

THE JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ

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and Partners associated with the FAOA Korea Chapter

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Korea Chapter

FOREIGN AREA OFFICER ASSOCIATION



**"Producing the premier leaders of the Republic
of Korea-United States Alliance since 2020"**

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A Farewell from Colonel Dan Hanson

Nearly 30 years on active duty, 24 years overseas, 21 years as a Foreign Area Officer, and 15 years in the Republic of Korea. These are the most important numbers of my career as I approach retirement. By the time most of you read this, I will already have had my retirement ceremony and be on transition leave. As I near the end of my service, I have had the opportunity to begin reflecting on all I have experienced, and have given some thought to the past, present and future of the FAO program and what it means to choose this career path.

If I had not had the good fortune to be selected as a FAO, I have no doubt I would have left active duty decades ago. I was doing well in my basic branch (Military Intelligence) and felt confident that I would have been competitive for key leader assignments and higher-level commands. However, remaining an MI officer just did not excite me. When I first saw Army FAOs in action in 1996 during Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia-Herzegovina, I was awestruck. There was a Russian-speaking Army Major serving as the liaison and unofficial translator to the Russian Brigade (yes, the Russians were assigned under an American 2-star at the time), and another Serbo-Croatian speaking Major serving as the Task Force Eagle Commander's special advisor. They were rock stars – recognized subject matter experts who had irreplaceable skills and knowledge. Nobody else could do what they did. I knew instantly that becoming a FAO was all I wanted to do. When I first came to Korea in 1997, I met several Korea FAOs who reaffirmed this desire exponentially. Finally, by some miracle, I was selected to become a Northeast Asia FAO in 1999 and started my training in 2001. I have never looked back.

I often tell younger FAOs that among the many benefits we receive, the best in my mind is the front-loaded educational training—language, graduate school, travel opportunities, internships, etc.—that comes with a healthy dose of autonomy. As far as I know, no other branch or functional area gets this much handed to them at the beginning. That said, I am very aware that over the past 20 years, the duration and extent of this training period has contracted—and that some even sadly bypass all of this training since they already have a critical second language and graduate degree. Still, many FAOs do get this training, and it is truly a golden opportunity.

The Army then leverages this substantial investment for the remainder of a FAO's career, and the former well-trodden career path of the basic branch is traded for a more ambiguous path



through a variety of interesting, but seemingly disparate assignments, none of which can be considered “key” or required for promotion. Thus, all FAO assignments are critically important for promotion and there are no such things as career-killer jobs.

If you ask any of the FAO Colonels about their career path and what they think are the most important jobs, you will get different answers from each one. The reality is that every FAO will have their own unique career path, and everyone has the potential for promotion if they focus on “blooming where they are planted.”

I mention this just to make the point that FAOs do not need to stress about their assignments with respect to promotion. Instead, the “stress” should be on what the FAO gets out of their assignments. That is, every FAO assignment is an opportunity for new experiences, fresh perspectives on the regional/country problem set, network-building with the leaders and experts in different fields, and for establishing a good reputation in the FAO community. Perhaps nothing is more important than the last point. FAOs will find that their professional and personal reputations are their superpower. This is what opens doors, presents new opportunities, and gives FAOs access to the highest levels and be trusted by senior leaders to provide their insights and expertise.

I do admit, though, that even with stellar reputations, it has become more challenging over the years for FAOs to access and advise senior Army leadership. In my mind, this has less to do with any loss of respect for the value a FAO program than with the Army's evolution from the post-Cold War period, through 9/11 and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Great Power Competition era of today.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 1990s and early 2000s were a time when the Army did not confront a clear global threat. The priority shifted to expanding partnerships and alliances. This meant strengthening relations with old allies and partners and establishing relations with new counterparts around the world. The FAO program was well-suited and positioned to have a starring role in this period. Even on the Korean Peninsula, there was a sense that North Korea would soon collapse and that the ROK would be taking charge of its own defense. As in other regions across the globe, the Korea FAOs of that time were front-and-center in supporting engagements and dialogues to manage the rapid changes unfolding. This was truly a "Golden Age" for the FAO program. So much so that the Army made FAO its own separate functional area to ensure it cultivated and retained this expertise.

This all changed in the years following 9/11. Terrorism became the focus threat and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan demanded a significant manpower commitment. While Allies and Partners never stopped being important, if for nothing else to determine if they were with us or not, the emphasis on developing global military relations became a secondary priority to the needs of the war. As much of the Army was going through its second, third or fourth combat tours, FAOs in DC, COCOM staffs and Embassy assignments stood out as non-deployers. This ultimately resulted in less officers being assessed into the program, reduced in-region training periods, and FAOs on joint and country team assignments eventually being pulled to deploy if they did not volunteer first. Here on the Peninsula, North Korea demonstrated time and again that it was not only not going away but was becoming an ever more serious threat with its ballistic missile and nuclear program. However, unlike the previous Golden Age, FAOs were not in visible, leading roles—if they were present at all. The lack of FAOs in key positions during this period, especially here in Korea, resulted in the impact value of FAOs receding from the minds of many Army senior leaders.

That brings us to today, the era of Great Power Competition. In place of the Soviet Union, and in addition to terrorist groups, the focus threats are China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Clearly more of an emphasis on threats rather than allies and partners. FAOs specializing in China and Russia seem to be in demand and valued wherever they are assigned in the world. Since we don't have Embassies or military commands in Iran or North Korea, and Korea FAOs are not specifically oriented on North Korea, FAOs specializing in these regions/countries appear to be less in demand.

With respect to everywhere else, I will point you to Jonathan Lord's 25 July article in *Breaking Defense*, "Want more capable military partners?"

The reality is that every FAO will have their own unique career path, and everyone has the potential for promotion if they focus on "blooming where they are planted."

Empower and promote Foreign Area Officers" and Ray Powell's LinkedIn comment on this article where he remarks that the "credibility problem faced by US military diplomats begins with the propensity of our own senior officials to discount them."

This is the tough environment FAOs face today. I really do not envy your situation. The global security environment and assumptions that led the Army to increase investment of personnel and resources into the FAO program in the 1990s and 2000s has changed. But, this is not a gloom and doom conclusion, just an acknowledgement that your path will be a little steeper than mine was. I am confident that FAOs still have an important role to play. It will just take more persistent effort and patience to prove this to Army senior leaders who have not had much experience with or need for FAOs as they have come up through multiple combat deployments. As you do the work and face resistance, always remember why you chose to become a FAO: the adventure, being a bridge-builder between militaries, the education, and the opportunity to do some unique assignments around the world. From this firm foundation of "why," cultivate and leverage your reputation superpower to become a recognized subject matter with irreplaceable skills and knowledge. A FAO of today must also have empathy for others, be devoted to selfless service, be the consummate team player, and be committed to building enduring relationships not only with host nation counterparts, but also with U.S. counterparts. Lastly, I would say that it is important to be humble and not feel entitled to a seat at the table. If reputation is a FAO superpower, elitism and entitlement are our kryptonite. FAOs always need to earn their place. I often say, and truly believe, that I will never demand to be included in a meeting or event. Rather, I will aim to prove I am value-added enough to be offered a seat. I wish everyone the best of luck and success in the future. You can do this!

Dan R Hanson

HIGHLIGHTS

The FAOA Korea Chapter held a Coffee & Chat with MG(R) Pyo, Se Woo on 26 July

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On 05 September, the FAOA co-hosted a ROK-Japan-U.S. trilateral seminar on advancing trilateral cooperation.

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The Chapter held our second FAO Social of the year on 06 Oct, bringing together FAOs, partners, academics, media, and more.

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Stay tuned for announcements of exciting new partnerships and opportunities for FAOs

A Message from the President



Dear Members, Partners, and Leaders of the FAOA Korea Chapter,

During a recent meeting, Ambassador Goldberg stated that it was his privilege to be able to engage with the Republic of Korea as a peer. The history of the ROK’s “Miracle on the Han,” and how over the span of a single generation, a war-torn agrarian nation transformed into an economic, cultural, and technological powerhouse, is a familiar narrative to most of us Alliance practitioners. The ROK has skyrocketed into the world’s 10th largest economy, with commanding influence in defense exports, semiconductors, shipbuilding, and more. Anyone that has resided in the ROK for even a short period can clearly see that it is also a vibrant democracy with a highly-educated population and a close-knit social fabric.

How the ROK has managed to grow rapidly before our eyes, and the eyes of our parents and grandparents, has become a topic of conversation among longtime Korea hands that is almost as common as the weather.

So the component of it being a ‘privilege’ to be part of this alliance, at this juncture in the ROK’s history, resonated with me most in the ambassador’s statement.

Though it may not have been his intent, I see this ‘privilege’ in being able to be a partner with this still vibrant and growing nation. As the current ROK administration has made the Alliance a cornerstone of its foreign policy, and we are witnessing the ROK coming to accept its potential for a global impact, we – as members of the Alliance – all have a role to play.

I hope this small statement helps you to realize the potential of your position and the ‘privilege’ we have as operators within the Alliance at such a key point in history. As always, we look forward to your inspired engagement and contributions!

President, FAOA Korea Chapter
Wei C. Chou

A Message from the Editor-In-Chief

Dear Readers,

I would like to introduce the third 2022 issue of *The Joint Communiqué*.

The Indo-Pacific has faced continued upheaval since our last issue. It would be remiss not to mention some key events such as the continuing political crisis in Sri Lanka, the furthered crackdown on dissent by the military junta in Myanmar, that Hong Kong has prosecuted its first teenagers under the National Security Law, the ongoing Chinese Communist Party's National Congress, the recent kindergarten shooting in Thailand, the many lives lost in the football stampede in Indonesia and the severe monsoon season that has affected vast swathes of the region.

Seoul itself experienced some of its most intense flooding and typhoon-related incidents in recent years, while wildfires and hurricanes raged across parts of the U.S.. Watching weather systems move ceaselessly across and through nations is a reminder that not every disaster can be controlled, but the effects can be mitigated and affected communities can be helped.

However, the need for disaster management will never go away and it is most likely only going to increase in the coming years as climate change continues to affect our world. It will be interesting to see how the international community learns from one another and continues to help their allies in disaster prevention, mitigation and recovery.

This issue touches on other regional occurrences, beginning with the effect of China's military escalation in the Indo-Pacific by Dr. Ashton S. Cho. Then Hyun Jin 'Emmy' Nam will discuss the 2022 Ulchi Freedom Shield joint exercises.

Next, Dr. Michael MacArthur Bosack briefly detours from the Indo-Pacific to discuss the useful lessons we can learn from negotiations in the Russia-Ukraine war, before we have our first member spotlight. LCDR Chris Wehner has helpfully introduced his billet and shares his experience as a Personnel Exchange Officer in Korea.

Apoorva Jayakumar will then reflect upon Abe's legacy in the Indo-Pacific. In a final analysis piece Andrew Park has kindly allowed us to republish his piece on the importance of the RIMPAC exercises. The issue will conclude with Jason Halub's review of Michael J. Green's *'Line of Advantage: Japan's Grand Strategy in the Era of Shinzo Abe'*.


I hope you enjoy this issue, and as ever I am grateful for the effort made by our contributors and the FAOA Korea Chapter team. If you are interested in contributing to the final issue of 2022 please get in touch.

With best wishes,



Emily Stamp


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If you are interested in pitching an article or book review for the next issue please email:

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Undermining Geopolitical Ambitions: How China's Military Escalation is Creating Hostility in the Indo-Pacific

by Dr. Ashton S. Cho

In the wake of Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in early August, China conducted a seven-day military drill encircling the self-governed island. Of the six "exclusive zones" demarcated for the military drills, three overlapped with Taiwanese territorial waters and were positioned just across the beaches most "suitable for landing troops." This military escalation was the most threatening set of Chinese military actions Taiwan has seen for some time.

China succeeded in sending a stronger signal of resolve for executing a future embargo and, possibly even, an amphibious assault on Taiwan. What China also succeeded in, intentionally or not, was to undermine the security of neighboring states, embolden regional countries to balance against China over the Taiwan issue, and create a more hostile Indo-Pacific region. This benefits no one, not even China and its ambitions towards Taiwan.

In the U.S., warnings of China's growing military capacity and political will to use force against Taiwan were based on hypothetical war simulations, extrapolated military assessments, and actively debated political analyses. However, with China utilizing more than 200 military aircrafts and 50 warships, the August military drills left little to the imagination and even less room for U.S. leaders who may have dismissed previous warnings as alarmist.

Just a month after the drill, on September 15th, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed the Taiwan Policy Act with bipartisan support. The Act promises to enhance U.S. military support for Taiwan, potentially paving the way for the U.S. to defend Taiwan in the event of a military attack. While the bill must still pass the Senate and the House of Representatives, public support in the U.S. for Taiwan has reached an all-time high this year at 60%. The steep rise in support from around 50% a decade ago, parallels the equally steep rise in China's military assertiveness under President Xi Jinping. If the past is any indication of the future, China's continued military threats and escalations will only provide stronger domestic support for the U.S. to aid Taiwan in its defense against China.

The last time Chinese military threats escalated to such a height was in 1996 during the Third Taiwan Strait crisis. While only a few western think tanks and media outlets are calling this year's escalation the 'Fourth' Taiwan strait crisis, the severity of this year's escalation surpasses what we saw in late July of 1996. While former President Jiang Zemin's China fired six ballistic missiles in the space of six days, Xi's China fired a total of eleven ballistic missiles in the space of only a few hours.

The acuteness of China's military escalation was compounded by the fact that, for the first time, Chinese ballistic missiles fell into the Japanese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Although the region had seen North Korean missile provocations causing as many as two ballistic missiles to fall into the Japanese EEZ, this year's Chinese military drills was the first time five missiles were fired into Japan's EEZ, besting North Korea's record.

With the closest Dong Feng-14 missile landing only 80km from Yonaguni, an island described as the "critical defense line for Japan's Self Defense Force," Japan's Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi strongly condemned China's "highly coercive" actions "a grave matter involving Japan's national



Chinese air force pilot conducts combat exercises around Taiwan on August 7
Credit: Wang Xinchao, Xinhua News Agency

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security and the safety of its people.” China’s military escalation over Taiwan thus linked the fate of Taiwan’s national security with that of Japan’s. It will be, in part, China’s own doing that a future military conflict over Taiwan would most likely involve a better domestically supported U.S. and one of its staunchest treaty allies – Japan.

South Korea

On the other hand, South Korea appears to be going to great lengths to remain silent about the issues surrounding Taiwan. This was most conspicuous when President Yoon Suk-yeol became the only state leader not to meet with Pelosi during her Asia trip. But if China continues to prefer using military might over responsible diplomacy, South Korea will have little choice but to protect its own national security interests and aid its blood-forged ally, the U.S., playing a more responsible role in the tensions surrounding Taiwan.

Many have pointed to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) incursions of the Taiwanese Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) as signs of China’s military escalation. Less has been aired about the PLAAF’s violation of South Korea’s own ADIZ (KADIZ), which are becoming both increasingly intrusive and frequent. Between 2006 and 2010, China’s KADIZ violations ranged from two to ten times a year. In 2013, this number quadrupled to 40 times. In recent years, the annual incursions have reached over 100. While these numbers still pale in comparison to Taiwan’s, the fundamental security problem is a common and an increasingly pertinent one for South Korea.

“it will thus also be China who is responsible for the stronger collective resistance it will have to face”

In the seas, South Korea has also been facing increasing security threats from China. Illegal Chinese fishing, which briefly subsided during the height of COVID-19, has in the past resulted in altercations between fishing boats and coast guards, leading to tragic fatalities on both sides. South Korea has also been facing increasing Chinese maritime assertion through increased Chinese surveillance ship and aircraft patrol activity around the loedo Reef and Socotra Rock, both of which fall under South Korean jurisdiction. With the recent installation of Chinese buoys around Baengnyeongdo, it does not take much to recognize that South Korea is also threatened by well-known Chinese gray zone tactics, as used in the South China Sea, and China’s increasing disregard for the free and open passage of the seas.

More directly, the Chinese military is already thinking and preparing for how South Korea will affect Chinese forces in the event of a conflict over Taiwan. Overlapping with and



Tourists look on as a Chinese military helicopter flies past Pingtan island, one of mainland China’s closest points from Taiwan, in Fujian province. Credit: AFP

continuing after the blockade-like military drills around Taiwan, China carried out military drills in the Bohai Sea and the West Sea (or Yellow Sea) that separates China and the Korean peninsula. The latter part of the military exercises were held off of Lianyungang, situated across from South Korea. The exercises appeared to serve the broader purpose of staving off the U.S.' presence in the Yellow Sea just before the annual ROK-U.S. combined military exercises. But closer assessments also suggest that China is already rehearsing how to move its major forces, including the Chinese fleet, to the Taiwan strait, anticipating possible reactions by the U.S. and South Korean forces.

The South Korean government has continuously chosen not to link increasing Chinese military assertiveness into their broader Chinese foreign policy. But the tide of South Korean domestic opinion has already turned with anti-Chinese sentiments reaching 80% in 2022, more than doubling since 2002's recording of 31%. The intensification of continued Chinese disregard for a rules-based regional order and its propensity to choose military escalation will be difficult for the South Korean government to ignore indefinitely.

“*With advanced military power, military aggression and escalation will continue to be an increasingly tempting option for China.*”

Concluding

China's military of today is much more formidable than it has been in the past. The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command assesses that Chinese anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities are now, if not very soon, dominant in the First Island Chain, which runs from the Kuril Islands towards Borneo. With advanced military power, military aggression and escalation will continue to be an increasingly tempting option for China.

However, Beijing should recognize that military escalation as a show of strength and signal of resolve comes at the cost of pushing affected states into countervailing alignments and alliances that will balance China. Also, when there is a greater frequency and density of Chinese military activities in both the air and the seas, the chances of unintended conflict through escalation becomes that much greater.

When military escalation results in accidental altercations between the PLAAF and scrambling aircrafts, China's military fleet and patrol boats, or stray ballistic missiles, the damage these accidents will do – both to property and lives lost tragically – will almost certainly cause domestic uproar for all sides. This was evidenced in the 2001 EP-3 crisis when a U.S. Navy EP-3 surveillance plane collided with a Chinese J-8 fighter jet, resulting in the death of the Chinese pilot and the detainment of 24 members of the EP-3 crew. It took a great deal of diplomatic effort for U.S. and China to diffuse the accident-turned-crisis.

China's August military drills have affected more states in the region than before. The next accident could happen between any set of countries - China and Taiwan, or the U.S., Japan, or South Korea. Given the already heightened military tensions, there is less guarantee that the next accident will be successfully diffused, as China's escalations are paving multiple paths to regional conflict.

All regional parties have a responsibility to avoid an escalated outcome where nobody gains and everybody loses. There has been a lot of debate – and plenty of criticism – within the U.S. about the timing and value of Speaker Nancy Pelosi's Taiwan visit. But the responsibility of sharply escalating tensions falls squarely on China: it was Beijing's decision to respond to the U.S.' uncoordinated political signal with a centralized military threat that undermined the security of multiple states in the region. Ironically, it will thus also be China who is responsible for the stronger collective resistance it will have to face over future tensions surrounding Taiwan.

Dr. Ashton S. Cho is currently the Director of International Security Cooperation at the Korea Association of Military Studies and a lecturer at Sunkyunkwan University. His research activities lie at the intersection of U.S. and Korean academia, military studies and policy analysis with a particular focus on U.S.-China relations and the ROK-U.S. Alliance. Previously, Dr. Cho was a Postdoctoral Fellow at Stanford University Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and an Advanced Research Scholar at Peking University's School of International Studies. Dr. Cho graduated from the London School of Economics (BSc, MSc) and received his graduate education at Columbia University (MPhil, Ph.D.).

"Talking while fighting": Lessons on wartime negotiations from the Russia-Ukraine War

By Dr. Michael MacArthur Bosack

Russia's invasion of Ukraine began on 24 February 2022, but it was only four days

later that delegates from the warring parties met in Belarus for the first round of face-to-face ceasefire negotiations. This engagement continued through three more in-person meetings before switching to a daily video-conference format and culminating with the "Istanbul round" of talks on 29 March. Although political-level ceasefire talks have stalled, the negotiating process is far from dead. On the contrary, there have been dozens of negotiations at various levels dealing with myriad issues and actors.

These negotiations offer important lessons for diplomats, political-military strategists, and other practitioners across the globe. The successes and failures of "talking while fighting" in the Russia-Ukraine War elucidate the role of negotiating during hostilities, while also illustrating the mechanics and limitations of dialogue among the various players tied to conflict.

These lessons, however, are not seen positively by all sides. Despite the many successful negotiations, the usefulness of such engagement for Ukraine has been debated.

Some argue that negotiations allow the aggressor to pause and regroup for another offensive. Others contend that the willingness to enter negotiations signals appeasement and entices Russia to demand more.

Those arguments ignore the fact that negotiation has indeed proven useful in many ways. While there is still no "zone of possible agreement" to reach the terms needed to cease hostilities, the two sides have achieved much through dialogue, and, as President Volodymyr Zelensky himself stated, "any war should be ended at the negotiating table."

Given that there have been gains thanks to "talking while fighting," it behooves practitioners to examine what lessons may be gleaned from the on-going Russia-Ukraine War, especially in places where similar conflicts could break out.

The characteristics of the Russia-Ukraine War

There is always risk in making comparisons in international relations. There is no "one size fits all" situation, and thus, it can be easy to draw conclusions that, while true for the circumstances in one area of the world, simply cannot be applied to another. To mitigate this risk, it is necessary to break down the circumstances in the Russia-Ukraine War to determine its structural components and key traits, which will in turn inform practitioners and other observers on which situations may be similar enough to apply lessons learned.

When looking at the Russia-Ukraine War, there are two key points. First, Russia's war of aggression represents a rare instance of an *interstate* war; that is, a war between countries, or, more specifically, between recognized member states of the United Nations.



The negotiating room, as prepared by Belarusian officials for the initial round of negotiations on 28 February 2022
Credit: Belarus MFA

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Second, it is a war in which a nuclear-armed actor is directly involved.

This means that lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War make more sense for places where those circumstances could also be true. In other words, what we learn from Ukraine and Russia will prove more salient for countries that might find themselves engaged in an interstate war rather than those that could perhaps be extrapolated from the extrastate conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan or intrastate wars (e.g., South Sudan) with which many military practitioners are more familiar.

Recapping Russia and Ukraine's wartime negotiations

Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine began, there have been three categories of negotiations thus far: (1) negotiation between the warring parties; (2) negotiations between the individual warring parties and other countries; and (3) negotiations among members of the international community. These have all had overlapping effects throughout the six-plus months of warfare so far.

Negotiations between Ukraine and Russia have tackled several issue areas. Government and military officials have engaged in face-to-face negotiations and via video-teleconference to negotiate ceasefire provisions, withdrawal of Russian forces, prisoner exchanges, humanitarian corridors, and security guarantees.

Those negotiations have not been without difficulties. Russia's aim to achieve a fait accompli of de facto annexation of occupied territories through pseudo-referenda violates an indispensable interest for the Ukrainian government. Further, the revelation of Russia's atrocities in liberated areas of Ukraine created a political barrier to direct, bilateral engagement.

This has required the warring parties to negotiate via mediation by international organizations, such as the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross, and shuttle diplomacy by countries including Türkiye and Saudi Arabia.

While it is easy to focus on what those negotiations have failed to produce, they have succeeded in other meaningful ways. During the Istanbul round of talks on 29 March, the two sides agreed on Russia's withdrawal from Kyiv Oblast (province). Through other negotiations, Ukrainian and Russian negotiators have secured the establishment of humanitarian corridors for evacuation of civilians and delivery of aid, as well as prisoner exchanges. At the time of writing, these negotiations have produced fourteen prisoner exchanges and enabled the evacuation of over 400,000 non-combatants.

Meanwhile, negotiations between Ukraine and its foreign partners have run the gamut from provision of tactical level military support to measures requiring legislative action. The deliberated topics have included security guarantees, accession to the European Union, sanctions against Russia, weapons delivery to Ukraine, loans and other financial assistance, potential enforcement of a No Fly Zone, and unblocking of Ukrainian ports to allow for grain exports.

These negotiations have proven largely successful for Ukraine, facilitating the provision of weapons and aid that have ensured the sustainability of Ukrainian forces, while also advancing the formalization of Ukraine's alignment with the European Union and NATO partners. Concretely, engagement with foreign partners has enabled the delivery in billions of dollars of weapon systems such as HIMARS,

the expedited accession to EU candidate status, and the establishment of legal pathways for liquidating seized Russian assets to use in Ukraine's postwar reconstruction.

*Ultimately, the
Russia-Ukraine
War will
conclude with
negotiations.*

Negotiations between Russia and members of the international community have focused mainly on ending the war and gaining humanitarian concessions. In particular, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and French President Emmanuel Macron have engaged Vladimir Putin several times in the past few months, but they have had less success than other would-be mediators. The United Nations and Türkiye have achieved much more in their direct engagements with Russian officials, including the opening up of humanitarian corridors from the besieged city of Mariupol, facilitation of bilateral dialogue between Ukraine and Russia, mediating prisoner exchanges, and enabling Ukrainian grain exports to mitigate a global food security crisis. These efforts culminated with delegates from Russia, Ukraine, Türkiye, and the United Nations signing and implementing the "Black Sea Grain Initiative" in late July. The United Nations and other international organizations have now set their sights on creating a demilitarized zone at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant to prevent a disaster at Europe's largest nuclear facility.

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Finally, negotiations among members of the international community have tackled the issues of United Nations resolutions, weapons delivery to Ukraine, sanctions against Russia, financial aid, security guarantees, acceptable levels of international military intervention, and measures to ensure food security.

Lessons for Practitioners

All these negotiations that have taken place yield several lessons, but there are three that are particularly important.

First, it is necessary to recognize that negotiating is a central component of the war effort. It is easy for militaries and governments to focus on the material and operational aspects of fighting, and even easier to succumb to the political sentiment that the mere act of negotiating is tantamount to appeasement or surrender.

Practitioners should realize that in war, negotiation is fighting by other means. Instead of using combat power to achieve key objectives and secure one's interests, negotiators use engagement and dialogue. Sometimes, this is supplemental; for example, a negotiated agreement contributed to Russia's withdrawal from Kyiv. Other times, it is essential; Ukraine would not have been able to secure the opening of humanitarian corridors through use of military force alone—dialogue was necessary to codify the areas and establish the provisions for the temporary ceasefires that enabled non-combatant evacuations. In short, there is much to be gained by employing the negotiating table and more to be lost if one refuses to approach it.

Second, policymakers must understand and adapt to the various types of negotiations that occur during war. There are negotiations

between belligerents that happen at both the military-to-military and political levels. There are negotiations with foreign partners to garner various forms of support in the conflict. Then there are the negotiations that occur among the international community vis-à-vis a particular crisis or war.

Each type may be different in their format, functions, and objectives, but all are important.

Finally, given the importance of negotiations and the breadth of discussions, it is critical to have the means, personnel, and preparation to handle those responsibilities.

Put another way, it is advisable to have an established venue and/or line-of-communication, a team that is capable of handling negotiations, and a clear understanding of interests, constraints, and restraints in a potential crisis or conflict. Sometimes, those things are already established, so the answer is merely to ensure that they are effectively postured to respond to escalating crises or conflict. In other cases, governments and militaries must work towards instituting appropriate measures. In either case, it is far better to have a plan for negotiation and dialogue in place before a war begins, rather than trying to figure those things out once the shooting has started.

Ultimately, the Russia-Ukraine War will conclude with negotiations. While those talks will yield even more lessons for practitioners seeking to understand the peace process and how wars end, the conflict has already given us invaluable insight into the role of negotiation in modern interstate conflict. While the hope is that engagement can prevent an outbreak of hostilities, we have clear evidence that the role of dialogue does not end when wars begin.

“it is advisable to have an established venue and/or line-of-communication, a team that is capable of handling negotiations, and a clear understanding of interests, constraints, and restraints in a potential crisis or conflict.”

Michael MacArthur Bosack is International Relations Advisor at United Nations Command and the founder of the Parley Policy Initiative, a nonpartisan project focused on negotiation, crisis management, peacemaking, and postwar policy. He previously served as a Foreign Area Officer in the U.S. Air Force specializing in Northeast Asian affairs.

Ulchi Freedom Shield

The Revival of Joint Military Exercises

By *Hyun Jin 'Emmy' Nam*

Amidst the unprecedented number of nuclear missile tests launched by North Korea in 2022, the recently inaugurated Yoon Suk-Yeol administration conducted the largest ROK-U.S. joint military exercise in the past four years, the Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS).

Beginning on 22nd August and ending on 1st September, the exercise consisted of computer simulations, field training and civil defense drills. Named after the Ulchi Freedom Guardian drills held up until 2017, the resumption of large-scale joint military drills signifies an anticipated shift in the two nations' nuclear deterrence strategy, one that deviates from previous attempts at nuclear diplomacy and accentuates the well-established ROK-U.S. military alliance.

Exercises like UFS are one of the many requirements that South Korea must satisfy for the U.S. to relinquish its wartime authority to the South Korean military. As a precondition for the ratification of the 1954 U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, operational control (OPCON) over South Korea's military was maintained by the United Nations Command and then subsequently transferred to the Combined Forces Command (CFC) in 1978.



CFC, USFK, UNC, and subordinate component commands under CFC, along with augmentees, civilian personnel and representatives of the UN sending states, began the Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise Monday, August 22, 2022.

Credit: Ministry of Defense

South Korea withdrew OPCON from the CFC during peacetime conditions in 1994. However, wartime OPCON remains with the CFC, whose commander is responsible to binational authorities. Thus, both the ROK and U.S. militaries would be controlled and led by CFC's four star Commander, General Paul J. LaCamera, and four-star Deputy Commander, General Ahn Byung-Seok, in the event of a North Korean attack. The alliance has agreed to reverse the nationalities of these positions as part of OPCON transition.

Although discussions to transfer wartime OPCON to South Korea began in 2005 and was initially agreed to be completed in 2012 during former President Lee Myung-bak's administration, North Korea's developing nuclear program and its provocations indefinitely delayed the transition's implementation. Instead, in 2014, the two countries agreed to transfer wartime OPCON when South Korea met the following conditions: the military acquisition of key capabilities, the ability to counter North Korea's threat of nuclear weapons and missiles, and a secure environment around the Korean Peninsula.

Despite South Korea's efforts to meet these conditions, joint military exercises were particularly scaled back during President Trump and President Moon's administrations (2017-2021 and 2017-2022 respectively) to advance strategies of nuclear diplomacy and accommodate public safety during the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic. However, due to the continued escalation of North Korea's nuclear weapons testing, combined with the diplomatic failure of the 2018 Singapore Summit, the resumption of large-scale military exercises signifies the alliance's shift towards strengthening South Korea's defense position and emergency preparedness for a North Korean attack. This is particularly demonstrated by the "all-out war" concept employed during this year's UFS exercise; the first part focused on drills repelling North Korean attacks and comprehensively defending the Seoul area, while the second part focused on counterattack operations. In addition, the UFS exercise reflects South Korean efforts to enhance wartime OPCON capabilities as the first joint military exercise led by a South Korean deputy commander.

Denouncing the joint exercise as a "rehearsal for invasion", North Korea resorted to firing two cruise missiles from South Pyongan Province toward the western sea on August 11, a day after the U.S. and South Korea began the four-day preliminary military drills.

“UFS also serves as a reminder to North Korea that a significant military counter-threat exists and aberrant behavior will not continue to go unaddressed.”

Although North Korea’s active condemnation was expected, scholars and South Korean citizens have exhibited mixed reactions to the revival of large-scale exercises. While some scholars consider the UFS a necessary measure to strengthen South Korea’s military defense against real nuclear threats, others have criticized the depiction of Pyongyang as the enemy in the real-life simulations as being overt provocation.

Additionally, many South Korean citizens have also expressed concern, regarding the exercise as provocative and confrontational. Members of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions and Federation of Korea Trade Unions took to the streets of Seoul, calling for peaceful ways to resolve inter-Korean tensions and voicing that those who will suffer the most from an outbreak of war are South Korean workers and laborers.

The UN Panel of Experts reported that as of August 2022 North Korea already tested 31 missiles (breaking its record of 25 in the entirety of 2019). Incited by the collapse of nuclear diplomacy and North Korea’s continuous disregard of international laws, it appears that the alliance is shifting away from dialogue and embracing a more confrontational stance. While critics may assess the UFS exercise as encouraging North Korea to continue nuclear testing, the UFS also serves as a reminder to North Korea that a significant military counter-threat exists and aberrant behavior will not continue to go unaddressed. Although the full political ramifications of the joint military exercise are still unclear, President Yoon’s conservative policies of reinforcing military ties with South Korea’s oldest ally symbolizes the end of the period of appeasement.

Hyun Jin (Emmy) Nam is a recent graduate from Yonsei University with a Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies from Yonsei University. She has internship experience in the Internal Political Unit of the US Embassy in the Republic of Korea, and was awarded second place in the ASEAN-Korea Academic Essay Competition.



South Korean and U.S. soldiers participate in an anti-terrorism drill at a stadium in Busan on 29 August, as part of the Ulchi Freedom Shield drill. Credit: Yonhap

The FAOA Korea Chapter Spotlight: LCDR Chris Wehner

PERSONNEL EXCHANGE OFFICER (PEP) - KOREA

BILLET BACKGROUND:

U.S. Naval Officers selected for the exchange officer program have the billet title of Personnel Exchange Program Officer Korea (PEP-K). The program was initiated between the U.S. and the ROK through a Memorandum of Understanding on the Exchange of Naval Academy Instructors Between the ROK Navy and the U.S. Navy during the Ninth US-ROK Navy Staff Talks on 31 October – 01 November 1990. PEP-K Officers perform their duties as exchange instructors at the ROK Naval Academy located in Jinhae, South Korea.

JOB:

The PEP-K billet is officially identified as an English language and culture instructor position. Functionally, the billet is an English professor position at the ROK Naval Academy, with daily responsibilities including English instruction to Naval Academy Midshipmen at the intermediate and advanced language levels. The Naval Academy's English Department Head acts as the PEP-K local manager. The immediate superior in command to the PEP-K is the U.S. Pacific Fleet N1B. Additionally, the PEP-K acts as a central point of coordination for training evolutions between the Naval Academy and U.S. Navy components. During the summer training season the PEP-K supports the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Korea COMBINED EDGE exchange program. The PEP-K also supports semester or four-year exchanges from the ROK Naval Academy and the U.S. Naval Academy by aiding SAT registration, conducting suitability interviews, coordinating with the U.S. Naval Academy International Programs Office and arranging for an interview between exchange candidates and the U.S. Naval Attaché to Korea

Outside the classroom, responsibilities include the arrangement of community relations (COMREL) events between the ROK Naval Academy and U.S. Navy personnel on the Korean peninsula. Prior to assumption of the responsibilities as PEP-K, Korean language training is required at the U.S. Defense Language Institute, or an equivalent course of training, typically 17 months in length.

BEST ASPECTS AND CHALLENGES:

The best aspect of being an exchange officer to the ROK Naval Academy is the professional network of relationships that officers get to build. The unique nature of being one of the only U.S. officers embedded on the ROK Jinhae Navy Base allows exchange officers to develop their use of the Korean language through immersion as well as the opportunity to obtain a better understanding of the culture and perspective of the Korean Navy. This same aspect also comes with challenges, such as finding ways to remain connected with the U.S. side. That can be done through the CFAC and CNFK wardrooms, or through the FAO community on the Peninsula. Being embedded also creates the possibility of culture shock and often officers need to adapt to cultural differences. For these reasons, officers who are interested in becoming exchange officers are encouraged to develop their foreign language proficiency and to study local history and culture in depth. Exchange officers offer the U.S. and ROK a crucial asset in facilitating more efficient interoperability through the use of those skills. The personnel exchange program is rewarding because of the freedom to pursue professional goals, as well as to contribute to the maintenance of the ROK-U.S. alliance.

The Political Legacy of Shinzo Abe

By Apoorva Jayakumar

Shinzo Abe has often been regarded as the most influential person in Japanese post-war politics. He was the prime minister from 2006 to 2007, when he resigned due to illness, and again from 2012 until 2020 when he stood down,

claiming a relapse of the illness that had cut short his previous tenure. Abe's ministerial terms were defined domestically by his innovative economic policy, dubbed "Abenomics," which included fundamental economic changes combined with monetary stimulus benefits to boost lending and investment. He also pursued progressive international goals as a promoter of international rules, a guardian of the global commons and an effective U.S. ally.

Throughout his political career, as a member of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), he was a well known right-wing conservative – which won him both supporters and detractors. Since his resignation, Abe had remained a powerful member of the LDP, returning to the leadership of its biggest faction, the right-wing *Seiwa Seisaku Kenkyu-kai*. He was also an important member of *Nippon Kaigi*, a right-wing lobbying organization founded in 1997.

Following his assassination on 8th July, he will be remembered as a leader who worked tirelessly to change Japanese politics, both domestically and on the international stage. Abe wanted to increase Japan's worldwide influence while simultaneously advocating the

so-called "Abe doctrine."

Numerous LDP senior officials sought the same goals for years – including Prime Ministers Yasuhiro Nakasone (1982-1987), Ryutaro Hashimoto (1996-1998) and Junichiro Koizumi (2001-2006) – and much of what Abe advocated for remains in the LDP manifesto.

Abe accomplished his goals by fortifying relationships with Japan's western allies via several treaties, notably the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2016 (with Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam), the Japan-EU trade agreement in 2019, the Japan-UK trade agreement in 2020, and the formation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad): Australia, India, Japan, and the United States.

Domestically, his pledge to "Take Back Japan" focused on rebuilding the local areas damaged by the Great East Japan Earthquake and nuclear disasters in 2011, revitalizing the economy, reestablishing diplomacy based on a strong partnership between Japan and the U.S., and reviving education that supports Japan's customs and history. This resonated with many Japanese citizens, and Abe was known to tap into nationalist sentiments to bolster his popularity and solidify his authority.

Abe also strengthened ties with the U.S., a treaty partner of Japan since 1951, including meeting with former U.S. President Donald Trump shortly after he took office in 2017. The former U.S.

President Barack Obama's trip to Hiroshima in May 2016 and Abe's reciprocal trip to Pearl Harbor in December 2016 should also be remembered as a major accomplishment in the history of the U.S.-Japan relations. In his speech to a joint session of the U.S. Congress in April 2015, he also expressed "repentance" for all the U.S. soldiers who lost their lives in the Pacific War.

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida expressing the memorial address at the State Funeral of Shinzo Abe 27 September 2022
Credit: Prime Minister's Office of Japan



Regionally, Abe supported free international use of the Indo-Pacific and he sought to strengthen relationships with other regional states. Prior to going to Washington in 2013, Abe and former Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio embarked on a whirlwind diplomatic tour across the Asia-Pacific region. Abe visited Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia, with Kishida visiting the Philippines, Singapore, Brunei and Australia. Strengthening ties with the Philippines is of particular importance, as both nations have territorial and maritime disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea.

But, perhaps Abe's most significant contribution is linguistic – the coining of the simple phrase "a free and open Indo-Pacific." This, according to many, is vital to the security of the greater Asia area. Abe initially advocated the idea in the 2007 address to the Indian Parliament under the title 'Confluence of the Two Seas,' as a way for the world to understand Asia. At a keynote address in Kenya in 2016, Abe first presented his more concrete ideas for a "free and open Indo-Pacific," according to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Abe's use of this phrase changed the way many foreign policy officials worldwide think and speak about Asia. 'Indo-pacific' has become the common phrase amongst many diplomats for the region, much to the displeasure of Chinese authorities.

Some Chinese academics claim that the U.S.' Indo-Pacific policy is an early attempt to unite the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, restrain China's ascent from a geopolitical standpoint, and protect its own leadership and interests in the area. Prior to this, Washington preferred to envision Asia as the vast region of the world extending from Australia to China to the U.S., using the term 'Asia-Pacific.' This idea, and normative phrase, placed China at the center of power, and legitimized Beijing's increasing regional influence. However, Abe and Japan were concerned with the power their neighbor could exert over Japan. Therefore this linguistic change was imperative to Japan's best interests, by reducing the power and influence that came from China being the focal center of Asia.

This re-examination of Asia's borders accomplished two key goals. First, it neatly shifted the geographic center of Asia to Southeast Asia and the South China Sea, focusing the world's conception of Asia on a region where Beijing has territorial and maritime disputes with multiple states. Second, and probably more significantly, it highlighted India as one of the only nations in the world large enough, both physically and otherwise, to serve as a counterbalance to China, through military force.

The initial manifestation of the Quad halted cooperation in 2008 as a result of Beijing's hostile threats of economic retaliation. However, Abe played his diplomatic cards well. His vision was supported by three pillars: the pursuit of economic prosperity; a dedication to peace and stability; and the promotion and establishment of the rule of law, freedom of navigation, and free trade. These pillars also served as "a counterweight to Beijing's increasingly China-centric vision of Asia's future, while promoting openness and values to attract regional hedgers," according to Hemmings of the East-West Center, which is also apparent through Abe's 'Indo-Pacific' framing of Asia.

Perhaps Abe's most significant contribution is linguistic – the ... simple phrase "a free and open Indo-Pacific"

The Quad was revived in 2009 and, by 2017, the U.S., during the Trump administration, had unveiled its own vision for a "free and open Indo-Pacific". Abe's vision had begun to flourish into reality.

The Quad had also significantly grown by the time of Abe's passing. The leaders of Quad member nations paid tribute to the group's founder through a joint statement and expressed intention to carry forward his vision and work. The state funeral for Shinzo Abe took place on September 27, 2022, with many attendees from allied nations including U.S. Vice-President Kamala Harris, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, South Korean Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, Vietnamese President Nguyen Xuan Phuc, and British Foreign Secretary James Cleverly. Expressing shock at the Abe's sudden assassination, the Quad leaders stated he wasn't just "a transformative leader for Japan" but also "for Japanese relations with each one of our countries," hailing his "formative role" in the creation of their group and advancing the "shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific."

For many years, Japan generally followed the rules in the global economy, frequently adopting a defensive stance in trade and infrequently taking risks to support new rules and norms. Abe transformed all of that through his work on treaty agreements and regional and allied relationships, skillful leadership, and changing of the narratives surrounding Asia. This was during a crucial time in the international sphere when the global economic system was under pressure and the U.S. was retreating from its historic role as the creator, and upholder, of these rules. His legacy will endure well beyond his untimely demise.

Apoorva Jayakumar is a Masters student pursuing a Global Economy and Strategy major at Yonsei Graduate School of International Studies. She enjoys reading and writing about Indo-Pacific strategy & policy.

RIMPAC: The Navy's Real Impact in the International Arena

By Andrew Park

Despite recent budgetary hiccups and attacks, the Navy has prevailed once again by proving its crucial importance in the era of great power competition by successfully conducting the world's largest military exercise, the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC). With participation by military forces of 'like-minded' nations from not only the Indo-Pacific but also Europe, Middle East, and North and South America, the biannual exercise is a platform through which the Navy leads other service branches and several dozen nations to enhance interoperability among participating armed forces, as a means of promoting stability in the region to the benefit of all participants. While the exercise has served well since 1971 as an important tool for the U.S. government to demonstrate its commitment towards the region, the Navy demonstrated several important masteries through this year's RIMPAC: 1) coalition building; 2) capability testing; 3) interoperability & interchangeability.

Coalition Building

The Indo-Pacific theater is predominantly a maritime domain that covers 52 percent of the Earth's surface, from North Pole to South Pole, and from Hollywood to Bollywood. In such a geographically expansive area of responsibility lies the most contested geopolitical hotspots, including the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, and East China Sea. As China's recent North Korea-style missile provocation in response to Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan demonstrates, China continues to pursue expansionist and revisionist policies that jeopardize the national security interests of not only the United States but also that of numerous allies and partner nations.

Accordingly, the Navy must be commended for hosting 26 like-minded nations that abide by the rules-based international order. In total, 38 surface ships, 4 submarines, 9 national land forces, 30+ unmanned systems, approximately 170 aircraft, and more than 25,000 personnel came together under the leadership of the U.S. Navy – against the backdrop of increasing threat from China. Among these nations, many have suffered from territorial and economic infringement perpetrated by China. Considering that the previous exercise in 2020 was downscaled to one-third of its usual size due to

the pandemic, the Navy's commitment and ability to bring the exercise back to full strength makes this year's RIMPAC more impactful.

Although RIMPAC is not oriented against any particular nation-state or situation, it is intended to "demonstrate the solidarity of all of its participants to the international rules-based order and the principles of sovereignty, of freedom of the seas, and of the United Nations Convention of the Law of Sea, and against what otherwise would be expansionist activities on states that would revise that agreed-upon international rules-based order." Hence, the U.S. Navy's investment of enormous time and resources to practice and engage with allies and partners sends a clear message to an 'unspecified actor,' as the Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Paparo stated.

Capability Testing

During the exercise, the Navy tested the hybrid manned-unmanned team concept that is critical to the future of naval technology. As the Navy hopes to test the ability of unmanned surface vehicles (USV) to augment manned vessels with additional sensing or weapons capabilities, the new command for USV, USV Division (USVDIV) One, dispatched four USVs to RIMPAC. Among the four, *Sea Hunter* and *Seahawk* were controlled by crews embarked aboard their respective destroyers, whereas *Nomad* and *Ranger* were controlled by crews at an operations center in San Diego. Although the Navy is still collecting and analyzing data from the USVs' operations, RIMPAC served as a valuable testing ground for the future concept of operations, which envisions one manned surface vehicle controlling multiple USVs. Not everything went in accordance with the plan, however, as one of the 'synced' destroyers had to drop out of the exercise for an unspecified reason. Ironically, this unexpected opportunity allowed the crews to test seamless transfer of the USV control from the destroyer to the shore-based operations center in San Diego.

The Navy is not the only one that benefited from testing unmanned systems during the exercise.

ANALYSIS

The U.S. Air Force's MQ-9A Reaper crews received the opportunity to learn how their system communicates with naval assets and operates in the maritime domain.

The most anticipated parts of the exercise, however, were the two live fire sinking exercises (SINKEX). As rare as it is for the U.S. military to conduct SINKEX, it is rarer for foreign forces to have the opportunity to test their own capabilities on a recently decommissioned warship. The first offering was the frigate USS Rodney M. Davis. USN F/A-18EA Super Hornets and USMC F-35C Lightning II fighters dropped paveway laser-guided bombs alongside ship-based anti-ship missile fire from Canadian Navy Halifax-class frigate HMCS Winnipeg as well as Royal Malaysian Navy Kasturi-class frigate KD Lekir. This was significant as it was the first time that the Royal Malaysian Navy fired outside of their territorial waters. USN maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft P-8 Poseidon also had a unique opportunity to be equipped with and launch an anti-ship Harpoon missile, providing a valuable data point to test its ability to conduct high-end missions, instead of just dropping sonobuoys. Surprisingly, even after being struck by these formidable weapon systems, the decommissioned warship remained afloat for a considerable amount of time. This draws a stark difference from the sinking of Moskva – even in the absence of trained crews to control damage, thanks to the absence of combustibles and sealed compartments.

The second SINKEX was conducted on a decommissioned Austin-class amphibious transporter dock USS Denver, providing an opportunity for U.S. and Japanese military to test multi-domain capabilities. From land, the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force fired Type 12 anti-ship missiles and U.S. Army launched guided rockets from a High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems.

From the air, USN F/A-18F Super Hornets of Fighter Squadron 41 shot a long-range anti-ship missile, USMC F/A-18 C/D Hornets of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 232 and Marine Air-Ground Task Force 7 fired cruise missile, air-to-ground anti-radiation missiles, and Joint Direct Attack Munition guided bombs, and U.S. Army's AH-64 Apache helicopters fired air-to-ground Hellfire missiles, rockets, and 30mm guns. From the sea, USN guided-missile destroyer USS Chaffee shot Mark 45 five-inch gun

Interoperability & Interchangeability

The USN values interoperability with partners and allies and therefore shared its accumulated experiences and advanced capabilities. Accordingly, participating forces including Australian and New Zealand navies dispatched refueling and replenishments ships to practice the necessary skills. The Mexican navy also learned how to conduct refueling at sea. In the air, USN's P-8 Poseidon and Royal Canadian AF CP-140 Aurora drilled together to learn how they perform in sync. Finally, the Hawaii-based USMC squadron trained on an Australian amphibious carrier HMAS Canberra L02.

The multinational armada conducted not only warfighting techniques but also humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions. Under a simulated mass rescue operation exercise, Australian, Japanese, South Korean navies joined the USN, U.S. Army, and U.S. Coast Guard to conduct complex operations: 1) USCG Cutter William Hart played a distressed fishing vessel; 2) JSDF JS Izumo reported to USCG Rescue Coordination Center; 3) USCG Cutter Midgett joined the search and launched an embarked USN MH-60R helicopter for search and rescue missions; 4) U.S. Army helicopters from the 25th Combat Aviation Brigade landed on Izumo and transported the patients to amphibious assault ship USS Essex; 5) aboard Essex, 80 medical personnel



RIMPAC exercise 2022.
Credit: RIMPAC's Twitter



Sea Hunter, an autonomous unmanned surface vehicle, arrives at Pearl Harbor on June 29, 2022 to participate in RIMPAC. Credit: U.S. Navy

of Australia, USN, U.S. Army in addition to 5 South Korean and 2 USN chaplains providing necessary medical and religious support.

The participants were given an additional opportunity to conduct a multinational and joint rescue operation, during an actual fire on a Peruvian Corvette *Guise*. The two injured Peruvian sailors were evacuated by French helicopter dispatched by FS *Prairial* and were transported to USCG Cutter *Midgett* first, then to USS *Abraham Lincoln*, and then to shore at a Honolulu hospital to receive treatment.

Lessons Learned

Given that China and other opponents of the rules-based international order are behaving increasingly assertively by conducting missile provocations and infringing on sovereign

territories in the Indo-Pacific, the Navy's role in the vast maritime domain is more critical than ever. Hence, this year's RIMPAC was a major success in more ways than one. Under the multinational flag, the USN successfully demonstrated its commitment towards the region and proved that it wields formidable influence and ability to build a strong coalition against potential threats to the rules-based international order. The two SINKEX granted a rare opportunity to our allies and partners to test their weapons on warships that are in working condition. Also, both the USN and USAF were able to test their unmanned systems during a large-scale multinational exercise. Furthermore, the participating forces learned the similarities and differences in conducting multinational joint operations. Lastly, several 'unplanned' events provided valuable opportunities for the international armada to test their skills. As the theme of this year's exercise envisions, the Navy successfully led the participants that are indeed not only "capable," but also "adaptive partners" that successfully completed their missions during the both planned and unplanned events.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the FAOA, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. This article was originally published by the Navy League of the United States in The MOC.

*“the Navy demonstrated several important masteries through this year’s RIMPAC:
1) coalition building;
2) capability testing;
3) interoperability & interchangeability”*

Andrew Park is Senior Analyst at the Center for Maritime Strategy and Non-resident James A. Kelly Fellow at the Pacific Forum. He previously served as a translator/interpreter at the U.S.-Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command / U.S. Forces Korea (CFC/USFK) and holds M.A. in Asian Studies from Georgetown University Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service

Remembering Shinzo Abe's Legacy

A Review of Michael J. Green's *Line of Advantage: Japan's Grand Strategy in the Era of Shinzo Abe*

By Jason Halub

The assassination of Shinzo Abe on July 8, 2022 robbed Japan and the world of a senior statesman who had played a major role in shaping the strategic landscape in the Indo-Pacific region. Senior Advisor and Henry A. Kissinger Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Michael Green, provides a timely assessment of Abe's accomplishments as Prime Minister in *Line of Advantage: Japan's Grand Strategy in the Era of Shinzo Abe*. Green persuasively argues that, under Abe's leadership from 2012-2020, Japan led liberal democratic countries in developing a strategic framework to respond to the People's Republic of China's (PRC) drive for hegemony over the Indo-Pacific region. Green makes clear that Abe reset the trajectory for Japan's strategy in Asia and, in the process, developed many of the key aspects of the U.S. approach to the region, including the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy and the Australia-India-Japan-U.S. Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad).

Divided into six chapters, *Line of Advantage* begins with a brief historical overview of the formation of Japan's grand strategy. Green highlights the centrality of China and the necessity for Japan to shape its "line of advantage" or strategic environment. Green also includes chapters that focus on Japan's relations with China, the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Indo-Pacific region, as well as a chapter on Japan's internal institutional developments under Abe

Through these successive chapters, Green points out that Japan has long been at the frontline against PRC competition and pressure, which has compelled Tokyo to develop a balance of power strategy to shape Beijing's choices. Fundamental aspects of Japan's strategy have included "strengthening ties with Washington, Canberra, and Delhi" to preserve the international rules-based order and leading the agenda for trade and investment norms and infrastructure development to counter the mercantilist tendencies and "debt trap diplomacy" associated with China's Belt and Road Initiative. Lastly, Abe ushered in important changes to Japan's institutional framework with the establishment of a U.S.-style national security staff and strategy document, a state secrecy law, and increased combined training with the U.S. military.

Green's major critique of Abe's strategy is Japan's failure to improve relations with the ROK. During Abe's tenure as Prime Minister, Japan-ROK

relations remained hampered by issues concerning Japan's colonial legacy in Korea. Moreover, Japan and the ROK continue to pursue divergent strategies on how best to manage security and economic relations with the PRC, with Seoul initially opposing the Quad and attempting to position the ROK as an intermediary between the PRC and the United States at the expense of Japan.

In assessing *Line of Advantage*, Green succinctly and convincingly highlights Abe's role in establishing Japan as a "leader of the liberal order in Asia" and one of the "most important thought leaders on China strategy." Green demonstrates how Japan, under Abe, led "the contest of ideas, investment, alliances, and diplomacy," as evidenced in Abe's August 2016 announcement for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" which has since become the basis for the United States' strategic framework in Asia.

Where *Line of Advantage* could have been strengthened is by including further space and analysis on Japan-ROK relations, which Green points out to be a major strategic gap in Japan's strategy for the region. Without fully addressing that point, some readers may find Green's account a little too sympathetic to Japan. Nevertheless, Green succeeds in crafting an insightful account of Abe's impact on the international relations of Asia, which will undoubtedly be felt for generations to come.



Jason Halub is a U.S. Army Foreign Area currently serving at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, South Korea.

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Calendar of Events

October 2022

Saturday 1st: Armed Forces Day (ROK)

Monday 3rd: National Foundation Day (ROK)

Tuesday 6th: FAOA Korea Chapter Social

Wednesday 7th: Korea Military Academy Dedication Ceremony for Fallen Korean War Veterans of USMA Class of '46

Wednesday 7th - Sunday 23rd: Gyeryong World Military Culture Expo

Wednesday 19th: Military Committee Meeting

Thursday 20 Oct: Trilateral Chiefs of Defense Meeting

Saturday 22nd - Sunday 23rd: Dajeon Science Festival

Tuesday 25th: Alliance Peace Forum

November 2022

Thursday 3rd: Security Consultative Meeting

Thursdsy 10th: Marine Corps Birthday (U.S.)

Friday 11th: Veterans Day (U.S.)

Thursday 24th: Thanksgiving (U.S.)

December 2022

Sunday 25th: Christmas Day

Sunday 31st: New Year's Eve

Community News

- The FAOA Korea Chapter recently had a social in Seoul on 6 September. It was lovely to meet everyone who attended in person and we look forward to seeing you again soon.
- Thank you to LCDR Chris Wehner (pictured) for providing details on his billet on as a Personnel Exchange Officer in Korea. If you would like to share your billet please get in touch by email: editor.faoakc@gmail.com
- If you would like to attend future events, including socials, coffee & chats with distinguished guests and panels, then sign up to our distro list by emailing: SecretaryFAOAKC@gmail.com

If you have any news to share, including personal or career achievements and upcoming events, please email

editor.faoakc@gmail.com



LCDR Chris Wehner
Credit: LCDR Chris Wehner

Distinguished Members



Sheena Chestnut Greitens

Dr. Sheena Chestnut Greitens is an Associate Professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. She has been an assistant professor of political science at the University of Missouri and was a founding co-director of MU's Institute for Korean Studies. Her work focuses on East Asia, authoritarian politics, and American national security. She holds a doctorate from Harvard University; an M.Phil from Oxford University, where she studied as a Marshall Scholar; and a bachelor's from Stanford University.



Derek Grossman

Derek Grossman is a senior defense analyst at RAND focused on a range of national security policy and Indo-Pacific security issues. He served over a decade in the Intelligence Community, where he served as the daily intelligence briefer to the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the assistant secretary of defense for Asian & Pacific Security Affairs. He holds an M.A. from Georgetown University in U.S. National Security Policy and a B.A. from the University of Michigan in Political Science and Asian studies.



Kongdan "Katy" Oh Hassig

Dr. Kongdan "Katy" Oh Hassig is an independent scholar. She has been a Senior Asia Specialist at the Institute for Defense Analyses, a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, and a member of the Political Science Department of the RAND Corporation. She has taught at the University of California San Diego, George Washington University, and the University of Maryland Global Campus in Asia. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Board of Directors of the U.S. Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, and the Board of Directors of the Korea Economic Institute of America. She was a founding co-director of The Korea Club of Washington, D.C.



Soo Kim

Soo Kim is a policy analyst at the RAND Corporation and an adjunct instructor at American University. Her research interests include the Korean Peninsula, Russia, Indo-Pacific strategy, near-peer competition, decision making, propaganda, and the intelligence community. She served as an analyst in the Central Intelligence Agency and also worked at the Department of Homeland Security. Kim earned a B.A. in French from Yale University and an M.A. in International Relations/Strategic Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.



Sung Hyun "Andrew" Kim

Sung Hyun "Andrew" Kim is a Non-Resident Fellow at Harvard's Kennedy School. Prior to this, he was a visiting scholar at Stanford University. Mr. Kim retired from the Central Intelligence Agency after 28 years of service and was the first Assistant Director of the CIA, Korea Mission Center. As the Chief of CIA Station in three major East Asian cities, Mr. Kim managed the collection, analysis, production, and distribution of information that directly affected national security. He is a recipient of the CIA Director's Award and the Presidential Rank Award.

Heino Klinck



Heino Klinck is a former U.S. Army China FAO who last served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia. His experience includes 2+ decades abroad; leading strategy efforts in a Fortune 100 company; senior political-military roles in the Pentagon; analytical and operational responsibilities in the intelligence community; and diplomatic postings in Europe and Asia. Mr. Klinck has a B.A. and M.A. in International Relations from Boston University; an MBA from the University of London; an M.S. in Global Strategy and Security from the University of Rome; and he was awarded a Fellowship by Stanford University's Asia-Pacific Research Center.

Mark William Lippert



The Honorable Mark William Lippert has a distinguished career in the United States government that spanned approximately two decades. From 2014-2017, he served as the U.S. ambassador and plenipotentiary to the Republic of Korea. He previously held positions in the Department of Defense, including as chief of staff to Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. He graduated from Stanford University with a B.A. in Political Science and holds an M.A. in International Policy Studies from the same institution.

Curtis "Mike" Scaparrotti



General (Retired) Curtis "Mike" Scaparrotti led a distinguished, 41-year career in the U.S. Army, and most recently served as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Commander of U.S. European Command. Prior to this, he served as the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea/United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command. GEN(R) Scaparrotti graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, and his education includes the Command and General Staff College, the U.S. Army War College, and a Master's degree in Administrative Education from the University of South Carolina.

Suzanne Vares-Lum



Major General (Retired) Suzanne Vares-Lum served 34 years in the U.S. Army and is President of the East-West Center. She is an influential executive with leadership and planning experience spanning the Indo-Pacific region, violent extremist organizations, and natural disasters. She most recently served for five years as one of the most senior leaders in U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and now serves as a strategic consultant and advisor. Vares-Lum received a B.A. in Journalism and an M.Ed. in Teaching from the University of Hawaii at Manoa, and a Master's degree in Strategid Studies from the U.S. Army War College.

Major General Mark Gillette, Honorary Member

Mark Gillette is a U.S. Army major general and the Senior Army Foreign Area Officer. He has extensive experience from various political-military assignments throughout Asia. MG Gillette holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the U.S. Military Academy, a Master of Social Science from Syracuse University, and a Master of Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College. He is currently assigned as the U.S. Senior Defense Official and Defense Attaché in Cairo, Egypt.

MG Gillette advised and supported the initiatives of the co-founders of the FAOA Korea Chapter—both leading up to the organization's establishment and during its formative period. He continues to play an active role in the events and activities of the FAOA Korea Chapter today and is a key advocate for the development of its membership. In recognition of his significant contribution toward accomplishing the mission of the FAOA Korea Chapter, MG Gillette was presented Honorary Membership on July 23, 2020.



Board Members



Wei C. Chou, *President*

Wei C. Chou is a U.S. Army Northeast Asia FAO. He holds a Bachelors of Science degree from the United States Military Academy and a Master of Arts degree from the University of Hawaii as an East-West Fellow. After eight years as an airborne and mechanized infantryman, Wei served across a range of FAO capacities in Hawaii, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.

Contact: PresidentFAOAKC@gmail.com



Chris Hobgood, *Vice President*

Chris Hobgood is a U.S. Army Northeast Asia FAO. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree from Lander University; a Master of Science degree from Webster University; and a Master of Arts degree from Middlebury Institute of International Studies. Chris has over 22 years of service and worked in a variety of FAO assignments by advising senior military and civilian leaders with regional expertise on the Indo Pacific region as a Security Cooperation officer, a political-military officer, and Senior Defense Official / Defense Attaché.

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Rich Naseer, *Treasurer*

Rich Naseer is a Major in the U.S. Army serving as a Northeast Asia FAO. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the United States Military Academy and a Master of Arts in Asian Studies from the University of Hawaii at Manoa.

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Josh Duran, *Secretary*

Josh "Duran" Duran is an active-duty Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the U.S. Naval Academy. After serving eight years as a Naval Intelligence Officer, he has served two additional tours in the Republic of Korea as an FAO.

Contact: SecretaryFAOAKC@gmail.com



Adrian Romero, *Chief of Public Relations*

Adrian Romero is an active duty Warrant Officer in the U.S. Army. He holds an A.A. degree in Applied Science and is currently pursuing an M.B.A. He has over ten years of work experience in the Indo-Pacific region.

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Staff Members

Editor in Chief

Emily Stamp is an Editor at International SOS. She is also a freelance editor and writer, working on projects involving Asian geopolitics, domestic violence awareness and AI creation and characterization. She holds an undergraduate M.A. in Psychology from the University of St. Andrews and an M.A. in International Conflict Studies from King's College London.

Assistant Editor

Gabriela Bernal is a PhD candidate at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul. She is also a freelance writer, with her articles having appeared in various publications. She holds two MAs, one in human rights from Sciences Po Paris and one in international peace and security from King's College London.

Assistant Editor

Apoorva Jayakumar is a Masters student pursuing a Global Economy and Strategy major at Yonsei Graduate School of International Studies. She enjoys reading and writing about Indo-Pacific strategy & policy.

Marketing Coordinator

YoonJeong Choi is a student pursuing a business bachelor's degree at Purdue University in Indiana State. Her interests include IT, HoloLens, environment, space technology, and e-commerce.

Research Intern

Salome Giunashvili is a Master's degree candidate in International Studies from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. She holds a Bachelor's degree in International Relations from Tbilisi State University. Her research interests span across several different areas involving international security, hybrid warfare and alliance politics.

Senior Researcher

Amos Oh is a U.S. Army Strategist with extensive policy and planning experience. He is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and also earned an M.P.A. from the Harvard Kennedy School. He is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations at the University of Southern California.

Associate Researcher

Sean McCauley is an instructor based in South Korea. He is a political science graduate of the University of Alberta with a special focus on international relations; and he has extensive background in political advocacy in Canada.

Associate Graphics Designer & Social Media Assistant

Sara La Cagnina is a Communications Coordinator who graduated with an M.A. in International Tourism from the Università Della Svizzera Italiana. She has extensive experience with digital communication and event coordination.

Research Intern

Hyun Jin (Emmy) Nam is a recent graduate from Yonsei University with a Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies from Yonsei University. She has internship experience in the Internal Political Unit of the US Embassy in the Republic of Korea, and was awarded second place in the ASEAN-Korea Academic Essay Competition.

About the Korea Chapter

The FAOA Korea Chapter was founded in July 2020 in accordance with Article VII of the FAOA Charter. It is a 501(c)19 non-profit organization, consisting primarily of current and former Foreign Area Officers and International Affairs Specialists who advance the Republic of Korea-United States (ROK-U.S.) Alliance through events and activities that promote mentorship, education, research, and connection.


Our Mission

To develop and inspire leaders engaged in the advancement of the ROK-U.S. Alliance.

Our Core Values

- Commitment to Leader Development
- Pursuit of Inspiration

Lines of Effort



CALL FOR ARTICLES

Contribute to the journal of the FAOA Korea Chapter,
The Joint Communiqué,
for the 4th quarter of 2022.



Deadline for submissions: November 30, 2022
Contact: editor.faoakc@gmail.com



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