

THE JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ

The Official Journal for the FAOs, International Relations Specialists,
and Partners associated with the FAOA Korea Chapter



Korea Chapter

FOREIGN AREA OFFICER ASSOCIATION



**"Producing the premier leaders of the Republic
of Korea-United States Alliance since 2020"**

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Refelctions on the Ukraine Conflict, from General (R) Mike Scaparrotti



Dear FAOA Korea,

Reflecting on my experience as both former NATO SACEUR and former Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, I've learned that regional security is inseparable from global security. We live in a connected world and the war in Ukraine serves to highlight that point. Putin's invasion of Ukraine is clearly about more than a violation of Ukraine's sovereignty. This is his attempt to fundamentally uproot the international order as we know it and would like it to remain. What is at stake is not only the future of Ukraine and the European security framework, but the preservation of international norms of respect for territorial integrity and democratic principles of freedom and independence. Although this is taking place in Europe, this is ultimately about global security and resonates in the Indo-Pacific as well.

The war in Ukraine reinforces the importance of our Allies and Partners and the imperative of Unity. The ROK-US Alliance must be strengthened and remain one in purpose and resolve. It has secured the peace on the peninsula for over 70 years and is our best deterrent of North Korean aggression and a platform for stability in NE Asia.

This conflict also reminds us of the enduring nature of war. That war is not easy or fast. It is unruly, unpredictable, and trends toward greater violence. We must train rigorously and be ready. War is unforgiving of the unprepared.

Also, this war has underscored the imperative of an accurate understanding one's capabilities, the adversary, and the environment. Russia clearly got much of this wrong.

Foreign Area Officers play a crucial role in each of these areas. FAOs provide civilian and military leaders an experienced understanding of foreign cultures, their people, their government, and their military. They provide insight and language skills that help build strong partnerships. FAOs combine these skills with their fundamental training as a Soldier, Sailor, Airman, or Marine to ensure complete discernment.

As a commander, I learned that an excellent FAO was a source of reporting and insight that rarely reached my desk. I sought them out. I encourage each of you to prepare yourself to be your best; prepare for the day when your insight is the crucial information that shapes a key decision. This will come. You just don't know when.

Katchi Kapshida!

Mike Scaparrotti

Mike Scaparrotti
General, USA Retired



A Message on the U.S.- ROK Alliance from Former Combined Forces Command Deputy Commander GEN(R) Leem

Dear FAOA Korea,

The May 2022 summit meeting between Presidents Joe Biden and Yoon Suk Yeol marks an important shift in the ROK-U.S. Alliance.

It provides not only the much-needed recommitment to the ironclad Alliance but clarifies important ways to update the Alliance – to better meet the threats and opportunities of today and tomorrow.

Military threats from North Korea continues to intensify. The ramifications of the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and China’s position therein, gives rise to a more fluid security situation in the Indo-Pacific theater. Our common vulnerability has also been laid bare by the COVID-19 pandemic.

It is high time to strengthen the Alliance. Expanding our cooperation beyond traditional areas, meeting economic security needs, but also working in closer coordination with our friends and like-minded nations in the Indo-Pacific.

These multiple shifts and challenges are what puts FAOs center stage. If the ROK-U.S. Alliance is the linchpin to peace and prosperity in the region, the FAOs are the linchpin to the Alliance itself.

Working shoulder-to-shoulder with U.S. officers as both Deputy C3 (Director of Operations) at Combined Forces Command, and later the Deputy Commander, I have had the honor to personally appreciate the pivotal role that FAOs play in making the ROK-U.S. Alliance one of the most robust military alliances in the world.

I am thankful for your dedication and service to Korea, and confident that “We Go Together” in whatever lies ahead.

Leem Ho Young,
General (Retired) ROK Army

A Message from the President



Dear Members, Partners, and Leaders of the FAOA Korea Chapter,

To diverge from the increasingly too familiar adage, it does not always take disaster to find opportunities. They can often be found in successes and standard processes as well. President Biden made his first trip to Asia as president last month with the first stop being in South Korea, just ten days after the inauguration of President Yoon Suk Yeol. I could only imagine the pressure on the new Yoon Administration, which made the ROK-U.S. Alliance a cornerstone of its campaign pledges.

The historic visit and the starting days of the Yoon presidency signaled agreement in a wide breadth of areas including technology, economics, defense, and even trilateral cooperation with Japan. As FAOs, most of us should have read the Joint Statement produced by the summit. It lays the groundwork for this new chapter in the ROK-U.S. Alliance and left and right limits within which we can operate. It was carefully crafted, yet unexpectedly broad in many areas. For example, several specialists expected a return to named, full-scale exercises, but the statement only mentions an agreement to expand the scale and scope of exercises.

Broad guidance leaves some waiting for direction while others welcome the opportunity to try something new and audacious. In this current feeling-out stage, I entreat our fellow leaders to try elements of the latter. Should boldness be met with resistance, then we can readjust, but the truly audacious ideas will be the ones that break paradigms, inspire organizations, and affect tangible advancement in the alliance.

As always, if you have a bold idea, we want to hear from you!

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Wei C. Chou'. The signature is fluid and cursive.

Wei C. Chou

President, FAOA Korea Chapter

HIGHLIGHTS

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The FAOA Korea Chapter hosted a Coffee & Chat with Foundation for Defense of Democracies' David Maxwell on 01 March.

* * * * *

A Joint FAOA Korea Chapter-GW Institute of Korean Studies Chat with Stephen Costello was hosted on 03 May.

* * * * *

The FAOA Korea Chapter hosted a panel of distinguished speakers, its first in-person event of 2022 at the Millennium Hilton Seoul Hotel on 12 May.

* * * * *

On 03 Jun, members were welcome to a free high performance seminar with coach Dominique Narciso.

A Message from the Editor

Dear Readers,

I am writing this from Oslo, where I had the pleasure of attending the 2022 Oslo Freedom Form ([OFF](#)). OFF is always a stark reminder that roughly 4.2 billion people are under authoritarian rule worldwide and one of those states is a major world player - China. A state that is ever trying, and succeeding, to expand its controlling reach.

There was great fear among many, including the Uyghur, Tibetan and Hong Kong activists that I spoke to, that human rights will be forgotten in favor of trade and economics. These activists know personally what it is like for China to create a blackbox of censorship and human rights violations in their homes. To quote Glacier Kwong's thought provoking [speech](#) on Hong Kong: "We don't just fight for our home, we fight for a way of life that you share. Our loss is your loss."

Echoing this message, some OFF talks centered on the ongoing Ukrainian crisis, including a [video message](#) from the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs. It is important to remember those fighting all across the world for freedom and democracy, professionally or out of necessity to save their homes. I am sure many of our readers understand this, having chosen to do so through their career path. Notably, we have just had both the U.S.' and ROK's Memorial Days. As always, we are grateful to those who lay down their lives in service of their nation.

In a regional update, North Korea declared a "severe national emergency" in May, and its first Covid-19 cases and deaths. It has tightened border security and started lockdowns and quarantines, further restricting the little movement people had. But, a larger outbreak is expected, as it's refusing international vaccine aid. I am sure many of us will be watching to see what occurs next.

For this second issue of the year, we begin with Ahmad Ibrahim Villaseñor commenting on the risks and political liabilities of foreign

fighters in Ukraine. Next is an article by Salome Giunashvili and Tamar Chkhartishvili, on the purpose and impact of AUKUS in the Indo-pacific region, and the response by regional powers to its actions.

Third is a discussion provoking, piece by Markus Garlauskas, on what the region could look like if a fictitious 'strategic surprise' were to occur on the Korean peninsula. I encourage you to share this scenario with colleagues, and see how they respond.

After that comes Part II of Edwin J. Nichols and Schuyler 'Sky' Webb's FAO Cross-Cultural Considerations, describing and explaining how cultural differences came to be and the importance of understanding them. The last of our analytical articles is Apoorva Jayakumar's look at foreign policy prospects under new ROK President Yoon, specific to implications for the ROK's relationship with the U.S., North Korea and China.

Finally we have a write up of our first in person event of the year by our Treasurer, Rich Naseer, a panel of distinguished speakers across military disciplines on FAOs and the ROK-U.S. Alliance.

Watching OFF panels on lack of free speech and journalistic repression, I was reminded that those of us contributing to this journal are lucky, we don't have to censor our words for fear of future repercussions. Debates and opinions are encouraged, not feared. As always I would like to thank our contributors and to all our staff who have worked towards the creation of this issue.


I hope you enjoy it.

Best Wishes,



Emily Stamp
Editor in Chief, FAOA Korea Chapter


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PITCH AN ARTICLE

If you are interested in pitching an article or book review for the next issue please email:

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Ukraine's Foreign Fighters

How a Military Expedient Risks Becoming a Civil-Military Liability

By Ahmad Ibrahim Villaseñor

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has prompted one of the largest mobilisations of foreign fighters since the Syrian Civil War. In the days following Russia's all-out assault, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy established an International Legion to supplement the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Since then, over 20,000 volunteers from across 52 countries have answered Zelenskyy's call to arms, with these new arrivals being described as "the most significant international brigade since the Spanish Civil War." The arrival of thousands of motivated foreign fighters carries immediate military benefits for an embattled Ukraine, mainly, an external source of manpower. But the history of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict and the historical record of the foreign fighter phenomenon give good reasons for caution about the impact these new arrivals will have, not just on Ukraine, but also on their home countries.

Although nominally integrated within the framework of the Ukrainian military, the various pro-state militias recruiting foreigners encompass the entire political spectrum and declare myriad motives for defending Ukraine. Reinforced by like-minded foreign volunteers, easy access to advanced weaponry, and under the command and control of the Ukrainian state, such units may be militarily useful for now, but they risk becoming a civil-military liability for Ukraine. This possibility takes on a more pressing tone when considering that some of these militias espouse their own views of what a post-war Ukraine should look like, together with the recorded instances of hostility

between certain pro-state militias and the Ukrainian government itself. Occupying a smaller space within Ukraine's political landscape, far-left anarchists are naturally positioned in fundamental opposition to the far-right forces also defending Ukraine. Anarchist militias like RevDia, bolstered by Russian and Belarusian volunteers, are using the war as an opportunity to grow their size and influence with the aim of establishing anarchism in Ukraine "as a permanent political force." But it is fair to say that their chances are remote, given that the far-left in Ukraine are outnumbered and outgunned by their ideological opposites in the far-right; chief among them being the Azov Regiment.

Since its founding to the present day, the Azov Regiment actively recruits from far-right organisations in Europe and North America, despite the unit having been integrated into the Ukrainian National Guard in 2014. Describing its international recruitment drive in the wake of the Russian

invasion, the SITE Intelligence Group states that "Not since ISIS have we seen such a flurry of recruitment activity."

The Azov Regiment's growth in size and influence during the current crisis is but a component of its broader political strategy. This involves the unit harnessing its positive public image, derived from its military effectiveness, to shift mainstream political discourse to the far-right to facilitate "the capture of political power." Their competing visions for Ukraine's political future notwithstanding, certain radical political elements in the country also have a history of mutual hostility dating back to the war in Donbas in 2014.

Through their attacks against far-right activists, RevDia have developed a reputation as one of Ukraine's most violent anarchist groups. Similarly, as recently as March of this year, members of the Misanthropic Division were alleged to have attacked left-wing volunteers in Lviv. Adding to this toxic mix of mutual hostility between



Azov Regiment fighters in Mariupol. Credit: The Telegraph

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Belarusian anarchists in the Territorial Defense Forces. Credit: @theblackheadquarter (Instagram)

Ukraine's radical political elements, foreign fighters of a more ideological persuasion can also superimpose ideas of a transnational struggle over the ongoing conflict.

The wars in Chechnya and Syria demonstrate how the arrival of ideologically-motivated foreign fighters can lead to the initial cause being hijacked and transformed into something completely alien to itself. Incidentally, the Sheikh Mansur Battalion, a pro-Ukrainian Islamist Chechen unit who count among their number veterans who fought alongside ISIS in Syria, view their involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War as a continuation of their campaign against what they describe as the Russian occupation of Chechnya.

Similarly, the Kastuś Kalinoŭski Battalion, a Belarusian unit with ties to the Azov Regiment and prefer not to be incorporated into the International Legion to preserve their operational autonomy, see their involvement in the war as another front in their campaign to remove both President Alexander Lukashenko from power and Russian influence over Belarus. The myriad reasons why foreign fighters have decided to join the war in Ukraine align with

observations of the tendency among them to introduce "new ideas about what the struggle is about and how it should be fought."

While the war has made strange bedfellows of these pro-state militias, there is a risk that the ideological fault lines within this coalition could lead to infighting between them. The risk of this grows as the war drags on or if Ukraine were to suffer significant military setbacks, which would degrade Kyiv's control over these independently-minded militias.

In this regard, the Spanish Civil War is a notable historical precedent for such an eventuality.

Disputes over the minutiae of ideology fractured the pro-Republican forces, culminating in the violent May Days of Barcelona in 1937, which considerably weakened the Republican war effort. In his study of the International Brigades, Dr. Matthew Hughes observes that the "Republican side spent too much time fighting internal enemies." If even this ideologically cohesive camp – relatively speaking – dissolved into warring factions, then this casts doubt about the long-term sustainability of the ideologically diverse coalition of pro-Ukrainian militias.

Although the historical record shows that infighting among foreign fighters is not beyond the realm of possibility, it is still too early to say if this pro-Ukrainian coalition will suffer the same fate, as seen in Spain and other conflicts since. What can be said now, however, and has been demonstrated to be the case already, is that foreign fighters can become a liability for their governments back home in a number of ways.

For instance, many countries have laws forbidding their citizens from serving in the armed forces of a foreign state. South Korea has even gone so far as to threaten to revoke the passports of citizens who have gone to Ukraine to fight, as seen in the high-profile case of Ken Rhee, a former South Korean special forces officer. Not only does joining the International Legion therefore constitute a criminal offence, but citizens who travel to fight in Ukraine also threaten to undermine the foreign policy of their governments back home by potentially jeopardising relations between their countries and Russia.

From the perspective of the government in Seoul, Koreans defending Ukraine against Russia, a valuable trade partner, threatened to derail, or at the very least, complicate, the foreign policy balancing act of former president, Moon Jae-in. His strategy of hedging saw South Korea try to cultivate friendly relations with Russia through commercial ties, despite the international condemnation of Putin's invasion, and the sanctions against him and his country that followed. Perhaps Moon's foreign policy strategy partly explains the severe consequences Koreans could face should they fight Russia in Ukraine. This also raises the question of whether his successor, Yoon Suk-yeol, will adopt a more

lenient stance towards Korean citizens fighting in Ukraine as part of a potentially more activist foreign policy towards the Russian invasion.

In addition to threatening to compromise their country's foreign policy, foreign fighters can also pose a major headache for their governments if they were to be captured by Russian forces, as this would give Putin considerable leverage in diplomatic negotiations. The capture of British citizens, Aiden Aslin and Shaun Pinner at the siege of Mariupol, brings this fact into stark relief. Appearing on Russian state media, the pair have requested that a key Putin ally be released from Ukrainian custody in exchange for their freedom. Coinciding with this is the growing domestic pressure for Prime Minister Boris Johnson to secure their release, placing him in an unfavourable position in negotiations with Putin, thus showcasing how captured foreign fighters create unexpected dilemmas for their governments back home.

The influx of foreign fighters into the Russo-Ukrainian War brings considerable risks, not just to the volunteers themselves, but also to Ukraine and to their countries of origin. The historical record of infighting, even among ideologically proximate groups, does not bode well for the ideologically diverse coalition of pro-Ukrainian foreign fighters, some of whom belong to militias with their own motivations for defending Ukraine. As such, foreign fighters risk becoming a civil-military liability for the Ukrainian government. Foreign fighters can also prove to be a political liability for their home countries, either by fighting countries who their governments have friendly ties with or by being captured in battle, thereby placing their governments in an awkward position in diplomacy with their captors. In the near term, Kyiv will find the numbers and military capabilities of foreign fighters indispensable in keeping Ukraine in the fight. But the risks associated with the involvement of foreign fighters will grow as more of them arrive and the longer the war drags on.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl), the Ministry of Defence, or the UK government

Editor update: Since the submission of this article Ken Rhee returned to South Korea after an injury and was subjected to a police investigation upon his arrival.

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“Foreign fighters can also prove to be a political liability for their home countries, either by fighting countries who their governments have friendly ties with or by being captured in battle”

AUKUS: Its Purpose, Regional Implications and Role in the Indo-Pacific

By Salome Giunashvili and Tamar Chkhartishvili

The AUKUS pact, an enhanced trilateral security partnership among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, opened up a new chapter in the special relationship between these long-standing strategic partners and allies. The launch of AUKUS has drawn considerable attention since its undeniable significance exceeds the unilateral setting exclusive to three partners. It has profound geopolitical implications, being established to promote defense technology and intelligence sharing, and enhance joint capabilities and interoperability in a security domain, specifically in the Indo-Pacific region. AUKUS, therefore, holds great potential to offer tremendous value to the regional security architecture.

The partnership received diverse attention from non-member Indo-Pacific powers. China openly expressed its displeasure towards the pact in light of its potential to pose a hindrance to China's growing naval capacities and expansionism in the South China Sea. On the other hand, Japan has praised the initiative, while South Korea and India have so far demonstrated a relatively neutral stance.

The three nations have already embarked upon their first initiative with the U.S. agreeing to assist Australia in building nuclear-powered submarines, strengthening bilateral

defense ties between the two allies and enhancing joint capabilities and interoperability in defense technology. This U.S.-Australian cooperation constitutes a significant preliminary assessed and evaluated strategic decision for regional security through the mutual willingness in Washington and Canberra to adopt a more proactive approach in response to the strategic challenges in the Indo-Pacific.

The U.S. is clearly determined to address the legacy of strategic confusion in the Indo-Pacific left by the Trump Administration, along with the disparaging narrative of U.S. decline triggered by the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Therefore, the Biden Administration aims to strengthen its

position in the Indo-Pacific by reaffirming U.S. commitment to its regional allies and reinforcing unilateral cooperation. One method to foster regional cooperation the

In reality, the urgent need to counter the Chinese authoritarian regime's military presence in the Indo-Pacific region necessitated the establishment of the security alliance.

U.S. is aiming to use is to integrate its allies into domestic supply chains and industrial planning.



President Joe Biden delivers remarks during a virtual trilateral press statement with Australia and the United Kingdom, Wednesday, September 15, 2021, in the East Room of the White House. Credit: Official White House Photo by Adam Schultz

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For the UK, the strategic benefits of AUKUS go beyond acquiring a new opportunity to work closely with its allies. The agreement provides post-Brexit Britain with tangible methods to re-demonstrate its geopolitical relevance as one of the major security actors in the Indo-Pacific region. At the strategic level, AUKUS enables the UK to have a greater strategic impact on the region by gaining permanent basing rights for its own nuclear-powered submarines in Australia.

Australia's increased willingness to join the AUKUS effort stems from its concerns regarding China's interests in the Indo-Pacific region, such as its interest in Australia's neighboring states, combined with political tensions between the two countries. Despite the strong support for its alliance with the U.S., Canberra previously seemed more ambivalent over the security threats posed by China. In fact, it sought to develop good relations with its largest trading partner. However, as China's appetite to assert its power increasingly threatens the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific, Australia confidently reassessed its hedging strategy. For Australia, AUKUS serves to reaffirm sustained U.S. support for Australian security and safeguards the effectiveness and liberal character of the rules-based regional order. This brings Australia, a middle power state, even closer to its powerful partners and strengthening its regional position.

After the AUKUS deal was announced, China was quick to criticize the respective countries involved and denounce the agreement. *China Daily* and *Xinhua*, state-controlled English language media outlets, both reported Beijing's official position on the deal, stating the agreement as being "irresponsible" and a "threat to peace and stability in the region". The Chinese government's main argument is regional and on how the military collaboration poses a risk for nuclear

proliferation by paving the way for an arms race and further conflicts in the South China Sea. While China focuses on its rise and influence in the Indo-Pacific region, the Communist Party adamantly criticizes the deal from a regional perspective as "our problem" instead of solely being an issue for China. By doing so, Beijing aims to appeal to other regional states, arguing that AUKUS undermines peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, by exaggerating a 'victim' narrative, where Western countries, incited by the U.S., are conspiring against China to 'hem' Chinese activities in the region. By labeling AUKUS' actions as coming from the 'enemy', the Chinese government's official stance could potentially justify any action in response as a 'defense mechanism' against the 'threatening' alliance, which serves as a ploy to legitimize future Chinese conduct internationally.

However, China increased its military expenditure and asserted influence in the region long before the idea of the AUKUS partnership was born. In reality, the urgent need to counter the Chinese authoritarian regime's military presence in the Indo-Pacific region necessitated the security alliance's establishment.

While the Chinese response mostly consisted of harsh rhetoric and continuous encouragement to boost cooperation amongst its allies to alienate AUKUS countries, there have been a few significant changes that could serve as a foundation for Beijing's increased military presence in the region, and the need for more AUKUS initiatives. The new Solomon-China security deal signed, but not disclosed to the international community, in April 2022, sets a tone for the Chinese long-term strategy to counter and replace other actors, mainly the U.S., as the dominant power in the region. The implications of the security agreement could mean both a potential military base in the

Solomon territory or a kind of support facility for Chinese forces. Either way, China will have a much-needed platform on the Solomon Islands to utilize as a military strategic checkpoint and it could attempt the same with other nations, such as Sri Lanka or Myanmar.

“For Australia, AUKUS serves to reaffirm sustained U.S. support for Australian security and safeguard the effectiveness and liberal character of the rules-based regional order,”

Another alarming development continues to take place in the disputed South China Sea. The vast majority of artificial islands that China started to build in 2014 have now been identified as fully militarized locations equipped with anti-aircraft, anti-ship, and other military equipment. While Chinese military build-up can be considered part of the Communist Party's strategy to have "superior military muscle" in disputed territories and/or to replace U.S. influence in the region, the geographic location of both the artificial islands and the Solomon Islands indicates that Beijing intends to place military pressure on regional sea lanes and Taiwan. Located south-west and south-east from Taiwan, if materialized, these military bases can deter military reinforcement to Taiwan, interfere with strategic communications, intimidate the country and, subsequently, increase Taiwan's vulnerability to Chinese advancements.

Beijing's strategy to be a dominant power in the region has economic, territorial, and geopolitical motivations that oppose AUKUS. First, China has territorial disputes with its neighboring countries, as well as

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maritime disputes over the South China Sea, which is considered to have untapped oil and natural gas reserves. Second, China seeks to strengthen its 'foothold' over Taiwan, which Beijing recognizes as part of 'One China'. Third, Beijing asserts itself as the dominant power in the region, competing with the U.S.' long-standing presence and influence. Given Chinese interests and strategic long-term aims to assert dominance in the Indo-Pacific, Beijing clearly perceives any sign of strengthening defense cooperation between like-minded democratic states as a direct threat to its strategic goal, and is likely to continue this stance.

China's active condemnation of AUKUS leads U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific to approach the pact more positively, as it opens up a new opportunity for a greater level of defense cooperation in the face of strategic challenges in the region. However, the nuclear focus of AUKUS has triggered some concerns amongst some U.S. regional allies.

It further fueled ongoing discussions in South Korea on whether or not the country should seek to acquire nuclear-powered submarines, with major differences in opinion among South Korean experts. While former President Moon Jae In made substantial efforts to revise South Korea's nuclear cooperation deal with the U.S., newly-inaugurated President Yoon Suk Yeol does not share the vision of his predecessor regarding the nation's own nuclear-powered submarines.

The topic also remains highly controversial in Japan. Tokyo officially welcomed the launch of AUKUS and signaled its willingness to engage in cooperation under this framework on topics like AI and cybersecurity.

For some commentators, no mention of the nuclear submarine deal demonstrated Japan's "uneasiness and discomfort" since Tokyo is yet to make a strategic decision and decide what role it wants to play as a maritime power in the South China Sea and beyond.

Considering the expressed objection toward acquiring nuclear submarines by the current leaderships in Tokyo and Seoul, increasing demand for the U.S. to grant its regional allies similar access to nuclear-power submarine technology seems rather implausible.

Instead, AUKUS could serve as a central element of the broader regional security network through engagement with like-minded states in the Indo-Pacific. To a large extent, the future efficacy and capabilities of the pact rely on its regional relevance. Therefore, AUKUS could adopt an issue-based approach instead of pursuing an exclusive grouping of three partners. While formally expanding the AUKUS agreement remains questionable, it is another opportunity to strengthen the U.S. alliance network and regional security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Introducing a minilateral component through AUKUS could therefore plausibly contribute to building a more coherent grouping of like-minded states in the region to combat China's naval expansion and effectively contain China.

“*Instead, AUKUS could serve as a central element of the broader regional security network through engagement with like-minded states in the Indo-Pacific.*”

Salome Giunashvili is a Master's degree candidate in International Studies from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. She holds a Bachelor's degree in International Relations from Tbilisi State University. Her research interests span across several different areas involving international security, hybrid warfare and alliance politics.

Tamar Chkhartishvili has obtained a Master's degree in East Asian Region Studies from Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania. Currently, she is an independent contributor to the fact-checking web-portal "Myth Detector." Her field of interests are information warfare, security and East Asia.

North Korea's Strategic Surprise in the Yellow Sea: A Future Scenario

By Markus Garlauskas

Earlier this month, at a Center for Strategic and International Studies event, the White House's Indo-Pacific coordinator, Kurt Campbell, told the online audience that the Pacific may be the most likely venue for a "strategic surprise" — from China.

During the event, there was a different kind of surprise: breaking news that North Korea had just test-fired a missile, which was only one of a number of different missiles North Korea has launched this month.

The following is a "future history" account of a hypothetical strategic surprise in the Pacific, but not the type Campbell had in mind. Though it is a work of fiction, it is grounded in analysis of historical patterns and current trends outlined in the CNA Occasional Paper: North Korea's Arena of Asymmetric Advantage: Why We Should Prepare for a Crisis in the Yellow Sea. It is a stark warning of the potential consequences if the United States and South Korea are unprepared for the military and political implications of North Korea's continued weapons development alongside the rising assertiveness of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The alliance was caught unprepared for the Yellow Sea Crisis, not because intelligence analysts did not see the warning signs, but because Seoul and Washington had not grasped how much had changed since the last confrontation with North Korea. Perhaps they were desensitized by the familiar narrative—threats and claims of grievances from North Korea amid rumors about contentious palace politics in Pyongyang. Perhaps they were so fixated on the potential for a U.S.-China war in the Taiwan Strait that a confrontation in the Yellow Sea seemed trivial by comparison...

...

The crisis first made headlines when Kim Yo-jong, the sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, warned of dire consequences for South Korean "violations" of an obscure agreement governing disputed waters in the Yellow Sea near South Korea's Paengyong Island. These waters had been a perennial flashpoint, the site of numerous military clashes between North and South Korea, as well as a politically sensitive area where North Korean, South Korean and Chinese fishing vessels all operated in close proximity. Seoul and Washington, moving in the practiced, coordinated manner of a mature and "ironclad" alliance, quickly agreed on increases in alert levels and other carefully calibrated measures to prepare for North Korea's next moves.

The allies agreed about the need to show restraint—particularly after Beijing warned "all sides" not to escalate. South Korea's president, confident in his military advantage and U.S. backing, stood firm while offering talks to resolve the dispute.

Pyongyang rejected Seoul's offer as insincere, and soon escalated to violence. Some observers at the time blamed Kim's temper, but thanks to newly declassified documents, we now know the premediated attack was a calculated risk. Pyongyang gambled that it had chosen the right time and place to surprise its more powerful adversaries with new weapons. Pyongyang also bet big that a conflict in the Yellow Sea could be contained, particularly because China's interests would lead it to intercede if the situation started to spiral out of control.

The clashes at sea between North and South Korean patrol boats began the day after Pyongyang rejected talks, but we now know that North Korea never expected to win them. They were merely prelude and a pretext for what came next...

Less than an hour before dawn, dozens of North Korean missiles of various types began raining down on the South Korean defenses of Paengyong Island, most of them striking bunkers, radars, barracks, and weapons positions with reasonable accuracy. Each of these missiles were new types that had been repeatedly tested by North Korea in the months and years after Kim Jong-un's summits with President Trump. Dismissed as mere "short range" missiles, the tests did not attract the international attention and additional sanctions that intercontinental ballistic missiles or nuclear weapons had—so North Korea's refinement of these weapons had gone largely unchecked...

...

To their credit, the island's defenders began returning fire within minutes, and the South Korean military rapidly moved to come to the beleaguered island's aid. However, despite South Korea's more advanced military equipment, along with its superior command, control and intelligence capabilities, geography stacked the odds in North Korea's favor.

North Korea's missiles were being fired from mobile launchers based on its massive, mountainous and well-defended Hwanghae Peninsula, located adjacent to the isolated South Korean island.

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This photo, distributed by the North Korean government, shows what it says is a test-fire of a Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), at an undisclosed location in North Korea on March 24, 2022. Credit: Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP, File

The risks posed by North Korean antiship missiles, coastal artillery, submarines, and sea mines in these constricted waters made it difficult and dangerous for the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy to even approach the Hwanghae Peninsula, while North Korea's numerous land-based surface-to-air missiles also kept the ROK Air Force operating at a distance. To neutralize these air and coastal defenses would require time that the island's defenders did not have and a level of massive escalation that Seoul was hesitant to authorize. South Korea did its best to hit back against the attackers as quickly as it could, unleashing its own land- and sea-based missiles from safely out of range of these defenses, using targeting data provided by advanced space-, air-, sea- and land-based sensors.

A U.S. liaison officer present for the planning of these counterattacks described the South Koreans as "playing whack-a-mole," while the North Koreans were "shooting fish in a barrel." South Korean forces were trying to find, identify and quickly strike North Korean targets—many of them mobile—in more than 8,000 square kilometers of mountains riddled with untold numbers of underground tunnels and bunkers. In comparison, the defenders of Paengyong were confined to a limited number of battle positions on a 45-square-kilometer island.

...

Within hours, the chairman of the ROK joint chiefs of staff told his president and his U.S. counterpart that this was a losing proposition, and so a much stronger response, including direct U.S. military involvement, was called for.

The "ironclad alliance" had already swung into motion...

...

While the allies were calibrating their next military actions to strike a decisive counterblow that would not trigger nuclear retaliation from North Korea, Beijing moved to intervene. PRC officials once again asserted China's "vital security interests" in the Yellow Sea, and its unwillingness to tolerate "chaos or war" on its doorstep. This time, however, it was more than rhetoric—it was backed by overwhelming military force. By the next day, hundreds of Chinese combat aircraft and dozens of warships were operating less than 20 miles west of Paengyong Island, backed by an umbrella of advanced air defense systems and sensors operating on the nearby Shandong Peninsula, a little more than 100 miles away. Beijing demanded an immediate cease-fire, with a "no-fly, no-sail" zone to separate the combatants.

This was a strategic shock to Seoul and Washington. Beijing held the initiative for the rest of the crisis...

With the announcement of the joint statement resulting from the negotiations that Beijing had forced on North and South Korea, the brief conflict came to an end, almost as abruptly as it began. The crisis had mercifully ended before the situation escalated to open warfare between the U.S. and China or to a North Korean nuclear strike. However, it had also ended before the military power of South Korea and the United States could be decisively brought to bear, before Washington and Seoul were able to demonstrate solidarity to counter coercion from Beijing and before North Korea could be held accountable for its aggression.

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Early speculation by some American pundits that the attacks would lead to the end of the Kim regime were definitively proven wrong. Once again, this would not be “the last straw” for Beijing or Pyongyang’s elites. Xi’s initial ire at Kim’s recklessness dissipated when it became clear that this unwanted crisis had elevated China’s position vis-à-vis the U.S. Meanwhile, this signal victory vindicated Kim’s choice to prioritize weapons and security over trade and prosperity—which cleared the way for domestic and international acquiescence to Kim family rule over a nuclear-armed North Korea for generations to come.

Beyond the hundreds of lives lost, it is clear to us today that the outcome of the crisis—highlighting the alliance’s inability to counter North Korea’s advancing missile capabilities and China’s rising power—proved to be a mortal wound for the alliance itself. The depth of the loss of South Korean confidence in the U.S. was not obvious at the time, but in retrospect, the seemingly inconclusive Yellow Sea Crisis and the minor “battle of Paengyong Island” was a watershed moment in the decline of the ROK-U.S. military alliance and Beijing’s rise to regional dominance.

It would take years, but the alliance’s defeat in the Yellow Sea Crisis set in motion the chain of events that led later to the withdrawal of U.S. Forces Korea, then still later to the infamous Seoul Statement proclaiming the division of China and Korea as both “internal matters” to be resolved without foreign military interference. These events, in turn, set the political conditions leading to Beijing’s decision to resolve the “Taiwan question” through force and the later collapse of the U.S. alliance system. If only Seoul and Washington had been better prepared and more resolute, the Yellow Sea Crisis could have instead cemented the strength of U.S. alliances and extended deterrence in the Western Pacific for decades to come...

For detailed analysis on the risk of a Yellow Sea Crisis like the scenario described above, and how to prepare for one, see the CNA occasional paper [“North Korea’s Arena of Asymmetric Advantage: Why We Should Prepare for a Crisis in the Yellow Sea.”](#)

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FAO Cross-Cultural Considerations

Philosophical Aspects of Cultural Difference, Part II

By Edwin J. Nichols, PhD, Schuyler C. Webb, PhD

In Part I of this series, *The Philosophical Aspects of Cultural Difference (PACD)* paradigm was introduced as a tool to help optimize a FAO's cultural competence and diversity insight by better enabling them to understand behaviors across ethnic groups. Part I discussed how different world cultures developed in response to various geographic and climatic environments. The PACD matrix provided insights into how different ethnic groups have adapted cultural ideas, values, beliefs, and practices to define their reality, illustrating how groups generally perceive themselves and how they engage situational and interpersonal interactions – philosophically and psychologically.

For millennia, the behavioral, physical, and psychological makeup of different human groups evolved to survive and thrive, creating a philosophical worldview that can characterize each ethnic group, with its dominance relative to the embodiment of alternative traits. Thus, PACD gives authenticity to established cultural patterns of behavior, providing confirmation that cultural differences are real and can significantly affect how a group understands their worldview experience.

This discussion aligns with Part I by comparing examples of Asian and Western (i.e., European and Northern American origin) contexts as the PACD paradigm makes it easier to appreciate and understand the cultural and human differences that FAOs will encounter throughout their work. FAOs can learn about the cognitive consequences of human cultural diversity, as well as the philosophical and cognitive underpinnings of culture in its various dimensions, as cultural diversity and intercultural contact become more pronounced throughout the world.

Axiology: Better Understanding the East Through Philosophy

After millennia of journeying and settling across Asia, and relying on their group for survival, each group developed distinct customs and values that may still be seen today. In current Asian societies, the life of the individual is focused on group affiliation, with the primary task to “fit” into society. Harmony in family and group life is virtually “wired-in” in the Asian cultural psyche. Comparatively because Westerners believe nonconformity is acceptable, group life in America varies from Asian culture. In Asia, values of group loyalty are taught to young children just as the values of individuality are taught to young children in a Western context.

One reason for the efficacy of the Japanese consensual decision-making process is their managers' and employees' understanding, acceptance, and support of decision-making techniques. They also consistently use various stages of the decision-making process, in addition to the unofficial politics, subtlety, and patience. Conversely, U.S. managers register suspicion towards participative decision processes which are used primarily for improving decision-making quality, opposed to the Asian aim of achieving unanimous consent.

On the regional level, China's 'One China' principle is



A Republic of Korea Sailor waves the American flag and ROK flag as the USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) pulls into the port of Donghae. Credit: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Bobbie G. Attaway

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motivated by the Asian collective philosophy formed over many millennia and not derived from contemporary political thought and practice. Recent expansionist *home(land)coming* invitations extended to Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau are underscored by this ancient worldview that predates recorded history. North and South Korea have been separated by an armistice agreement since the end of the Korean War in 1953, yet there have been recent ROK overtures and proposals laden with concessions and pre-conditions to declare the end of the war and eventually unify as one country. Relative to the PACD paradigm, such a declaration of peace conveys a need to fulfill the collective (consciousness) tendency of Asian group cohesiveness.

Epistemology: East and West: Differences in Ways of Thinking

Asian and Western ways of thinking differ radically; they are 180 degrees apart. The underlying difference is that Westerners are more analytic and deductive in their thinking, whereas Asians are focused on the collective, favoring an intuitive, inductive, "holistic" approach to learning. For example, Chinese philosophy is based on a holistic worldview and is directed towards a comprehension that is achieved through education and learning. Chinese epistemology is relational, meaning that it understands the external world to be ordered as a network of relations, forming a dynamic structure. Western philosophy is concerned with measurable and verifiable facts (i.e., counting and measuring), with the application of scientific (deductive) inquiry as the major method for gaining knowledge and forming a worldview.

Logic

Logic is how a person reasons and approaches a problem to derive an answer. Scholars from several disciplines including history, ethnography, and philosophy of science, maintain that Asians and Westerners reason in divergent ways. In general, Western logic is characterized as dichotomous (i.e., yes/no or right/wrong) whereas Asian logic is characterized as more all-encompassing, and holistic, in nature. Thus, Asians perceive and organize any external phenomena to enable them to explain events situationally and rely on knowledge-based reasoning. Meanwhile, people in the West are inclined to organize the world in rule-based categories, explain events dispositionally and rely on formal, decontextualized reasoning.

In traditional Chinese philosophy, there is no discipline of metaphysics because of their logic system. In the East, the objective world is conceived independently of thought and mind (*Nyāya*).

Dichotomous logic becomes problematic when applied to individuals and their relationships. During the pandemic, all South Koreans complied with government directives to wear masks in public spaces to protect themselves and respect the health of others. In contrast, the ongoing debates and protests in the U.S. suggest that wearing a mask is a personal choice and a contentious social issue.

...if there is to be a philosophy of the future, it must be born outside of Europe or it must be born as a consequence of encounters and impacts [percussions] between Europe and non-Europe.

*-- Dr. Michael Foucault,
Philosopher, Historian, Political
Activist*

Process

Process is closely related to logic, referring to how the practice of behavior aids adaptability to ordinary life situations. Asian philosophy covers a wide spectrum of life and philosophical ideas, with a focus on comprehending the Universe's never-ending "becoming" process. This philosophy is underscored in the Japanese tradition of *keiretsu* (系列). Japanese society is organized by groups of interest e.g., businesses, government bureaucracies, political parties, and universities. A web of informal cartels, as well as their formal derivatives, *keiretsu*, links the nation. Politics, society, and commerce are inextricably linked because the Japanese trust that these insular arrangements maintain their desired societal harmony, which translates into national security, full employment, and risk mitigation.

Asians perceive the world in similarities and relationships, explain events with context and rely on knowledge-based reasoning. Westerners are more likely to organize the world in terms of rule-based categories and rely on formal, decontextualized reasoning. Both are effective in perceiving the environment. Historically the Special Measures Agreement negotiations between the U.S. and ROK

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government are predictably deliberate and protracted. Western negotiators and FAO observers may become perplexed if a reasonable amount of time lapses over the preset deadline. However, if the negotiators understood the Asian process, they could anticipate an extended interaction and eventual consensus.

Social consensus is an integral part of Asian social relationships. For example, Japanese social events seem to be decided by this sense of harmony. Moreover, you may observe seemingly trivial and ritualistic behaviors, e.g., when watching a group of Japanese business people sitting down for lunch, it is likely that they would all order the same dish.


In Japan, life is highly ritualized from the cradle to the grave. School ceremonies are conducted precisely the same way across Japan. At important social events, people wear and behave within prescribed etiquette parameters. Public officials are reluctant to conduct events without precedence and protocol. In corporate Japan, substantial time and effort is directed into feasibility studies and all risk factors must be resolved before projects are approved. Managers request detailed data before making project decisions. This intrinsic need for consensus is a reason why organizational changes are challenging in Japan. Indeed, the Japanese are debating how to preserve this sense of equality, to ensure that decisions that have an impact on the group are socialized and deliberated among members. Consequently, Japanese organizations appear to have a higher degree of agreement on policies, goals, and aspirations than their Western counterparts.

This does not imply that Japanese people are innately agreeable or that Japan is a conflict-free culture, but rather that conflict and disagreements are managed within the community and bargained against other demands of human connection and social ties. Ultimately, the goals are to realize an agreement on a united perspective between members despite disputes. The most crucial factor is in-group cohesion, the cornerstone of corporate culture. In fact, people frequently sacrifice their personal ambitions to achieve in-group cohesion.

Conclusion

Through an analysis of axiology, epistemology, logic and process, the culturally specific philosophical distinctions of East and West become self-evident. Understanding and utilizing this knowledge leads to culturally grounded teaching that contributes to the successful orientation of regional FAOs posits that definitional systems reflect the distinct styles of survival maintenance characterizing different racial groups which have their own social reality (e.g., worldview), deriving from their common geographical and historical experiences. These definitional systems encompass an individual's or society's knowledge and perspective, including natural philosophy and normative postulates – values, logic, truths, and ethics.

“He who knows all answers has not been asked all the questions.”
-Confucius



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Foreign Policy Prospects Under President Yoon

A Focus on the U.S., DPRK, and China. *By Apoorva Jayakumar*

A

fter a close, suspense-inducing South Korean presidential election, People's Power Party candidate Yoon Seok Yeol won the race with a 0.8 percent lead ahead of Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung.

The close race involved negative campaigning and mudslinging, with popular Netflix show, "[Squid Game](#)", being used as an anecdote to reflect the low popularity of both candidates. Although President Yoon formerly attracted attention during his career as Prosecutor General for prosecuting political elites, such as former President Park Geun Hye, he is now being criticized for his unlawful behavior which, as well as the close election margin, [increasing household debt and rising unemployment rate](#), could cause domestic political struggles. Internationally, however he faces growing challenges in the form of an expanding China, North Korea, and security in the Indo-Pacific region.

The U.S.

Yoon's campaign focused on supporting and strengthening the ROK-U.S. [Alliance](#), improving bilateral dialogue channels for deeper extended deterrence cooperation, and he has [committed](#) to development and deeper involvement within the Indo-Pacific region. Despite President Moon Jae-in's efforts to enhance Washington's perception of South Korean progressives, political winds may have shifted to align more closely with Korean conservatives in Washington. A nail-biting initial act as President-elect – Yoon's [call](#) to President Biden - reaffirmed the strength of the ROK-U.S. partnership as the backbone of Indo-Pacific peace, security, and prosperity. Questions regarding U.S.-DPRK relations had been a centerpiece during Yoon's election campaigns, as he asserted his desire to seek a "comprehensive strategic alliance" with the U.S. During the call, President Biden reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the ROK's defense and stated that he pledged to work with the ROK on globally pressing concerns including climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic, and challenges presented by North Korea's nuclear and missile programs.

President Biden's recent [visit](#) to Asia amidst concerns of a North Korean nuclear test was his first since assuming office. His time in South Korea resulted in a [joint statement](#) agreeing

to strengthen the ROK-U.S. longstanding strategic relationship through economics, technology, regional responsibilities, and defense. Discussion about expanding the scope and scale of joint military exercises and reinstating the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group ([EDSCG](#)) indicated both Presidents' commitment to deterrence on the peninsula, as did the recent eight missile [combined](#) live-fire exercise on 6 June.

South Korea's stance toward Japan is another area where U.S. policymakers seem pleased with Yoon's efforts. For decades, the U.S. government has sought to improve trilateral cooperation between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea, but [bilateral ties](#) between Seoul and Tokyo weakened during former President Moon. Yoon has stressed Tokyo's crucial role to Seoul and expressed a desire to expand [trilateral security coordination](#). Fumio Kishida, Japanese Prime Minister and President Yoon agreed to repair their current fraught [bilateral ties](#). As with the U.S., they also committed to work closely together to address the challenges created by North Korea's firing of ballistic missiles at record rates and Pyongyang's abduction of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s.

South Korea's involvement in the G7 Summit, especially for Quad Plus initiatives, and U.S.-led tech collaborations, notably on semiconductors, provided grounds for deepening the alliance and expanding South Korea's own global presence. Yoon's [foreign policy team](#) has also expressed interest in South Korea joining the extended Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), which currently includes India, the U.S., Japan, and Australia - a move that is sure to upset Beijing, which regards it as an effort to geopolitically restrict its interests. This suggests that the ROK may be more willing to engage with the Quad and other democratic international organizations under Yoon's leadership, even if it means alienating China. As a result, Seoul will hopefully become a vocal advocate of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy and also strengthen regional ties.

However, the ROK's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine can be weighed against the U.S. and its other allies' response.

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Moon's administration backed international sanctions on Russia, but unlike Japan and Australia, it did not apply its own sanctions, leading to multiple criticisms. Furthermore, although South Korea contributed non-lethal aid, some Western countries believed the ROK should do more. Yoon stated his intent to convene with Ukrainian President Zelensky as soon as possible following the war's end to explore substantive cooperation, but the question of what actions South Korea should be taking during the war continues to be an issue of domestic and international dissonance.

The DPRK

During former President Moon Jae-in's administration, Moon endeavored to play a more active role in mediating DPRK relations, including encouraging reunification talks between the two countries in order to advance peace efforts on the Korean peninsula.

Yoon has been critical of Moon's diplomatic approach to North Korea, pushing instead for a strategy of deterrence and "peace through strength." He pledged to strengthen South Korea's deterrence against the DPRK while working closely with the U.S., campaigning with his advisors for further deployment of U.S. military weapons, particularly the anti-ballistic missile system, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). This could pose trouble with China, which previously said THAAD poses a security danger to China since its radar stretches into Chinese territory, allowing Washington and Seoul to theoretically monitor Chinese planes and missile launches. The diplomatic tensions crossed over into the tourism industry. Despite South Korea being a popular tourism destination for Chinese visitors, Beijing forced its travel businesses to cease booking package tours to South Korea. They acquiesced, leading to a massive decline in the industry according to South Korea's state-run tourist agency. While tourism from China is slowly re-emerging, it is a potential economic threat that could be utilized again.

Yoon's foreign policy adviser Kim Sung-han saw the Moon administration as creating a 'master-servant relationship' between the two Koreas that has been beneficial to the North, something he has been vocal about dismantling. Yoon is also likely to be more outspoken about, and less hesitant to criticize, North Korean human rights violations and Pyongyang's nuclear weapons development, and China's role in both, than the Moon administration was. Yoon stated during his presidential campaign that if elected, he would appoint a North Korean human rights ambassador, a chair that had been unoccupied since 2017, and is also open to dialogue and providing aid in order to improve inter-Korean relations.

It is therefore expected that he will be tougher on North Korea, while working closely with the Biden administration. His human rights stance could lead to closer inter-Korean relations with the DPRK which could enhance human rights in North Korea, but the opposite could also be true. A stronger deterrence stance could lead to a worsening of relations, as could strengthening the ROK-U.S. Alliance.

China

The "Global Korea" promised by previous conservative presidents will be making a comeback, but that is to be taken with a pinch of salt. In the midst of U.S.-China tensions, policymakers cannot downplay role or potential of South Korea. South Korea has its own issues with its largest neighbor. China's People's Liberation Army conducts naval exercises in the Yellow Sea (or West Sea in the ROK) on a monthly basis; fishing vessels regularly enter South Korean waters; and these territorial threats to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea pose a risk to South Korean exports to Europe and oil and gas imports from the Middle Eastern allies.

President Biden's recent visit to Asia amidst concerns of a North Korean nuclear ballistic missile test was his first since assuming office. His time in South Korea resulted in a joint statement agreeing to strengthen the ROK-U.S. longstanding strategic relationship...



President Joe Biden delivers remarks with South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol as they visit the Samsung Electronics Pyeongtaek campus, Friday, May 20, 2022, in Pyeongtaek, South Korea. Credit: Official White House Photo

Despite a firm stance on North Korea's human rights issues, Yoon avoided China's when asked about its abuses against the Uyghur population and other cultural controversies. Instead, he stated that South Korea, as a democratic country, should part-take in international cooperation to uphold human rights regardless of where the infringement occurs. If this occurs, the Yoon administration should take a strong stance to uphold human rights regionally, from North Korea and China to Hong Kong and Xinjiang, voting in favor of adoption of policies, sanctions and laws to protect human rights.

However, there are certain areas where Yoon may wish to work with China. Security on the Korean Peninsula, including North Korea's disarmament, is one example. Yoon also sees China as a future collaborator on problems like climate change and public health, and he believes that cultural interaction should resume after COVID-19. The above-mentioned mutual respect and collaboration with China clearly foresees continuing the two states' substantial economic connections, provided Beijing does not threaten to use commercial ties as a bargaining chip in security or political conflicts.

The ROK under Yoon will also implement a foreign policy strategy which builds on the foundation of former presidents but focuses on improving and strengthening ties with current and potential allies.

This includes developing relationships in the Indo-Pacific region, especially ASEAN, Australia, and India, in line with President Moon's New Southern Policy. Given the President's statements, Yoon is likely to enhance ROK-U.S cooperation, focus on deterring North Korea while improving Inter-Korean relations, and continuing the balancing act his predecessors faced with China. Overall, Yoon's foreign policy is a blend of consistency and bold dramatic shifts in line with the U.S. However, time will tell if nagging domestic issues and his narrow political mandate widens enough to make those riskier promises a reality.

"My administration will prepare an inter-Korean peace treaty when and if North Korea makes active efforts in complete and verifiable denuclearization."
- President Yoon

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The May 12 FAOA Korea Chapter Luncheon : A Summary

By Rich Naseer

The FAOA Korea Chapter hosted its first in-person event of 2022 at the Millennium Hilton Seoul Hotel. This event was made possible by the sponsorship of the Korea-U.S. Alliance Foundation (KUSAF). Many distinguished guests attended the event, most notably retired General Jung Seung-Jo and Major General Robert B. Sofge, who provided opening remarks. The remarks were followed by a panel discussion by the Defense and Army Attache - Colonel Dan Hanson, the Air Attache - Colonel Glen Shilland, and the Naval Attache - Captain George Dolan.

Maj. Gen. Sofge spoke about the importance of the U.S.-ROK alliance, claiming that “nations with strong allies thrive and those without wither.” He emphasized General Paul LaCamera’s five priorities: 1) defend the homelands - the U.S. and ROK, 2) strengthen the alliance, 3) readiness, 4) people, and 5) coalition. Most importantly, he drew attention to the higher priority of “strengthen the alliance” over “readiness.” This highlights the importance of the U.S.-ROK alliance and the value foreign area officers bring to this domain, as FAOs are a vital asset in building and maintaining diplomatic relationships.

GEN(R) Jung echoed similar sentiments, asserting that the top priority for KUSAF is also strengthening the alliance and that FAOs are the linchpin in maintaining it. He claimed that



the alliance is mutually beneficial to both nations and that the newly instated Yoon administration understands this strategic importance. GEN(R) Jung further stressed the importance of the roles of FAOs in achieving mutual strategic objectives.

COL Hanson posed a question to the group: “What is a FAO?” He stated that no one definition could truly encapsulate a FAO’s duty description. However, he provided his own definition: “A FAO is a staff officer who is trained to have familiarity with the geopolitics, culture, and language of a particular region or country - so that they can serve as a strategic-level advisor, facilitator, analyst or action officer.” To be a successful FAO, he expressed the importance of empathy, being a team player, and having the openness to learning.

Col Shilland explained how young the U.S. Air Force is, especially its FAO program which was established in 2008,



compared to the other services, such as the US Army FAO program that dates back to 1972. He stated that currently, there are less than 50 FAO Colonels in the Air Force, and the goal is to grow this number to 150. Col Shilland emphasized how someone does not need to be a FAO to do a job as a FAO. He, for example, is not a FAO, did not have any experience in Asia nor language training, but became the Air Attache in Seoul. Col Shilland exclaimed that FAOs must be capable of softening a message given by senior leaders and should have a keen understanding and empathy for the U.S. as well as their host nation.

CAPT Dolan emphasized a critical skill set to be a FAO - writing. He discussed how, despite being our least developed skill, writing is the “most potent weapon system” under our control and should/can be improved. CAPT Dolan introduced Peter Elbow, an author of countless books on writing, and recommended *Writing Without Teachers* as it provides methods for improving writing and generating creativity.



He also explained the importance of reading journals and magazines such as *The Diplomat* and *Foreign Affairs*, but also fiction as it contains wisdom that helps FAOs become better writers and people.

The diversity of participants from various U.S. and Korean organizations, and the collaboration of ideas at the luncheon, were a true reflection of the impact FAOs have in building and maintaining professional relationships. Whether a new or seasoned FAO, there is still much to glean from each other, especially from those who have walked this path for many years. As a lifelong learner, this luncheon provided an opportunity to expand my mind a little more and to rethink the challenges we face as FAOs today, and those we will face in the future.

A note from FAOA Korea Chapter President Wei C. Chou:

Experienced FAOs often emphasize the importance of relationships. One can even go as far as to state that a FAO is only as effective as his/her relationships. This does not only apply to foreign militaries, but to academia, government, and of course, other FAOs across the services. Our ability to navigate and leverage these relationships is the strength we bring to the table. Finally conducting an in-person event after almost two years, there was a palpable sigh of elation and relief being able to experience those intangible elements of interpersonal interactions we took for granted that truly solidifies a relationship: an exchange of business cards, a firm handshake, the flash of recognition after finally meeting someone you exchanged emails with, and looking into the eyes and knowing those working alongside us in the Alliance.

“Finally conducting an in-person event after almost two years, there was a palpable sigh of elation and relief being able to experience those intangible elements of interpersonal interactions we took for granted that truly solidifies a relationship: an exchange of business cards, a firm handshake, the flash of recognition after finally meeting someone you exchanged emails with, and looking into the eyes and knowing those working alongside us in the Alliance.”

Rich Naseer is a Major in the U.S. Army serving as a Northeast Asia FAO. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the United States Military Academy and a Master of Arts in Asian Studies from the University of Hawaii at Manoa.

All photos in this article are credited to Adrian Romero.

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The **Korea Defense Veterans Association's** mission is to enhance the ROK-U.S. Alliance by advocating for the Alliance and supporting the people who built and serve the Alliance. KDVA seeks to enhance, advocate for, and educate about the ROK-U.S. Alliance; recognize and support service members, government civilians, and their families who have or are serving in the ROK-U.S. Alliance; serve its members with professional networking, mentoring, volunteering, and researching opportunities; honor and support the veterans who defended South Korea during the Korean War.



The **United States Embassy Association** is a private, non-government, non-appropriated employee organization, established under the rules of the U.S. Department of State for the benefit of its members. It provides activities, facilities, programs, personal services, and lodging in order to bring a little bit of America and community spirit to the lives of employees assigned abroad.



The **Center for Future Defense Technology and Entrepreneurship** stands at the forefront of the global defense innovation ecosystem. As the only defense innovation hub in South Korea, we aim to advance the global defense innovation ecosystem through events, publications, strategic network partners, and in-house experts and advisors.



The **Sejong Society** is a non-partisan, and all-volunteer tax-exempt organization dedicated to informing, developing, and connecting young professionals interested and engaged in U.S.-Korea affairs. Our ultimate goal is to inspire the next generation, regardless of political and career affiliations, of Korea and Northeast Asia specialists.

Calendar of Events

June 2022

Friday 3rd: High Performance Coaching Workshop for Korea Chapter members

Monday 6th: Memorial Day (ROK)

Tuesday 14th: Army's Birthday (U.S.)

Thursday 23rd: National Security and Alliance Prayer Breakfast

Saturday 25th: 72nd Anniversary of the Korean War

July 2022

TBC: Coffee & Chat with MG(R) Se-woo Pyo

Saturday 2nd: ROKMC 72nd Anniversary

Monday 4th: Independence Day (U.S.)

Friday 8th: Commemoration for the late GEN Paik Sun-Yeop

Sunday 17th: Constitution Day (ROK)

Wednesday 27th: National Korean War Veterans Armistice Day (U.S.)

Wednesday 27th - Thursday 28th: Dedication for Wall of Remembrance in D.C.

August 2022

Thursday 4th: Coast Guard's Birthday (U.S.)

Monday 15th: Liberation Day (ROK)

Community News

- The FAOA Korea Chapter and George Mason University's Peace and Conflict Studies Center Asia (PACSC Asia) are signing a Memorandum of Understanding to establish a formal partnership. We look forward to future collaboration and cooperation.
- **Summer Transitions:** We welcome new FAOs and bid farewell to others in the upcoming handover:
 - **Hail:** CAPT Ben Cote, COL Ed Cuevas, COL Marvin Haynes, CDR Colleen McCusker, LtCol Eric Moffit, Maj Paul Kapavik, MAJ Jason Song, Capt Jonathan Yoo
 - **Farewell:** CAPT George Dolan, COL Dave Gigliotti, COL Dan Hanson, Col Glen Shilland, LtCol Greg DeMarco, LCDR Martin Battcock, MAJ Romelo Delos Santos, Maj Brad Diduca, Maj Billy Hayes, LCDR Greg Pavone, LCDR Raphael Sadowitz, Capt Matthew McClure
 - **Moving:** COL Christopher Hobgood, LCDR Tao Cheng, LCDR Ki Jung

If you have any news to share, including personal or career achievements and upcoming events, please email editor.faoakc@gmail.com

(Left to right) Colonel Dan Hanson, Colonel Glen Shilland and Captain George Dolan at FAOA Korea Chapter's Panel & Luncheon, 12 May. Credit: Adrian Romero



Distinguished Members



Sheena Chestnut Greitens

Dr. Sheena Chestnut Greitens is an Associate Professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. She has been an assistant professor of political science at the University of Missouri and was a founding co-director of MU's Institute for Korean Studies. Her work focuses on East Asia, authoritarian politics, and American national security. She holds a doctorate from Harvard University; an M.Phil from Oxford University, where she studied as a Marshall Scholar; and a bachelor's from Stanford University.



Derek Grossman

Derek Grossman is a senior defense analyst at RAND focused on a range of national security policy and Indo-Pacific security issues. He served over a decade in the Intelligence Community, where he served as the daily intelligence briefer to the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the assistant secretary of defense for Asian & Pacific Security Affairs. He holds an M.A. from Georgetown University in U.S. National Security Policy and a B.A. from the University of Michigan in Political Science and Asian studies.



Kongdan "Katy" Oh Hassig

Dr. Kongdan "Katy" Oh Hassig is an independent scholar. She has been a Senior Asia Specialist at the Institute for Defense Analyses, a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, and a member of the Political Science Department of the RAND Corporation. She has taught at the University of California San Diego, George Washington University, and the University of Maryland Global Campus in Asia. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Board of Directors of the U.S. Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, and the Board of Directors of the Korea Economic Institute of America. She was a founding co-director of The Korea Club of Washington, D.C.



Soo Kim

Soo Kim is a policy analyst at the RAND Corporation and an adjunct instructor at American University. Her research interests include the Korean Peninsula, Russia, Indo-Pacific strategy, near-peer competition, decision making, propaganda, and the intelligence community. She served as an analyst in the Central Intelligence Agency and also worked at the Department of Homeland Security. Kim earned a B.A. in French from Yale University and an M.A. in International Relations/Strategic Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.



Sung Hyun "Andrew" Kim

Sung Hyun "Andrew" Kim is a Non-Resident Fellow at Harvard's Kennedy School. Prior to this, he was a visiting scholar at Stanford University. Mr. Kim retired from the Central Intelligence Agency after 28 years of service and was the first Assistant Director of the CIA, Korea Mission Center. As the Chief of CIA Station in three major East Asian cities, Mr. Kim managed the collection, analysis, production, and distribution of information that directly affected national security. He is a recipient of the CIA Director's Award and the Presidential Rank Award.

Heino Klinck



Heino Klinck is a former U.S. Army China FAO who last served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia. His experience includes 2+ decades abroad; leading strategy efforts in a Fortune 100 company; senior political-military roles in the Pentagon; analytical and operational responsibilities in the intelligence community; and diplomatic postings in Europe and Asia. Mr. Klinck has a B.A. and M.A. in International Relations from Boston University; an MBA from the University of London; an M.S. in Global Strategy and Security from the University of Rome; and he was awarded a Fellowship by Stanford University's Asia-Pacific Research Center.

Mark William Lippert



The Honorable Mark William Lippert has a distinguished career in the United States government that spanned approximately two decades. From 2014-2017, he served as the U.S. ambassador and plenipotentiary to the Republic of Korea. He previously held positions in the Department of Defense, including as chief of staff to Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. He graduated from Stanford University with a B.A. in Political Science and holds an M.A. in International Policy Studies from the same institution.

Curtis "Mike" Scaparrotti



General (Retired) Curtis "Mike" Scaparrotti led a distinguished, 41-year career in the U.S. Army, and most recently served as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Commander of U.S. European Command. Prior to this, he served as the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea/United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command. GEN(R) Scaparrotti graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, and his education includes the Command and General Staff College, the U.S. Army War College, and a Master's degree in Administrative Education from the University of South Carolina.

Suzanne Vares-Lum



Major General (Retired) Suzanne Vares-Lum served 34 years in the U.S. Army and is President of the East-West Center. She is an influential executive with leadership and planning experience spanning the Indo-Pacific region, violent extremist organizations, and natural disasters. She most recently served for five years as one of the most senior leaders in U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and now serves as a strategic consultant and advisor. Vares-Lum received a B.A. in Journalism and an M.Ed. in Teaching from the University of Hawaii at Manoa, and a Master's degree in Strategid Studies from the U.S. Army War College.

Major General Mark Gillette, Honorary Member

Mark Gillette is a U.S. Army major general and the Senior Army Foreign Area Officer. He has extensive experience from various political-military assignments throughout Asia. MG Gillette holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the U.S. Military Academy, a Master of Social Science from Syracuse University, and a Master of Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College. He is currently assigned as the U.S. Senior Defense Official and Defense Attaché in Cairo, Egypt.

MG Gillette advised and supported the initiatives of the co-founders of the FAOA Korea Chapter—both leading up to the organization's establishment and during its formative period. He continues to play an active role in the events and activities of the FAOA Korea Chapter today and is a key advocate for the development of its membership. In recognition of his significant contribution toward accomplishing the mission of the FAOA Korea Chapter, MG Gillette was presented Honorary Membership on July 23, 2020.



Board Members



Wei C. Chou, *President*

Wei C. Chou is a U.S. Army Northeast Asia FAO. He holds a Bachelors of Science degree from the United States Military Academy and a Master of Arts degree from the University of Hawaii as an East-West Fellow. After eight years as an airborne and mechanized infantryman, Wei served across a range of FAO capacities in Hawaii, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.

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Chris Hobgood, *Vice President*

Chris Hobgood is a U.S. Army Northeast Asia FAO. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree from Lander University; a Master of Science degree from Webster University; and a Master of Arts degree from Middlebury Institute of International Studies. Chris has over 22 years of service and worked in a variety of FAO assignments by advising senior military and civilian leaders with regional expertise on the Indo Pacific region as a Security Cooperation officer, a political-military officer, and Senior Defense Official / Defense Attaché.

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Rich Naseer, *Treasurer*

Rich Naseer is a Major in the U.S. Army serving as a Northeast Asia FAO. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the United States Military Academy and a Master of Arts in Asian Studies from the University of Hawaii at Manoa.

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Josh Duran, *Secretary*

Josh "Duran" Duran is an active-duty Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the U.S. Naval Academy. After serving eight years as a Naval Intelligence Officer, he has served two additional tours in the Republic of Korea as an FAO.

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Adrian Romero, *Chief of Public Relations*

Adrian Romero is an active duty Warrant Officer in the U.S. Army. He holds an A.A. degree in Applied Science and is currently pursuing an M.B.A. He has over ten years of work experience in the Indo-Pacific region.

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Staff Members

Editor in Chief

Emily Stamp is an Editor at International SOS. She is also a freelance editor and writer, working on projects involving Asian geopolitics, domestic violence awareness and AI creation and characterization. She holds an undergraduate M.A. in Psychology from the University of St. Andrews and an M.A. in International Conflict Studies from King's College London.

Assistant Editor

Gabriela Bernal is a PhD candidate at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul. She is also a freelance writer, with her articles having appeared in various publications. She holds two MAs, one in human rights from Sciences Po Paris and one in international peace and security from King's College London.

Assistant Editor

Apoorva Jayakumar is a Masters student pursuing a Global Economy and Strategy major at Yonsei Graduate School of International Studies. She enjoys reading and writing about Indo-Pacific strategy & policy.

Marketing Coordinator

YoonJeong Choi is a student pursuing a business bachelor's degree at Purdue University in Indiana State. Her interests include IT, HoloLens, environment, space technology, and e-commerce.

Research Intern

Salome Giunashvili is a Master's degree candidate in International Studies from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. She holds a Bachelor's degree in International Relations from Tbilisi State University. Her research interests span across several different areas involving international security, hybrid warfare and alliance politics.

Senior Researcher

Amos Oh is a U.S. Army Strategist with extensive policy and planning experience. He is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and also earned an M.P.A. from the Harvard Kennedy School. He is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations at the University of Southern California.

Associate Researcher

Sean McCauley is an instructor based in South Korea. He is a political science graduate of the University of Alberta with a special focus on international relations; and he has extensive background in political advocacy in Canada.

Associate Graphics Designer & Social Media Assistant

Sara La Cagnina is a Communications Coordinator who graduated with an M.A. in International Tourism from the Università Della Svizzera Italiana. She has extensive experience with digital communication and event coordination.

Research Intern

Hyun Jin (Emmy) Nam is a recent graduate from Yonsei University with a Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies from Yonsei University. She has internship experience in the Internal Political Unit of the US Embassy in the Republic of Korea, and was awarded second place in the ASEAN-Korea Academic Essay Competition.

About the Korea Chapter

The FAOA Korea Chapter was founded in July 2020 in accordance with Article VII of the FAOA Charter. It is a 501(c)19 non-profit organization, consisting primarily of current and former Foreign Area Officers and International Affairs Specialists who advance the Republic of Korea-United States (ROK-U.S.) Alliance through events and activities that promote mentorship, education, research, and connection.


Our Mission

To develop and inspire leaders engaged in the advancement of the ROK-U.S. Alliance.

Our Core Values

- Commitment to Leader Development
- Pursuit of Inspiration

Lines of Effort



CALL FOR ARTICLES

Contribute to the journal of the FAOA Korea Chapter,
The Joint Communiqué,
for the 3rd quarter of 2022.



Deadline for submissions: 20 July, 2022
Contact: editor.faoakc@gmail.com



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