sundarbans.
Photo by M. Abu Abdullah Diyan. Used with permission.

limited number of Forest Officers have only minimal patrolling and weapons training, they are widely thought to be in the pay of smugglers, and the Department is profoundly under-resourced. Additionally, its leaders and managers are scientists with expertise in conservation, not security. In recent years, the presence of armed and trained pirates and an increase in smuggling activity throughout the Sundarbans has overwhelmed the Forest Department's capacity. Even so, the department is wary of any other governmental organization intruding in the Sundarbans, for fear of losing influence and authority (in addition to the lucrative income stream they allegedly receive from smugglers).

The dysfunctional relationship between the Forest Department and local law enforcement creates gaps in governance. Police do not generally operate within the Sundarbans without prior Forest Department approval – and claim that planned operations are leaked to pirates before they can be executed (presumably by Forest Officers, though Bangladeshi police are also regularly accused of corruption). On the other hand, Forest personnel have limited arrest powers, and by law must turn over any criminals to the police within 24 hours of capture. Since no police are within the forest to begin with, arrested criminals need to be transported to police stations outside the forest borders. Unfortunately, the Sundarbans are massive, and difficult to traverse within the required turnover period. Combined with the equipment and supply shortfalls that plague both the Forest Department and the police, this results in a limited number of

The Sundarbans (the dark green area), along the India-Bangladesh border.
NASA photo.



effective arrests. Furthermore, when arrests are made and pirates brought in front of the justice system, there are other obstacles preventing successful prosecution. Arresting officers have poor crime scene investigation skills, and regularly fail to obtain adequate evidence. As a result, local prosecutors, also poorly trained, often fail to bring convictions. The pirates and smugglers effectively exploit these gaps.

While smuggling is nothing new to Bangladesh, the groups currently working in the Sundarbans have taken it to new levels. Their increased presence in the forest is a relatively recent phenomenon, likely due to displacement from increased law enforcement activity along other smuggling routes. These pirates' weapons, while limited, surpass those of the Forest Department, and their tactics suggest that someone among them has prior military experience. These criminals, in addition to tiger poaching, also extort and kidnap Bangladeshi civilians living in and around the Sundarbans. The Bangladesh Coast Guard is the appropriate security agency to assist the Forest Department with this increased security threat but it, like the police, is limited by both bureaucratic and resource constraints in its inability to operate freely in the forest. In order to launch patrols, they require permanent bases of operation in critical regions within the Sundarbans, but the Forest Department is unwilling to grant them any land on which to build, citing conservation concerns.

Overshadowing all of these various hurdles and constraints is the reality that Bangladesh is among the world's

poorest countries and cannot provide sufficient funding to any of the involved agencies. Even if the corruption, insufficient training, bureaucratic turf wars and outdated legal codes weren't in the way, the lack of funding would hamstring enforcement efforts. A well-intentioned Forest Officer attempting an arrest might not have enough fuel in his boat to bring a pirate to the police, and eager policemen must choose between sending their limited forces into the forest to save tigers, or into the city to save people.

EMBASSY RESPONSE

To support Bangladesh's tiger conservation efforts and to combat piracy, the embassy team jointly formulated a plan for engaging each stakeholder agency. USAID led the project, as it is the Embassy's partner with the Forest Department. In this partnership, USAID provides training to enhance the capacity and professionalization of the organization. They also fund the \$13 million Bengal Tiger Conservation project, which is implemented by a local conservation non-governmental organization, WildTeam. Under their broad mandate, WildTeam

educates local Bangladeshis on safe tiger interactions, rescues people who have been carried off by tigers (or retrieves their bodies for proper burial), and conducts independent patrolling in the Sundarbans. They also educate villagers on sustain-



U.S. Embassy officials discuss recent pirate attacks with Bangladeshi villagers.
PACOM Augmentation Team photo.

able livelihoods in order to decrease local demand for tiger parts. USAID's partnership with both governmental and non-governmental agencies was augmented on this trip by the participation of DOJ's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). ICITAP provides training to both police and prosecutors. They have a vibrant relationship with other police organizations in Bangladesh, but at the time of the visit, had not conducted any training with police in the areas bordering the Sundarbans. During this visit, ICITAP brought together USAID and WildTeam leaders with local police at all levels to build awareness of the problem, and determine training needs for law enforcement and prosecutors in Bangladesh. Additionally, the Pacific Command (PACOM) Augmentation Team, which has a training relationship with the Bangladesh Coast Guard, sent a representative in order to identify ways in which the Coast Guard could be leveraged to enhance counter-smuggling efforts.

The embassy delegation was successful in attracting interest from Bangladeshi stakeholders in each relevant agency. Through meeting with this group of U.S. officials, Bangladeshi leaders formed new connections with their counterparts in other local agencies, and developed a greater appreciation for the overlap of conservation and security interests in the Sundarbans. Such new networks are vital for breaking down the bureaucratic dysfunction that hinders security in the Sundarbans. The visit also brought to light new ways in which the U.S. can support Bangladesh as it attempts to fight piracy and smuggling. For example, the weakness of the local justice system can benefit from ICITAP's prosecutor and police training. Also, during a conversation with the PACOM representative, Forest Department leaders admitted that while they remain opposed to land-based Coast Guard stations in the Sundarbans, they would be willing to support a permanent, ship-based presence, as it would not adversely impact conservation efforts. The Coast Guard does not have the required equipment for such a mission, but its needs could potentially be met by the Embassy's Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC). The ODC has a long and robust foreign military financing (FMF) relationship with the Coast Guard, having provided them with 25 patrolling boats since 2008, along with significant infrastructure projects. Providing the necessary equipment and training for this Sundarbans patrolling requirement could, in addition to enhancing Bangladeshi capacity, further deepen the U.S.-Bangladesh security cooperation relationship, and advance PACOM priorities in Defense Professionalization.

LESSONS LEARNED

This single sequence of engagements did not create a comprehensive solution to the problem of smuggling in Bangladesh. However, by bringing together key stakeholders from both U.S. and Bangladeshi sides, it identified critical focus areas and laid the groundwork for further improvements in governance. As an IRT Foreign Area Officer (FAO), I took away two primary lessons. First, I was impressed by the scope of access that Embassy officials can achieve when they work as an interagency team. During this trip we met with everyone from illiterate

Bangladeshi villagers who voluntarily retrieve dead human bodies from tiger dens, to local beat cops who explained the ground reality of inter-governmental cooperation in Bangladesh, to senior leaders in the National and Metropolitan Police forces and regional Forest Department leadership. The interagency approach allowed us to bring the right people together and bypass otherwise impassable bureaucratic hurdles. Bangladesh, like most South Asian bureaucracies, moves at a glacial pace. When working with such a government, immediate access of this kind could be the difference between success and failure.

Second, I was struck by how knowledge of the host nation's institutional culture is insufficient for FAOs on the country team. In order to effectively employ the interagency in the synergistic ways described above, the savvy FAO must also understand the foreign cultures that work alongside him or her inside the embassy. The interagency approach allows a unified embassy team to create space for progress that wouldn't be otherwise possible, but can also generate friction between U.S. agencies with different missions and perspectives. As organizations like USAID and DoD have different capabilities, they also have differing ideas about how problems should be approached, and which actions should be prioritized. Unless teams recognize these potential areas of conflict and consciously address them, such differences can undermine the powerful effects of an interagency team, and prevent mission accomplishment. Therefore, without a firm grasp of the institutional cultures of partner agencies like DOJ, USAID and State, FAOs will struggle to bring the strengths of each to bear on complex problems.



ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major W. Seamas Whitesel is a South and Central Asia Foreign Area Officer who recently completed his In-Region Training at the U.S. Embassy in Dhaka, Bangladesh. He has a B.A. from Lehigh University in International Relations, and is a graduate of the Bangladesh Defense Services Command and Staff College. He speaks Hindi and Urdu. He began his graduate studies at George Washington University's Elliot School in fall 2015.

NEWS FROM THE FIELD

“Je ne suis pas Charlie.”

BY MAJOR CLIFFORD ANDERSON, U.S. AIR FORCE

Just after the terrorist attacks on Charlie Hebdo’s offices in January of 2015, Paris experienced an outpouring of sentiment in support of free thought and journalism. The slogan touted was “je suis Charlie” (I am Charlie): a statement of solidarity with the murdered journalists and their ostensibly embattled cause for freedom of the press. It was big news, and taken as tacit lack of support, when King Mohammed VI of Morocco did not join the march of dignitaries through Paris following the funerals of the slain journalists. Less than a month later, outstanding juridical disagreements between France and Morocco were resolved in tandem with a renewal of security cooperation programs between the two countries. Clearly, the King did not intend to break Morocco’s long-standing relationship with France over an ideological dispute. So what did the failure to march portend?

At the time of the event, and for five months afterward, I was posted to Morocco for lingual and cultural immersion as a Regional Affairs Strategist in training. I studied under two local professors, one of whom is a former radio journalist. Her response to the events was like that of many in Morocco and perhaps across the Maghreb. “Je ne suis pas Charlie” (I am not Charlie), she intoned. How are we to take this? In light of the King’s refusal to march, and coupled with his continued solidarity with the West when it comes to security and legality, we might regard my professor’s statement as mirroring his attitude towards the Hebdo massacre. By and large, Moroccans condemned the terrorist acts, and also condemned the preceding actions of Charlie Hebdo.

In Moroccan eyes, the latter’s cartoons were designed to offend and could have had little other purpose. Portrayals of the prophet are already spurned due to Koranic interpretations forbidding such characterization, but to add a phallus on top of Mohammed’s head in such drawings was seen as more than a bridge too far. Further, the exportation of such publications to Muslim-majority countries was seen as purposeful provocation, as the inhabitants could have only one reaction to such depictions.

Perhaps then, the question that should be asked is “what response does the West expect or desire from Muslim nations when delivering the commentary that it does?” When obscene cartoons with imagery that is often censored in the West are exported to areas where they will be deemed even more insulting by local cultures, what can the West expect in response? The actions of terrorists aside, the King of Morocco’s icy response to the Charlie Hebdo procession should have been entirely predictable.

The stagnating relationship between France and Morocco came to a head in February of 2014, when French police acted upon lawsuits filed in France by Moroccan activists against the director of Moroccan domestic intelligence. Foolishly, the police visited the Moroccan embassy in Paris in an attempt to question the director. This resulted in the Moroccan government complaining to the French ambassador to Morocco, which was followed by coverage of questionable comments from the French ambassador to the U.S. only a few hours later. President Hollande called the Moroccan government to apologize and generally attempted to smooth things over, but Rabat refused to comment on whether he was successful. Things continued to simmer for nearly a year, when the Hebdo attacks (and following two days of shootings) created a wave of xenophobia in France that resulted in violence towards Muslims. Given this string of events, one might expect that Westerners operating in a country like Morocco would experience great personal risk. However, Department of State reports indicate that crime is not a significant risk for visiting Americans, and this has been the case for two decades.

Continuing strain resulting from Western support for the Polisario’s efforts in the Western Sahara has been the most visible culprit of deteriorating relations, but given otherwise warm relations, from where does this support originate? The most prominent catalysts are reports of human rights abuses by Moroccan forces policing the Western Sahara. This, paired with the somewhat outdated notion of unconditional self-determination (spawned during the era of Woodrow Wilson!), has resulted in international calls for Western Saharan independence. All of this ignores the historical borders of Morocco, the original cause of the dispute being Western colonization of both Morocco and the Western Sahara, Algeria’s own agenda in the region, and finally the more grievous human rights abuses of the Algerian-supported Polisario. The latter is now confirmed to have been redirecting humanitarian aid intended for the Tindouf camps to its own purposes, and is thought to run several slave camps in the region. Those members who become disenchanting with the Polisario often desert to join Jihadist organizations in nearby regions like Al-Murabitun in Mali, which is under the command of the Algerian terrorist Mokhtar Belmokhtar. For these reasons and others, Christopher Ross (UN Envoy to the Western Sahara) was forced to inform the Polisario leadership that the possibility of establishing a Sahrawi state “has become impossible and non-viable.” Time will tell if these developments are reflected in international thinking on the subject of the Western Sahara. Unless they are, the friction between Morocco

and all those who insist that the Polisario's claims and methods are valid will continue.

This friction is the real source of the "je ne suis pas Charlie" sentiment. At base, Morocco is proud of its considerable security efforts and progress in the fields of human rights and economic development. It has partnered itself with the West in many of these endeavors, and has been a bastion of stability in the Muslim world. It views its efforts as betrayed by the West in several instances. The dispute over the Western Sahara is the longest running of these, but the affronts of Charlie Hebdo are the most recent. In the end, Morocco will side with the West to fight against terrorists and improve cooperation. It will not always be happy about the state of affairs along the way. Just as the West asks that the Muslim world tolerate parody in the name of free journalism, Morocco asks that the West tolerate a separate belief system (and therefore press system) due to support for Western security efforts. Support of Western journalism can hardly be expected given the circumstances and that the West often decries its own press as unacceptable.

In the end, the West will just have to accept that Morocco and the Muslim world will not identify with Western journalism or accept parodies such as Charlie Hebdo's. Such lack of acceptance is not without precedent in the West. Ultimately, Morocco's support against the Islamic State, and the myriad other cooperation efforts in progress, should matter much more than a disagreement over which published insults are acceptable and which are not.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major Anderson entered the Air Force in January 2003 via Officer Training School in Maxwell, Alabama. A senior navigator, he has been assigned to two operational mobility units and multiple positions. He earned Bachelors and Masters Degrees in History, as well as a Master of Arts in Philosophy Degree at the Naval Postgraduate School. Prior to his current position, he was Assistant Director of Operations for the 39th Airlift Squadron at Dyess Air Force Base, Texas. As Regional Affairs Strategist, he spent six months in Morocco, and worked with the Office of Security Cooperation, US Embassy, Rabat, Morocco.



Transparent Language is the developer of the CL-150 Matrix for Critical Languages (CL-150). The CL-150 is a constantly evolving infrastructure of innovative technology, content and services providing economical and effective learning, sustaining and assessing of 120+ foreign languages for the Joint FAO Program and the greater U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and Intelligence Communities.

The purpose of the CL-150 is to improve the economics and effectiveness of language learning for both general use and for special purposes such as humanitarian relief, international relations or military liaison.

The CL-150 is available to all FAOs via FAOweb (fao.nps.edu) and all U.S. Government personnel (with a .gov or .mil address), language schools, and language programs via the Department of Defense's language portal, Joint Language University (jlu.wbtrain.com). Access is sponsored by the Defense Language and National Security Education Office and by Joint Language University. For more information, visit

TRANSPARENT.COM/GOVERNMENT

Must a Rising Sun Disturb the Morning Calm?

...or why the U.S. should promote reconciliation between South Korea and Japan to strengthen its Strategic Re-Balance to Asia

BY MR. BRENDAN M. MURRAY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Editor's Note: Mr. Murray's thesis won the FAO Association writing award at the College of Naval Warfare. In the interest of space the thesis is published here without research references. In the interest of space we publish this version without the authors' research notes. To see the full thesis with research notes, please visit www.FAOA.org and follow links for FAOA members only content.

In the Chinese language, four character expressions called “chéngyǐ” serve as idiomatic expressions that convey thoughts or ideas. One such expression, *shou zhu dai tu*, literally translates to “guarding a tree stump, waiting for rabbits.” The real meaning of *chéngyǐ* is often hard to discern without knowledge of the stories from which they originate; this particular expression is basically used to admonish those who sit idly by and wait for good things to happen. This passive approach parallels what the U.S. has adopted for more than a decade in terms of Japanese-South Korean relations. While the U.S. has stated explicitly that it remains committed to a strategic rebalance to Asia, and while it works hard to maintain its bilateral security alliances with Japan and South Korea, it has stood by and done little as Japan-South Korean relations have sunk to a new level of enmity. In light of China's recent rise, however, the U.S. can no longer afford this passive approach. The U.S. should instead actively promote Japanese-South Korean reconciliation and trilateral U.S.-Japanese-South Korean cooperation to counterbalance China's increasingly assertive political, military, and economic posture in Asia.

Specifically, the three areas in which the U.S. can make positive contributions to improved relations between its two most important Asian allies are the World War II-era historical issues of “comfort women” and forced labor, combined information sharing agreements, and combined exercises and military cooperation. Each of these areas will be examined in turn.

HISTORICAL ROOTS OF CURRENT RELATIONS

When two friends have a serious dispute between them, the wisest course of action is often to stay out of it, lest one (or both) of the friends takes offense. In the case of South Korea and Japan, though, the rise of China has made it a strategic necessity for the U.S. to become involved. The greatest source

of current tension in Japanese-South Korean relations stems from Japan's annexation and subsequent colonization of Korea from 1910 to 1945, especially Japan's use of sexual slaves and forced laborers during the Second World War. Qing Dynasty China and Meiji Japan fought the First Sino-Japanese War during 1894-95, largely a Japanese effort to end Chinese dominance of Chosun Korea and assume primacy there.

On October 8, 1895 new Japanese Minister to Korea, retired army lieutenant general Miura Goro, ordered the pro-Chinese Korean Queen Min hacked to death in Gyeongbuk Palace. After defeating Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, Japan forced Korea's Cabinet to sign a treaty under which Korea ceded its sovereignty and became a Japanese protectorate. Five years later after Korean nationalist Ahn Jung Geun assassinated Ito Hirobumi (who had drafted the Meiji Constitution and served as Japan's first Prime Minister and later Resident General in Korea), Japan annexed Korea and ruled it ruthlessly through the end of the Second World War. It is perhaps reflective of the state of relations among the three nations that South Korea, on the site of Ito's former Residency General in Seoul, and China, at the Harbin rail station site of his assassination, have both constructed monuments to Ahn – considered a hero by many Koreans for having killed Japan's preeminent modern political figure.

WARTIME SEXUAL SLAVERY AND FORCED LABOR

Among the most gruesome aspects of Japan's colonial rule and wartime occupation of conquered territory was its forcible use of an estimated 50,000 to 200,000 native women as sex slaves for its soldiers in Korea, China, Taiwan, Borneo, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaya, Burma, Indonesia, and many small Pacific islands. Individual Japanese leaders have expressed remorse on multiple occasions, but Japan has never formally accepted legal responsibility and its position remains that it satisfied all liabilities or obligations through the 1951 San Francisco Treaty that formally ended the war, and that its 1965 treaty with South Korea and subsequent \$500 million payment (\$300 million in cash and \$200 million in loans) also permanently satisfied its obligations toward its former colony.

The issue remains one of raw emotion in Korea, where crowds gather at a “comfort woman” statue across from the

Japanese embassy in Seoul every Wednesday, calling for its government to accept legal responsibility, to apologize formally, and to provide compensation to the fifty-four surviving Korean victims. The Obama administration has consistently taken the position, recently reiterated by Assistant Secretary of State Danny Russel, that “we’re not in the business of mediating between two peaceful democratic partners like Japan and Korea,” though officials will sometimes call, as Secretary of State John Kerry did last year, for “Japan and the Republic of Korea to put history behind them and move the relationship forward.”

This approach is simply too passive, and the U.S. should implement a much more proactive policy to encourage reconciliation. Not only China’s rise and its aggressive claims with respect to the South China Sea, but also the need for unity with respect to the campaign for North Korean denuclearization, mandate actual mediation efforts. Recent evidence also suggests that if the U.S. continues to distance itself from the comfort women issue, Japan and South Korea will actually grow even further apart, not closer. In June, 2014 Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s government released a review report undermining the 1993 Kono statement through which Japan expressed “sincere apologies and remorse” for its coercive use of sex slaves. Since Abe’s Chief Cabinet Secretary said the government did not intend to disavow the Kono statement, the decision to review it anyway seemed designed solely to pander to Abe’s far-right base despite the damage it would do to relations with Korea. Because 2015 is the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War and 50th anniversary since relations with South Korea were restored, Abe is widely expected to make a related statement this summer, and speculation persists that he may retract or weaken previous apologies.

Last year on the 95th anniversary of the Independence Movement in Seoul, President Park Geun-hye used especially strong language calling for Japan’s government finally to address the comfort women issue satisfactorily: “Turning a deaf ear to (victims’) testimonies and ignoring them just for the sake of political interests will only result in isolation.” Despite the emotionally fraught nature of the issue, the high-profile dispatch of former Senator George Mitchell as U.S. Special Envoy for Northern Ireland from 1995 to 2001 (former Senator Gary Hart is the current incumbent) showed there is in fact important precedent for the U.S. to play a positive mediating role between two close allies. It should seek Japanese and South Korean concurrence for a similar U.S. mediation effort, which could also address the separate-but-related issue of wartime forced labor.

While it doesn’t evoke the same level of emotion, Japan’s use of forced Korean labor during World War II has also remained a cause for tension between the two countries. As many as 1.2 million Koreans were forced to work in Japanese factories and mines in Korea, Japan, Manchuria, and Sakhalin Island; and some 300 Japanese firms still operating used such forced labor. Similar to its position regarding compensation for sex slaves, Japan’s position remains that its 1965 treaty with South Korea concluded its legal obligations toward wartime laborers taken from Korea. But in a landmark 2012 decision,

South Korea’s Supreme Court ruled that forced laborers could file claims with former Japanese employers for compensation, and lower courts have subsequently issued judgments awarding varying amounts to different claimants. On this issue too, the U.S. should offer to mediate; and here too, there is precedent for doing so effectively. During the Clinton administration, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Stuart Eizenstat coordinated efforts of the German government with victims groups and other national governments regarding the establishment of a joint public-private (i.e., corporations) fund, called the German Fund for the Future. This 5.2 billion euro fund is reported to have paid more than 1.6 million surviving forced laborers in nearly a hundred countries. Of course it will not be easy to mediate such historically divisive issues, but the U.S. should make best efforts to explain why it is in both countries’ interests, and in the interest of East Asian security and stability, finally to address and resolve these painful issues. Since there are no serious possible negative consequences for trying, and since their bilateral relations can hardly deteriorate much further, it makes sound strategic sense for the U.S. to make such best efforts.

COMBINED INFORMATION-SHARING AGREEMENTS

Even if progress on the historical issues is slow or halting, any positive movement that changes the atmosphere could create political space in which other advancements can be made. In June, 2012 South Korea came so close to signing a military intelligence sharing agreement (i.e., a General Security of Military Information Agreement or GSOMIA) with Japan that former President Lee Myung-bak had a minister in Tokyo ready to sign the prepared text. But last minute howls of protest by opponents in the Korean National Assembly, who were looking for an issue to derail the prospects of then-conservative candidate Park Geun-hye in the December, 2012 presidential election, caused the government to back away less than an hour before the signing ceremony. The outcry also caused Seoul to drop its efforts to sign an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with Japan. Since her inauguration at the beginning of 2013, President Park has been unwilling to hold a bilateral summit with Prime Minister Abe for the aforementioned historical reasons, which were exacerbated by his decision to visit the Yasukuni shrine to Japanese war dead that includes class A war criminals. So to his credit, President Obama orchestrated a meeting of the two other heads of government on the sidelines of the Nuclear Security Summit in March, 2014. This may have paved the way for a modicum of trilateral progress at defense ministerial talks in Singapore a few months later, after which then-Secretary Chuck Hagel and the Korean and Japanese defense ministers released a statement affirming the need for more trilateral security cooperation to deter North Korean nuclear and missile threats.

Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter should thus make progress on trilateral security cooperation a priority. If he cannot convince the two allies finally to sign their GSOMIA, then the U.S. should draft a trilateral agreement that would accomplish the same thing, i.e., establish a mechanism for the allies to exchange classified threat information. This will

enhance security for all three countries with respect to both potential North Korean provocations and potential Chinese aggressive actions. The U.S., South Korea, and Japan took an important symbolic step in the right direction very recently, announcing an agreement on December 29, 2014 through which Japan and South Korea will exchange classified information – but only regarding North Korean nuclear and missile threats, and only via the U.S. as intermediary. The U.S. should continue to engage both governments so that a more comprehensive agreement better designed to address regional threats can be reached.

In recent years China has invested enormously in its missile, air and sea power capabilities, both to threaten Taiwan and to enhance its anti-access/area denial capabilities (i.e., to disrupt U.S. power projection in the event of hostilities in or

with Japan and South Korea on layered missile defense incorporating Aegis-class destroyers and Patriot missile batteries in each country, and it has made other regional improvements such as stationing a Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system on Guam in April, 2013. But the U.S. should now extend its efforts to include promoting trilateral cooperation in missile defense, such as live exchange of radar data among the three countries. This would not only send a strong message of deterrence to North Korea and China, it is also an operational necessity given the close geography involved and how little warning there would be after a missile (or artillery) is launched, especially from North Korea. The recent successful first test by North Korea of a submarine-launched ballistic missile can only help build momentum for such an effort.

COMBINED EXERCISES AND MILITARY COOPERATION

Combined exercises provide another mechanism for promoting dialogue and improvement in relations between South Korea and Japan. Such exercises are also likely to be less controversial in terms of the domestic politics of each country. The South Korean government and many citizens have, not surprisingly, expressed concern after the Abe administration eased Japan's ban on collective self-defense last year, with an eye toward the recent revision of defense guidelines with the U.S. Combined exercises offer a way for the U.S., South Korea, and Japan to increase their interoperability while also underlining U.S. reassurances toward South Korea about

Japan's prospective role in collective self-defense. In December, 2013, for example, the guided missile destroyer USS Bulkeley participated in counter-piracy exercises in the Gulf of Oman with the Japanese destroyers JDS Ariake and JDS Setogiri as well as the South Korean destroyer ROKS Choi Young. The three navies practiced boarding exercises, signaling, search and rescue, medical training, and deck landings. It is noteworthy that the exercise took place in the Middle East, not in the seas surrounding the Korean peninsula. And although the U.S. and South Korean navies annually conduct about twenty combined exercises, in the last two years there have been only three trilateral naval exercises also involving Japan, restricted to search and rescue drills while the George Washington carrier strike group visited Korea. The U.S. should propose more (and more complex) trilateral exercises, both as a deterrent to North Korean or Chinese maritime aggression but also as a confidence-building measure between its two allies.

One annual combined U.S.-ROK exercise, Clear Horizon, involves both navies coordinating mine countermeasure operations from the air and on/under the sea. Such is exactly the type of exercise that would be even more beneficial with Japan also participating. This would both facilitate the larger strategic goal of promoting trilateral cooperation and also

IN RECENT YEARS CHINA HAS INVESTED ENORMOUSLY IN ITS MISSILE, AIR AND SEA POWER CAPABILITIES, BOTH TO THREATEN TAIWAN AND TO ENHANCE ITS ANTI-ACCESS/ AREA DENIAL CAPABILITIES

near Taiwan or the South China Sea); and last year it unilaterally established an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) that impinges on Japanese controlled-air-space over the Senkakus as well as South Korean airspace over its island province Jeju-do and another small island it controls, Ieo-do. North Korea continues to increase its ballistic missile and nuclear capabilities, and its behavior remains as unpredictably erratic and aggressive as ever. Just last year it exchanged hundreds of artillery rounds with South Korea near the Northern Limit Line off the peninsula's west coast, launched multiple drones that crash-landed in South Korean territory, exchanged machine gun fire with South Korean troops at the de-militarized zone (DMZ) that separates the countries multiple times, threatened to conduct another nuclear test, and according to the FBI conducted a devastating cyber-attack against the Sony corporation in retaliation for a comic film mocking dictator Kim Jong-un.

So the U.S. should not only push for a more comprehensive intelligence-sharing agreement, it should work toward eventual cooperation on theater missile defense with both Japan and South Korea. In light of continuing North Korean missile launches, and especially after a period of especially vitriolic rhetoric in early 2013, the U.S. has continued to work closely

provide demonstrable operational-level benefits that would save American lives during a security emergency. In the event of a large-scale kinetic provocation or attack by North Korea, it could become necessary to move large numbers of civilians out of harm's way. The U.S. Embassy in Seoul estimates that if a military-assisted NEO (non-combatant evacuation operation) were necessary from the Republic of Korea, as many as 233,837 potential evacuees would have to be moved. Of that staggering figure, 160,218 of the total estimate would be American citizens. Overland movement southward away from the DMZ would move civilians out of the range of much North Korean artillery and some missiles, but if flights from the peninsula were precluded by fighting, it would also be necessary to ferry people from Busan or other ports to Japan. Before doing so it would be essential to secure sea lines of communication and to conduct mine clearing, and the worst time to have to coordinate these types of complex activities for the first time among three nations is during an actual emergency.

A TERRITORIAL DISPUTE FROM WHICH TO STEER CLEAR

One difficult issue between Japan and South Korea with which the U.S. should not involve itself is the provenance of the small volcanic islets Koreans call Dok-do and Japanese call Takeshima, off the northeast coast of South Korea. This is because ownership of such a small island is a zero-sum game, and South Korea has had complete physical control of the islets since stationing police on them in 1954 (Japan controlled them during its 1910-1945 annexation of the peninsula). At the most recent Jeju Forum, Berkeley Law School Professor John Yoo delineated why, in his view, South Korea has significantly better legal claims than Japan, based on 12th century documents and long periods of effective control since then, as well as on the World War II Cairo Declaration that stripped Japan of "territories which she has taken by violence and greed." Since South Korea already maintains de facto control and since many legal scholars believe its legal case is much stronger than Japan's, the U.S. should not spend political capital by becoming involved.

POSSIBLE COUNTER-ARGUMENTS

One could counter-argue that even with significant U.S. effort toward reconciliation, South Korea would refuse to cooperate more closely with Japan simply because it would fear alienating China, with whom it has close trade relations and whose support would likely be needed for eventual Korean reunification. But despite South Korea nearing a final free trade agreement with China, its exports to China have actually been decreasing, 3.2% on year this past November according to the Korean Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy. There is no doubt China will remain important to South Korea's export-oriented economy, but as Chinese products improve in quality, imports of South Korean consumer goods are likely to continue to decline.

More importantly, South Korea has reason to be concerned with increasingly aggressive Chinese military and economic behavior, just as other neighbors do. When China unilaterally declared an ADIZ in the East China Sea that encompassed Jeju-do and a much smaller island, Ieo-do, on which South Korea operates a research station, South Korea objected immediately and reacted assertively: it sent planes through the area without notifying China, then announced the expansion of its own ADIZ to include not only Jeju-do and Ieo-do but also two other nearby islands it controls, Mara-do and Hong-do. Rather than viewing Chinese support as essential for eventual reunification, South Korean popular opinion has been greatly influenced by China's refusal to disavow North Korea even after the sinking of the South Korean warship ROKS Cheonan (which killed 46 South Korean sailors) and the artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong-do in 2010, as well as other issues that fester such as continued illegal Chinese fishing in South Korean waters and Chinese repatriation of North Korean defectors. Indeed, 68.1% of South Koreans express negative views of China's relations with North Korea, and 64.3% express negative views of China's likely intervention in case of a serious internal crisis in North Korea. It seems clear that while South Koreans understand the importance of maintaining good relations with their powerful neighbor, they harbor no illusions of immunity to the effects of growing Chinese aggressiveness. Even after Japanese Prime Minister Abe visited the controversial Yasukuni war shrine in December, 2013, poll results released by the Asan Institute in March, 2014 showed that 63.9% of South Koreans stated that security cooperation with Japan would be necessary in the event of China's rise.

CONCLUSION

After the horrors of the Second World War, the U.S. worked closely with the Japanese people to transform their country into a model of stability, prosperity, and democracy. Less than a decade after that great war ended, the U.S. sanctified its alliance with the South Korean people in blood; and from utter destruction they too have built their country into a similarly stable and prosperous democracy. China's recent rise has been so rapid, its intentions so unclear, and its diplomatic and military posture so aggressive, that the U.S. must make its best efforts at promoting Japanese-Korean reconciliation. Addressing historical issues, establishing strategic information-sharing agreements, and increasing combined military exercises provide realistic opportunities to strengthen our re-balance toward Asia by promoting cooperation and constructing an effective counterbalance to increasingly aggressive Chinese behavior.

The Perilous Road to Sovereignty

Lessons Learned through Tragedy and Triumph in Timor-Leste

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL DOUGLAS D. JACKSON, U.S. AIR FORCE

Editor's Note: Lieutenant Colonel Jackson's thesis won the Foreign Area Officers Association writing award at the Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy, National Defense University, Washington DC. Your Association is proud to bring you this outstanding scholarship.

Author's Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

Acknowledgements: I wish to express sincere gratitude to Mr. Julio Da Costa Freitas and the entire staff of the Embassy of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste in Washington DC. Mr. Freitas and his staff were generous with their time and offered key insights into the region and the culture that proved invaluable to my research. In addition, I am grateful to various senior leaders within the United States Department of State, both in Washington DC and in Dili, who shared their views and the perspectives of their organization regarding the past, present, and future of Timor-Leste. Each representative of the State Department provided valued information that shaped my project and enriched my research experience.

THE CONTRADICTIONS OF TIMOR-LESTE

In May of 2002, at the easternmost edge of the Lesser Sunda Islands, the nation of Timor-Leste (formerly East Timor) became the first internationally recognized, sovereign state of the 21st century. The occasion represented a milestone in the troubled history of the nascent nation, but the ceremony did not connote a cessation of the violence and hostilities that indelibly marked centuries of colonialism, occupation, failed pacification, and systematic reprisal. More than a decade after Timor-Leste's formal recognition of statehood, and fifteen years removed from the sovereignty referendum that concomitantly marked a termination, an escalation, and a genesis of episodic challenges confronting the country and its citizenry, Timor-Leste remains a study in contrasts. For idealists, Timor-Leste symbolizes the power of a free people to self-determine despite years of oppression and neglect. Advocates of multilateral engagement, meanwhile, trumpet Timor-Leste as an elegy to the vast potential of global cooperation and regional leadership. Conversely, skeptics of coordinated international intermediation contend that the various tragedies and missteps in Timor-Leste represent a cautionary tale of ineffective intervention and the impotence of the United Nations.

Perhaps the only unimpeachable truth of Timor-Leste is that its narrative is more complicated than a single perspective can convey, and therefore its past, present, and future defy

simple categorization. Accordingly, this study will consider Timor-Leste's complex and challenging history, with particular emphasis on the efforts to stabilize and develop the nation in the wake of the violent aftermath of the 1999 referendum. Further, the study will analyze lessons learned during the fifteen years following the popular consultation and the salient conclusions that international leaders and policymakers should draw from the post-sovereignty experience of Timor-Leste.

EAST TIMOR IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The island of Timor developed as a trading colony of the Portuguese in the 16th century, further colonized by the Dutch in the early 17th century.¹ The Dutch wrested control of the western portion of the island in 1616, while Portugal maintained dominion over the eastern section of the island that comprises modern Timor-Leste; a 19th century treaty between Portugal and the Netherlands formalized the partitioning of the island, to include the geographically separated East Timorese enclave of Occussi on the northern coast of West Timor.² As a result of centuries of Portuguese colonialism and separation from most of the western half of the island, East Timorese share a unique culture and a political unity, influenced by Christianity, European style governance, and resistance to occupying power.³

The Dutch-Portuguese cohabitation of Timor Island continued through civic unrest, failed attempts at pacification, and colonial indifference, with minimal interruption, until World War II.⁴ In early 1942, in anticipation of a Japanese invasion, the Netherlands and Australia positioned armed forces on Timor Island, with Portugal's permission. The ensuing fall of Singapore and Japan's decisive victory over the Allied fleet in the Java Sea signaled its dominance in the region and prompted Portuguese and Dutch forces to surrender Timor Island without resistance.⁵ Fearful of the geopolitical ramifications of a Japanese occupation of Timor Island, Australian forces were not as conciliatory, instead opting to engage in a prolonged guerilla war with Japan.⁶ The outnumbered Australian commandos were able to delay advances while inflicting significant casualties on Japanese units, due in large measure to assistance from young East Timorese men and boys – known as *Criados* – who served as guides for the agile Australian military forces.⁷

Though Australian forces eventually withdrew from Timor Island in 1943, the engagement was a pyrrhic victory for Japan that resulted in only forty Australian casualties compared to nearly fifteen hundred Japanese casualties. The most significant losses of the conflict were inflicted against the East Timorese, who endured nearly 70,000 casualties as a result

of Japanese reprisals after the Australians departed.⁸ This episode tragically foreshadows the exorbitant costs paid by East Timor when the international community fails to forestall and safeguard against atrocities of war. Furthermore, Australia's alliance with East Timorese *Criados* against occupying Japanese forces and the ensuing Australian withdrawal from the island that prompted widespread reprisals, influences the prevailing dynamic between the two nations. One could infer that this shared history at least partially explains the complicated and angst-filled relationship Australia shares with its neighbor 400 miles to the northwest.

When Japan relinquished control of its territorial gains in the Dutch East Indies at the conclusion of World War II in 1945, Indonesia immediately declared its independence. After a four-year revolution marked by periodic military conflict with the Netherlands and internal feuding, Indonesia was recognized as an independent amalgamation of the Dutch East Indies, to include the former Dutch colony of West Timor.⁹ Meanwhile, despite a renewed call for independence following World War II and an Australian consideration to request an international mandate to control East Timor for strategic reasons, East Timor remained a Portuguese colony.¹⁰ While the region of West Timor integrated into independent Indonesia, East Timor resumed its "prewar colonial model of forced labor, underdevelopment, and neglect."¹¹

Colonial incompetence in East Timor fomented calls for rebellion and resistance to Portuguese authority and gave rise to a generation of East Timorese leaders who would eventually lead an autonomous and independent nation; however, it was not until Portugal's predominantly bloodless "Carnation Revolution" of 1974 that decolonization became a reality.¹² Emboldened by a wave of public support, the new government in Lisbon acted swiftly to restore democracy and terminate Portugal's costly and unsuccessful colonial occupations around the globe. Within months, Portugal withdrew entirely from Timor Island, effectively ending 460 years of Portuguese domination of East Timor.¹³

Portugal's abrupt departure from East Timor, coupled with centuries of extraction and underdevelopment, left the impoverished region devoid of a coherent governing strategy, adequate infrastructure, and the institutional capacity to manage the transition to sovereignty. Amidst an internal struggle to determine the appropriate path forward – certain factions favored integration with Indonesia while others advocated a closer alignment with Portugal – the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) unilaterally declared independence in November 1975 and the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste was born.¹⁴ The two alternative political groups in East Timor opposed FRETILIN's declaration, as did Portugal's transitional assistance regime, but negotiations among the parties proved to be ineffective.¹⁵ The predictable discord in East Timor provided the ideal pretext for Indonesian forces, which had been engaging in small-scale, sporadic fighting with East Timorese factions, to intervene en masse. Nine days after FRETILIN's declaration of independence, ten thousand Indonesian troops invaded East Timor.¹⁶ Only two months

later, 60,000 East Timorese had died at the hands of the annexing Indonesian military.¹⁷

Scholars disagree regarding the level of international complicity in Indonesia's aggressive takeover of East Timor, however, none dispute at least tacit approval of Indonesia's action on the part of major world powers.¹⁸ As a result of Indonesia's staunchly anti-Communist disposition – a significant factor in the context of the Cold War – and widespread fear of potential Communist sympathy within FRETILIN, Western and Western-influenced nation-states opted against intervention when Indonesian forces breached the border of East Timor. Documents declassified in 2001 reveal that U.S. President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, under increasing pressure in the region due to military struggles in Vietnam, "assured [Indonesian President] Suharto that they would not object to what the Indonesian leader termed 'rapid or drastic action' in East Timor."¹⁹ Australian leaders were provided similar notification ahead of the Indonesian invasion of East Timor and elected to remain silent on the matter.²⁰ Weeks later, the United Nations Security Council formally condemned the invasion, confirmed East Timor's right of self-determination, and called for an immediate withdrawal of Indonesian forces, but the resolution was ineffectual.²¹ In July 1976, Indonesia declared East Timor to be its twenty-seventh province and shortly thereafter closed the territory to outside observers.²² Following 460 years of colonization, East Timor would now be victimized by 25 years of occupation, repression, and genocide.

INDONESIAN DOMINATION OF TIMOR-LESTE

Although consistent figures of East Timorese killed in the aftermath of the Indonesian invasion of Timor-Leste are elusive, conservative estimates suggest over 100,000 individuals were killed in the first two years following the December 1975 incursion.²³ FALANTIL, the militant wing of FRETILIN, resisted the advances and dominion of the Indonesian military (TNI), but the under-resourced and poorly equipped units could not withstand the direct assault of a superior-funded fighting force. FALANTIL forces instead commenced a 25-year guerrilla warfare campaign against occupying Indonesian forces, prompting a harsh pacification effort against all East Timorese. During the Indonesian domination of East Timor, massacres against civilian populations were commonplace, as were indiscriminate napalm bombing campaigns, widespread famine, and TNI-controlled labor camps.²⁴ By the time a military stalemate emerged in the mid-1980s, more than 200,000 East Timorese had lost their lives at the hands of the TNI.²⁵

Three developments in East Timor, beginning in the late 1980s, in conjunction with a determined and increasingly high-profile resistance force, prompted a significant shift in Indonesian policy in the region. The first spark toward a new geopolitical reality in Southeast Asia was an official visit to Dili by Pope John Paul II in October 1989.²⁶ After the Pontiff conducted mass for thousands of Timorese Catholics, representatives of FRETILIN and FALANTIL staged a pro-independence demonstration in view of hordes of international

media traveling with Pope John Paul II. The enormous press coverage sparked international outrage and began a steady application of pressure on the Indonesian government.

If the papal visit represented the initial spark toward enduring change in East Timor, the massacre of scores of Timorese by Indonesian military and police forces in Dili's Santa Cruz cemetery in November 1991 was the fuel that empowered a sustainable fire. After minor scuffles between funeral-goers and occupying forces during the procession, approximately 85 Indonesian defense and law enforcement personnel opened fire on the mourners inside the cemetery gates.²⁷ Some of the mourners survived, but most did not, as Indonesian troops launched intermittent gunfire at the unarmed crowd for nearly twenty minutes.²⁸ Unlike previous reports of atrocities in East Timor that the Indonesian government simply denied, the Santa Cruz massacre was incontrovertible because it was videotaped by a British journalist.²⁹ The death toll of the Santa Cruz massacre is disputed, but the impact of the event is clear; the massacre represented an "end of any chance of East Timor's successful integration into Indonesia," as Timorese anti-Indonesia sentiment fomented and human rights advocates found a galvanizing event to rally the international community.³⁰

A massive regional economic and monetary crisis, partially influenced by internal and international pressure applied on the Indonesian government over the occupation of Timor-Leste, led to political upheaval in Jakarta in May 1998. After 32 years in office, Suharto abruptly resigned and handed control of the government to his Vice-President, B.J. Habibie.³¹ Despite a close 40-year friendship with Suharto, Habibie immediately initiated a more internationalist, transparent, and conciliatory administration than his predecessor; among the changes Habibie instituted was the policy of decentralization of Indonesian provinces, including East Timor.³² In a June 1998 BBC interview, Habibie announced, "I am ready to consider, as the President, to give East Timor a special status."³³ After a 25-year occupation that led to the death of more than a quarter of its population, East Timor approached a narrow window of opportunity to self-determine, but the challenges of independence were only beginning to surface.³⁴

PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF POPULAR CONSULTATION

After rounds of negotiations between Indonesia and Portugal, facilitated by the United Nations, Indonesia agreed to a UN-administered referendum to determine whether East Timorese would prefer autonomous status within Indonesia or outright independence.³⁵ In accordance with the May 1999 agreement, if the East Timorese voted in favor of autonomy within Indonesia, East Timor would be removed from the list of Non-Self Governing Territories of concern to the General Assembly; this outcome effectively would have led to the UN officially recognizing East Timor as a legitimate, albeit autonomous province of Indonesia.³⁶ In contrast, if the East Timorese electorate endorsed independence and rejected autonomy, Indonesia would voluntarily withdraw from Timor-Leste and allow Portugal to oversee a transition to

independence.

Pursuant to the agreement signed by the Foreign Ministers of Portugal and Indonesia as well as the UN Secretary-General, the UN established the United Nations Mission to East Timor (UNAMET) "to organize and conduct a popular consultation...to determine the Territory's future status."³⁸ Though UNAMET was charged with nearly all logistical requirements of the consultation, in accordance with the agreement, Indonesian authorities were solely responsible for ensuring a secure environment in East Timor, devoid of violence and other forms of intimidation.³⁹ The collective decision to abdicate security responsibility to the occupying force proved to be a disastrous one.

UNAMET included 241 international staff divided into political, electoral, and informational components, along with 280 civilian police officers and 50 military liaison officers tasked with advising Indonesian police and military forces on the discharge of their duties.⁴⁰ UNAMET did not have authority to engage in peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations, but rather operated under the terms of Chapter 6 of the UN Charter, to aid "in the peaceful settlement of disputes."⁴¹ Shortly after its formation, UNAMET established an electoral commission and began registering and informing East Timorese voters; in only six weeks, UNAMET successfully registered over 450,000 East Timorese ahead of the negotiated cut-off date. UN operations in East Timor, however, continued to be threatened and impacted by violence in the region perpetrated directly by the TNI or, more commonly, by TNI-backed militia groups. The violence was the coordinated result of a pro-integration (anti-independence) campaign intended to ensure that Timor-Leste remained part of Indonesia.⁴³ Eventually, security conditions in East Timor deteriorated so profoundly as a result of the terror campaign that UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was forced to extend the voter registration deadline more than a month and delay the referendum date from August 8 to August 30.⁴⁴

Predictably, as the consultation date drew nearer, violence in East Timor escalated even further. UNAMET offices were victimized by grenade attacks and vandalism designed to intimidate, while UNAMET officials faced threats of violence as well as occasional car-jackings, ambushes, and physical attacks.⁴⁵ UNAMET officials were not the primary targets of intimidation, however, as TNI-supported militias were more interested in swaying the vote toward integration with Indonesia through terror against pro-independence Timorese.⁴⁶ Additional consultation delay and even postponement was considered, but due to demands of President Habibie to complete the process before the end of August and internal pressure to minimize time and cost requirements, Secretary-General Annan affirmed the amended consultation date of August 30, 1999. Annan pressed forward with the consultation despite the fact that several influential governments within the UN—notably the United States, Great Britain, and Australia—"had shared sufficient intelligence to make their leaders aware that the voting would be accompanied or followed by significant militia attacks."

In spite of these security concerns and the campaign of

intimidation launched by the TNI and TNI-supported militia groups, leaders in the National Council for Timorese Resistance (CNRT) also backed the August 30 consultation date. One can reasonably infer that the steadfast support of the East Timorese resistance to hold the consultation as scheduled despite fears of reprisal stemmed from centuries of occupation and domination. As Julio Da Costa Freitas – a veteran of the resistance movement and the current Charge d’Affaires for the Embassy of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste in Washington, DC – explained in an interview: “We were aware [of the threat of reprisal], but the referendum was our only chance for freedom. We feared if we delayed further, we might not get another chance.”

Days before the popular consultation, violence and terror peaked as pro-autonomy militias rioted, destroyed, burned, tortured, and killed indiscriminately in Dili and throughout the province.⁴⁹ Despite a UN mandate to ensure an environment devoid of intimidation and violence, Indonesian military and police forces did not intervene to prevent the pre-referendum rampage. Meanwhile, UNAMET personnel, neither equipped nor authorized to operate against pro-autonomy, TNI-backed militias, retreated into walled compounds. Perhaps for reasons of necessity or self-preservation, UNAMET officials documented but ultimately ignored the obvious environment of intimidation that existed beyond the gates. Indicative of willful ignorance or irrational optimism that belied the events on the ground, UN Secretary-General Annan released a statement on August 29, 1999 that heralded the next day’s referendum as an opportunity “to settle a long-running dispute by peaceful means.”⁵⁰

By the numbers, the popular consultation was an overwhelming success. 98.6% of eligible East Timorese participated in the referendum that was overseen by an additional 1,300 international observers.⁵¹ The day of the referendum was peaceful and surprisingly quiet; the majority of East Timorese voters cast their ballots by mid-morning through limited reports of voter intimidation, breaches of voting rules, and sporadic violence. By the early afternoon, however, as indications began to signal a massive surge in pro-independence voters, TNI-backed militias activated. UNAMET personnel were forced to close and evacuate numerous polling places by 2:00 p.m. due to safety concerns.⁵² Throughout the island region, as UNAMET officials departed, Indonesian militias torched the voting facilities and initiated a coordinated campaign of reprisal against the East Timorese. The reprisal was necessitated because pre-referendum attempts to intimidate, terrorize, and eliminate pro-independence support failed; East Timorese voted in favor of independence by a whopping margin of 57% (21.5% in favor of autonomy within Indonesia; 78.5% opposed). Julio Da Costa Freitas, a 1999 voter and victim of the subsequent post-referendum violence, proffered a representative perspective on the matter. Asked whether he would still vote for independence knowing the reprisals the outcome would engender, Freitas responded: “Absolutely. I am proud of the courage of the East Timorese and convinced we made the right decision.”⁵³

After a hand count of votes and the validation of the Electoral Commission, the UN released the result of the popular consultation on September 4, 1999. In the announcement, Secretary-General Annan praised the Indonesian government for its commitment and perseverance in East Timor.⁵⁴ Annan further asserted: “Now is the time for all concerned to seize the opportunity to lay a firm and lasting foundation for cooperation and peace, and to usher in an era of stability and prosperity for all future generations of East Timorese.”⁵⁵ Immediately after Annan’s address, President Habibie urged acceptance of the results and reiterated the Indonesian Government’s acceptance of full responsibility for the peace and security of East Timor.⁵⁶ Regrettably, Indonesian military and police forces operating in Timor-Leste did not honor President Habibie’s directives. Within minutes of the announcement, proxy militias – many wearing TNI uniforms, with TNI-issued weapons – launched a massive campaign of mayhem. More than 1,400 East Timorese were murdered in the first day after the consultation results were released; in two weeks, more than 70% of Timor-Leste’s built environment was razed.⁵⁷ Moreover, by September 14, more than three-quarters of Timor-Leste’s 800,000 people had fled their homes, mostly to Indonesian West Timor and the Timor mountains.⁵⁸ A scathing report from the Australian Consulate in September 1999 decried “a deliberate and selective lapse of law enforcement” in Timor-Leste.⁵⁹ The report concluded: “there would seem to be no doubt that TNI is allowing militia violence and intimidation to continue almost unchecked.”⁶⁰

Despite pre-referendum assurances to the contrary, the violence in Timor-Leste necessitated the emergency evacuation of nearly all remaining UNAMET personnel.⁶¹ By September 14, only twelve UNAMET staff members remained in Timor-Leste; most were evacuated to Australia, along with hundreds of East Timorese refugees and former UNAMET employees who had sought protection inside UNAMET’s gated facility.⁶² A later UN investigation of the post-referendum rampage concluded that an international criminal tribunal was necessary to bring the perpetrators of the coordinated violence and destruction to justice.⁶³ The measure was blocked by the UN Security Council, however, and no international criminal tribunal to address the post-consultation atrocities in Timor-Leste was or has ever been formed.⁶⁴

The post-referendum chaos and the public outrage the mayhem engendered – particularly in Australia and Portugal – prompted a coordinated and effective application of diverse instruments of power by the international community.⁶⁵ The United States preferred to defer leadership of the Timor-Leste intervention to regional power Australia, but applied financial and diplomatic pressure on Indonesia to compel acceptance of an international peacekeeping force on Timor Island. President Bill Clinton, for example, publicly declared: “My willingness to support future economic assistance from the international community will depend upon how Indonesia handles the situation [in East Timor] from today forward.”⁶⁶ Privately, meanwhile, the U.S. military suspended all ties with the Indonesian military,

to include joint exercises and foreign military sales, until the situation in Timor-Leste was resolved.⁶⁷ Further, at the request of the United States, the World Bank threatened to withhold Indonesia's emergency recovery funds and the International Monetary Fund planned to cancel an upcoming consultation with Indonesia if President Habibie refused to permit an international force to intervene in Timor-Leste.⁶⁸

The synchronized coercion succeeded; Indonesia accepted an international peacekeeping force in Timor-Leste on September 12, 1999.⁶⁹ Three days later, the UN Security Council authorized the formation of a multinational force "to restore peace and security in East Timor."⁷⁰ Though not formally designated, Australia assumed the role of "lead nation in a multinational coalition" for the first time in its history.⁷¹ In a demonstration of keen forethought, Australia, the United States, and New Zealand had already conducted preliminary, multinational military planning during the summer of 1999, in anticipation that the situation in Timor-Leste might deteriorate as the referendum approached.⁷² Furthermore, Australia and the U.S. had conducted bilateral training and peacekeeping exercises that summer, and regional planners from several supporting nations had already established a shared trust, vision, and respect.⁷³ As a result of these pre-conditions, the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) formed, deployed, and commenced operations more rapidly than similar multinational organizations.⁷⁴

The main body of INTERFET personnel arrived in Dili on September 20, 1999 – seventeen mayhem-filled days after the announcement of the result of the popular consultation. In spite of initial Indonesian demands that the force be lightly armed and drawn only from regional militaries, INTERFET was a fully-armored and integrated fighting force, comprised of personnel from 22 nations, with considerable capabilities in air, sea, land, and space.⁷⁵ By the end of September, more than 4,000 INTERFET personnel were operating in Timor-Leste; at its zenith, INTERFET's troop level swelled to over 11,000.⁷⁶ INTERFET's concept of operations was an "oil-spot" strategy based on the principal of "methodically reinforcing success" as personnel levels increased.⁷⁷ INTERFET initially focused security efforts in Dili, then transitioned to Baucau and other regional centers while maintaining a presence in previously pacified sections.⁷⁸ INTERFET's building-block approach to security succeeded; by October 22, 1999, security was restored throughout the island territory.⁷⁹ One week later, the last vestiges of the Indonesian military withdrew from Timor-Leste, leaving behind scorched earth, an already meager infrastructure in shambles, and a brutalized but not broken populace.

"BENIGN COLONIALISM"

As INTERFET addressed security concerns related to militia violence in East Timor, the UN developed plans for a managed transition to national sovereignty. On October 25, 1999 the Security Council established the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to be "an integrated, multidimensional peacekeeping operation fully responsible for the administration of East Timor during its

transition to independence."⁸¹ UNTAET's comprehensive mission distinguished it from previous and future UN operations. UNTAET was not tasked with controlling or assisting an existing administration; "UNTAET was the administration, with full executive and judicial authority."⁸² To accomplish this expansive mandate, per UN Security Council Resolution 1272, UNTAET was tasked to accomplish the following:

- (1) provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory,**
- (2) establish an effective administration,**
- (3) assist in the development of civil and social services,**
- (4) ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance,**
- (5) support capacity-building for self-government, and**
- (6) assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development.**

To attain its objectives, UNTAET was authorized a force of 13,390 personnel, including 8,950 military members, 200 military observers, 1,640 police officers, and 2,600 governance and administration civilians.⁸⁴ By February 2000, the entire UNTAET force was deployed to East Timor; subsequently, INTERFET relinquished control of military operations in the island territory to the nascent UN administration.

Assessments of UNTAET's performance and effectiveness in Timor-Leste are as diverse as the countries that supported the multinational force. Advocates point to the tangible accomplishments of UNTAET as evidence of a mission accomplished. For example, as directed by its first mandate, UNTAET created and maintained a sufficiently secure environment for the administration to operate, for free movement of citizens and personnel, and for the return of over 200,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs).⁸⁵ Moreover, UNTAET's success creating and sustaining a secure environment enabled the mission to evolve from operational peacekeeping to peacebuilding; consequently, UNTAET also established East Timorese police academies and multiple military recruiting and training facilities.⁸⁶

UNTAET critics, however, contend that successes in the security arena led to gross failures in the more critical and challenging areas of development and nation-building. A common criticism of UNTAET in this sector is that rather than prepare East Timorese to govern, UN administrators assumed "full control of state functions in the name of efficiency."⁸⁷ Some argue further that the fundamental failing of UNTAET was that "many of its officials were poorly trained, incompetent or just did not care."⁸⁸ UNTAET's tendency to over-manage rather than properly train East Timorese for their future of self-governance is reflected in the fact that fewer than 50% of management positions in the government were filled by the time UNTAET ceded control of the administration in 2002.⁸⁹

Some detractors argue that UNTAET's failure to overcome a lack of human capacity in East Timor stemmed from the approach of its chief administrator, Special Representative for the UN Secretary General Sergio Vieira de Mello. Mr. de Mello, a seasoned UN diplomat, presumed a greater capacity for the

East Timorese people than actually existed.⁹⁰ Furthermore, de Mello exerted absolute control in the nascent nation, thus potentially stifling the ability of the East Timorese to develop organic governing capacity.⁹¹ Nevertheless, UNTAET's direction and guidance – albeit, perhaps, heavy-handed – enabled national elections to be held exactly two years after the popular consultation. In the August 2001 balloting, 91% of eligible East Timorese elected an 88-member Constituent Assembly; the body was charged to draft and adopt a Constitution, establish a framework for future elections, and enable a transition to complete independence.⁹²

On March 22, 2002, the Constituent Assembly ratified Timor-Leste's Constitution, paving a path for a presidential election to be held three weeks later. The expedited timeline for constitutional creation and ratification, as well as the ensuing national election, prompted critics of UNTAET to claim that the process was artificially condensed to facilitate a hastened withdrawal of UNTAET forces.⁹³ Nevertheless, with the support of 82.7% of the electorate, Jose Alexandre "Xanana" Gusmao was elected East Timor's first president; he was inaugurated on May 20, 2002. Additionally, on the day of Gusmao's inauguration, in a controversial action that foreshadowed fissure within the nascent government, the Constituent Assembly transformed into the Legislative Assembly.⁹⁴ That same momentous day marked the termination of UNTAET and the formal independence of Timor-Leste.

Author Damien Kingsbury described the UNTAET era in East Timor as one of "benign colonialism," as the "UN assumed most of the functions of a colonial power and voluntarily withdrew, if precipitously, according to its own decolonization timelines."⁹⁵ Kingsbury's assessment alludes to one of the most damning criticisms of UNTAET; from its inception, the mission was designed to withdraw in accordance with timelines, rather than milestones. As a result, when it became clear that UNTAET would not fulfill all aspects of its comprehensive mandate, rather than extend the mission, the UN pushed forward with an incomplete outline of a state administration, "but without its substantive content."⁹⁶ As UNTAET withdrew from East Timor, a president, a legislative body, and a constitution were in place, but the necessary underpinnings to enable the governmental apparatus to adjust, adapt, and evolve did not exist. Charge' d'Affaires Julio Da Costa Freitas succinctly concurs: "UNTAET was too short."⁹⁷

Arguably the most accurate assessment of UNTAET was articulated, without the benefit of hindsight, by author Sue Downie: "If UNTAET's legacies are truly sustainable they cannot be gauged now. A test of UNTAET will be the first, and perhaps second, election after independence."⁹⁸ In the years following the withdrawal of UNTAET, the answer to Downie's prescient measure of mission success became apparent; based on the need for additional UN intervention to secure and facilitate future elections, UNTAET did not fulfill its mandate.

EARLY DEPARTURE AND THE MAKINGS A FAILED STATE
Days before the formal declaration of East Timor's

independence and the withdrawal of UNTAET, the UN Security Council approved the establishment of the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET).⁹⁹ UNMISSET was given a three-pronged mandate: to provide assistance to East Timor's administrative structures, to provide interim law enforcement and security while simultaneously developing the East Timor Police Service, and to assist with the maintenance of internal and external security.¹⁰⁰ At its peak strength in August 2002, UNMISSET was staffed by nearly 6,900 personnel (4,776 military, 771 police, and 1,321 international and local civilians);¹⁰¹ however, from the outset of the mission, UNMISSET leaders were mandated to downsize as quickly as possible and "devolve all operational responsibilities to the East Timorese authorities as soon as feasible."¹⁰² Regrettably for East Timor, the shortcomings of UNTAET revealed themselves throughout the three-year mission of UNMISSET.

The post-independence government of East Timor enjoyed only moderate legitimacy among the populace, partly due to its controversial establishment, but more attributable to its inability to respond to public grievances in an effective manner.¹⁰³ Lacking capacity to govern and the infrastructure to improve lives of its citizens, East Timor's government became the target of burgeoning civil unrest and widespread rioting beginning in late 2002 and escalating through 2003 and 2004.¹⁰⁴ An inexperienced, poorly-trained, and under-funded police force worsened discord by responding aggressively to protesters and applying the rule of law inconsistently throughout the nation.¹⁰⁵ Similarly, when an unprepared government was confronted with successive years of drought and subsequent reductions in crop yields, more than 10% of East Timor's population faced food shortages in 2003 and 2004.¹⁰⁶ Ill-equipped to resolve the natural disaster and unable to institute needed agricultural reforms, East Timor's government instead relied on international food aid to prevent a more debilitating crisis.¹⁰⁷ This arrangement of outside reliance conformed to systemic patterns established during UNTAET's rushed mission.

East Timor's homeland security continued to be an issue of concern for the post-independence government and UNMISSET personnel, as well. With a troop strength of 1,500, East Timor's new military – the Falintil-Timor-Leste Defense Force (F-FDTL) – was too diminutive to be effective; nevertheless, due to international support and funding, the F-FDTL expended nearly 8% of the federal budget.¹⁰⁸ For reasons of incapacity, corruption, or disinterest, F-FDTL did not secure the border between East Timor and Indonesia, leading to unchecked smuggling, economic subversion, and a perceived lack of territorial integrity.¹⁰⁹ Rather than address its systemic law enforcement and security problems, however, the government of East Timor became increasingly insular and authoritarian.¹¹⁰

Despite aforementioned deficiencies, on May 19, 2004, UNMISSET relinquished all police and both internal and external security responsibilities to the fledgling government of Timor-Leste.¹¹¹ Whether during the mandates of UNAMET or UNMISSET, complete or early abdication of security responsibility is a consistent theme throughout international engagement in Timor-Leste. Moreover, in accordance with its original

mandate rather than the realities evident in country, as 2004 progressed UNMISSET continued to demobilize its forces, shed its responsibilities, and precipitously decrease funding for the mission in Timor-Leste.¹¹² In spite of persistent indications of inadequate governance, porous borders, civil dissatisfaction, and insufficient internal and external security, UNMISSET employed barely more than 1,000 staff members at the time of its withdrawal on April 30, 2005.

UNMISSET gave way to the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) – an exclusively political mission – in May of 2005. UNOTIL was modestly mandated to support development of critical institutions and provide training on observance of democratic governance and human rights.¹¹³ Of note, UNOTIL did not have any direct security or law enforcement responsibility; the limited military and law enforcement personnel authorized were tasked to train, not operate. Concurrent to UNOTIL's establishment, East Timor's imminent political crisis worsened, as national poverty and income inequality increased while acrimony sparked by institutional weakness and communication barriers swelled.¹¹⁴ Revenue from Timor-Leste's plentiful oil and gas reserves in the Timor Gap became a symbol of government ineffectiveness, as it enabled profligate spending by political elites, without supporting sustainable economic development and non-oil GDP growth.¹¹⁵ President Gusmao and the prevailing FRETILIN government, comprised primarily of East Timorese who lived in exile during the Indonesian occupation, was increasingly seen as illegitimate and repressive by underrepresented minority groups.¹¹⁶ As UNOTIL's scheduled 2006 withdrawal approached, conditions in Timor-Leste deteriorated to dangerous levels.

Schisms within the East Timor National Police (PNTL) and the F-FDTL prompted widespread riots in April 2006. As national disaffection mushroomed, anti-government groups combined with aggrieved military and police forces to demand change. The fledgling government responded with aggression and the riots quickly devolved into open hostilities between pro-government forces and the protesters.¹¹⁷ Cleavages, previously papered over by pro-independence nationalism, reopened as violence erupted in Dili and throughout Timor-Leste. In an effort to pacify the protesters, President Gusmao accepted the resignation of the first national prime minister and appointed Nobel Peace Prize laureate Jose Ramos-Horta as interim prime minister in advance of 2007's national elections.¹¹⁸ Ramos-Horta was seen as a suitable replacement, as he was no longer a member of FRETILIN, yet enjoyed widespread national popularity.¹¹⁹ Despite the leadership change, violence continued, causing a massive proliferation in internally displaced persons (IDPs) reminiscent of the post-popular consultation reprisal. By June 2006, approximately 160,000 East Timorese resided in IDPs in or around Dili.¹²⁰

As East Timor's 2006 humanitarian and security crisis expanded, the international community was forced to act. At the request of the Timor-Leste government, Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Portugal provided emergency security forces beginning in May 2006.¹²¹ Simultaneously, the UN conducted a rapid assessment to determine the appropriate form of future

intervention.¹²² The assessment's findings included acknowledgement that the achievements of previous UN missions in Timor-Leste were at risk of compromise if the international community failed to respond in a decisive manner.¹²³ In a major departure from previous wording vis-à-vis time horizons in Timor-Leste, a follow-on Secretary-General report released in August 2006 concluded: "A renewed commitment by the international community to assist the country in this [nation-building] process must correspondingly be a long-term one."¹²⁴ The report's stark language suggests that after nearly seven years of international half-measures, the one positive development to emerge from the 2006 humanitarian and security crisis in East Timor is that the events finally inspired substantive change.

UNMIT AND THE REINVIGORATION OF INTERNATIONAL EFFORT IN TIMOR-LESTE

On August 25, 2006, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). UNMIT was given a multi-faceted mandate to provide for government and institution development, support the 2007 electoral process, enhance national security and law enforcement agencies through direct support and training, and coordinate UN post-conflict peacebuilding and capacity-building efforts.¹²⁵ Unlike the preceding UN missions in Timor-Leste, UNMIT's mandate made no reference to departure, withdrawal, abdication of responsibility, or cost controls; the emphasis of the mandate was security to enable effective governance. UNMIT was authorized slightly more than 1,600 personnel – most of which represented international police and military forces – but the troop strength was not designed to decline over time, but rather maintain a steady footprint for the duration of the mission. Similarly, UNMIT's budget remained relatively constant throughout the nearly seven-year operation, ranging between \$177 million and \$218 million annually.¹²⁶

As UNMIT personnel deployed to Timor-Leste in the summer of 2006, they arrived in a fledgling nation described by Damien Kingsbury as "not quite anarchy," but "very close to it."¹²⁷ A massive and violent rift had developed between pro-FRETILIN "easterners" (also known as "loyalists") and anti-FRETILIN "westerners" (referred to as "petitioners").¹²⁸ The PNTL and the F-FDTL reflected the national divide, as armed members of these police and military forces abandoned organizational roles and identities in favor of factional allegiances. In short, civil war in Timor-Leste was a real possibility. Undoubtedly, the timely establishment of UNMIT in Timor-Leste, even with limited manpower, quelled the violence throughout the island nation and averted a full-scale civil war.¹²⁹

To be clear, UNMIT was not a panacea in Timor-Leste and the arrival of the multinational force did not signify a cessation of hostilities; however, UNMIT's deployment dramatically improved the security situation in the nation, enabled nearly all IDPs to return to their homes, and facilitated East Timor's national elections in 2007.¹³⁰

After a tense but secure political campaign period, Prime Minister Jose Ramos-Horta emerged from two rounds of ballot-

ing as the overwhelming selection for President of Timor-Leste; he was inaugurated on May 20, 2007. In accordance with the Timor-Leste Constitution, the president is a symbolic head of state, though he does have authority to veto legislation and call for dissolution of Parliament, when appropriate.¹³¹ The Prime Minister is the head of government position and is selected by the 65-member Parliament. Accordingly, Timor-Leste's parliamentary elections, that take place after the presidential elections, are most significant for the citizenry and the nation. Though violence did increase marginally in advance of the 2007 parliamentary elections, UNMIT personnel teamed with East Timorese law enforcement and military forces to ensure a safe environment that enabled more than 80% voter participation. Ironically, former President Kay Rala "Xanana" Gusmao (he shed his Portuguese names in favor of local ones) emerged at the conclusion of the parliamentary elections, cobbled together a coalition of minority parties that did not include FRETILIN, and ascended to the position of Prime Minister in August 2007.

Having learned from the failures of post-election international intervention in 2002, UNMIT did not scale back operations or cede responsibilities following the 2007 elections. On the contrary, UNMIT's troop strength and financial commitment remained steady, as did its emphasis on security and effective governance. This consistency of effort paid major dividends in February 2008 when a rival political faction launched a coordinated yet unsuccessful assassination attempt against both President Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Gusmao. Rather than erupt into chaotic violence, as one might have anticipated in a less secure environment, Timor-Leste demonstrated new found national resiliency in the aftermath of the assassination attempts.¹³² Attributable at least in part to the presence and progress of UNMIT, the assassination attempts actually broke a political deadlock, rather than exacerbate one.¹³³ The perpetrators of the plots were killed or detained by authorities, while surviving supporters and sympathizers negotiated with the government to surrender their weapons in exchange for the opportunity to start their lives anew.¹³⁴ The state of emergency that had been declared immediately after the assassination attempts was lifted less than ten weeks later, with virtually no additional violence.¹³⁵

The clearest indication of improved governing and security capacity in the wake of the 2008 assassination attempts emerged from the United Nations' summary of events which noted the following: "The Prime Minister demonstrated firm and reasoned leadership; the Parliament functioned effectively as a forum for debate in response to the events; and leaders of all political parties urged their supporters to remain calm, while the general population demonstrated faith in the ability of the State to deal with the situation." Less than two years since its inception, UNMIT had helped transform a post-conflict state from one susceptible to violent protests and mass internal displacement to one capable of resolving national crisis in a systematic, transparent, and effective manner. Timor-Leste remained fragile, but intact.

As Timor-Leste moved past the assassination attempt, the international commitment to the country remained steadfast.

Accordingly, the UN Security Council extended the UNMIT mandate with a long-term focus on the next round of national elections in 2012.¹³⁶ Moreover, fifteen months ahead of a proposed withdrawal, UNMIT and Timor-Leste officials identified 129 critical metrics of progress to monitor and validate mission termination.¹³⁷ Rather than abide by rigid timelines for withdrawal, as had been done during previous UN missions, UNMIT and Timor-Leste's negotiated departure plan allowed for an event-based, phased exit.

When 2012's presidential elections were completed devoid of major security breaches and with more than 72% voter turnout, UNMIT's withdrawal at the conclusion of 2012 became increasingly acceptable.¹³⁸ When Taur Matan Rauk – a former commander of F-FDTL – peacefully transitioned to President of Timor-Leste in May 2012 after defeating incumbent Ramos-Horta and a host of other candidates, the path for UNMIT withdrawal opened further. These electoral developments, combined with the peaceful establishment of Timor-Leste's third Parliament and reappointment of Prime Minister Gusmao, served both as evidence of UNMIT's success and the suitability of its withdrawal. Nearly six and a half years after its emergency establishment, UNMIT completed its mandate on 31 December 2012. As withdrawal approached, UN Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon lauded the progress in Timor-Leste as "a global example of how to successfully emerge from conflict to lasting peace."¹³⁹

Despite the successes and extended commitment of UNMIT, not all assessments of its performance are glowing. A comprehensive analysis of recent multinational assistance in Timor-Leste to enact security sector reform (SSR), for example, suggests the results are mixed.¹⁴⁰ Some observers contend that Timor-Leste's SSR, the chic modern phrase used to describe combined efforts in the security and development sectors, yielded tactical victories but failed to implement a coherent strategic vision to link political and military operations with social outreach.¹⁴¹ In short, the criticism claims that multinational SSR in Timor-Leste focused too much on institutions, at the expense of societal engagement.¹⁴² Nevertheless, there is broad consensus among international relations scholars that UNMIT's extensive commitment in the region facilitated a more secure, more stable, and more adaptive Timor-Leste.

TEN LESSONS OF TIMOR-LESTE

The international community acquired reams of experience and datasets from fifteen years of multinational intervention in Timor-Leste. The ten lessons outlined below are assessed as the most critical and salient for future state-building consideration and multinational intervention operational planning.

Lesson 1. Patience is more than a virtue – it's a necessity. When announcing the planned withdrawal of the final members of UNMIT from Timor-Leste in 2012, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon noted: "State-building, nation-building, is very difficult, it takes time."¹⁴³ A State Department official in Washington DC with knowledge of Timor-Leste further acknowledged that "the average, post-conflict country takes

15-30 years to recover – basically, a generation.”¹⁴⁴ Notably, these statements of certainty regarding lengthy timelines for nation-building were made after multinational experiences in Timor-Leste, as well as Iraq and Afghanistan in the early 21st century. The recognition of the challenge and required time commitment for state-building reflects arguably the most striking lesson of Timor-Leste: in matters of international intervention, patience is more than a virtue—it’s a necessity.

Throughout the establishment and implementation of UNTAET, policymakers emphasized an expedited transition to independence; according to one critic, UNTAET was “preparing to depart from its inception.”¹⁴⁵ Based on this approach, one should not be surprised that the nation UNTAET helped establish devolved into chaos less than four years after its withdrawal. Ultimately, the international community must accept that effective intervention – be it for purposes of peacekeeping, peacemaking, or nation-building – requires a robust commitment that far exceeds the levels espoused by optimistic estimates. If the international community concludes intervention is appropriate, it must do so with the clear understanding that a mandate will not be completed in accordance with a pre-determined timeline. If world leaders are unwilling to commit to potentially indefinite support of an operation—be it a result of donor fatigue, lack of political will, or another constraint—less onerous alternatives to direct intervention must be pursued.

Lesson 2. Expect the horrific. The tragic history of Timor-Leste reinforces a lesson that the international community episodically learned and relearned throughout the 1990s in locations ranging from the Balkans to Somalia and Rwanda. The critical yet simple directive is expect the horrific. A consistent theme of international attitudes and actions in Timor-Leste from 1975 through 2006 is the tendency to minimize the risk of extreme violence and genocide. The record suggests that American and international policy in the region has often been shaped by hopeful expectations of rational behavior rather than realistic assessments of likely outcomes.

This tendency is evident in now declassified exchanges between the Ford administration and Indonesian President Suharto. Of Indonesia’s planned, covert invasion of East Timor, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger advised Suharto to “succeed quickly.”¹⁴⁶ Kissinger’s missive ignores the historical resistance and guerilla tactics of the East Timorese and instead presumes an ability to end the conflict swiftly, with minimal bloodshed. A 25-year campaign of suppression and brutality indicates that Kissinger’s assumptions on Timor Island were woefully inaccurate. Rather than jeopardize its relationship with the anti-Communist regime in Jakarta, the Ford Administration dismissed the possibility of a protracted conflict in favor of a simpler resolution.

Similarly, in advance of the 1999 sovereignty referendum, the UN allowed Indonesia to dictate the nature and terms of the international intervention and therefore enabled a completely preventable reprisal campaign. Despite later revisionist claims by world leaders, including President Clinton and Secretary-

General Annan, that the mayhem in East Timor was unpredictable, historical analysis suggests the violence could and should have been anticipated. Horrifying experiences in East Timor and throughout the world prompted international relations scholar Alan Kuperman to implore intervening world powers to structure reaction forces with the guarded expectation that “violence against civilians can be perpetrated very quickly.”¹⁴⁷

Lesson 3. Stability must be the first priority, but not an end unto itself. Experience in Timor-Leste – be it related to popular consultation, state-building, or economic development – reminds policy makers of the criticality of internal and external security. Indeed, arguably the most effective interventions in Timor-Leste (INTERFET and UNMIT) enjoyed success because they directed sufficient attention to security operations. These experiences, however, should not obscure the importance of integrated operations, as opposed to exclusively military and law enforcement engagements. The relevant two-part lesson, therefore, is security must be the first priority, but not an end unto itself. This mantra reflects the current perspective of interviewed State Department officials in Washington DC and Dili who consistently list security as their chief objective, but also note myriad additional priorities that are integral to developmental plans.¹⁴⁸

For effective state-building, security must be considered a necessary but not sufficient condition. Furthermore, an inability to balance competing and diverse requirements beyond security poses a significant risk for mission failure. UNTAET, for example, according to Damien Kingsbury, began its mission excessively focused on security; this singular focus prevented understanding of the long-term and complicated elements of nation-building.¹⁴⁹ The need to balance mission focus must also be addressed in personnel authorizations for future operations. Outlining this dilemma, former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld famously remarked: “Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it.”¹⁵⁰ Clearly, military and law enforcement personnel will remain essential elements of 21st century multinational interventions, but fifteen years of involvement in Timor-Leste highlights the critical and complementary roles played by administrators, legal experts, teachers, technocrats, and various other specialists from representing the whole of civil society.

Lesson 4. “Smart power” can succeed where less integrated efforts fail.¹⁵¹ While certainly not perfect, Timor-Leste’s complicated history provides vivid examples of successful international intervention at moments of humanitarian crisis. Invariably, coordinated efforts succeeded in Timor-Leste when the international community employed what Joseph Nye dubbed, “smart power,” rather than mere brute force or impotent negotiation. “Smart power” – defined by Nye as “the ability to combine hard and soft power resources into effective strategies” – will be the key tool of effective geopolitical engagement in the 21st century, but the concept was deftly applied in Timor-Leste at the conclusion of the 20th century, as well.¹⁵²

When TNI-backed militias initiated a post-referendum

campaign of mayhem in East Timor in 1999, UNAMET personnel were powerless to arrest the violence and forced to retreat into walled compounds. Discourse from the UN on the matter and resolutions condemning the violence contributed to international public awareness, but ultimately coordinated and integrated action by multiple world leaders compelled Indonesian action. As resolutions proved ineffective, the United States gained traction with Jakarta by threatening to sever military ties and funding. These military actions short of conflict grabbed Indonesia's attention, but the tangible threat to cut-off emergency economic resources by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund inspired action. If one accepts power as the ability "to get others to act in ways that are contrary to their initial preferences," the application of "smart power" to compel Indonesian action in September 1999 must represent one of the seminal moments in the evolution of its use.¹⁵³

Lesson 5. Effective intervention demands regional leadership. Fifteen years of multinational intervention in Timor-Leste additionally highlighted the importance of regional leadership to implement global initiatives. The model of regional leadership in the case of Timor-Leste was validated by the effectiveness and dexterity of the UN, supported largely by Australia and other Asian powers, in executing coordinated policy in the island nation. Regional direction takes on added importance in a multipolar world; without a hegemon, it is essential to develop coalitions of responsibility and collective objectives.¹⁵⁴ This scenario was evident in September 1999, as the U.S. and the international community deferred to Australia to assume command authority for INTERFET, the integrated peacekeeping force in East Timor. A similar model was employed in 2006 with equally encouraging results when South Asian nations of Australia and Malaysia, in partnership with New Zealand, were mandated to provide contingency forces to stabilize Timor-Leste after weeks of rioting, violence, and proliferation of IDPs.

Ongoing international commitments in Timor-Leste suggest that policy makers have embraced the notion and capacity of regional leadership. For example, the multilateral "New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States" – endorsed by 41 nations, including the United States – identifies Australia as the chief partner for engagement in Timor-Leste and defers leadership responsibility to that regional power.¹⁵⁵ Correspondingly, an official at the U.S. Embassy in Dili acknowledged that due to history, geography, and proximity, the United States plays a complementary, though still important, role to Australia in Timor-Leste.¹⁵⁶ A U.S. State Department expert in Washington DC concurred that many U.S. activities in Timor-Leste "dovetail with the Australian effort."¹⁵⁷ Empowered by successes in locations like Timor-Leste, while simultaneously constrained by persistent diffusion of power and global fiscal challenges, world leaders must continue to leverage regional leadership to execute diverse worldwide interventions.

Lesson 6. Context matters. In a zeal to draw conclusions and catalog lessons learned from fifteen years of intervention in Timor-Leste, one must recall an immutable truth that moderates claims of certainty with regard to international relations: context matters. Not all realities of Timor Island will translate beyond the Indonesian archipelago. For example, consider the enormous cultural differences and distinct colonial histories of East Timorese and West Timorese Indonesians. Illustratively, many Indonesians fought alongside the Japanese during WWII, in the interest of ridding themselves of Dutch colonization.¹⁵⁸ These massive divisions between East and West on Timor Island clearly influenced the relationship between Indonesia and East Timor. If one disregards these contextual differences, however, one is more likely to misread probable outcomes with potentially disastrous results.

To exemplify this point, consider the U.N.'s tragic decision to abdicate responsibility for security to Indonesia in advance of East Timor's popular consultation. The judgment was likely made in an attempt to strike a middle ground and appease President Habibie, but the security decision failed catastrophically because policymakers failed to consider the context. Though such an option might have been prudent in another region of the world or even with Indonesia and a different nation in Southeast Asia, the context of Timor should have served to forewarn the international community of likely turmoil. Interestingly, historical context likely contributed to a positive development in Timor-Leste, as well. Many historians have surmised that Australia's willingness to invest heavily in blood and treasure to secure Timor-Leste is a consequence of latent national guilt for having abandoned Timor Island during WWII and having tacitly permitted Indonesia to invade in 1975.¹⁵⁹ Both instances suggest the likelihood of effective intervention is enhanced through an informed understanding of historical context.

Lesson 7. Multinational effectiveness requires advance multilateral engagement and planning. The success of INTERFET did not begin in the streets of Dili or the hills of Baucau. On the contrary, the genesis of the success of INTERFET was the cooperative relationships Australia established with partner-nations months and, in some cases, years in advance of the deployment. Australian and U.S. military forces, for example, conducted several training missions and exercises in the region throughout the 1990s.¹⁶⁰ These exercises helped ensure rapid compatibility, familiarity, and shared trust when decisive and timely action was required, particularly with mobilization of strategic air and sealift.

Employing the same model, Australia's resilient relationship with New Zealand enabled the expedited addition of a "Kiwi" battalion during the initial deployment phase.¹⁶¹ Moreover, Australia's robust military, economic, and diplomatic engagement with ASEAN member states facilitated natural participation and contribution from other regional powers, to include Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia.¹⁶² These relationships enabled INTERFET leaders to operate with a pre-established system for intelligence sharing, logistical support, and joint

operability. In light of INTERFET's widespread recognition as a "highly successful" deployment, in large measure because of its ability to initiate action quickly, one must assess Australia's pre-operation engagement as effective.¹⁶³ A striking lesson of Timor-Leste, therefore, is that nations interested in efficacious 21st century global interventions must pursue an activist strategy of bilateral and multilateral engagement across the spectrum of power.

Lesson 8. In a globalized world, coalitions are pathways to progress and prosperity. A corollary takeaway from experience in Timor-Leste is that just as bilateral and multilateral engagement is critical for intervening nations, the same is true for the developing nation-state. Forging partnerships, in fact, represents one of the most valuable actions a burgeoning nation can undertake on its path toward prosperity and global integration. Creating new or joining existing coalitions does not guarantee success, but in a globalized world, partnerships enable expedited progress in a preferred direction.

The current government of Timor-Leste understands this 21st century reality and is operating in a manner consistent with the premise. This recognition explains why Timor-Leste describes full membership in ASEAN as a top national priority and why the United States enthusiastically supports the initiative.¹⁶⁴ With a collective population of over 600 million and a combined economy of more than \$2 trillion, ASEAN represents a powerful and robust collection of regional states that would provide myriad developmental opportunities for Timor-Leste.¹⁶⁵ To attain its ASEAN objective, Timor-Leste is currently investing in embassies in each of the ten member nations.¹⁶⁶ National emphasis on bilateral cooperation further justifies Timor-Leste's decision to move quickly past its troubled history with Indonesia to forge a cooperative diplomatic and economic relationship with the neighboring nation.¹⁶⁷ The issue of coalitions for a nascent nation like Timor-Leste has become a simple matter of mathematics; the value of bilateral free trade agreements with potent economic powers like Indonesia far outweighs the benefits of grudge-holding or the pursuit of conflict reparations.

Lesson 9. Early investments in human capacity prevent late deficits. U.S. State Department officials describe a lack of human capacity as one of the major, persistent challenges confronting Timor-Leste in 2014.¹⁶⁸ One State Department official further noted that while USAID is doing excellent work to develop human capacity in Timor-Leste now, the agency is "really starting from the bottom up," and the classes being taught for many Timorese are at a very basic level.¹⁶⁹ The lesson that can be drawn from this experience is that investments in education and human capacity – or lack of similar investments – early in the nation-building process have dramatic effects as the initial wave of national leaders mature and give way to the successor generation. Timor-Leste may additionally feel the impacts of insufficient early investments in human capacity in late 2014 if, as expected, Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao retires. Interestingly, in recognition of the lack of a

prepared successor to preserve the continuity of government, Mr. Gusmao has already delayed his planned departure by several months.¹⁷⁰

To benefit from this experience-based lesson of Timor-Leste, initial nation-building efforts should include appropriate resources to ensure that a cadre of promising and diverse young leaders are educated, trained, and groomed to assume leadership roles in future administrations. As Timor-Leste has demonstrated, state-building is a long and difficult process. Multinational engagement should be conducted accordingly, with an eye not only on the current generation of leaders, but also those that will replace the first wave of founders and pioneers.

Lesson 10. In developing nations, resources represent a blessing that can become a trap. Timor-Leste is the beneficiary of enormous oil and gas reserves in the Timor Sea. Revenue from these reserves account for more than 80% of Timor-Leste's annual GDP and enable a strategic Petroleum Fund worth over \$13 billion.¹⁷¹ The existence of oil and gas afforded the Timor-Leste government significant developmental opportunities and enabled remarkable national growth for the last six years; however, some observers worry that these natural resources and the associated economic growth have facilitated an inefficient and myopic government, exacerbated income inequality, and produced rampant public corruption.¹⁷² The perverse and deleterious effects of natural resources on developing nations prompted author Paul Collier to refer to such apparent advantages as "natural resource traps."¹⁷³ According to Collier, natural resources are traps because even as they provide for opulent national wealth, they may ultimately lead to boom and bust economies, reduced growth, and systemic poverty.¹⁷⁴ Moreover, natural resources tend to trap nations because the initial riches they provide enable leaders to ignore critical development of alternative markets and assets.¹⁷⁵

Timor-Leste will be particularly challenged by the natural resource trap over the next six to seven years, when the oil and gas reserves in the Timor Sea are expected to be exhausted.¹⁷⁶ The government of Timor-Leste established the Petroleum Fund in an attempt to extend the fiscal benefits of the oil and gas reserves, but has controversially tapped into the account when fiscal conditions worsen.¹⁷⁷ Perhaps the most important issue to be addressed over the next decade in Timor-Leste is how the burgeoning nation will emerge from the natural resource trap in a post-oil economy. Until that pressing issue is resolved, the status of Timor-Leste's oil and gas reserves as a blessing or a curse remains unknown.

A HOPEFUL FUTURE DESPITE A TORTURED PAST

Today, Timor-Leste – the first nation of the 21st century – endures as a complex study in contrast and contradiction. Hopeful observers point to double-digit economic growth rates, peaceful national elections and transitions of power, and democratic and security sector consolidation as evidence of a young but thriving nation. Dissenters note rampant income inequality, limited human capacity, and a fragile security situation as indicators of a fledgling state with a vexing future. Similarly,

through an alternative prism, champions of international intervention in Timor-Leste suggest rapid cessation of violence, dramatic decrease in IDPs, and steady economic development are signs of nation-building success. Contrarily, critics of multinational engagement in Timor-Leste contend that the various mandates in the island nation have been inadequately resourced and overly concerned with time-based, rather than milestone-based, withdrawal plans.

Throughout more than four and a half centuries of colonial domination, twenty-five years of brutal occupation, and fifteen years of international intervention and sporadic internal conflict, Timor-Leste has borne the extremes of the human condition. The years have provided ample evidence of the fortes and foibles of humanity, the best and worst of realpolitik, the triumphs and failures of the international community, and the hopes and limits of self-determination. For all its tortured past, however, Timor-Leste has survived, the spirit of the Timorese people is unbroken, and its future, though replete

with challenges, holds the promise of economic independence and liberty. As the Strategic Development Plan for Timor-Leste underscores: "It is easy to simply identify problems and criticize plans for change. The braver path is to recognize our strengths, build on our successes, and work together for a better Timor-Leste."¹⁷⁸ The world community can honor those words as well as the sacrifices of thousands of East Timorese that perished resisting occupation or exercising the right to vote by analyzing the salient lessons of Timor-Leste and applying them to future multinational operations.



ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Lieutenant Colonel Doug Jackson is an Operations Officer, Joint Operations Directorate, Joint Staff, Pentagon, Washington DC. He is a command pilot with 4,200 hours in the C-5A/B/C/M, T-37B, and T-1A. Colonel Jackson graduated Magna Cum Laude with a Bachelor of Arts, Political Science, from the University of Pennsylvania. He holds a Master of Arts degree in International Relations, Norwich University, a Master of Arts degree in Communication, Summa Cum Laude, George Mason University, and he was the Distinguished Graduate in his class at The Eisenhower School.

★ In military life,
the one constant
is change.

We know what to do.
We've been there.

➤ USAA.COM/MILITARYLIFE
or 800-531-8722



No Federal endorsement of sponsor intended. USAA means United Services Automobile Association and its affiliates. © 2014 USAA. 205456-0614-G

PRACTISE TO DECEIVE

Learning Curves of Military Deception Planners

ADDRESS BY DENIS CLIFT

FOREIGN AREA OFFICERS ASSOCIATION
FT. MCNAIR, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Thank you members of the Foreign Area Officer Association – It feels like I am back home again.

My admiration and appreciation for FAOs runs wide and deep. You have played an important part in my own rogue's progress down through the decades. As an example, in 1992, President George H.W. Bush appointed me as a plank-owning Presidential Commissioner on the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on Prisoners of War and Missing in Action, which he and President Boris Yeltsin created – almost on the spur of the moment, it was such a good idea – to account for those American and Russian Servicemen missing, unaccounted for at the end of the Cold War – a half century of missing, unaccounted for from World War II, Korea, Vietnam, air reconnaissance missions, and the Soviet fighting in Afghanistan. It was a select, high-level operation, with Senators, Representatives, senior executive-branch officials on the U.S. side, and top players from the Soviet, now Russian intelligence agencies, and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, on the Russian side

I served as a Commissioner, and for a while as acting Chair of the U.S. side, from 1992 to 2009. We interviewed countless people, researched in key former Soviet archives, traveled to every one of the former Soviet republics, and Warsaw Pact nations. We did some good work.

Throughout this service, I always had a really sharp Russian-speaking FAO as my assistant, at my side – several of them: Navy, Army, Air Force over the seventeen years. One day, during a break early in our work in Moscow, I was strolling through an open-air market and came upon a big wooden table loaded with what looked like burnt-out light bulbs.

“What’s this,” I asked?

“Yes, my FAO said, “it is burnt out light bulbs, the new Russian economy. People buy these bulbs – they are cheap – and use them to replace the good bulbs they steal from their offices. The government puts in new bulbs and makes a little money selling the burn-outs to these merchants in the market – full-cycle economy.”

At another point in my travels, one of my Russian speakers was talking about earlier service on another delegation, a civilian diplomat heading the U.S. side, a Russian general on

the other. During one of the requisite luncheons, the Russian general started off the toasts, and noticed that the American only touched the vodka glass to his lips and placed it back on the table. He called for fresh glasses, proposed another toast, drained his and watched as the American again repeated the ‘touch to the lips and return to the table.’

“Why aren’t you toasting?” the Russian asked through his interpreter.

“You see, General,” the American replied, “I am a recovering alcoholic and I cannot touch a drop.”

The words were translated, and the General replied, “In Russia, we do not have that problem.”

Earlier in our history, there were much greater challenges. World War II was raging. In June 1944, Lieutenant Commander Douglas Fairbanks, Jr., led his pioneering naval deception unit, the Beach Jumpers, into action against the Germans in the Mediterranean. Just weeks after the D-Day landings in Normandy, ten U.S. and French divisions and a British brigade were going ashore in Southern France, and Fairbanks’ mission, with his small unit, was to create a diversion, confuse the Germans by faking the main landing at Genoa.

In Fairbanks’ words, “The naval craft assigned to us were an almost comically patternless force:” six British gunboats, 12 U.S. PT boats, and an American destroyer. His units pushed off from several ports at night hoping to lead German radar operators and spy planes into thinking a much larger amphibious attack force was heading to sea. His supporting Army Air Force aircraft broadcast pre-recorded chatter among many U.S. pilots, dropped strips of tinfoil – chaff – to give the radars the appearance of many allied planes, and dropped hundreds of dummy paratroopers along the French-Italian coastline.

Frogmen from his embarked Free French forces headed off to shore loaded with explosives to set off chains of blasts, and Fairbank’s flotilla, still steering toward Genoa, began blazing away at the shore with every ship gun and weapon at its disposal. Although the frogmen were captured, the diversion achieved its aim. Radio Berlin broadcast that the unit included

four or five large battleships.

Fairbank's successful deception is one of 88 case studies in the remarkable new book *Practice to Deceive: Learning Curves of Military Deception Planners* written by Barton Whaley, edited by his wife Susan Stratton Aykroyd, and published by the Naval Institute Press. It was my privilege to write the Introduction.

Over the course of his life, from 1928 to 2013, Barton Whaley became the undisputed dean of U.S. denial and deception experts. He knew the history of denial and deception, the disciplines, and culture. He was an authority on strategy and tactics, and saw deception as a mind game requiring imagination, deep critical thought, patience, fortitude – and, in keeping with the writings of Sun Tzu, a profound understanding of the enemy as well as one's self.

Whaley had degrees from Berkeley, London, and MIT. He was a member of the Army's psychological warfare team during the Korean War, would teach at the Naval Postgraduate School, and work for the Director of National Intelligence's Foreign Denial and Deception Committee. His many earlier books included *Codeword Barbarossa* examining Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union. Of equal importance and fascination, he was the author of four prize-winning books on the art and practice of magic, illusion, and deception -- including his *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Magic*, *Who's Who in Magic* and the biography *Orson Wells: The Man Who Was Magic*.

On stage, it is the magician's job to manipulate minds and manage the audience's attention. Misdirection is at the heart of such management, with the magician causing the audience to focus on one action, steering the audience's attention away from another action. In magic, the performer influences the audience's mind. In warfare, successful denial and deception influences the enemy's mind and actions.

If Barton Whaley acted on the confluence of denial and deception in magic and warfare, he added a third key element – humor. "If the reader detects a tone of lightheartedness, even occasional frivolity, in the case studies," he writes, "this faithfully reflects the attitude of the majority of deception planners themselves ... humor requires precisely the same manipulation of congruities and incongruities that defines deception. Consequently, it is not surprising that the more clever military deception planners tend to have highly developed senses of humor."

Whaley notes that "World-class military deception expert Amron Katz, when asked which was his favorite practical joke, replied 'My next,' His new acquaintance then asked – somewhat nervously – what the next one would be? She drew the unreassuring reply, 'How do you know I am not already doing it?'" If Whaley had an almost poetic, quixotic side to him, he was at the core an intensely serious researcher and scholar. In his case studies focused on the grim, uncertain business of war, he looks at denial and deception through the minds and eyes of the leaders and the planners:

*--the careers and personalities of the principal planners,
--the specific problems and planning constraints faced by each,
--the details of their consequent deception plans,*

*-- the actual deception operations, and
--the results.*

The 88 case studies range chronologically from Gideon's Trumpet, Israel, circa 1249 BC to General Schwarzkopf's deception planners in Iraq in 1991. As we meet the deception planners, Case Study Number One focuses on Major-General Sir Garnet Wolseley's Night Advance on Tel el-Kebir, Egypt, in 1882. When a colonel earlier in his career, Wolseley had written: "As a nation we are bred up to feel it a disgrace even to succeed by falsehood; the word spy conveys something as repulsive as slave; we will keep hammering along with the conviction that 'honesty is the best policy', and that truth always wins in the long-run. These pretty little sentences do well for a child's copy book, but the man who acts on them in war had better sheathe his sword forever."

In 1862, Wolseley had observed the American Civil War from the Confederate side and had been impressed by the imaginative tactics and accomplishments of Generals Stonewall Jackson and Nathan Bedford Forrest, as well as those of Generals Lee and Longstreet. He was brought to Egypt to suppress the Urabi Revolt led by Aledem Urabi. He first tried a straight, overland 110-mile thrust down the Nile valley toward the rebel-held capital Cairo, but failed to break through the well-entrenched enemy. Wolseley switched to an indirect strategy, moving his forces to take the recently opened Suez Canal and then traveling along undefended waters to take Cairo from behind in an entirely unconventional night attack. Urabi had been advised by the canal's builder de Lesseps that such a waterborne action would not be a realistic option.

Moving ahead several decades, the vitally important World War II deceptions of a young British physicist – and practical joker – Dr. R.V. Jones – are the subject of case study 19. From his long history of practical joking, he knew that with 'induced incongruities' presenting false evidence, the deceiver lets the target, or victim, build up an incorrect but self-consistent world picture, causing him to take actions incongruent with reality.

Breaking the German top-secret Ultra code was crucial to British and U.S. successes in the war. It was even more crucial to keep the Germans from knowing the code had been broken. In 1943, as the Germans started losing more and more U-boats, Jones and his colleagues persuaded them that the losses were due to a fictitious airborne infrared detector. The German Navy quickly developed an anti-infrared paint and recoated their U-boat fleet. Whaley observes that the paint was superb and would have camouflaged the U-boats if the British had been using an infrared detector.

From my own research on R.V. Jones, I had learned of his work and that of his colleagues earlier in the war when they discovered that the German air force was using directed radio beams to guide its bombers on night attacks against British targets when the British fighter aircraft would be almost powerless. Jones then discovered that the radio guide paths, without evidence of interference, could be bent sending the bombers and their payloads wide of target.

In 1944, Jones tackled a new deception problem, dealing with the Luftwaffe's V-1 Buzz Bomb campaign, which rained

more than 2,300 flying bombs against London, killing 5,500 and seriously injuring 16,000. The casualties would have been much higher had it not been for the Germans' persistent misperception that most of their bombs were overshooting the aim point of Tower Bridge at the geographical center of the city. As Whaley's case study 53 informs, most V-1 bombs were, in fact, falling short onto the less-densely populated southern suburbs.

In making their aim point and range adjustments, the Germans were depending on time-and-place bomb reports from their spies in London. They did not know that these spies were under British control. Jones conceived and designed a scheme of plausible agent reports, keeping the hits consistent with German photo-reconnaissance evidence while faking the timings. The Germans, in turn, steadily readjusted their aim points further short from the intended targets.

One of the turned agents was a safecracking robber by the name of Eddie Chapman who the Germans had found in a British prison when they overran the Channel Islands at the beginning of the War. He offered them his services. They trained him in sabotage, and slipped him into England in 1942 to blow up an aircraft factory. On his arrival, Chapman made contact with the British and reported his mission. The target factory was camouflaged so that German aerial reconnaissance would report its destruction. Jones and his team then sent Chapman back to Germany where he began training on the V-1 and V-2 missions. He then re-entered England and rejoined the British deceivers to begin transmitting the false British targeting data back to the Luftwaffe.

There is another story about R. V., or Reg Jones and Churchill. During the war, Jones had a mischievous secretary named Daisy Mowat. One day Churchill's secretary called and Daisy told him that Dr. Jones was not available. By the time Jones was able to get to the telephone, he heard a grieved voice saying "This is Peck, the Prime Minister's Secretary – is that really Dr. Jones? I have just been talking to a most extraordinary lady who asserted that you had just jumped out the window!" With some presence of mind, Jones replied, "Please don't worry; it's the only exercise that we can get." I would add that, after the war, Churchill called Jones to his bedside office to thank him for this invaluable actions.

Whaley next turns to 42 case studies of planners in specific actions, opening with Gideon's Trumpet, Israel, circa 1249 BC. His story, taken from the Old Testament, captures Gideon, a respected judge of the Israelites, as the father of the night attack, of the notional or dummy army, and of sonic deception. To conceal his force's small numbers, he ordered a night attack on the invading Arab army with as many extra battle trumpets as possible sounding, simulating different units, and with his soldiers banging away on all things noisy and metal to produce the sounds of a large force in motion. His enemies fled, and one of the first recorded fathers of denial and deception entered history.

If I have opened touching on sea and land deceptions, Whaley devotes considerable admiring attention to British, Allied, and German denial and deception in the World War II North African desert – to include aviation deception. The

maestro for these operations, serving under British Generals Wavell and Montgomery, was Colonel Dudley Clarke, who headed the "A" Force deception planning team in Cairo from late 1940 to the end of 1945.

Clarke was described in 1974 by The Times in his obituary as "no ordinary man" – a clear, quick thinker, in respect but never in awe of authority, a realist, and enduring character "containing a boundless sense of the ridiculous." Quoting Whaley, "It was typical of the man that Clarke set up his most secret "A" Force headquarters at No.6 Kasr-el-Nil behind Cairo's fashionable Groppi cafe in one of Cairo's most popular brothels, whose women continued their illicit business on the top floor while he and the lads conducted theirs on the lower one."

Clarke ran the first British double agents, and he devised the idea of entire dummy military units, including whole divisions, corps, and armies. Case study 14 focuses on a new boy getting his first lesson from the master. In March 1942, Captain Oliver Thynne joined "A" Force as a novice deceptionist, and soon after discovered from intelligence that German aerial observers had learned to distinguish the dummy British aircraft from the real ones because the flimsy dummies were supported by struts under their wings.

When Thynne reported this to his boss, Clarke fired back:

"Well, what have you done about it?"

"Done about it, Dudley? What could I do about it?"

"Tell them to put struts under the wings of the real ones, of course"

Clarke's devious mind had instantly seen a way to capitalize on the flaw. "By putting dummy struts on the real planes while grounded, enemy pilots would avoid them as targets for strafing and bombing. Moreover, it might cause the German photo-interpreters to both mislocate the real RAF planes and underestimate their numbers."

Whaley moves next from the deception planners to case studies on the challenge of persuading the commander to act on deception plans. Following World War II, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower would note in his memoir *Crusade in Europe* that "the American public has always viewed with repugnance everything that smacks of the spy."

In the 1970s, Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Leonard Durham would grapple with this problem as he headed the tiny Special Plans office on the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, the shallow cover designation for the denial and deception planners. He had a hard job; his generals and admirals seemed to find it all too complicated, virtually incomprehensible, a 'tangled web.' As Whaley reports in Case Study 70, Durham's most effective pitch was to take the skeptical West Point, Annapolis, or Air Force Academy General or Admiral to a football game. "There, as one deceptive play after another unfolded before their eyes, he would repeated shout above the crowd, 'THAT'S WHAT I MEAN!'"

In the Vietnam conflict, the loss of Air Force and Navy aircraft to surface-to-air missiles and ground anti-aircraft is common knowledge. The loss of our aircraft to the North

Vietnamese, newly acquired, and more nimble MiG-21s is a less-well-known part of the history. By late 1966, we estimated there were 16 MiG-21s in theater. They were not being risked in dogfights, but were being used to attack F-105 Thunderchiefs – Thuds – flying bombing runs. U.S. losses were substantial.

Colonel Robin Olds arrived in theater and sold an ambush plan to the Commander of the 7th Air Force, General Spike Momyer. The plan called for F-4C Phantoms to simulate the F-105s. To draw from Barton Whaley's case study 63: "The strike force would imitate the route, altitude, speed, and radio chatter of the normal F-105 mission. However the force would comprise not bomb-laden Thuds but rather F-4s, each armed with four Sparrow and four Sidewinder missiles. To add to the deception, the Phantoms would be rigged with the QRC-160 radar jamming ECM pod that only the Thuds typically carried. This part of the deception planning triggered a rapid-action across Southeast Asia and back to the U.S. call for more of the pods, which would be on loan for seven days. The pods would be reinforced to fit the F-4C sway braces.

The missions – codenamed Operation BOLO – launched. Long story short – nine of the original 16 Mig-21s were shot down in a single week, and the MiG-21s went into a three-month stand-down during which the North Vietnamese and their Russian suppliers studied the lessons of the battle.

In his concluding case study 88, a brief look at the DESERT STORM operations against Iraq in 1991, Whaley notes that as the commander, General Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr. fully accepted his planning team's deception operations recommendations, and noted that he was aided in this by the fact that his hobby was conjuring tricks.

Looking back across these case studies and the business of deception, Whaley underscores the importance of the prepared

mind, a mind that understands the opponent, and a mind that is open to anomalies, discrepancies, and unusual events, a mind able to detect deception against one's own forces by the enemy.

For the deception planner, he gives his own text book steps in the planning process:

1. Understand the **GOAL** of the operation, military or otherwise.
2. Decide how we want the target to **REACT**.
3. Decide what we want the target to **PERCEIVE**.
4. Decide which facts or objects are to be **HIDDEN** and which to be **SHOWN**.
5. Analyze the **PATTERN** of the **REAL** thing to be hidden to discover the specific characteristics, or signatures, that must be deleted or added to create another pattern that will suitably dissimulate it.
6. Do the same for the **FALSE** thing to be shown to create a pattern that will suitably simulate it.
7. At this point, having designed a desired **EFFECT** together with its concealed **METHOD**, the planner must explore the means available for presenting this effect to the target.
8. Having designed the effect and the method, the planning phase ends and the **OPERATIONAL PHASE** begins.
9. Select the **CHANNELS** through which the various false characteristics are to be communicated.
10. Take note to ensure the effect has been communicated to the target, and monitor the target's responses.

There you have it. We are good to go as deniers and deceivers.

HAND-ROLLED PREMIUM TOBACCO BY PUCHO CIGARS COMPANY, LLC

AN AMERICAN COMPANY SINCE 1996

"SHARE THE EXPERIENCE"

**MICHAEL "PUCHO" PALMA
SEMPER FIDELIS**

PUCHOCIGARS@YAHOO.COM

703-225-9953

WE CUSTOMIZE BLENDS AND LABELS

(MINIMUM ORDER REQUIRED)



**9451 LEE HIGHWAY, #1015,
FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA 22031**

**WE SHIP TO
APO/FPOS**

SPONSORS & PARTNERS

FAOA would like to thank its corporate members and partners who make it possible to serve the Foreign Area Officer community.

To become a FAOA sponsor, please contact president@FAOA.org



JOINT FOREIGN AREA OFFICER PROGRAM



Oak Grove Technologies



Walsingham Group



USMCU - Gray Research Center



SPONSORS & PARTNERS



Center for Army Lessons Learned



We know what it means to serve.®



FAO Association
PO Box 295
Mount Vernon, VA 22121

Return Service Requested



Get information and become a
member online
at www.FAOA.org

FAOA Journal Submissions Writing Guidelines

When submitting articles, book reviews or letters to the editor for potential publication, please email them as word documents, single spaced, in Times New Roman, size 11 font to EDITOR@FAOA.org. Insert any graphics or maps within the text at the appropriate locations and include a short "About the Author" bio with personal photo at the end of the piece. Photos, maps and graphics are highly encouraged, especially high resolution pictures that might make for a good cover image. Footnotes/endnotes are generally not printed, but may be included in an online version of the article, so include critical references within the text body and provide an extended copy for online publishing if applicable. All regular articles are peer reviewed by the Editorial Board before being approved for print. Letters to the Editor receive minor edits for spelling and are printed at the discretion of the Editor-in-Chief.

EMAIL SUBMISSIONS TO EDITOR@FAOA.ORG

