

# THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE

The Official Journal for the FAOs, International Relations Specialists,  
and Partners associated with the FAOA Korea Chapter



*Korea Chapter*

# FOREIGN AREA OFFICER ASSOCIATION

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


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# A Message from Colonel Dave Banning, USMC, NE Asia Foreign Area Officer



**Dear FAOA Korea,**

It is evident from the historical record that nations with strong systems of alliances and partnerships with other like-minded nations are far more successful at avoiding and, if necessary, prevailing in times of crises than those nations without a robust network of allies and partners.

The U.S. military has long recognized this fact and has dedicated some of its most talented personnel to serve in key billets overseas with our friends and allies. While oftentimes the language and cultural expertise that these professionals develop garners most of the attention, it is important to keep in mind that language and cultural expertise are merely a means to an end to help our military forces operate more effectively together in pursuit of shared national interests.

Being able to operate together goes far beyond scoring well on a language test or being able to get around in a foreign country on your own it means nurturing a deep intellectual curiosity and dedication to understanding the institutions, the formations, and the imperatives that frame our partner nations' decisions and actions. Foreign Area Officers who understand these aspects of a partner nation and understand those same aspects of our own forces are uniquely postured to be able to provide recommendations to senior leaders on how best to train, deploy, and employ forces in support of shared national objectives.

While staff officers toil in anonymity, as the saying goes, Foreign Area Officers should welcome this toil. Very few people have the opportunity to make the kind of outsized impacts that you do not only within our own forces, but across the joint, combined, operational and strategic levels as well. I am constantly amazed at what a high quality force of dedicated professionals our Foreign Area Officer cadre represents and am humbled to be able to work alongside and learn from you. Your membership in professional organizations and participation in its activities actively strengthens the networks of our nation's and our partner nations' most valuable resource - its people.

*“Rarely has there been a time in history where understanding those around us is as important as it is now, and you are the vanguard of that effort.”*

*Semper Fidelis*

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Dave Banning".

Colonel Dave Banning  
USMC NE Asia (Japan) Foreign Area Officer



# A Message from the President



## HIGHLIGHTS

The FAOA Korea Chapter welcomes the new board of FAOA and the Chapter's new Editor-in-Chief and editing team.

\* \* \* \* \*

The Chapter hosted former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Heino Klinck for a virtual "Coffee & Chat" conversation on 17 September.

\* \* \* \* \*

On 27 October, the Chapter hosted a virtual FAO conference with the esteemed Dr. Victor Cha.

\* \* \* \* \*

On 04 November, Chapter leaders met with partners at the Sejong Society in Washington D.C. for networking and discussing joint projects.

## Dear Members, Partners, and Leaders of the FAOA Korea Chapter,

I write this edition's message to you with a heavy heart. As a small organization centered around one of our most vital alliances, for me, as with many other veterans that committed so much to Afghanistan, the past few months have been a rollercoaster of emotions and reflection.

I reinforce the message that so many senior leaders have echoed that for many fellow servicemen and women, this has been a trying time. Please do consider reaching out to those you are close with - or even those you are not - to check in on them. For many, the shoulder of a fellow brother or sister-in-arms that has been there will offer more comfort than any therapeutic credential. I offer myself to anyone that wants to talk or if anyone wants to know more about the myriad resources that are out there for veterans.

I would also like to humbly offer a different perspective on how to look at the fall of Afghanistan. Even if they escape the fickle attentions of the news cycle, the images and memories are permanently engraved upon the hearts of those that fought and sacrificed there. Rather than forget those images, for the professionals engaged with our allies every day, I offer this:

Remember those images and that which has befallen those left behind. Let the fall of a nation and its people serve as a constant reminder of the seriousness of our profession. This is why we plan. This is what is at stake should those plans fail. This is why it is necessary to reassure our allies that have committed themselves to fight alongside us. This is why candor and honor are of utmost importance in every communication and report we make. And to re-emphasize a cliched adage - when we fail, people die.

In closing, I could not help but to share a quotation from WWII concentration camp survivor, Victor Frankl:

*“ We who have come back, by the aid of many lucky chances or miracles – whatever one may choose to call them – we know: the best of us did not return. ”*

I wish you all the best in your work at hand. As always, we welcome your contributions to better serve, inform, and empower the members of our specialized community.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Wei C. Chou'.

Wei C. Chou  
President, FAOA Korea Chapter

# A Message from the Editors

## Dear Readers,

We would like to introduce the final issue of the Joint Communiqué for 2021.

Firstly, we sincerely appreciate our contributors for their articles as always. It is one of our privileges working and communicating with contributors who are interested in publishing their stories through our journal. Also, we would like to extend our gratitude to our colleagues who voluntarily work to create our journal and maintain its high, professional, standard - our board members, graphic designers and researchers.

Since our previous issue, the United States has withdrawn from Afghanistan and South Korea is getting closer to election time. Both North and South Korea have conducted missile launches, amidst increasing tensions, heightened by the Fall 2021 ROK-U.S. Combined Command Post Training.

The two leading articles of this issue focus on the implications of President Joe Biden's abrupt U.S. withdrawal of troops and the evacuation of civilians from Afghanistan in August 2021 sending a message to the world. Lt. Gen (RET). Chun In Bum begins by emphasizing the need to strengthen the ROK-U.S. alliance and reassure South Koreans regarding the potential pull-out of USFK. Deployed to Iraq in 2004 and commanding the ROK Special Forces until his retirement in 2016, Chun draws from his personal experiences to elucidate the perspective and emotional psychology of South Koreans, who have historically depended on the U.S. for safety and deterrence. David Maxwell, a retired U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel who spent

more than 20 years in Asia, further delves into the takeaways U.S. threats may gain and exploit from U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Focusing specifically on North Korea and the potential negative impact on the ROK-U.S. alliance from a Noncombatant Evacuation Order, David points to the necessity of considering such possibilities for future preparation.

Next, Gabriela Bernal, a PhD candidate at the University of North Korean Studies, elaborates on the steady decline of inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korean relations since the Hanoi Summit.

As Gabriela identifies ROK-U.S. joint military exercises as one of the key issues of contention for North Korean denuclearization, our research interns Hyun Jin (Emmy) Nam and Salome Giunashvili, have analyzed these exercises from the U.S., South Korean, and North Korean perspectives amidst changing military and political settings.


Then, Josh Duran, an active-duty Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy, provides a specific update on the ROK's efforts to improve military defense capabilities through the development of the navy's light aircraft carrier.

This November issue closes with a special biographic article by COL (Ret) Jim Young, the first Korean FAO. As he details his journey, he affirms that his experiences were instrumental for his later success and stresses that he was simply "doing his part."

With best wishes,

The Editorial Team

## STAFF EDITORS




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# One Hundred Serpents for the Garden of Eden

Korean concerns after Afghanistan. *By Lt. Gen (RET) Chun In Bum*

**I**t seemed as if the United States would be in Afghanistan forever, but as news reports of the U.S. withdrawal started to reach Korean news outlets, it was relieving to learn that the U.S., and many of my friends, had finally left and come to terms with the realities of Afghanistan.

As a Korean Military officer, I attended the U.S. Army War College from 2002-2003 and witnessed the U.S go to war. I also served in Baghdad at the MNF-I (Multi-National Force-Iraq) Headquarters (2005), went to Kabul for a mission and was at the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) Headquarters (2007) for a short period.

Given my experiences, which most Koreans do not have, I could clearly see the many difficulties surrounding the situation in Afghanistan, and that is why I supported the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan.

Subsequently, as the news of the disorderly withdrawal came to light and the sudden disintegration of the Afghan military came into focus, it resulted in a series of criticisms and emotional reactions from all over the world. This was especially true in Korea.

Although the U.S. has explained that it will not withdraw its troops from the ROK, and emphasized the importance of its alliance with the ROK, Koreans have a unique perspective of the situation in Afghanistan. These views come from historical experience and their reliance on the U.S. for security.

When the ROK was liberated from Japan, the U.S. seemed to have had no clear vision of its role in Asia. By 1948, the U.S. decided that it had no national interests on the Korean Peninsula and made a decision to withdraw U.S. forces from the ROK.



A U.S. Marine assigned to 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) provides over-watch during an evacuation at Hamid Karzai International Airport, Kabul, Afghanistan, August 21, 2021. Credit: LCpl. Nicholas Guevara/U.S. Marine Corps



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The South Koreans begged the U.S. not to leave, to no avail. When the ROK military requested for weapons to defend themselves, their request was denied. Within a year of the withdrawal, the North Korean government, with the backing of Stalin and Mao, attacked the ROK. The Korean War cost the ROK a million lives, and the U.S. 37,000. The U.S. withdrawal, the subsequent war, and the constant threat posed by North Korea has made the ROK believe that U.S. military presence is key to deterrence and the safety of their country.

During the immediate years after the Korean War, many South Koreans survived on food left-over from U.S. bases. There was a saying that “Even American dung smelled sweet.” To the average Korean, the U.S. was almighty and could do no wrong. The U.S. much like with Afghanistan, left Vietnam with “honor.” When the North Vietnamese attacked South Vietnam, the U.S. Congress ignored President Ford’s pleas for assistance to South Vietnam.

The sight of the last Huey helicopter leaving the rooftop of the U.S. embassy in Saigon is a sight imprinted in the minds of my generation. Since the end of the Korean War, U.S. military presence has assisted South Korean economic wealth and led the ROK to significantly contribute to the world economy. But during the same period, U.S. military presence has also been gradually reduced and, more often than not, the ROK was not fully consulted.



U.S. Air Force pararescuemen, 83rd Expeditionary Rescue Squadron, provide security during a mission in Afghanistan, November 7, 2012. Credit: TSgt Jonathan Snyder/ U.S. Air Force

Although South Korea has grown economically and prides itself with a capable military, it faces a nuclear weapon state: North Korea. North Korea is supported by China and shares mutual interests with Russia as well. For South Koreans, unless we have a nuclear deterrent of our own, the extended deterrence provided by the U.S. is critical. The guarantee of this deterrence is United States Forces Korea (USFK), but it has been gradually decreasing. From the ROK’s perspective, U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula is visual evidence of the U.S. commitment to Korea.

Listening to the Koreans who escaped from Kabul, it seems that they were totally caught off-guard regarding any plans to withdraw. It seems that even U.S. embassy staff were unaware of the exact withdrawal plans. The main reason for this suggests a total miscalculation of the capabilities of the Afghan government and military. How could the United States be so unaware of the realities of the Afghan security forces? To the Koreans who can recall the bad experience in 1949 and the uncomfortable memories of 1975, to see Kabul in 2021 brings fear and controversy. What is more worrisome is what adversaries like North Korea, Iran, China and Russia must be concluding from these events.

As for now, what is done is done.

*“The nightmare of Afghanistan isn’t over.”*

U.S. credibility has been damaged and the developing story in Afghanistan is only going to increase the concerns of South Koreans.

Human rights abuses in Afghanistan, ranging from public executions to the violation of basic women’s rights, are a reminder of the consequences that will come if the ROK ever falls under the rule of North Korea. Add these images of misery to those of the Vietnamese boat people and the massacres of the Killing Fields of Cambodia, and it is natural that this will give South Koreans a good scare. Its manpower level is an important indicator that Koreans can relate to and tangibly see, but the quality and capabilities of the USFK must be continuously improved to include Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). In order to reassure Koreans, the first thing the U.S. must do is to provide strong and supportive statements towards the ROK-U.S. Alliance. Secondly, the USFK must be maintained and strengthened.

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Third, the U.S. needs to discuss, in greater detail, the operations of extended deterrence. Koreans need to know the process, procedures, and decision points of extended deterrence that will be provided in a contingency. Finally, the U.S. must modernize its nuclear force. American nuclear weapons are more than fifty years old- most of which are strategic weapons designed for Cold War era scenarios.

“Although nobody is saying it, U.S. allies are thinking, “can we trust the U.S. as an ally?” and its enemies are thinking, “America can be defeated.”

The Korean Peninsula might require a precision nuclear strike that only an air-dropped B61-12 now provides. Tactical ballistic nuclear missiles and cruise missiles are options that would not only be a deterrent but also a strong message to North Korea. We, South Koreans, have very little choice or no choice at all when it comes to choosing allies. Who else can the ROK rely on to guarantee our way of life except the U.S.?

The only other option is for the U.S. and the international community to accept the failure of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to prevent North Korea from becoming a nuclear weapon state and consider the arming of the ROK, Japan, and Taiwan with nuclear deterrents of their own. The nightmare of Afghanistan isn't over.

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**Lt. Gen. Chun In Bum** graduated from the Korea Military Academy. He commanded the ROK Special Forces and retired in 2016 with the rank of Lieutenant General. Gen. Chun served at all levels of command in combat units with thirteen months on the Eastern mountains of the Korean DMZ. Gen. Chun studied at the US Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk VA and the US Army War College, Carlisle PA where he received a Masters Degree in Military Strategy. He also has a Ph.D. in Political Science from Kyungnam University, Korea.

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# What Kim Jong-Un May Learn From Biden's Chaotic Afghanistan Exit

An analysis on what North Korea could exploit, and how to prevent it. *By David Maxwell*

As the dust is settling from the fallout of the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, Americans and allies will be conducting after-action reviews to determine what went wrong even as efforts by the State Department and myriad veteran, private, and non-governmental organizations continue to ensure no one is left behind.

The revisionist and rogue powers and violent extremist organizations will also be examining what happened to determine what they can exploit in the future. While the U.S. conducts its post-mortem it is important to discern what lessons adversaries will take from the recent events.

Of the five major threats to the U.S., North Korea would seem the least likely to exploit what has taken place. However, to overlook what Kim might do would be a strategic error. Fortunately, Robert Collins has already provided a very important assessment of the likely guidance Kim Jong-un is providing to the Workers Party of Korea and the North Korean People's Army. However, there is one specific area that requires some consideration by policymakers and strategists: How can the Kim family regime support its political warfare strategy by creating the conditions to cause the U.S. to decide to evacuate non-combatants from South Korea?

There is an overarching lesson from the recent Afghanistan situation

that both the U.S. and North Korea can draw when it comes to Noncombatant Evacuation Order (NEO) Operations and that is there are two related two imperatives: first is an early decision to execute will increase the chance of a successful evacuation. Second, is that noncombatants must be withdrawn before the military withdraws. In [South Korea, NEO operations](#) are complex and require a much greater effort than just took place in Afghanistan. Specifically for Korea, these two imperatives can be translated to mean there must be an early decision to evacuate before the ROK/U.S. combined military forces are engaged in defending South Korea from an attack by the North. While this appears to be a logical and prudent lesson it is one that Kim Jong-un can exploit in ways not generally considered and it can be done without ultimately going to war.

Kim is facing [a range of complex domestic problems](#): defense against COVID,

a failed economy, natural disasters, external information influencing unrest among the population, and international sanctions.

He is cracking down on the Korean people in the north with draconian population and resources control measures. He has closed the borders with China and Russia as a COVID mitigation measure and this has led to further damage to the already failed economy.

To maintain control inside North Korea it is necessary to ensure the people know they must sacrifice to contribute to defending against the threat.

The regime's consistent propaganda has engrained this into all Koreans in the north. The regime's strategy toward the ROK/U.S. alliance is a sophisticated [political warfare strategy](#) that is based on [subversion, coercion/extortion \(blackmail diplomacy\) and the use of force](#) to dominate the Korean peninsula to ensure regime survival. One of the major lines of effort is to split the ROK/U.S. alliance with the intent to give the North a superior balance of combat power. Based on what happened in Afghanistan, Kim Jong-un may sense a new course of action that will both subvert the South and drive a wedge in the ROK/U.S. alliance as well as ensure the Korean people in the North see the continued threat from the South. Conducting NEO in South Korea is not only a complex operation, the effects of the decision to conduct it are such that



North Korea as seen from the DMZ. Credit: D. Myles Cullen





Kim Jong-Un. Courtesy of KCNA

the ROK economy will be significantly weakened as confidence in the security of the ROK is undermined.

This will in turn bring great stress on the South Korean political system. Traditionally, the military, which is responsible for NEO execution, will request an early decision so that noncombatants can be moved out of harm's way and so that dual apportioned military capabilities will be ready to support combat operations when the war commences. The Chief of Mission, who has the responsibility and authority to order the evacuation, will be reluctant to do so too early because if he or she miscalculates it will have severe economic and political consequences for the alliance. However, based on what occurred in Afghanistan Kim may believe that when faced with an increased threat from the North the U.S. may be more likely to conduct a premature evacuation with the attendant consequences.

Kim may be willing to present the alliance with the appearance of the road to war to achieve

the objectives of undermining the legitimacy of the ROK and damaging the alliance.

Once the U.S. makes the decision to conduct NEO and the ROK economy collapses, Kim could deescalate the situation and watch as the ROK blames the U.S. for its potentially severely damaged economy.

Experts may be critical of presenting this scenario, but it is necessary for three reasons. The first is to prevent a failure of imagination which is the cause of significant intelligence failures. The second is to inoculate the Korean and American people from this possible strategy. It is imperative that if Kim does execute such actions that the press, political leaders, and population understand what Kim may be doing and support the decisions of national leaders. The third and most important reason for presenting this is to heed Sun Tzu's important advice: What is of supreme importance is to attack the enemy's strategy. By understanding and exposing the potential strategy the alliance can effectively undermine Kim's efforts and protect the alliance.

“Once the U.S. makes the decision to conduct NEO and the ROK economy collapses, Kim could deescalate the situation and watch as the ROK blames the U.S. for its potentially severely damaged economy.”

*This article originally appeared in [1945](#).*

David Maxwell, now a 1945 Contributing Editor, is a retired US Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 20 years in Asia. He is the editor of Small Wars Journal and a non-resident senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

David Maxwell will also be joining us for a "Coffee & Chat" in January.



Republic of Korea President Moon Jae-in meets with North Korean State Affairs Committee Chairman Kim Jong Un at the military demarcation line, April 27, 2018. Credit: ROK Ministry of Unification

# The limits of Inter-Korean cooperation

The current state of Inter-Korean Cooperation, and potential futures. *By Gabriela Bernal*

South Korean President Moon Jae-in has made it his top priority to engage with North Korea ever since he first took office in 2017. Although much effort was put into improving bilateral ties early in his term, relations between the two Koreas have been on the decline for the past two years. In a turn for the worst, recent missile tests by both North and South have further dampened the chances of fruitful diplomacy in the remainder of Moon's term.

Moon wasted no time on the North Korean issue soon after he was sworn in as President in 2017. The overall mood on the Peninsula was tense, with North Korea conducting its sixth nuclear test in the September of that year. However, Moon pushed forward and used the February 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics as an opportunity and platform to bolster inter-Korean ties. And so he did. What started off

with sports soon expanded to official meetings between the two Korean leaders.

The first such meeting in eleven years, took place in April 2018, at Panmunjom – a border village on the South Korean side. That day, Kim Jong Un became the first North Korean leader to ever set foot on South Korean soil. It seemed like a big win; a true step forward in repairing the long strained relations between the two sides.

Kim's visit was followed up by Moon's trip to Pyongyang in September,

where he addressed an enthusiastic crowd of 150,000. The two leaders seemed to be getting along well and hope for renewed peace efforts echoed on both sides of the border. After the meeting, the two leaders released a joint declaration, in which they agreed to explore ways to further advance exchanges, cooperation and other measures to bring long-term peace to the peninsula.

Although the mood on the Korean Peninsula seemed optimistic, North Korea's nuclear problem is not one limited to the two Koreas alone. No matter how much internal and bilateral progress is made, truly establishing a long-term peace regime on the peninsula requires the cooperation of other actors as well. Chief among them is the U.S. Given that the Korean War Armistice Agreement was signed between the U.S. and North Korea (and China)—not between North Korea and South Korea—the only way to put an end to this seventy-plus-year long war is through progress in U.S.-North Korea relations.

When negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang collapsed

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in Hanoi in 2019, this not only affected U.S.-North Korea relations but also resulted in a stalemate between the two Koreas. Inter-Korean economic projects such as trans-border railroads had to be put on halt. The situation worsened when Pyongyang reacted strongly to balloons filled with ‘anti-propaganda’ leaflets being flown across the border, resulting in North Korea blowing up the newly built inter-Korean liaison office in the North’s Kaesong region.

### Steady decline

Ever since the liaison office incident, bilateral relations between the two Koreas have continued to go downhill. Despite Seoul’s offers of humanitarian assistance during the pandemic, Pyongyang has consistently declined and has returned to its old behavior of name-calling and provocations. Although the inter-Korean hotlines were briefly restored in July, North Korea cut off communication soon after due to the U.S.-ROK joint military drills. Although the hotline has been restored since, there’s no telling when Pyongyang will unilaterally cut off communication once again.

A more recent issue plaguing inter-Korean relations, however, are missile developments by both sides. Although the international community is used to North Korea’s frequent missile testing, news of South Korea’s first submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) test was less anticipated. South Korea became the first country without nuclear weapons to launch an SLBM. South Korea’s presidential office said in a statement that the ROK military had also developed other new missiles,

including a supersonic cruise missile to be deployed in the near future, and a new ballistic missile that has “overwhelming counterattack capability” by firing a larger warhead. “Through the successful test we have shown that we have sufficient deterring capability to counter North Korean provocations at any time,” Moon said after the test.

North Korea’s Kim Yo Jong was quick to respond to the tests the same day, warning of the “complete destruction of inter-Korean ties” and criticized Seoul’s “illogical, antiquated and foolish attitude”, according to North Korean state media.

### Moving forward

Despite the ups and downs, however, President Moon is vowing to continue striving to promote peace with North Korea through dialogue until the end of his term next May. As part of his efforts to ease tensions on the peninsula, Moon has been calling for an end-of-war declaration to finally end the Korean War, which ended with an armistice, not a peace treaty.

The proposed end-of-war declaration topped the agenda in recent trilateral meetings between the U.S, ROK, and Japan, with Washington confirming its willingness to discuss the topic in more detail. Less than a year, however, is unlikely to be enough time to make enough progress to achieve such goals. It will thus likely be up to the next South Korean president to make significant long-term gains on the issue. The current Democratic Party nominee for president and current frontrunner in the polls, Lee Jae-myung, has said he would handle

North Korea in a “pragmatic” way. According to Lee, he plans to “inherit and develop” the policies of Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun and other proponents of the Sunshine Policy that advocated for engagement with North Korea. In order to achieve this, he wants to get sanctions exemptions from the UN for the two Koreas to finally be able to implement the many inter-Korean projects proposed under the Moon administration as well as to possibly revive old ones like the Kaesong Industrial Complex.

Although it’s too early to predict who the next South Korean president will be, dealing with North Korea is unlikely to get any easier. A fine line must be walked between engagement and deterrence, while continued cooperation with key allies like the U.S. and Japan remains essential to achieve long-term progress. The North Korea issue is not limited to the Korean Peninsula alone but affects the entire region. Continued multilateral talks are thus necessary as is the need to maintain consistent signaling towards North Korea as well as efforts at direct engagement with Pyongyang in order to slowly start building up a foundation of trust that has been lacking for decades.

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**Gabriela Bernal** is a PhD candidate at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul. She is also a freelance writer, with her articles having appeared in various publications. She holds two MAs, one in human rights from Sciences Po Paris and one in international peace and security from King's College London.

“Recent missile tests by both North and South have further dampened the chances of fruitful diplomacy”



# Joint Military Exercises: National Defence or Hostility?

Different perceptions of the U.S.-ROK Joint Military Exercises.

*By Hyun Jin (Emmy) Nam & Salome Giunashvili*

Ever since the Hanoi Summit, relations between the U.S. and North Korea have gradually deteriorated due to one central issue: U.S.-ROK joint military exercises. While the U.S. and South Korea continue to practice annual joint military drills based on overlapping strategic and security interests, North Korea has made it blatantly clear that it will not approach bilateral nuclear talks with the U.S. until these perceived signs of hostility are halted. As North Korea continues developing WMDs (Weapons of Mass Destruction) and provocative missile testing, it proposes that the U.S.-ROK joint military exercises must end before dialogue can begin. Although both the U.S. and South Korea are skeptical of North Korea's strategies and long term goals, both countries should keep seeking new ways to restore diplomatic relations with North Korea.

Since President Moon Jae-in's inauguration, his administration has displayed a strong determination to engineer Inter-Korean solutions and reestablish channels for dialogue and cooperation between the two Koreas. Initially, Seoul's dovish tone coincided with Washington's desire to adopt a more proactive approach and revive talks on the denuclearization process with North Korea. Consequently, the U.S. and South Korea previously agreed to suspend a

series of U.S.-ROK military exercises in 2018 and 2019, including Vigilant Ace in December 2019 and the annual Key Resolve and Foal Eagle joint military drills in March 2019. However, "step by step, simultaneous action" towards denuclearization ultimately failed after the Hanoi summit due to the lack of trust and security between the U.S. and North Korea. Although North Korea has demonstrated a new willingness to begin Inter-Korean dialogue, the intentions behind North Korea's action are being questioned.

Unlike its previous strategies aimed at engagement with Washington, North Korea increasingly points to the U.S. as a hindrance to peace on the Korean peninsula. It has reversed its traditional "*Tong-mi-bong-nam*" strategy, which refers to "engage the U.S. and block South Korea," to focus on driving a wedge between U.S.-ROK relations by engaging South Korea and blocking the U.S. North Korea restored the Inter-Korean military hotlines on July 27 - which had been severed since the destruction of the Kaesong Complex in 2020 - but this connection abruptly ended on August 10, after the annual U.S.-ROK military exercises went ahead. However, after President Moon Jae-in's proposal for an "end of war declaration" at the United Nations General Assembly in October, Kim Jong-un made the first move, extending an olive branch by once again restoring the Inter-Korean hotline for communication with South Korea. Yet, while North Korea demonstrates willingness to develop dialogue with South Korea, this is contingent on South Korea's "attitude."

Pyongyang's ramped-up rhetoric against joint military exercises puts a strain on the U.S.-ROK alliance and contributes to a challenging strategic environment in the region. Therefore, putting the U.S.-ROK military exercises into perspective is of critical importance to assess their



ROK/U.S. Combined Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Field Training Exercise at Daegu Air Base, South Korea, April 20, 2017. Credit: TSgt. Alex Fox Echols/U.S. Air Force

## ANALYSIS



ROK/U.S. Combined Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Field Training Exercise at Daegu Air Base, South Korea, April 20, 2017. Credit: TSgt. Alex Fox Echols/U.S. Air Force

ramifications within the broader context of South Korean security and defense strategies. Given that the alliance with the U.S. remains the central element of South Korea's defense policy, joint military exercises are necessary in order to enhance U.S.-ROK interoperability. From a military perspective, the complexity of joint drills allows South Korean military personnel to heighten their level of skill and strategic preparedness, thus ensuring greater joint defense capabilities. Moreover, as South Korea actively seeks to regain Wartime Operational Control (OPCON) over South Korean armed forces from the U.S., enhancing U.S.-ROK joint military training is of pivotal importance. However, this requirement comes with the risk that the continuation of large-scale military exercises may trigger North Korean conventional provocations and jeopardize diplomatic efforts to achieve Inter-Korean peace.

Despite the U.S. and South Korea's denial of any hostile policy towards North Korea, Kim Jong-un has clearly expressed the presence of 28,500 USFK troops in South Korea and the annual U.S.-ROK joint military exercises are perceived as a sign of hostility. Contrasting the lack of foreign troops on North Korean territory to the presence of USFK troops in South Korea, North Korea continues to assert that it faces "hostile acts everyday." While North Korea strategically expresses willingness to engage in diplomatic relations with South Korea, the precondition of putting a halt to U.S.-ROK military exercises has framed Washington as an obstacle to peace on the Korean peninsula.

**Hyun Jin (Emmy) Nam** is a FAOA Korea Research Intern, a recent graduate from Yonsei University with a Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies from Yonsei University. She has internship experience in the Internal Political Unit of the US Embassy in the Republic of Korea, and was awarded second place in the ASEAN-Korea Academic Essay Competition.

**Salome Giunashvili** is a FAOA Research Intern and a Master's degree candidate in International Studies from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. She holds a Bachelor's degree in International Relations from Tbilisi State University. Her research interests span across several different areas involving international security, hybrid warfare and alliance politics.

In response to North Korea's recent strategies to approach South Korea, U.S. intelligence officer Sydney Seiler argued that the North does not seek a permanent relationship with South Korea but is attempting to decouple the U.S.-ROK alliance to potentially invade South Korea. Stressing that the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea is a sign of commitment, Seiler advocated for international support to plainly convey that North Korea will never be accepted as a nuclear-owning state. Similarly South Korean conservatives argue that North Korea must make significant steps toward denuclearization first, while on the other hand liberals in South Korea are optimistic that Moon's "end-of-war declaration" is an opportunity to make progress with North Korea on the stalled peace process.

“While North Korea demonstrates willingness to develop dialogue with South Korea, this is contingent on South Korea's “attitude.””

As North Korea vies to become a de facto nuclear weapons state, the ongoing controversy over the U.S.-ROK joint exercises point to a larger question: is the annual military exercise a necessary component for South Korean security, or a symbol of U.S.-ROK alliance? If the answer is the latter, it may be time for South Korea to consider finding a less provocative method of national defense, while maintaining a strong alliance with the U.S. Regardless of whether South Korea continues with Moon's two-track approach of pressure and dialogue or takes a more hawkish stance with an alternative strategy, the opportunity to work towards peace on the Korean peninsula is now.

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# FAOA KOREA CHAPTER

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# Seeing Blue

## The ROK Navy's Light Aircraft Carrier Program

*By Josh Duran*

No other military technology platform captivates one's imagination the way an aircraft carrier does. The enormous size of the platform coupled with the complexity of executing maritime flight operations convey a sense of national confidence and strength that very few other weapons systems can come close to replicating. The sophistication of modern aircraft carriers also permit multi-mission capabilities across a broad range of the operational continuum. It is precisely these characteristics that have appealed to decision-makers in the Republic of Korea (ROK) and have propelled it on its journey to become one of the few countries globally capable of operating an aircraft carrier. The conception of the ROK aircraft carrier program – known as CV eXperimental (CVX) - is part of a multi-decade program to shift focus from the Korean Peninsula towards external strategic and security priorities. Driven by demographic challenges and changes in the threat environment, the ROK has undergone a significant shift in its defense structure and budget prerogatives.

*“This is a significant increase in capabilities and is an immutable symbol of the navy's transformation from a green water force fielded to perform coastal defense to a force capable of blue water operations in the global maritime commons”*

Considering its geography as a peninsular nation, the evolution of the North Korean threat, and the recent moves by neighboring East Asian countries to modernize and develop their navies, one of the key beneficiaries of this defense-oriented shift is the ROK Navy.

Over the last twenty years respective ROK government administrations have pushed through a sequence of defense reform programs. These sought to reduce the overall manpower required of the respective service branches, while leveraging advances in technology and ROK indigenous defense systems engineering to increase the sophistication of their military forces. The result has been increased expenditure on the navy and its platforms, and their increased say in ROK defense discussions in a traditionally army dominated military culture.

Nested within larger defense reform is the ROK Navy's Navy Vision 2045. Released in 2019, the document outlines six key lines of effort for the force and provides several specific examples of how the navy will support the lines of effort. Given the maritime nexus of kinetic provocations perpetrated by North Korea in the present age - including the naval skirmishes of the early 2000s near the Northern Limit Line in the West Sea as well as the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan by a North Korean submarine in 2010 - advancing national naval defense capabilities is critical for the ROK. The changing security landscape in the region induced by the naval modernization of neighboring countries, like China and Japan, lends additional credibility to the argument that developing domestic naval capabilities is in the ROK's long-term strategic interest. While the ROK made great strides over the preceding decade and a half in terms of advancing capabilities through its indigenous KDX-III destroyers and KSS-III submarine program, these efforts are but a prelude to a grander ambition for the fleet.

The ROK seeks to field a domestically produced “light aircraft carrier” capable of supporting short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) combat aircraft in addition to other naval aviation platforms by 2032. This is a significant increase in capabilities and is an immutable symbol of the navy's transformation from a green water force fielded to perform coastal defense to a force capable of blue water operations in the global maritime commons.

## ANALYSIS

The expectation is that naval platforms and programs, both existing and in development, will be used to create a unique carrier strike group formation to support ROK defense objectives.

The initiative to build a domestic light aircraft carrier has come front and center, and the current concepts under development were highlighted in the 12th iteration of the ROK-hosted International Maritime Defense Industry Exhibition (MADEX), held in Busan in June of this year. The two competing models on display were produced by Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) – a ship builder with over 40 years of naval experience - and Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (DSME). Both companies have formed partnerships with reputed international companies; HHI with the U.K.'s Babcock International and DSME with Italy's Fincantieri. These partnerships are in addition to other agreements these two shipbuilding giants forged with other parts of the Korean domestic defense industry.

The expectation is that regardless of which of the two concepts is selected, the carrier will be capable of supporting the flight operations of approximately twenty F-35Bs. Coupled with this, current mock-ups show features like a well deck for unmanned underwater vehicles, an indented rear flight deck to support drone operations, as well as the ROK's indigenous vertical launch system for offensive/defensive missile systems.

Given the relative size of the ROK Navy vis-à-vis other major players in the region, investing in platforms capable of a broad range of operations is a must.

Despite notable progress, the ROK's CVX program is still in its infancy stages. Partnerships with experienced foreign partners will help overcome common hurdles in the development of a domestic maritime aviation capability. The ROK will additionally benefit from its experience operating rotary wing platforms from its Dokdo-class amphibious assault ships. Sustained domestic support for the program and coherence of a vision for its use will immensely impact ultimate success. The pronounced global strategic interests of the ROK and the change in the security landscape mean that a competent blue water force is beneficial for the ROK and for the region.

*The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the FAOA, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.*

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**Josh "Duran" Duran** is an active-duty Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the U.S. Naval Academy. After serving eight years as a Naval Intelligence Officer, he has served two additional tours in the Republic of Korea as an FAO.



A conceptual sketch of the ROK Navy Vision 2045 fleet. Credit: ROK Navy

# The First Korea FAO

## Reflections on the origin of the Korea FAOs

*By James 'Jim' Young*

**T**here is nothing special about myself, I'm just a simple Oklahoma guy who joined the Army after ROTC at Oklahoma University, commissioned in 1963. My first tour was in Korea as a platoon leader, then back to the U.S., and then to Vietnam with the 1st Infantry Division, where I served as an operations officer and company commander.

I had planned to leave the Army after Vietnam, so it was a surprise to get selected for FAS (Foreign Area Specialist) training and graduate school. I entered the FAS program in January 1970, went to the Defense Language Institute-Monterey for Korean language training, the University of Southern California for grad school, then to Korea for Phase 3 FAS training (in-region training now) under the auspices of the Defense Attaché Office. The Defense Attache (DATT) at the time was COL Don Hiebert, who gave me carte blanche to start the Korea FAS training program. At the time, there was no template for Phase 3 training, so I made it up as I went along. First, I considered a missionary school to improve language capability, but it did not work as they thought that because I was assigned to the Embassy, I might work in intelligence (very perceptive...).

I even went to Ewha Women's University, which had a well-known Korean language program. It was fun, but not very productive intellectually. After that, I just traveled all over Korea and East Asia.



In those days, it was difficult - bad roads, poor *yogwans* (Korean style hotels), etc. - but I had fun blazing new trails. I took my son, Boe, on the back of my motorcycle on a couple of trips, and we still remember those days fondly. My best trip during that time was walking from the DMZ on the east coast all the way to Pohang in the south of the Peninsula. I wore out two sets of boots, spent nights on the ground, in the mountains along the east coast, and even stayed with monks in a couple of Buddhist temples.

I told the DATT that the travel was good, but we probably needed a more focused program. I was not the right guy to do it, but he looked me right in the eye and said, "You are exactly the right guy to do it!" So as I was leaving for a job on the Army Staff, I left a well-constructed plan: focusing on enhanced but functional language training, better focused travel, and integrated on-the-job training with ROK Army (ROKA) counterparts. Over the years, some of this was implemented while other aspects faded away. After that, I spent 3 years on the Army Staff and returned to Korea after Command and General Staff College (CGSC). I was now an Assistant Army Attache (A/ARMA) and could influence the training program better. The DATT was Roland Rogers, and we immediately hit it off. The FAS (now renamed as FAO) program was better resourced and we had good officers coming into it. I mentored Gordon Cucullu and several others that would go on to have amazing careers. We discussed having incoming FAOs to attend the ROKA Staff College, so we established that relationship for the first time. It worked well at the time, but attendance has since fluctuated due to accreditation issues. From my perspective, it was the perfect springboard for Korea FAOs to establish contacts and knowledge about ROKA tactics and operations, and I encourage FAOs to attend foreign schools and training programmes.

My time as an A/ARMA was exciting. After COL Rogers left, COL Don Blottie became the DATT. He was a good officer, but not a 'Korea guy', so I became the main reporting officer. This was the most interesting time to possibly be an attaché. We went through a presidential assassination, the Chun Doo Hwan coup, and then the pro-democracy movements in Kwangju, in which I was deeply involved.



## REFLECTION

I knew Chun both by reputation and personally, and Rho Tae Woo, who replaced Chun as president, I knew better yet. I have to briefly advertise my book *Eye on Korea*, which includes all the details from these events and chapters on the 12/12 coup, the Kwangju incident, and the subsequent fallout. It is available at most libraries and was a best seller in South Korea. I receive no profits from the book proceeds, as they all go to charity.

After that assignment, I spent four years teaching as a department head at CGSC, then as the DOD Assistant for Korea working for Casper Weinberger, a wonderful gentleman and Secretary of Defense during the Reagan Administration.

*“Encourage FAOs to attend foreign schools and training programmes.”*

Later, I finished my Army career as DATT in South Korea working for Jim Lilley and Don Gregg, two very competent and effective Ambassadors. I retired in 1990 after 28 years of service. Bill McKinney replaced me as DATT and served much longer than myself as a FAO. He would go on to have a much longer career of service in the region.

Shortly after leaving the Army, I was asked by General Dick Stilwell, former Commander-in-Chief in Korea (famously during the North Korean axe murder incidents) and later Deputy Secretary of Defense for Policy, to accompany him to North Korea. It was a ground-breaking trip, unprecedented at the time and we were able to meet with the senior leadership of the DPRK.

After retirement, I started my own company and ran an international business consulting firm for several years; retiring for the last time 20 years ago. My FAO training, experience and contacts were instrumental in my later business success and I urge all Korea FAOs to expand your horizons,

learn some business skills and "language", and remember that we all tell each other the truth in the military, but the business world and other spheres are sometimes different.

My sons are now also retired, but I have 3 grandchildren serving in Joint Special Operations Command, 82nd Airborne, and a to be determined infantry unit. We are still doing our part. I occasionally get back to Korea, but not often.

If you have questions about the early part of the Korea FAO program, or anything else, email me at [jvy@mindspring.com](mailto:jvy@mindspring.com).



The whole view of the Seoul Station Overpass with the Mallijae-Toegy-ro section under construction in 1975. Credit: Seoul Metropolitan Government

**COL (Ret) James V. Young** was the first Korea FAO. His service included assignments as Assistant for Korea to the Secretary of Defense and Defense and Army Attaché to Korea. He was an Embassy attaché and firsthand observer during the Pak assassination, the 12/12 incident, and the Kwangju tragedy. His book *"Eye on Korea: An Insider Account of Korean-American Relations"* was a best seller in Korea.



# Partners

The FAOA Korea Chapter would like to thank the following organizations for their generous support:



The **Korea-United States Alliance Foundation** is an organization committed to promoting the ROK-U.S. Alliance and the contribution of the United States Forces Korea to security and peace on the Korean Peninsula. The Foundation exists to financially support the management and operations of the Korea Defense Veterans Association; to strengthen the ROK-U.S. Alliance through programs that facilitate education, discussion and research on the Alliance; and to promote the honor and welfare of both countries' armed forces personnel and their families.



The **Korea Defense Veterans Association's** mission is to enhance the ROK-U.S. Alliance by advocating for the Alliance and supporting the people who built and serve the Alliance. KDVA seeks to enhance, advocate for, and educate about the ROK-U.S. Alliance; recognize and support service members, government civilians, and their families who have or are serving in the ROK-U.S. Alliance; serve its members with professional networking, mentoring, volunteering, and researching opportunities; honor and support the veterans who defended South Korea during the Korean War.



The **United States Embassy Association** is a private, non-government, non-appropriated employee organization, established under the rules of the U.S. Department of State for the benefit of its members. It provides activities, facilities, programs, personal services, and lodging in order to bring a little bit of America and community spirit to the lives of employees assigned abroad.



The **Center for Future Defense Technology and Entrepreneurship** stands at the forefront of the global defense innovation ecosystem. As the only defense innovation hub in South Korea, we aim to advance the global defense innovation ecosystem through events, publications, strategic network partners, and in-house experts and advisors.



The **Sejong Society** is a non-partisan, and all-volunteer tax-exempt organization dedicated to informing, developing, and connecting young professionals interested and engaged in U.S.-Korea affairs. Our ultimate goal is to inspire the next generation, regardless of political and career affiliations, of Korea and Northeast Asia specialists.



# Calendar of Events

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## November 2021

**Wednesday 10th:** Marine Corps Birthday (U.S.)

**Thursday 11th:** Armistice Day, Veterans Day (U.S.)

**Thursday 25th:** Thanksgiving Day (U.S.)

## December 2021

**Monday 13th:** National Guard Birthday (U.S.)

**Friday 24th:** Christmas Eve

**Saturday 25th:** Christmas Day

**Friday 31st:** New Years Eve

## January 2022

**Saturday 1st:** New Years Day

**Monday 31st:** Seollal (Korea)

Background image: A member of the ROK Air Force's High-Altitude Low-Opening Parachute Team rehearses for the 2019 Air Power Day at Osan Air Base, ROK. Credit: Greg Nash/DVIDS

# Distinguished Members

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## Sheena Chestnut Greitens

Dr. Sheena Chestnut Greitens is an Associate Professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. She has been an assistant professor of political science at the University of Missouri and was a founding co-director of MU's Institute for Korean Studies. Her work focuses on East Asia, authoritarian politics, and American national security. She holds a doctorate from Harvard University; an M.Phil from Oxford University, where she studied as a Marshall Scholar; and a bachelor's from Stanford University.



## Derek Grossman

Derek Grossman is a senior defense analyst at RAND focused on a range of national security policy and Indo-Pacific security issues. He served over a decade in the Intelligence Community, where he served as the daily intelligence briefer to the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the assistant secretary of defense for Asian & Pacific Security Affairs. He holds an M.A. from Georgetown University in U.S. National Security Policy and a B.A. from the University of Michigan in Political Science and Asian studies.



## Kongdan "Katy" Oh Hassig

Dr. Kongdan "Katy" Oh Hassig is an independent scholar. She has been a Senior Asia Specialist at the Institute for Defense Analyses, a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, and a member of the Political Science Department of the RAND Corporation. She has taught at the University of California San Diego, George Washington University, and the University of Maryland Global Campus in Asia. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Board of Directors of the U.S. Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, and the Board of Directors of the Korea Economic Institute of America. She was a founding co-director of The Korea Club of Washington, D.C.



## Soo Kim

Soo Kim is a policy analyst at the RAND Corporation and an adjunct instructor at American University. Her research interests include the Korean Peninsula, Russia, Indo-Pacific strategy, near-peer competition, decision making, propaganda, and the intelligence community. She served as an analyst in the Central Intelligence Agency and also worked at the Department of Homeland Security. Kim earned a B.A. in French from Yale University and an M.A. in International Relations/Strategic Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.



## Sung Hyun "Andrew" Kim

Sung Hyun "Andrew" Kim is a Non-Resident Fellow at Harvard's Kennedy School. Prior to this, he was a visiting scholar at Stanford University. Mr. Kim retired from the Central Intelligence Agency after 28 years of service and was the first Assistant Director of the CIA, Korea Mission Center. As the Chief of CIA Station in three major East Asian cities, Mr. Kim managed the collection, analysis, production, and distribution of information that directly affected national security. He is a recipient of the CIA Director's Award and the Presidential Rank Award.



### Heino Klinck



Heino Klinck is a former U.S. Army China FAO who last served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia. His experience includes 2+ decades abroad; leading strategy efforts in a Fortune 100 company; senior political-military roles in the Pentagon; analytical and operational responsibilities in the intelligence community; and diplomatic postings in Europe and Asia. Mr. Klinck has a B.A. and M.A. in International Relations from Boston University; an MBA from the University of London; an M.S. in Global Strategy and Security from the University of Rome; and he was awarded a Fellowship by Stanford University's Asia-Pacific Research Center.

### Mark William Lippert



The Honorable Mark William Lippert has a distinguished career in the United States government that spanned approximately two decades. From 2014-2017, he served as the U.S. ambassador and plenipotentiary to the Republic of Korea. He previously held positions in the Department of Defense, including as chief of staff to Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. He graduated from Stanford University with a B.A. in Political Science and holds an M.A. in International Policy Studies from the same institution.

### Curtis "Mike" Scaparrotti



General (Retired) Curtis "Mike" Scaparrotti led a distinguished, 41-year career in the U.S. Army, and most recently served as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Commander of U.S. European Command. Prior to this, he served as the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea/United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command. GEN(R) Scaparrotti graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, and his education includes the Command and General Staff College, the U.S. Army War College, and a Master's degree in Administrative Education from the University of South Carolina.

### Suzanne Vares-Lum



Major General (Retired) Suzanne Vares-Lum served 34 years in the U.S. Army. She is an influential executive with leadership and planning experience spanning the Indo-Pacific region, violent extremist organizations, and natural disasters. She most recently served for five years as one of the most senior leaders in U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and now serves as a strategic consultant and advisor. Vares-Lum received a B.A. in Journalism and an M.Ed. in Teaching from the University of Hawaii at Manoa, and a Master's degree in Strategid Studies from the U.S. Army War College.

### Major General Mark Gillette, Honorary Member

Mark Gillette is a U.S. Army major general and the Senior Army Foreign Area Officer. He has extensive experience from various political-military assignments throughout Asia. MG Gillette holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the U.S. Military Academy, a Master of Social Science from Syracuse University, and a Master of Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College. He is currently assigned as the U.S. Senior Defense Official and Defense Attaché in Cairo, Egypt.

MG Gillette advised and supported the initiatives of the co-founders of the FAOA Korea Chapter—both leading up to the organization's establishment and during its formative period. He continues to play an active role in the events and activities of the FAOA Korea Chapter today and is a key advocate for the development of its membership. In recognition of his significant contribution toward accomplishing the mission of the FAOA Korea Chapter, MG Gillette was presented Honorary Membership on July 23, 2020.





# Board Members

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## **Wei C. Chou, *President***

Wei C. Chou is a U.S. Army Northeast Asia FAO. He holds a Bachelors of Science degree from the United States Military Academy and a Master of Arts degree from the University of Hawaii as an East-West Fellow. After eight years as an airborne and mechanized infantryman, Wei served across a range of FAO capacities in Hawaii, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.

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## **Chris Hobgood, *Vice President***

Chris Hobgood is a U.S. Army Northeast Asia FAO. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree from Lander University; a Master of Science degree from Webster University; and a Master of Arts degree from Middlebury Institute of International Studies. Chris has over 22 years of service and worked in a variety of FAO assignments by advising senior military and civilian leaders with regional expertise on the Indo Pacific region as a Security Cooperation officer, a political-military officer, and Senior Defense Official / Defense Attaché.

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## **Raphael Sadowitz, *Treasurer***

Raphael Sadowitz is an active-duty Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Coast Guard currently serving as the Coast Guard Liaison at the U.S. Embassy Seoul. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the U.S. Coast Guard Academy and a Master of Science degree from Boise State University.

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## **Josh Duran, *Secretary***

Josh "Duran" Duran is an active-duty Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the U.S. Naval Academy. After serving eight years as a Naval Intelligence Officer, he has served two additional tours in the Republic of Korea as an FAO.

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## **Adrian Romero, *Chief of Public Relations***

Adrian Romero is an active duty Warrant Officer in the U.S. Army. He holds an A.A. degree in Applied Science and is currently pursuing an M.B.A. He has over ten years of work experience in the Indo-Pacific region.

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# Staff Members

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## **Editor in Chief**

Mitch Shin is a Chief Korea Correspondent at The Diplomat, where he covers national security and foreign affairs of the two Koreas. He had worked as a news reporter at Asia Times before joining the team.

## **Managing Editor**

Emily Stamp holds an undergraduate M.A. from the University of St. Andrews, Scotland and an M.A. in International Conflict Studies from King's College London, England.

## **Assistant Editor**

Gabriela Bernal is a PhD candidate at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul. She is also a freelance writer, with her articles having appeared in various publications. She holds two MAs, one in human rights from Sciences Po Paris and one in international peace and security from King's College London.

## **Copy Editor**

Apoorva Jayakumar is a Masters student pursuing a Global Economy and Strategy major at Yonsei Graduate School of International Studies. She enjoys reading and writing about Indo-Pacific strategy & policy.

## **Research Intern**

Salome Giunashvili is a Master's degree candidate in International Studies from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. She holds a Bachelor's degree in International Relations from Tbilisi State University. Her research interests span across several different areas involving international security, hybrid warfare and alliance politics.

## **Senior Researcher**

Amos Oh is a U.S. Army Strategist with extensive policy and planning experience. He is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and also earned an M.P.A. from the Harvard Kennedy School. He is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations at the University of Southern California.

## **Associate Researcher**

Sean McCauley is an instructor based in South Korea. He is a political science graduate of the University of Alberta with a special focus on international relations; and he has extensive background in political advocacy in Canada.

## **Associate Graphics Designer & Social Media Assistant**

Sara La Cagnina is a Communications Coordinator who graduated with an M.A. in International Tourism from the Università Della Svizzera Italiana. She has extensive experience with digital communication and event coordination.

## **Research Intern**

Hyun Jin (Emmy) Nam is a recent graduate from Yonsei University with a Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies from Yonsei University. She has internship experience in the Internal Political Unit of the US Embassy in the Republic of Korea, and was awarded second place in the ASEAN-Korea Academic Essay Competition.

# About the Korea Chapter

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The FAOA Korea Chapter was founded in July 2020 in accordance with Article VII of the FAOA Charter. It is a 501(c)19 non-profit organization, consisting primarily of current and former Foreign Area Officers and International Affairs Specialists who advance the Republic of Korea-United States (ROK-U.S.) Alliance through events and activities that promote mentorship, education, research, and connection.


## Our Mission

To develop and inspire leaders engaged in the advancement of the ROK-U.S. Alliance.

## Our Core Values

- Commitment to Leader Development
- Pursuit of Inspiration

## Lines of Effort



# CALL FOR ARTICLES

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Contribute to the journal of the FAOA Korea Chapter,  
*The Joint Communiqué*,  
for the 1<sup>st</sup> quarter of 2022.



Deadline for submissions: January 28, 2022  
Contact: [editor.faoakc@gmail.com](mailto:editor.faoakc@gmail.com)





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