

# THE JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ

The Official Journal for the FAOs, International Relations Specialists,  
and Partners associated with the FAOA Korea Chapter



*Korea Chapter*

# FOREIGN AREA OFFICER ASSOCIATION

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**"Producing the premier leaders of the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance since 2020"**

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# A Message from Brigadier General Jason (Brad) Nicholson



A distinct privilege of commanding U.S. Army Security Assistance Command as a foreign area officer (FAO) is leading the organization's global mission. The unit executes foreign military sales cases in 139 countries and deploys training teams in 39 of those countries. As part of this mission, I am fortunate enough to travel throughout each of the geographic combatant commands' areas of responsibility to meet with Allies and partners, military leaders, and embassy teams.

Many of the U.S. military personnel I meet during my travels are foreign area officers, serving at numerous military headquarters, organizations, or embassies. Frequently, I am able to hold sensing sessions with members of our career field and a few common themes emerge in our conversations. I want to share some of these here.

Leaders, uniformed and civilian, in both the military and interagency, tremendously value the skills, experiences, and perspectives FAOs bring to an organization. We are strategic enablers in security assistance, political-military affairs, intelligence, and diverse other fields. While serving on staff, we are expected to be regional specialists, and for the country team, we are expected to be country experts.

Informed by graduate education, we have to use our interagency fluency to translate all of this into the best military advice. We must strive to be experts in our service's capabilities, while at the same time fully understanding the joint force. The most effective FAOs understand service components and geographic combatant command contingency, crisis, and operational plans. However, these skills and experiences depend upon communication and relationships in order to be put into action.

Communication is a FAO's primary weapon system. Concise and clear delivery of ideas via written or oral presentation is how we operationalize hard-earned specialized knowledge. However, effective communication requires understanding the intended audience. The anecdotes and stereotypes are well known; State Department does not use PowerPoint and the military is only slide deep are just a few.

Buried inside each is a kernel of truth, but the fact is, we must speak in doctrinally correct military language with uniformed leaders, while avoiding a jargon laden lexicon with those who are

interagency. Both are perishable skills and require constant honing. The perspective of the FAO on the ground is invaluable but only if communicated in such a way to resonate with leaders.

The FAO's primary weapon system is not an individual but a crew served one. Relationships are at the core of our military competencies. Managing relationships with foreign militaries is an obvious focus area, whether at an embassy or on a staff. However, the relationships within, and between, the FAO community ensure the FAO's "finger tip feel" perspective actually makes it into the hands of appropriate leaders.

Harnessing the power of this network is imperative. Distance and hierarchy shrink quickly when the FAO at the point of the spear leverages their network to move information. Beginning at the earliest stages of the training pipeline, FAOs meet their control language cohort who will serve alongside them throughout a career. Positioned throughout the military and interagency, from tactical units to the National Security Staff, the FAO network is powerful.

Military members do not lack work. Stress levels are often high. Clear communications assist in buying down risk to relationships, not only professional but personal ones. As field grade officers, we must avoid burning bridges and instead build teams. Email and other technical means can move concise ideas but the power of a phone call cannot be overstated. As the community emerges from the pandemic and from behind telemeetings and virtual environments, a renewed focus on adding value with the time proven skills upon which leaders depend but leaning in to improve our communications and deepen our relationships will ensure our community remains relevant to the warfighter.

*Brad Nicholson*

HIGHLIGHTS

The FAOA Korea Chapter held a Coffee & Chat with Col (R) Lawrence Wilkerson on 21 Nov 2022

\* \* \* \* \*

On 07 February, FAOA hosted a social to meet the FAO Branch team.

\* \* \* \* \*

The Chapter held our first FAO Social of the year on 31 January, bringing together FAOs, partners, academics, and media during APCSS's visit to Korea.

\* \* \* \* \*

Stay tuned for announcements of exciting new partnerships and opportunities for FAOs

# A Message from the President



**Dear Members, Partners, and Leaders of the FAOA Korea Chapter,**

Welcome to 2023. This year is a momentous year for the alliance, marking 70 years of combined partnership, growth, and relative peace. You and generations of service members before us have all played a significant part of that.

For Americans, it's easy to become complacent in our alliances. As a former Australian Ambassador to the United States Joe Hockey once remarked, America is a historical anomaly in that other nations around the world willingly seek to enter the American sphere of influence rather than being coerced or forcibly compelled. It is these alliances based on free will that have withstood the test of time in our modern age.

Most historical alliances around the world from the 19th and 20th century were not so fortunate. Many fell apart due to divergent national interests, many others were disrupted by region-engulfing wars or political upheaval. Yet, the ROK-U.S. Alliance remains ironclad, and our commitments to each another continue to grow stronger.

This is in no small part due to alliance practitioners and operators like you.

Keep up the great work.

President, FAOA Korea Chapter  
Wei C. Chou

# A Message from the Editor-In-Chief

**Dear Readers,**

Welcome to our first edition of *The Joint Communiqué* in 2023. I hope that you have settled into the New Year well.

I would like to first take a moment to mention the recent earthquakes in Türkiye and Syria. Many of those residing within the Indo-Pacific know the pain of natural disasters, and we send our condolences to anyone personally affected. I would also like to praise the search and rescue teams who gathered from around the world, and highlight those who will be working to rebuild the communities lost.

February 24 marked a year since Russia invaded Ukraine, and we continue to watch the war and its global implications, from the personal effects of the conflict to the trend of rising insecurity due to the rising cost of living across regions such as Europe and Africa.

Recently, we have witnessed the shooting down of suspected Chinese surveillance balloons in the US, as well as multiple public appearances of Kim Jong-Un's daughter, believed to be named Kim Ju Ae. South Korea's defense ministry also released a white paper in February referring to North Korea as an 'enemy' for the first time in six years, with the North becoming increasingly active in missile tests.

This issue will begin with an analysis of South Korea's rise in the global defense sector, with multi-billion dollar contracts

signed in 2022, by Alexander Eid and Daniel Mitchum. Second, Heino Klink has provided an analysis of trilateral cooperation between the U.S., South Korea and Japan, and how this can be enhanced. Next, Lakhvinder Singh presents an Indian perspective on South Korea's new Indo-Pacific strategy.

Stella Lee then details her billet with the Engineer and Scientist Exchange Program, as part of the journal's effort to spotlight different postings in South Korea.

Following this, our former Editor-in-Chief Mitch Shin and Jaganath Panda discuss the Indo-Pacific strategy in reference to its approach to China. Lastly, following a successful Coffee & Chat session with Lawrence Wilkerson we have some of his, slightly less traditional, book recommendations for those in, or aiming toward, diplomatic and military positions.


As always the editorial team and I are pleased to have your readership and hope you enjoy the articles contained within. Thank you to the contributors and the wider FAOA Korea Chapter team, it would not be possible without you. If you have any queries, follow ups or wish to write an article for the next issue please get in touch.

With best wishes,



Emily Stamp

## STAFF EDITORS




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If you are interested in pitching an article or book review for the next issue please email:

[editor.faoak@gmail.com](mailto:editor.faoak@gmail.com)



The first prototype of KF-21, or *Boramae*, fighter aircraft which began undergoing ground tests at Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) in Sacheon-si, Gyeongsangnam-do.

# Rising Tiger: South Korea in the Global Defense Sector

*By Alexander Eid and  
Daniel Mitchum*

**I**n July 2022, a \$27.9 billion arms deal with Poland catapulted South Korea into the headlines as a dominant new player in the global defense industry. The agreement came out of the blue for many casual observers, but it shouldn't be surprising that South Korea, a country with a robust military-industrial complex and an infamously antagonistic neighbor, could rise to the upper echelon of arms exporters. Beyond Poland, South Korea has recently made, or is in the process of making, deals with multiple nations, including Egypt, Malaysia, Columbia, and Norway.

Its customers will receive cutting-edge assets, from FA-50 light attack aircraft to K2 tanks, Cheongung-II surface-to-air missiles, and K9 self-propelled howitzers. Worth more than \$35.3 billion in 2022 alone, these arrangements are emblematic of South Korea's transformation into a major international arms supplier. If anything, it is more curious that it took so long for South Korea to advance into the global arms market.

What were the factors that positioned Seoul to make such globe-spanning deals, and why did it take until now for the world to take note? For answers, one must go back to the industrial policies of the totalitarian industrialist Park Chung-hee to reveal how oscillating security commitments from the U.S. laid the groundwork for his democratically elected successors, mostly from the Korean political left, to develop a technologically advanced and more independent military. From there, an excess weapons-making capacity drove South Korea's famous export-oriented economy amid a rising China and war in Europe, thereby solidifying South Korea's entrée into the highest tier of the global defense industry.

## **Bloody Training and Steely Will: Park Chung-hee's Plan for a Strong South Korea**

Since the authoritarian rule of Park Chung-hee, South Korea has possessed the type of critical infrastructure required for large scale weapons production. Park's first 5-year plan, announced in July 1961, set basic economic goals, such as boosting heavy industry by promoting fertilizer and steel production. That these industries have both civilian and military applications is no coincidence. Park was not only worried about the existential threat of North Korea but also harbored fears of American abandonment. Likely catalyzed by the 1961 security pacts formed between North Korea, China, and Russia, Park sought to solidify American security commitments by offering aid during the Vietnam War. These overtures were dismissed out of hand by the Kennedy administration. The U.S.' subsequent Johnson administration sought to project a façade of multilateralism in its war effort and Park again offered combat troops to assist the war effort, but was rebuffed a second time. However, Washington's attitude shifted following the Gulf of Tonkin incident and the failure of Operation Rolling Thunder in 1972.

It then formally requested troops from South Korea, an appeal which Park eagerly accepted. Yet Park's hopes for Washington's security commitments would be dashed when Johnson announced he would not seek re-election, and Seoul began to understand the ramifications of the Nixon Doctrine.

Security became much more central to Park's political economy as President Nixon began a U.S. military withdrawal from Asia. Park's agenda, encapsulated by his axiom of "rich nation, strong military", began leveraging dual-use civilian industries to bolster the domestic weapons industry and many of South Korea's conglomerates have roots in such initiatives. Contemporaries like Hyundai Rotem, Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI), and Hanwha Defense are continuations of companies that the Park regime tapped to become contractors in the state's push toward self-sufficient military modernization. Thus, by the late 1970s, South Korea had established an increasingly capable arms industry.

“President, Yoon Suk-yeol, has been happy to continue promoting arms exports as an engine for growth”

#### **Leaner and Meaner: How Democratic South Korea's New Military Led to a Revolution in Arms Exports**

While the government of Park Chung-hee laid the foundations for South Korea's rise in the defense sector, its democratically elected successors—particularly those led by left-leaning presidents—were the ones to capitalize on it. Following reforms designed to destroy the overreaching “political soldier” class, spearheaded by South Korea's first civilian president, Kim Young-sam, the escalating and soon-to-be nuclear threat posed by North Korea combined with doubt over the U.S.' security commitments in a post-Cold War world made it clear that South Korea's military needed serious upgrades.

In 2005, progressive President Roh Moo-hyun announced South Korea's first comprehensive national defense rehabilitation program, Defense Reform 2020 (DR2020). The plan envisioned a stronger, leaner, and more diverse armed forces that made up for a shrinking pool of recruitable individuals with cutting edge technology. Roh hoped to leverage this more dynamic and capable military to finally win wartime operational control (OPCON) from the U.S. – a key political goal for his administration that remains contentious even today – in addition to bolstering national security.

Accordingly, DR2020 was predicated on successive years of increased defense spending primarily devoted toward harnessing South Korea's industrial capacity to outfit its military with domestically produced, cutting edge kit. Roh expanded the national defense budget by 37% compared to the previous government, at a breakneck average of 8.76% per year. This set the tone for future reform and advancement. Following the 2008 recession, Roh's conservative successors of Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye reduced the pace of spending growth, only averaging 5.32% and 3.89% on-year respectively, but the process remained in motion.

When Roh's protégé Moon Jae-in became president in 2017, he inherited a legacy of pushing for large defense budgets to develop a modernized military, that was more independent from the U.S.. Like his mentor, Moon prioritized the issue of OPCON transfer, even going so far as to launch a plan to procure South Korea's first carrier. However he also sought to capitalize on years of government investment in the defense sector by allocating excess capacity toward the export market. During Moon's tenure, South Korea's defense exports more than tripled from \$1.2 billion to \$3.8 billion as Hanwha's K9 self-propelled howitzers, KAI's FA-50 light attack aircraft, and Hyundai Rotem's K2 Black Panther tank went toe-to-toe with competitors from India and Germany. Thus, South Korea became the largest Asian arms supplier to the Australian military and scored a \$3.5 billion contract with the United Arab Emirates, which was the largest in the country's history up to that point. In searching for ways to ameliorate South Korea's growing economic woes, the current President, Yoon Suk-yeol, has been happy to continue promoting arms exports as an engine for growth. Nonetheless, it should be understood that South Korea was already well on its way to becoming a global defense industry powerhouse before Yoon's inauguration in May 2022.

#### **High-Tech and Low-Cost: South Korea's Contemporary Competitive Edge**

To contextualize South Korea's progress, consider that France was the world's 3rd largest arms exporter from 2017 to 2022 and made an estimated \$34 billion from 2021 to 2022, South Korea's Poland deal alone is worth a whopping \$27.8 billion and there is no sign that such trends




## ANALYSIS

will abate. Customers have come to appreciate the technical prowess of South Korean arms manufacturers as the nation continues to indigenize its arms production. The rate of indigenization jumped from 70% in 2015 to 75.5% in 2019 and is most prevalent where South Korea has had a well-established domestic foundation, encompassing guided systems, communications and electronics, along with chemical, biological, and radiological arms.

Aerospace, an area once lagging in indigenization, has received a boost from the development of the remarkable KF-21, or *Boramae*, fighter aircraft. With 20% of the funding coming from Indonesia, the KF-21 project was so ambitious that South Korea's own Korean Institute for Defense Analysis expressed significant skepticism over Seoul's ability to succeed. Yet, overcoming the odds, South Korea has produced a capable 4.5 generation multirole fighter. Its success represents South Korea's competitive advantage in the arms industry, offering an economical alternative to expensive fighters like the F-35 while its technological sophistication surpasses aircraft such as France's Dassault Rafale.

With future multi-billion dollar contracts coming down the pipeline, with the likes of Saudi Arabia and the UK, as well as the impending rollout of the KF-21, it is clear that South Korea is here to stay as a major defense supplier. Further, in a world beset by growing security challenges from China, Russia, and North Korea, now is the perfect time for Western nations to welcome a new defensive powerhouse to the global stage.

**Alexander Eid** is the Deputy Research Director at the Sejong Society of Washington D.C. and a master's candidate in the Asian Studies Program at the Georgetown University Walsh School of Foreign Service, focusing on the Korean peninsula. Alex studied Korean language and culture as an exchange student at both Sungkyunkwan University and Cheonnam National University, as a recipient of the Boren and Critical Language Scholarships. Alex received his bachelor's degrees in Physics and East Asian Languages & Civilizations from the University of Chicago. **Daniel Mitchum** holds a dual BA in Global Politics and East Asian Studies from State University of New York and an MA in International Cooperation from Yonsei University. He has previously worked with organizations such as Liberty in North Korea and the North Korea Review academic journal as a writer and copy editor. Daniel is the former resident and non-resident James Kelly Korea fellow with the Pacific Forum and has been published in outlets including Insights & Issues, The Asia Times and the East Asia Forum. Daniel's research interests also include East Asian geopolitics, the rise of China, and nuclear non-proliferation.



Credit: Government of Korea data.go.kr (공공데이터포털)

As South Korea's population continued to age, so too did the number of military-age citizens. Roh's DR2020 plan sought to achieve the counterintuitive goal of reducing manpower while increasing effectiveness through streamlining reforms and technological investment. As shown above, Roh's tenure was marked by a decrease in conscriptions, an increase in recruitments, and an overall decline in the number of active duty troops.

# U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral Cooperation

## Strengthening Regional Security

*By Heino Klink*

The United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Japan share a long list of common democratic values and security interests. However, the full potential of trilateral cooperation has yet to be realized. In fact, the last several years were particularly challenging during President Moon Jae-in's administration as the ROK's bilateral relationships with both the United States and Japan deteriorated for a variety of mainly political reasons.

ROK-Japanese relations are fraught with the historical legacy of colonialism and World War II. Arguably, Japanese contrition has not mirrored that of postwar Germany with regard to war crimes and atrocities, at least not from the perspective of many Asian countries invaded and subjugated by imperial Japan. This unfortunate vestige of history is particularly profound in South Korea due to the exceptionally sensitive issue of the so-called "comfort women." This and other bilateral disputes, including territorial disputes revolving around the Liancourt Rocks (known as Dokdo in South Korea and Takeshima in Japan), have manifested themselves in a downward spiral of diplomatic, economic, judicial, and political scuffles.

With the election of President Yoon Suk-yeol, there is cause for optimism that relations between Seoul and Tokyo will



Credit: Kim Hong-Ji

improve and thus also offer opportunities for trilateral collaboration with Washington. Since his inauguration in May, there have been several bilateral and trilateral meetings at the head-of-government and cabinet levels. Arguably, the exigent nature of security concerns is driving this much-needed rapprochement.

North Korea presents all three allies with an imminent threat of a renewed provocation cycle that could include a nuclear test. China is a long-term strategic threat, pressuring like-minded democracies in all domains to acquiesce to a new world order governed by the interests of the Chinese Communist Party while threatening to invade Taiwan. Russia has encroached on the air space and waters of both Japan and South Korea with air and naval incursions alongside China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) on multiple occasions. These geopolitical realities incentivize Seoul and Tokyo to manage their differences in order to deepen trilateral military cooperation with Washington to mitigate against these common threats.

In the defense and security arena, the following steps should be taken, among others, to increase trilateral military cooperation:

- Resume and enhance missile warning and tracking exercises.
- Practice relevant information sharing.
- Conduct exercises focused on air and sea interdiction, anti-submarine warfare, mining, and maritime domain awareness.
- Build an exercise regime that develops bilateral exercises into trilateral opportunities to enhance interoperability; and when that is not feasible, regularly exchange observers to bilateral exercises.
- Conduct regular leader exchanges between the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command and U.S. Forces Japan focused on the supporting role of Japan in a Korean Peninsula scenario.

At the political-military level, both Japan and South Korea have had concerns about the United States' extended nuclear deterrence. While the U.S. commitment is very real, it must be repeatedly reaffirmed. Given a possible (perhaps even probable) North Korean nuclear test, Russia's nuclear saber-rattling vis-à-vis NATO, and the PLA's growing nuclear triad, it would be appropriate to augment bilateral U.S. dialogues on extended deterrence with an initial trilateral meeting to discuss common threats, assessments, and policies.

The clear, present, and growing Chinese threat to a democratic Taiwan is also a threat to the interests of the United States, Japan, and the ROK. This point is now routinely highlighted in senior leader joint statements. While Chinese sensitivity to any apparent enhancement of unofficial relations with Taiwan is well-known, no- or low-profile actions in support of legitimate security interests are urgently needed. Deterring Chinese aggression against Taiwan as well as planning for possible Taiwan contingencies is clearly in Japan's and South Korea's interests.

With U.S. leadership and support, these actions should be considered:

- All three countries should engage in trilateral discussions regarding possible Taiwan contingencies, leading to a tabletop exercise to examine coordinated responses as well as the potential impact on and roles of U.S. Forces Korea and U.S. Forces Japan.
- Japan and South Korea should exchange unofficial military attaché equivalents with Taiwan.
- The coast guards of Japan, South Korea, the United States, and Taiwan should operate and exercise together, focusing on law-enforcement activities and climate change mitigation, particularly in the waters of Pacific Island countries with which they all have diplomatic relations.
- Given the strategic value of the semiconductor industry, opportunities for a "semiconductor chip Quad" consisting of the United States, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan should be explored.

There are also actions that the legislatures of all three countries should take to enhance trilateral cooperation. The U.S. Congress, ROK National Assembly, and Japanese Diet should facilitate people-to-people exchanges by supporting initiatives that focus on common values and interests while bridging the painful

history of the last century. The strengths of the Korean-American and Japanese-American communities should be harnessed to the same ends, and the respective congressional caucuses could lead these efforts.

*The Biden administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy likewise "encourage[s] our allies and partners to strengthen their ties with one another, particularly Japan and the Republic of Korea."*

There is strong bipartisan support in the United States for enhancing ROK-Japan ties. An objective of the Trump administration's U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific was "drawing South Korea and Japan closer to one another." The Biden administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy likewise "encourage[s] our allies and partners to strengthen their ties with one another, particularly Japan and the Republic of Korea." Both documents should be heeded, and the United States should enhance and expand trilateral cooperation to defend shared values and interests against a myriad of common threats.

Disclaimer: This article was originally published by the [National Bureau of Asian Research](#).

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**Heino Klinck** is a member of the Board of Advisors at the National Bureau of Asian Research and the Founder and Principal of Klinck Global LLC. Most recently, he was the deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia. In that role, he devised and implemented U.S. defense policy in a portfolio of over twenty countries and territories, advancing national security interests through defense strategy development, bilateral alliance management, security cooperation, contingency planning, and program oversight.

# South Korea's New Indo-Pacific Strategy: An Indian Perspective

*by Lakhvinder Singh*

With the rise of challenges threatening a free, peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific, the stability of the U.S.-led regional order, which has been the region's hallmark, is being increasingly eroded. Rising uncertainties about the U.S.'s ability to keep protecting and promoting universal values such as freedom, the rule of law and human rights, is providing fresh impetus to regional democracies to search for new, regional, democratic alignments. The drive for cooperation among Indo-Pacific nations is further pushed due to rising geopolitical competition, in both the security and economic arenas, between the current and rising superpowers. South Korea's new push into the Indo-Pacific region stems from these uncertainties and challenges.

Much water has flown in the Han River since Korea was known as the Hermit Kingdom. Today South Korea has become a full-fledged member of the community of nations. Its national interests are directly intertwined with the Indo-Pacific region's growth, prosperity, stability, and security. The

region holds 65% of the world's population, 62% of the world's GDP and 46% of international trade. It has emerged as the epicenter of world economic growth, housing new critical strategic industries such as semiconductors, green technologies, and intelligent automobiles. In response to growing worldwide interest in the Indo-Pacific, regional countries have also begun crafting their foreign policies

to engage with the outside world more effectively. With the inauguration of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration in 2022 South Korea came out with a new comprehensive regional strategy encompassing the economic and security realms, to engage with the region far and wide.

The economic and strategic importance of the region for South Korea cannot be over-emphasized. In 2021 the Indo-Pacific region included around 78% and 67% of its total exports and imports. Twenty of its top trading partners are in the Indo-Pacific. Also, more than half of its foreign direct investment is destined for the Indo-Pacific countries. The highly contested South China Sea, accounting for around 64% and 46% of South Korea's crude oil and natural gas transport respectively, also lies in this region.

## Stable Democracy and Increasing Aspirations

With South Korea emerging as a stable democracy, its aspirations to play a more active role in world affairs are increasing. Its new Indo-Pacific strategy is a blueprint for regional partnerships, and for South Korea to play bigger, more assertive roles in the region, including in leadership positions. It has committed to work with key players in the region in the construction of new regional order, in both economic and security domains. By promoting a rules-based international order, conducive to a stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific, South Korea is seeking to work towards a new order that empowers smaller and weaker nations to prosper alongside more prominent players. By seeking to become a Global Pivotal State, it aims to make collective efforts to find standard solutions to various sets of complex challenges. It also seeks to establish a sustainable and resilient regional order which works for all states, preventing the high-handedness of powerful countries towards weaker nations.

## Preparing to Face Complex Security and Economic Challenges

Going forward, South Korea faces complex security challenges that require a multi-dimensional and holistic approach. This new Indo-Pacific strategy prepares South Korea by building new economic and security networks. By building resilient supply chains for critical industries and items this strategy prepares the country in the event of future contingencies such as a further pandemic on scale with Covid-19 or the sudden eruption of regional hostilities and other natural calamities. By pushing for regional cooperation in "critical domains of science and technology, quantum science, artificial intelligence, advanced biology,

Its new Indo-Pacific strategy is a blueprint for regional partnerships, and for South Korea to play bigger, more assertive roles in the region

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next-generation telecommunications, and space,” South Korea is planning to integrate with regional economies like never before. This will not only help close the digital gap in the region, but will also help establish South Korea’s leadership role. This will go a long way in promoting South Korea’s stature as a global high-tech power. By promoting regional cooperation in research and development in critical and emerging technologies, including technology norms and standardization, South Korea will be helping to narrow the gap between the have and the ‘have-not’ nations of the region.

By focusing on climate change, energy security and energy transition, South Korea is paving the way for many regional countries who seek fast growth and look towards South Korea as a role model of building a sustainable development model, which is the key to future growth. South Korea’s commitment to supporting the region’s achievement of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals is bound to strengthen its leading position in the evolution of the new developmental agenda for the Indo-Pacific region. By “contributive diplomacy” commensurate with its economic stature, South Korea is showing its willingness to contribute its share in helping the less privileged societies/nations. South Korean Overseas Development Aid to developing countries is expected to increase under its new strategy. By promoting people-to-people exchanges, especially among youth, this strategy is due to bring South Korea much closer to other nations in the region.

### **Pursuing Multiple Layers of Actions**

To achieve the goal of a free, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific, South Korea is aiming to pursue multiple layers of actions under this strategy.

South Korea is pledging to stand with the international community in condemning and responding firmly to actions threatening universal values and international norms. It is also expected to enforce internationally agreed rules more actively than ever before. As a thriving democracy, South Korea should remain committed to promoting freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. With South Korea adopting this new strategy, its non-proliferation and counter-terrorism policies and initiatives are also anticipated to intensify regionally. Further, this new strategy is liable to further strengthen the ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral security cooperation to protect and promote current security architecture in the region to maintain peace and stability. South Korea is also enabled to address traditional and non-traditional threats to security more effectively, including its maritime cooperation with regional navies being expected to significantly boost under this policy. Protecting sea lanes, countering piracy, and securing the safety of navigation are significant areas of concern for South Korea. This strategy provides required tools for South Korea to address such concerns.

### **Emergence of India as Special Country of Interest**

South Korea’s new Indo-Pacific strategy seeks to push for comprehensive partnerships that encompass traditional and non-traditional security domains with regional countries. By enhancing the connectivity and complementarity of trade and investment networks, the strategy aims to secure future growth engines of sustainability. Given the scope and breadth of the new strategy, the widest South Korea has ever adopted, it is preparing to pursue partnerships with all nations around the region in ‘minilateral groupings’. By focusing on South Asia, Oceania, Southeast Asia, and the African Coast of the Indian Ocean as special areas of interest

President Yoon Suk-yeol arrives for the G20 Leaders’ Summit in Bali, Indonesia on November 15, 2022.  
Credit: Mast Irham / Reuters





Cargo to be shipped abroad loaded on a dock in Busan. Credit: Yonhap

South Korea is going far beyond its traditional areas of operations in Northeast Asia. It is developing a new network of strategic partnerships tailored to each sub-region for deeper penetration at the strategic level.

Under this new strategy, South Asia and particularly India is receiving special attention from South Korean policymakers. This special attention is being paid to further developing the unique strategic and economic partnership with India, as it offers enormous growth potential for South Korean industries and the South Korean defense establishment.

India, with the world's second-largest population and cutting-edge IT and space technologies, is a significant player in the emerging new order in the region. Under the new strategy, South Korea plans to increase strategic communication and cooperation through high-level foreign affairs and defense exchanges. Sky's the limit of cooperation between two countries under this new strategy.

South Korea's new strategy has developed a grand democratic vision for the region in direct opposition to a regional order shaped by force or coercion, and carved out a more prominent regional role for itself. South Korea's new strategy depicts a strong, democratic nation preparing to lead the Indo-Pacific from the front.

Time for South Korea's place under the sun has come!

“This new Indo-pacific strategy prepares South Korea by building new economic and security networks.”

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**Dr. Lakhvinder Singh** is the director of peace and security studies at the Asia Institute in Seoul, South Korea. He can be reached at [parvkaur@hanmail.net](mailto:parvkaur@hanmail.net).

# The FAOA Korea Chapter Spotlight: Stella Lee



## THE ENGINEER AND SCIENTIST EXCHANGE PROGRAM

### ENGINEER AND SCIENTIST EXCHANGE PROGRAM (ESEP)

The Engineer and Scientist Exchange Program (ESEP) is a professional development program that sends scientists and engineers to work in foreign defense laboratories. It offers great opportunities to work together among our nation's ally countries to research, develop and cooperate for the common goal of national defense and world peace. Currently, the U.S. has active ESEP programs with 16 allied and friendly countries. This program is intended to provide career development opportunities for mid-career military personnel and/or civilian engineers and scientists.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (DASA) for Defense and Exports Cooperation (DE&C) serves as an executive agent for the Army ESEP. Each year the DASA (DE&C) circulates a memorandum to U.S. Army commands announcing a call for ESEP candidate' nominations. Any interested candidate should reach out to their parent command's International Point of Contact (IPOC) or equivalent office for further information.

My assignment is with the Chemical Biological (CB) Technology Center at the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) in Daejeon, South Korea. I work with ADD engineers and scientists to investigate, design and develop various CB detectors, decontamination methods and individual protective gears for overall CB defense systems.

“CURRENTLY, THE  
U.S. HAS ACTIVE  
ESEP PROGRAMS  
WITH 16 ALLIED  
AND FRIENDLY  
COUNTRIES.”

In addition, it is my goal to identify international collaborative efforts which enhances both the U.S. and ROK's research, development, test, and evaluation objectives. I have witnessed many opportunities for international cooperation and exchange of good will and friendship. The relationship built and the knowledge shared have been helpful not only on a personal level but also for the strong alliance that has been built between the two nations.

In South Korea, the ESEP is under the care of the U.S. Embassy in Seoul's Joint U.S. Military Affairs Group Korea (JUSMAG-K). I am grateful for this tremendous opportunity to participate in the ESEP program and have enjoyed my time here in the beautiful land of South Korea. Although my one-year assignment will end by the spring of 2023, I intend to maximize my time here by getting to know both the people and projects for the purpose of understanding and diplomatic cooperation.

# Will Yoon's Indo-Pacific strategy tackle China threat?

*By Jagannath Panda and Mitch Shin*

**I**n late December 2022, South Korea, under the relatively new presidency of Yoon Suk-yeol effectively concluded its policy shift from strategic ambiguity by releasing the "Strategy for a Free, Peaceful and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region."

The document sets forth a wide-ranging ambit in cooperation, including on traditional and non-traditional security domains such as economic security; maritime security; counter-terrorism; nuclear non-proliferation; climate action; energy security; cyber security; and new technologies.

One of the most important features is its focus on "future-oriented" diplomacy, namely the centrality of "collective" partnerships with Indo-Pacific allies to build a sustainable and resilient regional order. The strategy envisions the ultimate goal of developing the Republic of Korea (ROK) as a "Global Pivotal State" – which has been the mainstay of Yoon's doctrine.

Until Yoon took office in March, South Korea's regional strategy involved hedging its bets. As a state that is highly reliant on China for its economic sustenance and the United States – its principal ally –

for its security considerations, South Korea has long avoided siding with either great power.

The difficulty of managing bilateral relations with both China and the U.S. pre-dates the Yoon administration; different governments have sought to manage the country's security versus trade dilemma, which is always influenced by the U.S.-China rivalry through various strategies – and with varying degrees of success.

To some extent, Yoon's Indo-Pacific policy is the present administration's response to the geopolitical complexities that have arisen with the intensifying great power competition and ever-widening divergence between the U.S. and China.

In line with South Korea's cautious (yet bold) positioning of itself between its two indispensable major partners, Beijing and Washington, Seoul's Indo-Pacific strategy is prudent, pragmatic and a way to enhance systematic flexibility. It also contributes to creating a balancing act against great power politics.

It highlights South Korea's plans to pursue deeper partnerships beyond China and the U.S., through Indo-Pacific partners like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Japan, Canada, Mongolia, India, Australia and New Zealand, as well as like-minded states in the Middle East, Africa (on the Indian Ocean coast), Europe and Latin America.





In other words, by expanding the country's trade, investment and security relationships beyond China and the U.S., the Yoon government is looking to preserve national and regional prosperity and stability and enhance South Korean leadership in the region.

At the same time, the strategy barely mentions China, which in itself is evidence of Seoul's determination to continue seeking a carefully calibrated balance between its largest trade partner and military ally, China and the U.S., respectively. In fact, China is recognized as a "key partner for achieving prosperity and peace in the Indo-Pacific" as Seoul aims to "nurture a sounder and more mature relationship" with Beijing that is built upon "mutual respect and reciprocity" and "guided by international norms and rules."

Seoul's plan to resume the ROK-Japan-China trilateral summit, alongside the ongoing ROK-U.S.-Japan collaboration for harmonious cooperation between the three East Asian powers consolidates the balancing act narrative.

Although Yoon indicated he would take a tough line on China during his presidential campaign, South Korea's interdependence with China makes any outright alignment with the U.S. and against China unsustainable. While the U.S. and its allies like Japan and Australia (and to some extent India) have openly criticized China's attempts to assert its maritime and territorial claims and unilaterally change the status quo, plus, its actions of violating human rights in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, South Korea has taken a more muted stance so as to avoid antagonizing China.

In other words, South Korea's Indo-Pacific strategy is constrained by the country's high export dependency, which demonstrates the limitations and risks that it faces in totally transforming its regional geopolitics and its struggle to formulate a long-term sustainable radical vision.

*“Seoul's Indo-Pacific strategy is prudent, pragmatic and a way to enhance systematic flexibility”*

However, South Korea's Indo-Pacific policy does indirectly feature the China threat and Seoul's commitment to countering it. For instance, the strategy raises concerns over Chinese military actions in the Taiwan Strait and reaffirms Seoul's commitment to peace and security in the Taiwan Strait, as a factor critical to maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula and the Indo-Pacific at large.

At the same time, the policy highlights the importance of peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, especially due to its strategic significance for sea lines of communication and trade routes.

North Korea, on the other hand, has been clearly labeled as a "serious threat to peace and stability" not just in East Asia but globally. The heightened trilateral cooperation measures with the U.S. and Japan – with which relations have been historically fraught – highlight that deterrence will remain the favored method over dialogue vis-a-vis North Korea. In that respect, the dependence on China, which has been a critical stakeholder in the negotiations between the two Koreas, will be considerably reduced.

Notably, South Korea's announcement of its Indo-Pacific policy and declaration of gradually building cooperation with the increasingly relevant Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or Quad – comprising the U.S., Japan, Australia and India – demonstrates a marked shift toward internalizing the Indo-Pacific concept. It solidifies South Korea's intent to acquire greater strategic and foreign policy autonomy, as well as to transform from a peripheral player to a central one by capitalizing on its as yet underutilized middle power status and capabilities.

Therefore, even though South Korea's strategy for a free, peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific region seems at the outset, only mildly concerned with the threat posed by China, it has taken a non-confrontational but reasonable approach. However, whether the strategy's implementation to address the North Korean and Chinese threats will be effective in practice will depend on not only geopolitical headwinds but also how well the Yoon government is able to manage the South's bilateral relationship with China and the U.S., as well as the potential contradictions between economic growth, supply chain resiliency and security.

Disclaimer: This article was originally published in Korea Times and is republished with permission.

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**Dr. Jagannath Panda** is the head of Stockholm Centre for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs at the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Sweden and a senior fellow at the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS), the Netherlands. **Mitch Shin** is an assistant editor at The Diplomat. Shin was a non-resident research fellow at the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm Korea Center.




# Lawrence Wilkerson's Recommended Reading List

It is as important as ever to expand one's understanding in a myriad of realms, including the professional, personal, political, geographical and economic. Professional reading lists are thus a vital source of trusted recommendations to help curate one's to-read lists.



We would like to introduce a short reading list recommended by Colonel (R) Lawrence Wilkerson. These slightly more 'non-traditional' recommendations were highlighted during our recent Coffee & Chat session, which is available for viewing [here](#). Wilkerson served in a variety of distinguished posts, including as Chief of Staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell and Director of the U.S. Marine Corps War College in Quantico, VA. He is presently a senior non-resident fellow at the Quincy Institute.

We hope you are inspired to pick up one (or many) of the books recommended below.


**1** **Alan Furst** is an author of historical spy novels, including his popular series *Night Soldiers* – which currently comprises 15 novels that are set in the run up to World War II, as well as during and immediately after the war. Furst is, according to Wilkerson 'a historian par excellence', and particularly focuses on bureaucratic elements around conflicts – the meshing of diplomacy and military power.



**2** A second fiction pick, **Phillip Kerr** published over 30 novels. He is best known for 14 historical detective thrillers - surrounding the protagonist Bernie Gunther, a private investigator in Berlin trying to survive the Nazi environment he finds himself in. Again, Wilkerson drew attention to the author's detail to historical accuracy.



**3** **Claude von Clausewitz's** 1832 treatise is a classic for anyone interested in strategy, but Wilkerson noted that 'if you want to know something about war, read book 8'. He also reminded us that Clausewitz was writing with his role model in mind– Napoleon – and to remember this while reading.



*Support the*

# FAOA KOREA CHAPTER

## DONATION DRIVE

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If you are interested in making a **tax-deductible** donation or endowment to the FAOA Korea Chapter, please reach out to:

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# Partners

The FAOA Korea Chapter would like to thank the following organizations for their generous support:



The **Korea-United States Alliance Foundation** is an organization committed to promoting the ROK-U.S. Alliance and the contribution of the United States Forces Korea to security and peace on the Korean Peninsula. The Foundation exists to financially support the management and operations of the Korea Defense Veterans Association; to strengthen the ROK-U.S. Alliance through programs that facilitate education, discussion and research on the Alliance; and to promote the honor and welfare of both countries' armed forces personnel and their families.



The **Korea Defense Veterans Association's** mission is to enhance the ROK-U.S. Alliance by advocating for the Alliance and supporting the people who built and serve the Alliance. KDVA seeks to enhance, advocate for, and educate about the ROK-U.S. Alliance; recognize and support service members, government civilians, and their families who have or are serving in the ROK-U.S. Alliance; serve its members with professional networking, mentoring, volunteering, and researching opportunities; honor and support the veterans who defended South Korea during the Korean War.



The **United States Embassy Association** is a private, non-government, non-appropriated employee organization, established under the rules of the U.S. Department of State for the benefit of its members. It provides activities, facilities, programs, personal services, and lodging in order to bring a little bit of America and community spirit to the lives of employees assigned abroad.



**George Mason University Korea** draws on an extraordinary combination of people, place and values to create a top institution of global higher education. The **Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter School for Peace and Conflict Resolution** is a community of faculty, students, staff, alumni, and partners with a fundamental commitment to building peace. Through the development of cutting-edge theory, research, education, and practical work, we seek to identify and address the underlying causes of conflict and provide tools for ethical and just peacebuilding on the local, national, and global stages. abroad.



The **Center for Future Defense Technology and Entrepreneurship** stands at the forefront of the global defense innovation ecosystem. As the only defense innovation hub in South Korea, we aim to advance the global defense innovation ecosystem through events, publications, strategic network partners, and in-house experts and advisors.



**The Sejong Society** is a non-partisan, and all-volunteer tax-exempt organization dedicated to informing, developing, and connecting young professionals interested and engaged in U.S.-Korea affairs. Our ultimate goal is to inspire the next generation, regardless of political and career affiliations, of Korea and Northeast Asia specialists.

# Calendar of Events

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## March 2023

- Wednesday 1st:** ROK Independence Movement Day
- Thursday 1st - Saturday 4th :** Avalon Air Show (Australia)
- Monday 13th - Thursday 23rd:** Freedom Shield
- Monday 20th - Tuesday 4th April:** Sang Yong Exercise
- Thursday 30th:** ROK-U.S. Alliance Forum featuring AMB Goldberg

## April 2023

- Tuesday 11th - Wednesday 12th :** Korea Integrated Defense Dialogue
- Friday 14th:** U.S.-Japan-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks
- Saturday 15th:** ROKMC founding Anniversary
- Saturday 22nd:** Battle of Imjin River Commemoration
- Sunday 23rd:** Battle of Gapyeong Commemoration

## May 2023

- Friday 5th:** Children's Day (ROK)
- Friday 12th:** Military Spouse Appreciation Day (U.S.)
- Saturday 13th:** Children of Fallen Patriots Day (U.S.)
- Saturday 20th:** Armed Forces Day (U.S.)
- Saturday 27th:** Buddha's Birthday (ROK)
- Monday 29th:** Memorial Day (U.S.)

# Community News

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- The FAOA Korea Chapter recently had a social in Seoul on 31 January. It was lovely to meet everyone who attended in person and we look forward to seeing you again soon.
- We would like to thank Rich Naseer, Gabriela Bernal and Hyun Jin 'Emmy' Nam for their time with the FAOA Korea Chapter. We wish them the best in all future endeavours.
- Thank you to Stella Lee for providing details on her billet on as part of the Engineer and Scientist Exchange Program in South Korea. If you would like to share your billet please get in touch by email:  
*editor.faoakc@gmail.com*
- If you would like to attend future events, including socials, coffee & chats with distinguished guests and panels, then sign up to our distro list by emailing: *SecretaryFAOAKC@gmail.com*

If you have any news to share, including personal or career achievements and upcoming events, please email [editor.faoakc@gmail.com](mailto:editor.faoakc@gmail.com)



FAOs on Tap, Seoul

# Distinguished Members

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## Sheena Chestnut Greitens

Dr. Sheena Chestnut Greitens is an Associate Professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. She has been an assistant professor of political science at the University of Missouri and was a founding co-director of MU's Institute for Korean Studies. Her work focuses on East Asia, authoritarian politics, and American national security. She holds a doctorate from Harvard University; an M.Phil from Oxford University, where she studied as a Marshall Scholar; and a bachelor's from Stanford University.



## Derek Grossman

Derek Grossman is a senior defense analyst at RAND focused on a range of national security policy and Indo-Pacific security issues. He served over a decade in the Intelligence Community, where he served as the daily intelligence briefer to the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the assistant secretary of defense for Asian & Pacific Security Affairs. He holds an M.A. from Georgetown University in U.S. National Security Policy and a B.A. from the University of Michigan in Political Science and Asian studies.



## Kongdan "Katy" Oh Hassig

Dr. Kongdan "Katy" Oh Hassig is an independent scholar. She has been a Senior Asia Specialist at the Institute for Defense Analyses, a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, and a member of the Political Science Department of the RAND Corporation. She has taught at the University of California San Diego, George Washington University, and the University of Maryland Global Campus in Asia. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Board of Directors of the U.S. Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, and the Board of Directors of the Korea Economic Institute of America. She was a founding co-director of The Korea Club of Washington, D.C.



## Soo Kim

Soo Kim is a policy analyst at the RAND Corporation and an adjunct instructor at American University. Her research interests include the Korean Peninsula, Russia, Indo-Pacific strategy, near-peer competition, decision making, propaganda, and the intelligence community. She served as an analyst in the Central Intelligence Agency and also worked at the Department of Homeland Security. Kim earned a B.A. in French from Yale University and an M.A. in International Relations/Strategic Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.



## Sung Hyun "Andrew" Kim

Sung Hyun "Andrew" Kim is a Non-Resident Fellow at Harvard's Kennedy School. Prior to this, he was a visiting scholar at Stanford University. Mr. Kim retired from the Central Intelligence Agency after 28 years of service and was the first Assistant Director of the CIA, Korea Mission Center. As the Chief of CIA Station in three major East Asian cities, Mr. Kim managed the collection, analysis, production, and distribution of information that directly affected national security. He is a recipient of the CIA Director's Award and the Presidential Rank Award.

### Heino Klinck



Heino Klinck is a former U.S. Army China FAO who last served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia. His experience includes 2+ decades abroad; leading strategy efforts in a Fortune 100 company; senior political-military roles in the Pentagon; analytical and operational responsibilities in the intelligence community; and diplomatic postings in Europe and Asia. Mr. Klinck has a B.A. and M.A. in International Relations from Boston University; an MBA from the University of London; an M.S. in Global Strategy and Security from the University of Rome; and he was awarded a Fellowship by Stanford University's Asia-Pacific Research Center.

### Mark William Lippert



The Honorable Mark William Lippert has a distinguished career in the United States government that spanned approximately two decades. From 2014-2017, he served as the U.S. ambassador and plenipotentiary to the Republic of Korea. He previously held positions in the Department of Defense, including as chief of staff to Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. He graduated from Stanford University with a B.A. in Political Science and holds an M.A. in International Policy Studies from the same institution.

### Curtis "Mike" Scaparrotti



General (Retired) Curtis "Mike" Scaparrotti led a distinguished, 41-year career in the U.S. Army, and most recently served as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Commander of U.S. European Command. Prior to this, he served as the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea/United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command. GEN(R) Scaparrotti graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, and his education includes the Command and General Staff College, the U.S. Army War College, and a Master's degree in Administrative Education from the University of South Carolina.

### Suzanne Vares-Lum



Major General (Retired) Suzanne Vares-Lum served 34 years in the U.S. Army and is President of the East-West Center. She is an influential executive with leadership and planning experience spanning the Indo-Pacific region, violent extremist organizations, and natural disasters. She most recently served for five years as one of the most senior leaders in U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and now serves as a strategic consultant and advisor. Vares-Lum received a B.A. in Journalism and an M.Ed. in Teaching from the University of Hawaii at Manoa, and a Master's degree in Strategid Studies from the U.S. Army War College.

### Major General Mark Gillette, Honorary Member

Mark Gillette is a U.S. Army major general and the Senior Army Foreign Area Officer. He has extensive experience from various political-military assignments throughout Asia. MG Gillette holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the U.S. Military Academy, a Master of Social Science from Syracuse University, and a Master of Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College. He is currently assigned as the U.S. Senior Defense Official and Defense Attaché in Cairo, Egypt.

MG Gillette advised and supported the initiatives of the co-founders of the FAOA Korea Chapter—both leading up to the organization's establishment and during its formative period. He continues to play an active role in the events and activities of the FAOA Korea Chapter today and is a key advocate for the development of its membership. In recognition of his significant contribution toward accomplishing the mission of the FAOA Korea Chapter, MG Gillette was presented Honorary Membership on July 23, 2020.



# Board Members

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**Wei C. Chou, *President***

Wei C. Chou is a U.S. Army Northeast Asia FAO. He holds a Bachelors of Science degree from the United States Military Academy and a Master of Arts degree from the University of Hawaii as an East-West Fellow. After eight years as an airborne and mechanized infantryman, Wei served across a range of FAO capacities in Hawaii, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.

Contact: [PresidentFAOAKC@gmail.com](mailto:PresidentFAOAKC@gmail.com)



**Chris Hobgood, *Vice President***

Chris Hobgood is a U.S. Army Northeast Asia FAO. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree from Lander University; a Master of Science degree from Webster University; and a Master of Arts degree from Middlebury Institute of International Studies. Chris has over 22 years of service and worked in a variety of FAO assignments by advising senior military and civilian leaders with regional expertise on the Indo Pacific region as a Security Cooperation officer, a political-military officer, and Senior Defense Official / Defense Attaché.

Contact: [VPFAOAKC@gmail.com](mailto:VPFAOAKC@gmail.com)



**Karen DeLoria, *Treasurer***

Karen DeLoria is a U.S. Army Indo-Pacific FAO. She holds an Associate in Arts in Japanese from the Defense Language Institute, a Bachelor of Arts degree in Business Administration from Cal Poly Pomona, and a Master of Science in Project Management from Missouri State. Karen has over 18 years of service including a decade of experience in the Army Engineer Regiment.

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**Josh Duran, *Secretary***

Josh "Duran" Duran is an active-duty Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the U.S. Naval Academy. After serving eight years as a Naval Intelligence Officer, he has served two additional tours in the Republic of Korea as an FAO.

Contact: [SecretaryFAOAKC@gmail.com](mailto:SecretaryFAOAKC@gmail.com)



**Adrian Romero, *Chief of Public Relations***

Adrian Romero is an active duty Warrant Officer in the U.S. Army. He holds an A.A. degree in Applied Science and is currently pursuing an M.B.A. He has over ten years of work experience in the Indo-Pacific region.

Contact: [PAOFAOAKC@gmail.com](mailto:PAOFAOAKC@gmail.com)



# Staff Members

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## **Editor in Chief**

Emily Stamp is an Editor at International SOS, working with global security teams to publish incident alerts and risk forecasts. She holds an undergraduate M.A. in Psychology from the University of St. Andrews and an M.A. in International Conflict Studies from King's College London.

## **Assistant Editor**

Apoorva Jayakumar holds a Masters degree in Global Finance and Economy from Yonsei Graduate School of International Studies. She has a keen interest in reading about Indo-Pacific strategy & policy.

## **Marketing Coordinator**

YoonJeong Choi is a student pursuing a business bachelor's degree at Purdue University in Indiana State. Her interests include IT, HoloLens, environment, space technology, and e-commerce.

## **Research Intern**

Salome Giunashvili is a recent Master's degree candidate in International Studies from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. She holds a Bachelor's degree in International Relations from Tbilisi State University. Her research interests span across several different areas involving international security, hybrid warfare and alliance politics.

## **Senior Researcher**

Amos Oh is a U.S. Army Strategist with extensive policy and planning experience. He is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and also earned an M.P.A. from the Harvard Kennedy School. He is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations at the University of Southern California.

## **Associate Researcher**

Sean McCauley is an instructor based in South Korea. He is a political science graduate of the University of Alberta with a special focus on international relations; and he has extensive background in political advocacy in Canada.

## **Graphics Designer & Social Media Assistant**

Sara La Cagnina is a Communications Coordinator who graduated with an M.A. in International Tourism from the Università Della Svizzera Italiana. She has extensive experience with digital communication and event coordination.

# About the Korea Chapter

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The FAOA Korea Chapter was founded in July 2020 in accordance with Article VII of the FAOA Charter. It is a 501(c)19 non-profit organization, consisting primarily of current and former Foreign Area Officers and International Affairs Specialists who advance the Republic of Korea-United States (ROK-U.S.) Alliance through events and activities that promote mentorship, education, research, and connection.


## Our Mission

To develop and inspire leaders engaged in the advancement of the ROK-U.S. Alliance.

## Our Core Values

- Commitment to Leader Development
- Pursuit of Inspiration

## Lines of Effort



# CALL FOR ARTICLES

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Contribute to the journal of the FAOA Korea Chapter,  
*The Joint Communiqué*,  
for the 2<sup>nd</sup> quarter of 2023.



Deadline for submissions: April 20, 2023  
Contact: [editor.faoakc@gmail.com](mailto:editor.faoakc@gmail.com)



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